People vs. Hernandez

The Court held that the crime of arson is consummated once the fire is actually set to the property and any part thereof is burned, regardless of whether the fire is subsequently extinguished or causes only slight damage. The governing principle is that consummation depends on the fact of initial burning, not on the magnitude of destruction or the successful completion of the intended damage.

On February 3, 1929, Miguel Dayrit resided with his children in a nipa house located in the barrio of Duque, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Prior to the incident, Dayrit suspected the appellant of stealing his stored paddy. Dayrit reported the suspicion to the barrio lieutenant, and the two confronted the appellant, who threatened them with a bolo and declared he recognized no authority. The appellant subsequently resisted arrest with similar violence. On the night of the incident, past midnight, the appellant approached Dayrit’s house with a stick fitted with a petroleum-soaked rag, ignited the thatched roof, and fled when Dayrit raised the alarm.

• On the night of February 3, 1929, past midnight, Miguel Dayrit retired to his nipa house in Mabalacat, Pampanga, where he lived with his children.
• Dayrit awoke to find the thatched roof of his house on fire and observed the appellant standing beside the dwelling holding a stick.
• Dayrit shouted for help and attempted to extinguish the flames, successfully containing the fire after a small portion of the roof had burned.
• Responding to the alarm, Artemio Tanglao arrived at the scene and observed the appellant fleeing, while Daniel Mallari encountered the appellant en route to the house.
• The stick carried by the appellant was recovered leaning against the house with a burnt end and a petroleum-soaked rag, which Mallari identified as the appellant’s fruit-gathering stick.
• The appellant was aware that Dayrit and his children occupied the house at the time of the incident.
• Prior to the fire, the appellant and Dayrit had engaged in a hostile confrontation when Dayrit accused him of stealing paddy; the appellant brandished a bolo and threatened violence, later resisting arrest with similar force.

• Appellant maintained that the crime committed constituted only frustrated arson, arguing that the fire was extinguished before substantial damage occurred and that the intended destruction was not fully realized.
• Appellant implicitly contested the severity of the penalty imposed, relying on the limited extent of the burning and the subsequent extinguishment of the fire to support a lesser classification and sentence.

• The Attorney-General argued that the crime was consummated arson, contending that the actual ignition and partial burning of the roof satisfied the elements of consummation regardless of the fire’s subsequent extinguishment.
• The prosecution emphasized that the appellant acted with knowledge that the dwelling was occupied, set the fire at night to ensure success, and exhibited prior motive and violent conduct, warranting the maximum penalty under the applicable penal provision.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the trial court erred in classifying the offense as frustrated arson instead of consummated arson.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the crime of arson is consummated upon the actual burning of any part of the structure, notwithstanding the subsequent extinguishment of the fire and the minimal extent of the damage.

• Procedural: The Court modified the trial court’s judgment, reclassifying the offense from frustrated arson to consummated arson, and accordingly adjusted the penalty to life imprisonment.
• Substantive: The Court ruled that arson is consummated once the fire is set to the property and any part thereof is actually burned. The extent of the damage or the subsequent extinguishment of the fire does not negate consummation, as the crime is complete upon ignition and initial burning. Applying Article 549 of the Penal Code, the Court found the appellant guilty of consummated arson in a dwelling known to be occupied. The presence of the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, which the appellant utilized to facilitate the commission of the crime, justified the imposition of the penalty in its maximum degree.

• Doctrine of Consummation in Arson — The crime of arson is consummated the moment the fire is actually set to the structure and any material part thereof begins to burn. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the appellant’s act of igniting the roof and causing partial burning completed the felony, rendering the subsequent extinguishment irrelevant to the stage of execution. Consummation in arson depends on the fact of burning, not on the magnitude of destruction.

• "Once the fire has been started, the consummation of the crime of arson does not depend upon the extent of the damage cause[d]." — This passage establishes the controlling rule that arson reaches consummation upon actual ignition and burning of any part of the property, irrespective of whether the fire is later controlled or causes only minimal damage.

• United States v. Go Foo Suy and Go Jancho, 25 Phil. 187 — Cited as controlling precedent establishing that arson is consummated upon the actual setting of fire to the property, regardless of the extent of the resulting damage.
• United States v. Po Chengco, 23 Phil. 487 — Followed to reinforce the principle that the consummation of arson does not require total destruction or substantial burning; partial burning suffices to complete the felony.

• Article 549 of the Penal Code — The substantive provision penalizing arson committed in a dwelling known to be occupied, prescribing the penalty of cadena temporal to life imprisonment. The Court applied this article to determine the appropriate penalty for the consummated offense.
• Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Penal Code — Cited to authorize the recommendation for executive clemency. The Court invoked this provision to forward the decision to the Governor-General for consideration of leniency, given the appellant’s advanced age and the slight damage caused.

• Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ. — Concurred in the en banc decision without separate opinions, affirming the majority’s application of the consummation doctrine, the imposition of the maximum penalty, and the recommendation for executive clemency.