People vs. Gutierrez

Self-defense cannot be successfully pleaded where the accused fails to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, and where the accused's uncorroborated testimony is less credible than the prosecution's evidence; treachery qualifies the killing to murder when the attack is sudden and unexpected, depriving the victims of any opportunity to defend themselves.

Ford Gutierrez y Dimaano was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62, with five separate Informations arising from a single shooting incident on May 17, 2003 in Cembo, Makati City. The victims — Leo Salvador Regis (who died), Alexis Dalit (who was wounded), Jaypee Boneo, Randy Marcelo, and Jefferson Gallemit — were gathered in front of Regis's house when the appellant approached and opened fire. The case required resolution of the appellant's affirmative defense of self-defense, the proper appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the distinction between frustrated and attempted murder, and the proper award of damages under prevailing jurisprudence.

On May 17, 2003, at around nine o'clock in the evening, Leo Salvador Regis, Randy Marcelo, Jefferson Gallemit, Jaypee Boneo, and Alexis Dalit were conversing in front of Regis's house at 477 Narra Street, Cembo, Makati City. They noticed appellant Ford Gutierrez y Dimaano walking along the street and assumed he would simply pass by. When appellant was about two arms' lengths away from the group, he suddenly raised his arm and shot Regis in the chest with a .45 caliber pistol. Regis exclaimed "Aray!," embraced Marcelo who was seated to his left, and fell to the ground. Gallemit, Boneo, and Dalit stood from their seats, whereupon appellant fired several more shots, one of which struck Dalit's arm. Boneo and Gallemit ran up the street while Dalit fled in the opposite direction and hid behind a car. Regis and Marcelo remained huddled at the spot where Regis fell. Appellant stayed at the same position from which he fired the first shot even after the three fled, then pursued Dalit down the street but failed to catch him, shouting, "Pagnaabutan ko kayo, pagpapatayin ko kayo!" Dalit sought refuge at BLISS Makati and contacted the police. The police arrived approximately twenty minutes later. Dalit was taken to Ospital ng Makati for initial treatment and later operated on at the Philippine Orthopedic Hospital. Regis was brought to Ospital ng Makati by Marcelo, where he died that same night.

Appellant presented a markedly different account. He testified that at around eight o'clock that evening, he went to an ihaw-ihaw restaurant with a live band in Guadalupe to relax, consumed two bottles of beer, and then took a jeepney ride home, alighting in front of a bakery owned by Barangay Captain Leo Magbantay, about 120 meters from his house. While walking, he noticed a group of five youngsters on the right side of the street, among whom he recognized only Jaypee Boneo, whom he had babysat when the latter was young. One member of the group cursed him and shouted "tang ina mo!" He stopped and looked at them, and two from the group approached. According to appellant, Regis boxed him while Dalit stood beside Regis; when he fell to the ground, Regis continuously beat him, and a gun fell from Regis's person. Appellant grabbed the gun, and when Regis was about to attack again, he kicked Regis, causing Regis to fall. When appellant stood up and saw Regis rising, he fired a shot at him, then continued firing the gun directed toward the ground to warn the others. He thereafter fled, threw the gun on a vacant lot, and, confused and without money, took a jeepney to Pateros, then eventually went to Cubao to borrow money from a retailer.

The trial court found the prosecution's version more credible and rejected appellant's claim of self-defense, convicting him of murder, frustrated murder, and three counts of attempted murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications, reducing the frustrated murder conviction to attempted murder as to Dalit and adjusting the damages awards. Appellant elevated the case to the Supreme Court, maintaining that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and reiterating his claim of self-defense.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant argued that the trial court and the CA erred in giving weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, which he characterized as contradictory.
• Self-Defense: Appellant admitted killing Regis and wounding Dalit but insisted he acted in self-defense, claiming the victims had initiated the aggression by boxing and beating him and that a gun had fallen from Regis's person during the struggle.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The OSG, on behalf of the People, argued that the trial court correctly gave credence to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies and properly rejected appellant's claim of self-defense.
• Modification of Conviction for Dalit: The OSG asserted that while appellant's guilt for murder and three counts of attempted murder was proven beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction for frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 03-3640 should be reduced to attempted murder because the wound inflicted on Dalit was not life-threatening.
• Modification of Damages: The OSG prayed for modification of the actual damages awarded and for the grant of moral and exemplary damages to the heirs of Regis.

• Self-Defense: Whether appellant's claim of self-defense should be sustained, thereby exculpating him from criminal liability.
• Treachery: Whether treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance to elevate the killing to murder.
• Frustrated vs. Attempted Murder: Whether the conviction for frustrated murder as to Dalit should be reduced to attempted murder.
• Damages: Whether the awards of damages by the CA were proper, including the simultaneous award of actual and temperate damages.

• Self-Defense: No. Appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; his uncorroborated testimony was less credible than the unanimous prosecution account of a sudden, unprovoked attack.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was properly appreciated because the attack was sudden and unexpected, depriving the unsuspecting victims of any real opportunity to defend themselves.
• Frustrated vs. Attempted Murder: Yes, the reduction was proper. No convincing proof was offered that the wound inflicted on Dalit was fatal or would have caused his death absent medical intervention; accordingly, the crime is only attempted murder.
• Damages: Partially modified. The award of temperate damages was deleted for being mutually exclusive with actual damages; exemplary damages to Regis's heirs were increased to P30,000.00; moral damages of P40,000.00 and exemplary damages of P20,000.00 were awarded to Dalit.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that requires the accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The burden of evidence shifts to the accused, who must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. Unlawful aggression is the primordial element; without it, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. Appellant's version of events was uncorroborated and found less credible by the trial court, which had the best opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor. The surviving victims were unanimous that appellant suddenly fired at them without provocation. None of the recognized exceptions to the rule deferring to the trial court's credibility assessment obtained. Accordingly, the rejection of self-defense was sustained.

• Treachery: The essence of treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack on unsuspecting victims, depriving them of any real chance to defend themselves and ensuring the commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims. The evidence established that the attack was sudden and unexpected, as testified to by the prosecution witnesses. Provocation by the victims was not proven, and appellant's testimony that the victims were about to attack him could not be credited. The victims had no inkling of the impending attack and no opportunity to mount a defense. Treachery was therefore correctly appreciated to qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Frustrated vs. Attempted Murder: A conviction for frustrated murder requires proof that the wound inflicted was fatal and would have caused the victim's death had medical intervention not been provided. No convincing proof was offered to show that the wound on Dalit's arm was life-threatening. Where the wounds inflicted are not sufficient to cause death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the victim's death. The CA's reduction of the conviction from frustrated murder to attempted murder was therefore sustained. The penalty for attempted murder is two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Article 51 of the RPC, yielding prision mayor as the imposable penalty; applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum falls within prision correccional and the maximum within prision mayor in its medium period, resulting in the indeterminate sentence of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum.

• Damages: When death results from a crime, the heirs may recover civil indemnity ex delicto, actual or compensatory damages, moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and interest in proper cases. The CA's award of P42,337.25 as actual damages to Regis's heirs was sustained. However, temperate and actual damages are mutually exclusive and may not be awarded simultaneously; since actual damages were granted, the P10,000.00 temperate damages award was deleted. The grant of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity was sustained, as it requires no proof other than the fact of death and the accused's responsibility. The grant of P50,000.00 as moral damages was sustained, as moral damages are awarded in view of the violent death of the victim without need for allegation or proof of emotional suffering. Exemplary damages were warranted because the commission of the offense was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and the award was increased to P30,000.00. As to Dalit, the award of P22,596.50 as actual damages was affirmed; moral damages of P40,000.00 were awarded, as the wounds would naturally cause physical suffering, fright, serious anxiety, and moral shock; and exemplary damages of P20,000.00 were awarded in light of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

• Elements of Self-Defense — Self-defense requires (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. All three elements must concur, but unlawful aggression is the primordial element; without it, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded. One who admits killing or injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving the elements clearly and convincingly, and must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution. The Court applied this doctrine to reject appellant's uncorroborated self-defense claim.

• Treachery as a Qualifying Circumstance — The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack on unsuspecting victims, depriving them of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring the commission without risk to the aggressor and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims. The Court found that the sudden, unprovoked shooting satisfied this definition and properly qualified the killing of Regis as murder under Article 248 of the RPC.

• Distinction Between Frustrated and Attempted Murder — Where the wounds inflicted on the victim are not sufficient to cause death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the victim's death. Frustrated murder requires proof that the wound was fatal and would have caused death absent medical intervention. The Court applied this principle to reduce the conviction for frustrated murder to attempted murder as to Dalit, whose arm wound was not shown to be life-threatening.

• Mutual Exclusivity of Actual and Temperate Damages — Temperate and actual damages are mutually exclusive and may not be awarded simultaneously; where actual damages have been granted, no temperate damages may be awarded. The Court applied this rule to delete the CA's P10,000.00 temperate damages award to Regis's heirs.

• Civil Indemnity and Moral Damages in Murder — Civil indemnity ex delicto, fixed at P50,000.00, requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accused's responsibility. Moral damages are awarded in view of the violent death of the victim, without need for any allegation or proof of the emotional sufferings of the heirs. The Court sustained both awards to Regis's heirs.

• Exemplary Damages When Aggravating Circumstance Attends — Exemplary damages are warranted when the commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. The Court sustained and increased the exemplary damages award to Regis's heirs to P30,000.00 and awarded P20,000.00 to Dalit, in both cases because treachery attended the commission of the offenses.

• "One who admits killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense. By invoking self-defense, the burden is placed on the accused to prove its elements clearly and convincingly. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the elements and burden of proof in self-defense, emphasizing unlawful aggression as the indispensable primordial element.

• "Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution." — This passage states the rule on the burden of evidence shifting to the accused in self-defense claims, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor on unsuspecting victims, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend themselves, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victims." — This passage defines treachery in its standard formulation, applied to qualify the killing to murder.

• "It is well settled that where the wounds inflicted on the victim are not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused had not performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about the victim's death." — This passage states the controlling rule distinguishing attempted from frustrated murder based on the sufficiency of the wounds to cause death.

• People of the Philippines vs. Bienvenido Mara y Bolaqueña, G.R. No. 184050, May 8, 2009 — Followed for the formulation of the elements of self-defense and the primacy of unlawful aggression, and for the definition of treachery.
• Razon vs. People, G.R. No. 158053, June 21, 2007 — Followed for the rule that self-defense cannot be appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, and that the burden of evidence shifts to the accused.
• People vs. Ronas, G.R. Nos. 128088 & 146639, January 31, 2001 — Followed for the rule that where wounds are not sufficient to cause death, the crime is only attempted murder.
• People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 139177, August 11, 2003 — Followed for the rule that temperate and actual damages are mutually exclusive.
• People vs. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, February 7, 2003 — Followed alongside Villanueva for the mutual exclusivity of temperate and actual damages.
• People vs. Goleas, G.R. No. 181467, August 6, 2008 — Followed for the rule that civil indemnity of P50,000.00 requires no proof other than the fact of death and the accused's responsibility.
• People vs. Balais, G.R. No. 173242, September 17, 2008 — Followed for the rule that moral damages are awarded in view of the violent death of the victim without need for proof of emotional suffering, and that exemplary damages are warranted when an aggravating circumstance attends the offense.
• People vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. 176385, February 26, 2008 — Followed for the enumeration of damages recoverable when death occurs due to a crime and for the award of exemplary damages.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder, including when committed with treachery, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Applied to qualify the killing of Regis as murder.
• Article 63, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Applied to impose reclusion perpetua for murder, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
• Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for attempted felony is two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Applied to determine the imposable penalty of prision mayor for attempted murder.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence for attempted murder: prision correccional as minimum to prision mayor in its medium period as maximum.

Carpio, Corona (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., and Peralta, JJ., concurred. Justice Carpio sat as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza per Special Order No. 818 dated January 18, 2010.