People vs. Gutierrez

In a prosecution for rape, the sufficiency of the Information is determined by the actual recital of facts constituting the offense, not by the caption, preamble, or the specific statutory provision cited; and where the offender is a close relative of the victim, moral ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation, such that physical resistance need not be proved.

Complainant Gina Alcantara y Velasquez is the niece of appellant Bernabe Gutierrez y Gutierrez; her grandmother is the sister of appellant's mother, Francisca Gutierrez. Complainant and her sister, Matet, resided in appellant's house in Barangay Salaan, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, where they cared for appellant's bedridden mother. The Informations charged appellant under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for three separate incidents of rape allegedly committed on July 24, 1999, July 30, 1999, and August 12, 1999. At the time the Informations were filed, Article 335 had already been repealed and superseded by Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which reclassified rape as a crime against persons under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.

Complainant Gina Alcantara and her sister Matet worked in the house of their uncle, appellant Bernabe Gutierrez, in Barangay Salaan, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, where they took care of appellant's bedridden mother, Francisca Gutierrez. On July 24, 1999, at approximately 3:00 p.m., appellant sent Matet to buy medicine in Dagupan City. After Matet left, appellant dragged complainant to his room, pointed a knife at her, and ordered her to remove her shorts and panties. She pleaded with him to stop, but he ignored her. He removed his own shorts and briefs, made her lie on the bed, lay on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. After the sexual intercourse, appellant threatened to kill complainant and her family if she told anyone what had happened.

On July 30, 1999, at around 5:00 p.m., complainant was in the kitchen preparing a meal for appellant's mother. Again, appellant pulled her into his room, pointed a knife at her, and ordered her to undress. Overwhelmed with fear, she acceded to his demands. He removed his shorts and briefs and had sexual intercourse with her on the bed. As in the previous incident, he threatened to kill her and her family if she disclosed what had occurred.

In the afternoon of August 12, 1999, complainant was at her own house in Barangay Salay, Mangaldan, attending a prayer for the death anniversary of her deceased mother. At 4:30 p.m., Matet, who was at appellant's house, sent word that appellant was very angry at complainant. Complainant arrived at appellant's house at 5:00 p.m. to relieve Matet. After Matet left at 6:00 p.m., appellant pulled complainant inside his room, forced her to take off her clothes while pointing a knife at her, pushed her to the bed, and raped her. On August 15, 1999, appellant again attempted to sexually molest complainant, but she was able to run to the room of his mother before he could draw his knife. That same day, appellant's brother, Boyet, arrived from Hawaii and stayed for four days. Before Boyet left for Manila on August 19, 1999, complainant told him what appellant had done to her. Boyet took complainant to the house of her sister, Brenda, in Pasay City. On August 23, 1999, complainant, accompanied by her aunt, Beatriz Saclao, went to the police in Mangaldan and filed formal complaints for rape. Upon police advice, complainant underwent a physical examination.

Dr. Revelina A. Millan, Medical Officer III of Region I Medical Center, conducted the examination and found hymenal lacerations at the 3 o'clock, 5 o'clock, and 7 o'clock positions, with the introitus admitting two fingers with ease. The vaginal smear tested negative for spermatozoa, and no abrasions or hematomas were found on complainant's skin. Appellant denied the charges and alleged that all his sexual encounters with complainant were consensual. He presented the testimonies of his two nieces, Irene and Daisy Gutierrez, who testified that complainant appeared happy and acted sweet toward appellant, and that they had observed complainant place her leg on top of appellant's legs while they slept. The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of consummated rape, crediting complainant's testimony and finding the medico-legal findings consistent with her account.

• Validity of the Informations: Appellant contended that the three Informations were invalid for failing to substantially conform to the prescribed form, particularly as to the designation of the offense by statute, because they cited Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which had already been repealed by Republic Act No. 8353 at the time of filing.
• Sufficiency of the Decision: Appellant asserted that the trial court's decision failed to comply with the constitutional mandate that a judgment of conviction must state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
• Insufficiency of Force or Intimidation: Appellant argued that complainant neither resisted nor shouted for help despite the proximity of her grandmother's room, and that no physical injuries were found on her body to demonstrate force or intimidation.
• Unnatural Behavior of Complainant: Appellant assailed complainant's behavior after the alleged rapes as unnatural and uncommon, implying that her conduct was inconsistent with having been sexually assaulted.
• Hymenal Lacerations: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in concluding that hymenal lacerations were consistent and conclusive with complainant's allegations of rape, noting that no testimony to that effect was given by the medico-legal officer.
• Inefficiency of Counsel: Appellant argued that he was deprived of the opportunity to present his evidence and refute the prosecution's case due to the negligence of his former counsel, who prematurely terminated his direct examination after asking only a few irrelevant questions.

• Sufficiency of the Informations: Whether the Informations were valid despite citing Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, which had been repealed by Republic Act No. 8353 at the time of filing.
• Sufficiency of the Trial Court's Decision: Whether the trial court's decision failed to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it was based, in violation of the constitutional mandate.
• Sufficiency of Intimidation: Whether the prosecution established that the degree of threat, force, or intimidation was sufficient to compel complainant to submit to appellant, notwithstanding the absence of physical resistance and physical injuries.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for three counts of rape.
• Delay in Reporting: Whether complainant's failure to immediately report the rape diminished her credibility.
• Medico-Legal Evidence: Whether the hymenal lacerations found on complainant were consistent and conclusive with her allegations of rape, and whether medical evidence was essential to the prosecution.
• Negligence of Counsel: Whether appellant was deprived of effective assistance of counsel due to his former counsel's premature termination of direct examination.

• Sufficiency of the Informations: Yes. The Informations were sufficient because the designation of the offense as "rape" was clearly indicated in both the caption and preamble, and the real nature of the charge is determined by the actual recital of facts, not by the statutory provision cited.
• Sufficiency of the Trial Court's Decision: No. The decision sufficiently set forth in detail the facts alleged by both parties and laid down the applicable law and jurisprudence on which the trial court based its conviction.
• Sufficiency of Intimidation: Yes. Intimidation was sufficiently established by appellant's use of a knife during each incident and by his moral ascendancy as complainant's uncle, which takes the place of violence and intimidation in rape committed by a close kin.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. Complainant remained steadfast in her testimony despite rigorous cross-examination, and her credibility was affirmed by the trial court, whose findings on witness credibility are binding and conclusive on appellate courts absent any overlooked or misapprehended fact.
• Delay in Reporting: No, the delay did not diminish credibility. The silence of a rape victim does not prove that her charge is baseless, and the delay in this case was sufficiently explained by appellant's death threats.
• Medico-Legal Evidence: No error. The medical examination and certificate are merely corroborative and not essential elements of rape; the material fact to be considered is the occurrence of the rape itself.
• Negligence of Counsel: No relief. A client is bound by the conduct, negligence, and mistakes of counsel in handling the case and cannot complain that the result might have been different had counsel proceeded differently.

• Sufficiency of the Informations: Under Rule 110, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a complaint or information need only state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts constituting the offense, and specify qualifying and aggravating circumstances. Where no specific name is given to the offense, reference to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it suffices. Here, the designation "rape" was clearly indicated in the caption and preamble of each Information. Moreover, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption, preamble, or specification of the law violated—these being mere conclusions of law—but from the actual recital of facts in the Information. The accused must look to the facts alleged, not the technical name of the crime, for the protection of his substantial rights and the effective preparation of his defense.

• Sufficiency of the Trial Court's Decision: Contrary to appellant's bare allegation, the decision was found to have sufficiently set forth in detail the facts alleged by both parties and to have laid down the applicable law and jurisprudence on which the trial court based its judgment of conviction, as well as the penalty and civil liability imposed. The constitutional requirement was therefore satisfied.

• Sufficiency of Intimidation: Physical resistance need not be proved in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. It suffices that the intimidation produces fear in the victim's mind that if she does not submit, something worse would befall her. Appellant pointed a knife at complainant during each incident, and threatening a victim with bodily injury while holding a knife constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring a woman to submission. The absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate rape. Furthermore, appellant was complainant's uncle who exercised moral ascendancy over her, and in rape committed by a close kin, moral ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Complainant remained steadfast in her testimony that appellant raped her on three occasions despite rigorous cross-examination, and she cried during her testimony when she could no longer control her emotions, indicating truthfulness. A blanket denial and assertion that the encounters were consensual cannot overturn these facts. No woman in her right mind would fabricate a story of bestiality against her own relative that could sully her reputation and expose herself and her family to public aspersions if she were not motivated to seek justice. The assessment of witness credibility is best undertaken by the trial court, whose findings are binding and conclusive on appellate courts unless facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted.

• Delay in Reporting: The silence of a rape victim or her failure to disclose the assault to the authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal the assault on their virtues because of the rapist's threats on their lives, more so when the offender is someone known to and living with the victim. The delay in this case was sufficiently explained by appellant's repeated death threats and thus did not destroy complainant's credibility.

• Medico-Legal Evidence: In a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the rape itself. The medical examination of the victim and the medical certificate are merely corroborative in character and are not essential elements of rape. Appellant's argument that no testimony linked the hymenal lacerations to the rape therefore deserved scant consideration.

• Negligence of Counsel: It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case. The client cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. Appellant's claim of deprivation due to his former counsel's premature termination of direct examination therefore afforded no ground for relief.

• Nature of the charge determined by facts, not caption — The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information, nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, as these are mere conclusions of law. Rather, the nature of the accusation is determined by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. Applied here to hold that the Informations were valid despite citing a repealed statutory provision, because the facts alleged clearly described rape.

• Moral ascendancy substitutes for violence in rape by close kin — In rape committed by a close relative, the moral ascendancy exercised by the offender over the victim takes the place of violence and intimidation. Applied here where appellant was complainant's uncle residing in the same household, such that physical resistance was not required to establish the crime.

• Intimidation by deadly weapon suffices for rape — Physical resistance need not be proved when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. Threatening the victim with bodily injury while holding a knife or bolo constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring a woman to submission. The absence of external signs or physical injuries does not negate rape.

• Medical evidence is merely corroborative in rape — The medical examination of the victim and the medical certificate are merely corroborative in character and are not essential elements of rape. The material fact to be considered is the occurrence of the rape itself.

• Delay in reporting rape explained by threats does not impair credibility — The silence of a rape victim or her failure to disclose the assault to the authorities without loss of material time does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal the assault because of the rapist's threats, more so when the offender is someone known to and living with the victim.

• Client bound by counsel's negligence — The client is bound by counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case and cannot complain that the result might have been different had counsel proceeded differently.

• Exemplary damages require an aggravating circumstance — Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded only where an aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense. Applied here to delete the trial court's award of exemplary damages because no aggravating circumstance was found.

• "Physical resistance need not be proved in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself, against her will, to the rapist's advances because of fear for her life and personal safety." — This passage articulates the controlling standard for establishing intimidation in rape where the victim does not physically resist, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent rape jurisprudence.

• "It is a settled rule that in rape committed by a close kin, moral ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation." — This statement defines the doctrine that a close relative's moral ascendancy over the victim substitutes for the elements of violence and intimidation, eliminating the need to prove physical resistance.

• "The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information, nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, as these are mere conclusions of law. Rather, the nature of the accusation is determined by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the sufficiency of the Informations, establishing that the factual allegations—not the statutory citation—control the nature of the charge.

• People vs. Bernas, G.R. Nos. 133583-85, 20 February 2002 — Cited for the proposition that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the Information, not by the caption, preamble, or statutory provision cited.
• People vs. Sadiosa, 352 Phil 700, 708 [1998] — Cited for the rule that the accused need not be informed of the technical name of the crime but must look to the facts alleged.
• People vs. Llanto, G.R. No. 146458, 20 January 2003 — Cited for the principle that physical resistance need not be proved in rape when intimidation produces fear in the victim's mind.
• People vs. Austria, G.R. No. 123539, 27 July 2000 — Cited for the rule that threatening the victim with bodily injury while holding a knife constitutes intimidation sufficient to bring a woman to submission.
• People vs. Quiamco, 335 Phil 988, 1000-1001 [1997] — Cited for the proposition that the absence of external signs or physical injuries on the victim does not negate the commission of rape.
• People vs. Musa, G.R. No. 143703, 23 November 2001 — Cited for the doctrine that in rape committed by a close kin, moral ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.
• People vs. Daramay, G.R. Nos. 140235 & 142748, 9 May 2002 — Cited for the principle that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is binding and conclusive on appellate courts unless facts of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted.
• People vs. Bertulfo, G.R. No. 143790, 7 May 2002 — Cited for the rule that the silence of a rape victim or her failure to immediately report the assault does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated.
• People vs. Supnad, G.R. Nos. 133791-94, 8 August 2001 — Cited for the observation that it is not uncommon for young girls to conceal the assault on their virtues because of the rapist's threats, more so when the offender is known to and living with the victim.
• People vs. Espejon, G.R. No. 134767, 20 February 2002 — Cited for the principle that in a prosecution for rape, the material fact to be considered is the occurrence of the rape itself.
• People vs. Velasquez, G.R. Nos. 142561-62, 15 February 2002 — Cited for the rule that the medical examination and medical certificate are merely corroborative and not essential elements of rape.
• People vs. Kawasa, 327 Phil 928, 933 [1996] — Cited for the well-settled rule that the client is bound by counsel's conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case.
• People vs. Yonto, G.R. Nos. 148917-18, 21 November 2002 — Cited on the penalty for rape committed with a deadly weapon under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and the application of Article 63 for imposing the lesser penalty where neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present.

• Rule 110, Section 6, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Sets forth the requisites of a sufficient complaint or information: the name of the accused, the designation of the offense, the acts or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date, and the place of commission. Applied to determine that the Informations were sufficient.
• Rule 110, Section 8, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that the complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify qualifying and aggravating circumstances; if there is no designation, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. Applied to hold that the designation "rape" sufficed.
• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon as reclusion perpetua to death. Applied to determine the proper penalty range.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides that where the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Applied to justify imposing reclusion perpetua rather than death.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Provides that exemplary damages may be awarded only where an aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense. Applied to delete the award of exemplary damages for lack of an aggravating circumstance.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.