People vs. Gungab

A plea of guilty entered by an uneducated accused does not constitute an intelligent admission of aggravating circumstances described in technical legal terms in the information; the plea is limited to the admission of the crime itself, and aggravating circumstances must be independently proven. Where four or more mitigating circumstances are present with no aggravating circumstances, and the prescribed penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death) such that Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code is silent on the proper reduction, recourse must be had to the Chief Executive under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code.

Pedro Gungab, an illiterate who did not know how to read or write, was charged with parricide for the killing of his wife, with the information alleging the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. The Revised Penal Code, Article 246, prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for parricide, while Article 63 governs the application of indivisible penalties and Article 64 governs the application of penalties composed of three periods. Article 5 authorizes the Supreme Court to refer matters to the Chief Executive when strict enforcement of the Code would result in a clearly excessive penalty.

Pedro Gungab and his wife were married canonically by agreement of their respective elders approximately eight months before the commission of the crime, without any prior courtship between them. Prior to the fatal incident, Gungab had caught his wife in sexual intercourse with another man on two occasions, the second occurring two days before the killing. Upon the first discovery, he threatened to hack her with a bolo if she should again be unfaithful, and she promised never to repeat the act. Notwithstanding her promise, his wife again had illicit intercourse with the same man at a later date.

On November 9, 1936, Gungab requested his wife to cook rice for him. Before returning home at about four o'clock in the afternoon, he drank one-half frasco full of wine without having taken any solid food. Upon arriving at his house, he did not find his wife and suspected she had gone to the house of her paramour. He waited for her, and she arrived two hours later. As he repeatedly asked her where she had come from and she refused to answer, he lost his temper and, without knowing what he was doing, hacked his wife with his bolo. He was not in the habit of drinking wine and did not know how to read or write.

When the case was called for trial on January 22, 1937, Gungab pleaded not guilty and was granted time to prepare his defense. When the case was again called on January 27, 1937, he asked permission to withdraw his plea of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty, which was granted after the court informed him of the consequences and he ratified the plea. He then asked and was granted permission to prove mitigating circumstances in his favor, and testified to the facts narrated above. The trial court, together with the prosecution attorney, appreciated the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation merely because the accused had pleaded guilty to the crime of parricide as charged in the information.

• Sole Assignment of Error: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with accessory penalties, indemnity of ₱1,000, and costs.

• Scope of Guilty Plea: Whether a plea of guilty by an illiterate accused to an information charging parricide with aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation constitutes an admission of those aggravating circumstances.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua is proper where four mitigating circumstances are present with no aggravating circumstances, and the prescribed penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties.

• Scope of Guilty Plea: No. The plea of guilty was understood as limited to the admission of having committed parricide, not of having done so with treachery and evident premeditation, because the accused lacked instruction and could not have understood the technical juridical meaning of those terms.
• Proper Penalty: The penalty of reclusion perpetua was excessive under the circumstances, and because Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code is silent on the case of two or more mitigating circumstances with no aggravating circumstance for indivisible penalties, recourse was made to the Chief Executive under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Scope of Guilty Plea: While a plea of guilty freely and voluntarily entered admits all material facts alleged in the information, the trial court has discretionary power to take evidence to determine whether the plea was entered with full knowledge of its meaning and extent. In this case, the trial court heard the accused's testimony upon his own petition regarding the circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime. That testimony revealed nothing to show that the accused had premeditated the death of his wife or acted treacherously. Taking into account the accused's ignorance and illiteracy, it was neither just nor reasonable to assume that he understood the allegation that treachery and premeditation were present, as those are highly technical terms the juridical meaning of which is beyond the understanding not only of illiterates but even of educated non-lawyers. Accordingly, the plea of guilty could not be held to encompass an admission of the aggravating circumstances.

• Proper Penalty: After eliminating the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, only four mitigating circumstances remained: intoxication (not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the crime), lack of instruction, voluntary surrender to the authorities, and voluntary confession before the court prior to the presentation of prosecution evidence. The penalty prescribed by Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code for parricide is reclusion perpetua to death — two indivisible penalties. Article 63, which regulates the application of indivisible penalties, is silent with respect to the case where two or more mitigating circumstances are present with no aggravating circumstance, unlike Article 64, Rule 5, which governs penalties composed of three periods and provides that when two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower. Because the non-application of the equivalent of Article 64, Rule 5 to indivisible penalties is evidently unjust and inequitable where four mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code authorized the Court to submit a statement to the Chief Executive through the Department of Justice, recommending that the President exercise the authority conferred upon him by the Constitution to modify the sentence for the benefit of the accused.

• Scope of a Plea of Guilty by an Uneducated Accused — A plea of guilty admits all material facts alleged in the information, but where the accused lacks instruction and the information alleges aggravating circumstances in highly technical terms, the plea is understood as limited to the admission of the crime itself and not the aggravating qualifiers, unless the aggravating circumstances are independently established by evidence. The trial court has discretionary power to take evidence to determine whether the plea was entered with full knowledge of its meaning and extent.

• Treatment of Mitigating Circumstances Under Indivisible Penalties — Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, which governs the application of indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua and death), is silent on the case where two or more mitigating circumstances are present with no aggravating circumstance. This contrasts with Article 64, Rule 5, which applies to penalties composed of three periods and provides for the penalty next lower in such a situation. Where strict enforcement of the Code would result in a clearly excessive penalty due to the presence of multiple mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances, Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code authorizes the Supreme Court to refer the matter to the Chief Executive for the exercise of executive clemency.

• "treachery" and "premeditation" are highly technical terms the juridical meaning of which is beyond the understanding not of the illiterates alone but even of those who, being educated, are not lawyers." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for limiting the scope of a guilty plea entered by an uneducated accused, establishing that technical legal terms in an information cannot be deemed intelligently admitted by a layperson through a plea of guilty alone.

• "when an accused, who lacks instruction, pleads guilty of the crime of parricide described in the information as having been committed with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, and his testimony given under oath before the trial court, upon his petition, fails to show the existence of such aggravating circumstances, his plea of guilty shall be understood as being limited to the admission of having committed the crime of parricide, not of having done so with treachery and evident premeditation" — This is the Court's explicit holding on the scope of a guilty plea by an uneducated accused, formulated as a rule of application for lower courts.

• "as the nonapplicant of rule 5 of article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, in cases where the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, is evidently unjust and inequitable, when there are four mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present, recourse shall be had to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, by stating what is deemed proper, in accordance with the provisions of article 5 of said Code." — This passage establishes the remedy when Article 63's silence on multiple mitigating circumstances with indivisible penalties produces an excessive penalty, directing recourse to executive clemency under Article 5.

• U.S. vs. Barba, 29 Phil. 206 — Cited for the proposition that a plea of guilty freely and voluntarily entered admits all material facts alleged in the complaint or information.
• U.S. vs. Santiago, 35 Phil. 20 — Cited alongside U.S. vs. Barba for the same proposition regarding the effect of a voluntary plea of guilty.
• U.S. vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541 — Cited for the proposition that the trial court has discretionary power to take evidence to determine whether a plea of guilty was entered with full knowledge of its meaning and extent.
• U.S. vs. Rota, 9 Phil. 426 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the trial court's discretion to take evidence on the voluntariness and understanding of a guilty plea.
• U.S. vs. Agcaoili, 31 Phil. 91 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the trial court's discretionary power to take evidence on the accused's understanding of a guilty plea.
• U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305 — Cited for the same proposition regarding the trial court's discretion to take evidence on the voluntariness and comprehension of a guilty plea.

• Article 246, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for parricide, the killing of one's spouse. Applied as the base penalty for Gungab's conviction.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties. The Court found it silent on the situation where two or more mitigating circumstances are present with no aggravating circumstance, creating a gap that rendered the prescribed penalty excessive.
• Article 64, Rule 5, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of penalties composed of three periods and provides that when two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower. The Court noted the absence of an equivalent rule for indivisible penalties under Article 63.
• Article 5, Revised Penal Code — Authorizes the Supreme Court to submit a statement to the Chief Executive through the Department of Justice when strict enforcement of the Code would result in a clearly excessive penalty. Applied as the remedy for the excessive penalty resulting from Article 63's silence.
• Section 11, paragraph 6, Article VII, Constitution of the Philippines — Confers upon the President the authority to grant pardons, reprieves, and commutations. Cited as the constitutional basis for the recommendation of executive clemency.

Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concurred.