People vs. Gumayao

Self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense that the accused must establish with clear and convincing evidence by proving the concurrence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself; absent proof of unlawful aggression, there can be no complete or incomplete self-defense. A killing is qualified by treachery where, at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself and the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method, and form of attack employed, even where the attack is frontal but sudden and unexpected upon an unarmed victim.

The case arose from the stabbing death of Concordio Sulogan, a corn farmer who tilled about 5.8 hectares of land and resided with his wife Wilma and their three children at Zone 2, Kalasungay, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. The appellant Jerryvie Gumayao was a long-time resident of the same locality, married to Josalyn Binayao and living with his mother. The killing was charged as murder under an Information alleging intent to kill by means of treachery with the use of a sharp-bladed instrument, in violation of Republic Act No. 7659, the special law under which the offense was penalized.

Concordio Sulogan and his wife Wilma resided at Zone 2, Kalasungay, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, where Concordio worked as a corn farmer tilling his own land of about 5.8 hectares; the couple had three children. At around 10:00 to 10:45 p.m. on December 28, 1996, Diocrly Binayao was standing by the Syre Highway at Kalasungay, watching a disco party being held at the plaza about thirty meters away, an area adorned with brightly colored blinking lights and enclosed by a gate where partygoers paid entrance fees. Concordio sat down beside Diocrly, cross-legged, by the side of the asphalt pavement, and the two talked as they watched the ongoing party. An electric light post about ten meters away illuminated the street, and a nearby store across the street owned by SPO1 Ersie Paano was likewise lighted.

Jerryvie Gumayao approached the two and joined them, squatting beside Concordio to the latter's right. Edmund Paano, who had known Concordio since he was seven years old and was the victim's first cousin, was that night with his other cousin Kenneth at their auntie's house near the plaza; the two decided to check out the disco party and, on the way, passed by the Syre highway where they saw Diocrly, Concordio, and Jerryvie sitting at the edge of the asphalt road. Edmund walked toward them, shook Concordio's hand, and then proceeded to the disco place. When Edmund and Kenneth left, Jerryvie suddenly took out a seven-and-a-half-inch-long knife with his right hand and stabbed Concordio on the left side of the chest and again on the abdomen, also on the left side. Concordio fell mortally wounded on his back, the knife still embedded in his body, and Jerryvie hurriedly left the scene toward the direction of their house in Zone 4. Diocrly walked away and sought help for the fallen Concordio in the direction of the nearby store.

Edmund and Kenneth stayed at the disco for only about fifteen minutes because there were no ladies there for them, and headed back toward the highway, where they saw Concordio lying on his back, bloodied all over. Edmund ran to his auntie's house and informed the victim's brother Christopher that Concordio was stabbed; he returned to the scene and found that Concordio had already been brought to the hospital, later learning that the victim had succumbed to his injuries. SPO1 Paano, who had been fast asleep, was awakened by his daughter and wife and informed of the stabbing in front of his residence; he proceeded to the area and saw the victim lying prostrate on the ground beside the road, with a crowd already gathered. Because he was more interested in apprehending the suspect and pursuing the investigation, SPO1 Paano instructed those present to bring the victim to the hospital. He immediately went to Diocrly's house and inquired about the incident, and Diocrly told him that the person responsible for the stabbing was Jerryvie. SPO1 Paano then looked for Jerryvie at Purok 4, Kalasungay, where the latter's father lived; Jerryvie was not there, but his father accompanied SPO1 Paano to his residence about fifty meters away, where Jerryvie was nowhere to be found. At around 6:00 a.m. the next day, December 29, 1996, SPO1 Paano went to the Malaybalay Police Station to verify whether the incident had been recorded in the police blotter, and at around 7:10 that same morning, SPO1 Boy Solito brought Jerryvie to the Malaybalay Police Station.

Jerryvie denied the charges. He testified that he was a long-time resident of Kalasungay, married to Josalyn Binayao, and living with his mother, and that he and a certain Popoy Helacio were enemies owing to a misunderstanding that arose about two years earlier when Jerryvie's cousin drove without permission the motorcycle of Helacio's uncle; on December 24, 1996, Jerryvie had an encounter with Helacio. According to Jerryvie, at 7:00 p.m. of December 28, 1996, he was at his auntie's house about two kilometers from the plaza having a drinking spree with three others, and at around 9:00 p.m. he and his companions proceeded to the plaza to join the disco; upon entering, he came face to face with Helacio, who challenged him to a fight. Jerryvie asked where, and Helacio replied, "On the portion outside by this disco place." A fight ensued; Jerryvie punched Helacio, who fell, and when Helacio got up, Jerryvie saw that he was armed with a knife and declared, "We will kill you now." Jerryvie replied, "Wait for me," and ran toward his mother-in-law's house; when he returned, he saw that Helacio had summoned two more companions, Edmund and Concordio, who surrounded him. Sulogan took hold of him, twisted his head, and said, "We will kill him." Jerryvie struggled free, took hold of Concordio, and stabbed the latter with the knife he had tucked by his waist, although he could no longer remember how many times he stabbed Concordio. He fled to his godfather George and told him he had stabbed a person in the plaza whose identity he did not know; his father later arrived and told him to surrender, and he surrendered to Boy Solito, the husband of his mother's niece and a policeman, the following morning, after which he was brought to the CID for investigation. Jerryvie also testified that prosecution witness Diocrly Binayao was his brother-in-law and that the two had differences because Diocrly did not want him to marry Diocrly's sister; he insisted that he did not intend to kill anyone that night but had no choice but to stab Concordio when the latter held him.

Lilency Liman-ay testified that Jerryvie was her nephew and that she had known him since he was a small boy; that his misunderstanding with Helacio started during a drinking spree at the house of Lilency's niece, when Lilency's son and Jerryvie used a motorcycle parked near the house owned by Helacio's relative Arlene, who got angry and was joined in the fray by Helacio. On December 29, 1996, Lilency woke up very early and found that the authorities were looking for Jerryvie; she assisted the latter's mother in the search, and they found Jerryvie in Lumayagan, near the BFI Nursery at Kalasungay, about two kilometers from his residence. Wilma Sulogan testified that her husband sustained two stab wounds on the chest above his left nipple, that he was buried on December 31, 1996, that they spent P1,500 for embalmment and P30,000 for the wake with the coffin donated by the barangay, and that she suffered sleepless nights and mental anguish upon her husband's untimely death. The trial court found that the appellant stabbed the victim in cold blood, credited the eyewitness account of Diocrly Binayao, and rejected the appellant's claim of self-defense.

• Self-Defense: The appellant argued that his passive stance when Helacio's group confronted him proved he was not the unlawful aggressor as the prosecution's evidence tended to establish, that he was surrounded by three men with Helacio armed with a knife and Concordio backing the latter up, and that his use of a knife in inflicting the fatal blow was justified and reasonable under the circumstances then prevailing.
• Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed: The appellant maintained that he was clearly outnumbered and literally pushed to the limit, without any means to choose what kind of weapon with which to defend himself, and that Popoy Helacio, accompanied by the victim, was determined to attack him owing to their long-standing feud.
• Weakness of the Prosecution's Evidence: The appellant contended that his claim of self-defense was clear and convincing because the prosecution did not present rebuttal witnesses to assail it, and that the claim was further strengthened by his voluntary surrender to the authorities, which the prosecution admitted during trial.
• Homicide, Not Murder: The appellant insisted that there was a fight between him and Helacio prior to the stabbing incident, so that when he returned to the scene armed with a knife, the victim and his companions were forewarned of an impending danger; thus, should a verdict of conviction be rendered, the crime committed would only be homicide.

• Nature and Number of Wounds: The Office of the Solicitor General contended that the appellant's claim of self-defense was belied by the location, nature, and number of wounds inflicted, the appellant having stabbed the victim on the chest and the abdomen with fatal results.
• Sudden and Unwarned Attack: The Office of the Solicitor General argued that the appellant's attack on the victim was sudden and without affording the victim any opportunity to defend himself, such that the appellant committed murder and not homicide.

• Self-Defense: Whether the trial court erred in not appreciating the accused-appellant's claim of self-defense with respect to the stabbing incident.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite the uncontroverted evidence adduced by the accused-appellant and his witness.
• Classification of the Crime: Whether, on the assumption that the accused-appellant is guilty, the trial court erred in convicting him of murder as the crime committed was only homicide.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense requires clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself; the appellant failed to discharge this burden.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: No. An eyewitness account, coupled with the fact of the victim's death, is sufficient proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the testimony of a single prosecution witness, if positive, clear, and credible, suffices to anchor a judgment of conviction.
• Classification of the Crime: No. The killing was murder, qualified by treachery under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the victim having been attacked suddenly and without warning while unarmed and seated, and reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty, must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate, and when invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to prove with clear and convincing evidence the essential requisites of (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There can be no complete or incomplete self-defense unless the accused proves unlawful aggression, and the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence rather than on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, because in pleading self-defense he thereby admits the killing and can no longer be exonerated if he fails to prove the confluence of the requisites. The appellant failed to discharge this burden on four grounds: first, after stabbing Concordio he fled from the situs criminis, and flight is a veritable badge of guilt that negates the plea of self-defense; second, although he surrendered to the police authorities early the next day, he failed to inform them that he had acted in self-defense, and despite the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Malaybalay issuing a subpoena on January 10, 1997 requiring him to submit his counter-affidavit, he failed to do so, invoking self-defense for the first time only during trial; third, he stabbed the victim twice on the chest with both wounds proving fatal, and the nature and number of the wounds negated self-defense and proved instead a determination to kill; and fourth, as found by the trial court, the appellant made inconsistent and conflicting statements, initially testifying on direct examination that his confrontation was only with Popoy Helacio and that it was only upon returning to the plaza with a knife that he found Helacio had summoned two companions, but later changing his version when questioned by the court so that the victim was already a participant in the fray even before he went back to the plaza to get a knife. The trial court's findings of fact, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of the evidence, and its conclusions anchored thereon are accorded great weight and even conclusive effect unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case, because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe at close range the conduct, demeanor, and deportment of the witnesses as they testify; upon careful review, no cogent reason existed to overrule the trial court's finding that the appellant stabbed the victim in cold blood.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence: An eyewitness account, coupled with the fact of the victim's death, is sufficient proof of the guilt of the appellant beyond cavil of doubt for the crime of murder. The appellant failed to show any ill or improper motive on the part of Diocrly Binayao to impute the crime of murder to him, for which he could be sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The testimony of a single prosecution witness, as long as it is positive, clear, and credible, is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction, and corroborative or cumulative evidence is not a prerequisite to conviction, because truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. The trial court found Diocrly to be a credible witness, and he testified that he was very sure Jerryvie was Concordio's assailant since the scene of the crime was adequately lighted by a bright moon, the electric lights from the electric bulb of the store and the disco dance area, and a big lamp along the street light.
• Classification of the Crime: The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder, qualified by treachery under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There is treachery in the commission of the crime when (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (b) the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method, and form of attack employed by him; even a frontal attack may be considered treacherous when sudden and unexpected and employed on an unarmed victim who would not be in a position to repel the attack or to avoid it. In this case, the victim was merely sitting on the pavement at the edge of the road, chatting with a friend as they watched an ongoing disco party; the appellant joined them without giving the victim any inkling of the tragedy about to befall him, and then suddenly and without warning pulled out the knife hidden in his waist and stabbed the victim twice on vital parts of the body, ensuring the latter's immediate death. Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, and as such the circumstance of voluntary surrender will not affect the penalty to be meted on the appellant, since under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code the penalty of reclusion perpetua must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime.
• Civil Liabilities: The trial court correctly awarded to the heirs of the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000, which needs no other proof than the death of the victim, and correctly did not award actual damages considering that there were no receipts to support them; the heirs are nevertheless entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000. The trial court was likewise correct in not awarding damages for lost earnings, because the prosecution merely relied on Wilma Sulogan's self-serving statement that her husband was earning more or less P40,000 a year as a corn farmer; compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and requires adequate proof, and for loss of income due to death there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's average income as well as proof of average expenses, the award for lost income referring to net income, that is, total income less average expenses. No proof of the victim's average expenses was adduced in evidence, so there could be no reliable estimate of lost earnings.

• Requisites of Self-Defense — Self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate. When invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to prove with clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of three essential requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. There can be no complete or incomplete self-defense unless the accused proves unlawful aggression, and the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, because in pleading self-defense he admits the killing and cannot be exonerated if he fails to prove the confluence of the requisites. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting the appellant's plea, finding that he failed to discharge the burden in light of his flight, his failure to raise self-defense at the earliest opportunity, the nature and number of the wounds, and his inconsistent statements.
• Treachery (Alevosia) — There is treachery in the commission of the crime when (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (b) the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method, and form of attack employed by him. Even a frontal attack may be considered treacherous when sudden and unexpected and employed on an unarmed victim who would not be in a position to repel the attack or to avoid it. The Court applied this doctrine to qualify the killing as murder, the victim having been seated on the pavement, unarmed, and attacked suddenly and without warning by the appellant, who drew a concealed knife and stabbed him twice on vital parts of the body.
• Flight as Evidence of Guilt — Flight is a veritable badge of guilt and negates the plea of self-defense. The Court relied on this doctrine in finding that the appellant's flight from the situs criminis after stabbing Concordio undermined his claim of self-defense.
• Reclusion Perpetua as an Indivisible Penalty — Reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, and under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code it must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender could not affect the penalty to be meted on the appellant.
• Sufficiency of a Single Witness's Testimony — The testimony of a single prosecution witness, as long as it is positive, clear, and credible, is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction; corroborative or cumulative evidence is not a prerequisite to conviction, because truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. The Court applied this doctrine in sustaining the conviction on the basis of Diocrly Binayao's eyewitness account, coupled with the fact of the victim's death.
• Great Weight Accorded to Trial Court Findings of Fact — The trial court's findings of fact, its calibration of the collective testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the probative weight of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings are accorded great weight and even conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misunderstood, or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, would alter the outcome of the case, because of the unique advantage of the trial court to observe at close range the conduct, demeanor, and deportment of the witnesses as they testify. The Court found no cogent reason to overrule the trial court's finding that the appellant stabbed the victim in cold blood.
• Proof Required for Lost Earnings — Compensation for lost income is in the nature of damages and requires adequate proof; for loss of income due to death, there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's average income as well as proof of average expenses, because the award for lost income refers to the net income of the deceased, that is, the total income less average expenses. The Court applied this doctrine in disallowing damages for lost earnings, no proof of the victim's average expenses having been adduced in evidence.

• "In a case where self-defense is invoked by the accused, the burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the following essential requisites: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the requisites of self-defense and the quantum of proof required of the accused, and is the controlling rule applied in rejecting the appellant's plea.
• "Flight is a veritable badge of guilt and negates the plea of self-defense." — This passage articulates the doctrine on flight as evidence of guilt, which the Court used as one of the grounds for discrediting the appellant's claim of self-defense.
• "There is treachery in the commission of the crime when (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; (b) the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, method and form of attack employed by him. Even a frontal attack may be considered treacherous when sudden and unexpected, and employed on an unarmed victim who would not be in a position to repel the attack or to avoid it." — This passage defines the qualifying circumstance of treachery and its two elements, and explains that even a frontal attack may be treacherous, which is the ratio for qualifying the killing as murder.
• "This Court has consistently ruled that the testimony of a single prosecution witness, as long as it is positive, clear and credible is sufficient on which to anchor a judgment of conviction. Corroborative or cumulative evidence is not a prerequisite to the conviction of the accused. Truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies." — This passage states the rule on the sufficiency of a single credible witness's testimony, which the Court used to sustain the conviction based on the eyewitness account of Diocrly Binayao.

• People vs. Sibonga, G.R. No. 95901, June 16, 2003 — Cited for the rule that the testimony of a single prosecution witness, as long as it is positive, clear, and credible, is sufficient to anchor a judgment of conviction, and that corroborative or cumulative evidence is not a prerequisite to conviction; also cited for the rule that an eyewitness account coupled with the fact of the victim's death is sufficient proof of guilt.
• People vs. Cual, 327 SCRA 623 (2000) — Cited for the definition and elements of treachery, including the rule that even a frontal attack may be considered treacherous when sudden and unexpected and employed on an unarmed victim unable to repel or avoid the attack.
• People vs. Real, 308 SCRA 244 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the nature and number of the wounds negate a claim of self-defense and may prove the offender's determination to kill the victim.
• People vs. Balmoria, 287 SCRA 687 (1998) — Cited for the rule that reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty.
• People vs. Abadies, G.R. No. 135975, August 14, 2002 — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity needs no other proof than the death of the victim, and for the requirements of proof for lost earnings.
• People vs. Orcula, Sr., 335 SCRA 129 (2000) — Cited for the award of temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.
• People vs. Castillano, Sr., G.R. No. 139412, April 2, 2003 — Cited for the requisites of self-defense and the rule that the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence.
• People vs. Hubilla, Jr., 252 SCRA 471 (1996) — Cited, through People vs. Castillano, Sr., for the rule that in pleading self-defense the accused admits the killing and cannot be exonerated if he fails to prove the confluence of the requisites.
• People vs. Ocsimar, 253 SCRA 689 (1996) — Cited for the rule that self-defense, like alibi, is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate.
• People vs. Lotoc, 307 SCRA 471 (1999) — Cited, through People vs. Sibonga, for the rule that an eyewitness account coupled with the fact of the victim's death is sufficient proof of guilt.
• People vs. Esponilla, G.R. No. 122766, June 20, 2003 — Cited for the rule that actual damages may not be awarded absent receipts to support them.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder; the Court applied it in holding that the trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties and provides that an indivisible penalty must be applied regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime; the Court applied it in holding that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender could not affect the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — The special law under which the offense was charged and penalized, as alleged in the Information and as stated in the trial court's dispositive portion.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.