People vs. Gulpe

The constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the death penalty did not alter the prescribed periods of penalties for purposes of determining the proper imposable penalty; the death penalty must still be reckoned with as the base penalty when applying privileged mitigating circumstances, with its automatic reduction to reclusion perpetua applying only after the appropriate graduation is made.

On June 30, 1990, in Sitio Iraya, San Pedro, Iriga City, seven-year-old Lenly Ranola was sexually assaulted by Roger Gulpe and Ricardo Vigas, who took turns holding her down and having sexual intercourse with her. After the acts, Vigas stabbed the victim with a piece of bamboo, causing her death. At the time of the crime, Gulpe was 17 years old and Vigas was 16 years old.

• The Crime: In the afternoon of June 30, 1990, at about 4:00 PM, in Sitio Iraya, San Pedro, Iriga City, appellants Roger Gulpe and Ricardo Vigas were seen by eyewitnesses having sexual intercourse with seven-year-old Lenly Ranola. Gulpe was first seen having sexual intercourse with the victim while Vigas pinned her right shoulder with his right hand, her left shoulder with his left elbow, and covered her mouth with his left hand.
• Exchange of Positions: Gulpe and Vigas thereafter exchanged positions. Vigas had sexual intercourse with the victim while Gulpe held her down.
• The Homicide: Upon finishing the sexual acts, the appellants called for Villaruel, Jr., a co-accused who was eventually acquitted. After Villaruel, Jr. left, Vigas obtained a piece of bamboo and stabbed the victim, causing her death.
• Minority of Offenders: At the time the crime was committed on June 30, 1990, Gulpe was 17 years old and Vigas was 16 years old.

• Base Penalty for Graduation: Petitioners argued that the RTC correctly imposed the lower penalty, contending that because the death penalty was constitutionally proscribed at the time of the crime, the prescribed penalty for Rape with Homicide was effectively reclusion perpetua. Thus, applying the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should reduce the penalty by one degree from reclusion perpetua down to reclusion temporal.

• Death Penalty as Base Penalty: Respondent countered that the death penalty was not abolished by the Constitution but was merely in a state of "hibernation." Therefore, in offenses where death is prescribed, it must still be reckoned with as the base penalty. With the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty is reduced by one degree from death, resulting in reclusion perpetua.

• Proper Base Penalty: Whether the penalty of death should still be reckoned with as the base penalty for purposes of applying the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, notwithstanding the constitutional proscription against its imposition at the time the crime was committed.

• Proper Base Penalty: The death penalty must still be reckoned with as the base penalty. The constitutional prohibition did not alter the periods of the penalty for purposes of determining the proper imposable penalty. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was merely to consider the death penalty automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua upon its actual imposition, not to change the prescribed penalty itself. Accordingly, with the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty is reduced by one degree from death to reclusion perpetua.

• Constitutional Proscription of the Death Penalty and Penalty Graduation — The constitutional prohibition against the imposition of the death penalty under Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution did not abolish the penalty or alter the prescribed periods for purposes of determining the proper imposable penalty. The death penalty remains the prescribed penalty to be reckoned with when applying mitigating or aggravating circumstances, and is merely deemed automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua upon its actual imposition.

• "…the intent of the framers of the Constitution was merely to consider the death penalty automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua. The same thing may be said as regards rape with homicide. The penalty of death provided under the governing law then was deemed reduced to reclusion perpetua; however, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death was still the penalty to be reckoned with…"

• People v. Quintori, 285 SCRA 196 (1998) — Controlling precedent followed. Established that the RTC erred in reasoning that the prescribed penalty was changed to reclusion perpetua; the death penalty was still the penalty to be reckoned with for purposes of determining the proper penalty due to mitigating circumstances.
• People v. Munoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989) — Cited in Quintori. Ruled that the constitutional prohibition did not alter the periods for the penalty for murder for purposes of determining the proper imposable penalty.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code — Prescribed the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of Rape with Homicide. Applied to characterize the crime committed by the appellants prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997).
• Section 19(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Prohibited the imposition of the death penalty. Interpreted to mean that the death penalty is merely automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua upon imposition, but remains the prescribed penalty for graduation purposes when mitigating circumstances are present.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.