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People vs. Grospi and Parulan

The petition for certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court set aside the respondent Judge's dismissal of Criminal Case No. 2800 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and Criminal Case No. 2813 for Estafa, which dismissal was predicated on the erroneous conclusion that the trial court lacked territorial jurisdiction. The Court held that venue was properly laid in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga because, in the estafa case, deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga where the checks were legally issued and delivered, and in the bouncing checks case, the offense is continuing in nature. The dismissal was likewise held correctable by certiorari and did not place the accused in double jeopardy.

Primary Holding

A court has territorial jurisdiction to try a criminal case where any one of the essential ingredients of the offense took place within its territorial area. For transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case. In determining venue, what is of decisive importance is the delivery of the check to a person who takes it as a holder, meaning the payee or indorsee who is in possession of it with intent to transfer title.

Background

San Miguel Corporation (SMC) is a corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of beer products. Respondent-accused Manuel Parulan was an authorized wholesale dealer of SMC in Bulacan. The two criminal cases arose from separate transactions involving dishonored checks issued by Parulan in favor of SMC for beer purchases. The cases were governed by two different penal laws: B.P. Blg. 22 (the Bouncing Checks Law) for one check, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code (Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check) for the other.

History

  1. Criminal Case No. 2800 was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga charging Parulan with Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a check on June 13, 1983 for P86,071.20 in favor of SMC, which was dishonored for insufficient funds.

  2. Criminal Case No. 2813 was filed in the same court charging Parulan with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for issuing a check on June 18, 1983 for P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was dishonored for insufficient funds.

  3. The two cases were tried jointly, with the same witnesses for both prosecution and defense.

  4. Respondent Judge, on February 17, 1986, dismissed both cases for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that deceit and damage did not occur within the territorial jurisdiction of the Pampanga court.

  5. Petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court challenging the dismissal as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

Facts

Respondent-accused Manuel Parulan was an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Bulacan. In Criminal Case No. 2800, he was charged with Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22) for having issued a check on June 13, 1983 for P86,071.20 in favor of SMC, which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. In Criminal Case No. 2813, he was charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code for having made out a check on June 18, 1983 in the sum of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC in payment of beer he had purchased, which check was refused payment for insufficient funds.

The two cases were tried jointly, with the same witnesses for both prosecution and defense. The trial court found that the two checks were issued and signed by the accused in connection with beer purchases made at the Guiguinto, Bulacan sales office of SMC, and were handed and delivered to the Sales Supervisor of SMC, Mr. Ruben Cornelio, who held office in that municipality. The court found it difficult to believe the accused's claim that the checks, which he admittedly signed and delivered in blank, were filled up without his knowledge.

On June 13, 1983, Parulan issued Planters Development Bank (Santa Maria, Bulacan Branch) Check No. 19040865 in the sum of P86,071.20 in favor of SMC, which was received by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan. The check was forwarded to the SMC Regional Office at San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to and received by the SMC Finance Officer, who then deposited the check with the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), San Fernando Branch, the SMC depository bank. On July 8, 1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the PDB, the drawee bank in Santa Maria, Bulacan.

On June 18, 1983, Parulan likewise issued PDB Check No. 19040872 in the amount of P11,918.80 in favor of SMC, which was received also by the SMC Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, as direct payment for the spot sale of beer. That check was similarly forwarded to the SMC Regional Office in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was delivered to the Finance Officer, who deposited it with the SMC depository bank in San Fernando, Pampanga. On July 8, 1983, the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank.

Despite being convinced that the accused had issued the checks to the representative of SMC and that the checks were subsequently dishonored due to lack of funds, the respondent Judge concluded that he was "bereft of jurisdiction to pass judgment on the accused on the basis of the merits of these cases." He reasoned that deceit and damage, the two essential elements of offenses involving dishonored checks, did not occur within the jurisdictional area of his court. He ruled that the checks were issued at Guiguinto, Bulacan, that false assurances were made there, and that the element of damage was inflicted at the moment the checks were dishonored by the drawee bank at Santa Maria, Bulacan.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that the dismissal of the two criminal cases was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and that venue was properly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
  • Territorial Jurisdiction: The People maintained that jurisdiction is properly vested in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, pointing out that there are two dishonored checks involved, each the subject of different penal laws with different basic elements.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Acquittal and Double Jeopardy: Respondent-accused argued that the order of dismissal was, in effect, an acquittal not reviewable by certiorari, and that to set the order aside after plea and trial on the merits would subject him to double jeopardy.

Issues

  • Territorial Jurisdiction over the Estafa Case: Whether venue was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in the estafa case under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code.
  • Territorial Jurisdiction over the Bouncing Checks Case: Whether venue was sufficiently conferred in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga in the case for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
  • Correctability by Certiorari: Whether the dismissal of the criminal cases by the respondent Judge, predicated on lack of jurisdiction, is correctable by certiorari.
  • Double Jeopardy: Whether the present petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the void decision places the respondent-accused in double jeopardy.

Ruling

  • Territorial Jurisdiction over the Estafa Case: Yes. Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check may be a transitory or continuing offense, and jurisdiction may be entertained by either the Bulacan court or the Pampanga court. Deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, where the check was legally issued and delivered to the payee's representative who could take the check as a holder.
  • Territorial Jurisdiction over the Bouncing Checks Case: Yes. The offense is continuing in nature, and knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense, is by itself a continuing eventuality. Jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.
  • Correctability by Certiorari: Yes. The error committed is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits. Questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
  • Double Jeopardy: No. The questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits but a dismissal upon the respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his court had no territorial jurisdiction. The dismissal being null and void, the proceedings before the trial court may not be said to have been lawfully terminated, and there is no second proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy.

Ruling Rationale

  • Territorial Jurisdiction over the Estafa Case: Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, carried over in Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case. In the crime of Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential elements. While the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered. What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof, as the delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. The SMC Sales Supervisor at Guiguinto was not the person who could take the check as a holder, that is, as a payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. The issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof" under Section 190 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The element of deceit, therefore, took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, where the rubber check was legally issued and delivered, so that jurisdiction could properly be laid upon the court in that locality.
  • Territorial Jurisdiction over the Bouncing Checks Case: For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, the elements of deceit and damage are not essential nor required. An essential element of that offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds. The Anti-Bouncing Checks Law makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check a special offense punishable thereunder, and malice and intent in issuing the worthless check are immaterial, the offense being malum prohibitum. The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check, not the non-payment of an obligation. The offense is committed by the very fact of its performance, and the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. Knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. Moreover, jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling, and the Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga.
  • Correctability by Certiorari: The error committed by the respondent Judge is one of jurisdiction and not an error of judgment on the merits. Well-settled is the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction renders whatever order of the trial court null and void.
  • Double Jeopardy: The questioned judgment was not an adjudication on the merits. It was a dismissal upon the respondent Judge's erroneous conclusion that his court had no territorial jurisdiction over the cases. Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense. The dismissal being null and void, the proceedings before the trial court may not be said to have been lawfully terminated. There is therefore no second proceeding which would subject the accused to double jeopardy.

Doctrines

  • Transitory or Continuing Offense Doctrine — In transitory or continuing offenses in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will exclude the others. However, if all the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality or territory, the court of that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that both the estafa case and the bouncing checks case could be validly tried in Pampanga.
  • Delivery as the Decisive Act in Determining Venue for Check Offenses — What is of decisive importance in determining the place of commission of offenses involving checks is the delivery of the instrument, which is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. The issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, meaning the payee or indorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the element of deceit in the estafa case took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, where the check was delivered to the SMC Finance Officer who could take it as a holder.
  • Jurisdiction Determined by Allegations in the Information — Jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling. The Court applied this principle to hold that since the Information filed in the bouncing checks case specifically alleged that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga had jurisdiction over the case.
  • Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction Not an Acquittal — Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits but is based on an erroneous conclusion of lack of jurisdiction, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense, and the accused is not placed in double jeopardy. The dismissal being null and void, the proceedings before the trial court may not be said to have been lawfully terminated.

Key Excerpts

  • "What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereat The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine for determining venue in cases involving checks: the place of delivery, not the place of signing or dating, fixes the place of commission of the offense.
  • "The issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means 'the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.'" — This passage defines the requirement that delivery of a check must be made to a person who can take it as a holder under the Negotiable Instruments Law, which was decisive in determining that deceit took place in Pampanga.
  • "The Anti-Bouncing Checks Law makes the mere act of issuing a worthless check a special offense punishable thereunder. Malice and intent in issuing the worthless check are immaterial, the offense being malum prohibitum." — This passage distinguishes the nature of the offense under B.P. Blg. 22 from estafa, emphasizing that deceit and damage are not essential elements of the bouncing checks offense.
  • "Where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense." — This passage states the rule that a dismissal based on an erroneous conclusion of lack of jurisdiction does not constitute double jeopardy.

Precedents Cited

  • People vs. Yabut, L-42902, April 29, 1977, 76 SCRA 624 — Controlling precedent for the proposition that estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check may be a transitory or continuing offense whose basic elements of deceit and damage may arise independently in separate places, and that what is of decisive importance is the delivery of the check.
  • Lozano vs. Hon. Martinez, Nos. L-63419, etc., December 18, 1986, 146 SCRA 323 — Cited for the rule that an essential element of the offense under the Bouncing Checks Law is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, and that the gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a check, not the non-payment of an obligation.
  • Que vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 75217-18, September 21, 1987 — Cited for the propositions that malice and intent in issuing a worthless check are immaterial, the offense being malum prohibitum, and that the determinative factor in determining venue is the place of the issuance of the check.
  • People vs. Hon. Manzanilla, G.R. Nos. 66003-04, December 11, 1987 — Cited for the rule that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds is by itself a continuing eventuality, and that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information.
  • Tuzon vs. Cruz, No. L-27410, August 28, 1975, 66 SCRA 235 — Cited for the rule that in transitory or continuing offenses, the court of either province has jurisdiction to try the case, and that jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information.
  • People vs. Bellosillo, No. L-18512, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 835 — Cited for the rule that where an order dismissing a criminal case is not a decision on the merits, it cannot bar as res judicata a subsequent case based on the same offense.
  • City of Davao vs. Dept. of Labor, No. L-19488, January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 111 — Cited for the rule that questions covering jurisdictional matters may be averred in a petition for certiorari, inclusive of matters of grave abuse of discretion, which are equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
  • U.S. vs. Rivera, 23 Phil. 383 — Cited for the proposition that in the crime of estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense.

Provisions

  • Section 14(a), Rule 110, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. The Court applied this provision to determine that venue was properly laid in Pampanga.
  • Section 15(a), Rule 110, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure — The successor provision to Section 14(a) of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court, carrying over the same rule on the place where action is to be instituted.
  • Article 315, paragraph 2(d), Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of estafa by postdating a check or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The Court applied this provision to the estafa case.
  • B.P. Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) — Penalizes the act of issuing a worthless check. The Court held that the elements of deceit and damage are not essential nor required for this offense, and that the mere act of issuing a worthless check is a special offense punishable thereunder.
  • Section 190, Negotiable Instruments Law — Defines a holder as "the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof." The Court applied this definition to determine that the SMC Sales Supervisor at Guiguinto was not a holder who could take the check with intent to transfer title, and that delivery to the Finance Officer in San Fernando, Pampanga was the legally significant delivery.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Yap (Chairman), Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred.