People vs. Golez

An unlicensed practitioner who causes the death of a patient through reckless treatment may be charged with homicide through reckless imprudence, as the lack of medical skill and knowledge supplies the negligence element; however, a valid information dismissed after plea without the accused's consent bars further prosecution on double jeopardy grounds.

The accused, Anunciacion Vda. de Golez, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental with homicide through reckless imprudence for allegedly diagnosing, prescribing, and treating one Susana Tam without a medical license, resulting in the patient's death. The case arose under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 2678 of the Revised Administrative Code (the Medical Law then in force). The accused had also been separately charged with illegal practice of medicine before another sala of the same court.

On October 2, 1957, the provincial fiscal of Negros Occidental filed an information in the Court of First Instance charging Anunciacion Vda. de Golez with the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence. The information alleged that from December 12 to December 24, 1956, in San Carlos, Negros Occidental, the accused, without being duly licensed to practice medicine and with reckless negligence, diagnosed, prescribed, and treated Susana Tam, who had been suffering from a bodily ailment, knowing fully well that she lacked the necessary technical or scientific knowledge or skill, and as a consequence of such negligence and lack of medical skill, the patient died.

The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. When the case was called for trial, the assistant fiscal manifested that the accused had also been charged with illegal practice of medicine before another sala of the same court. The trial court, motu proprio, dismissed the information as fatally defective. The court reasoned that illegal practice of medicine is malicious per se — that a quack doctor who practices medicine does so against the law, making the act necessarily malicious and criminal. It held that homicide through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code results from the performance of a lawful act done without due care, not from an unlawful act, and therefore the facts charged did not constitute the offense.

The provincial fiscal appealed the order of dismissal to the Supreme Court, urging through the Solicitor General that the trial court erred in dismissing the information. The accused did not file a brief or raise the question of double jeopardy.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The appellant argued that the trial court erred in dismissing the information for being fatally defective, as the facts charged therein did constitute the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the facts charged in the information sufficiently constitute the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the appeal should be barred on the ground that reinstating the information would place the accused in double jeopardy.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Yes. The allegations that the accused acted with reckless negligence in diagnosing, prescribing for, and treating the deceased, knowing she lacked the necessary technical knowledge or skill, sufficiently charge homicide through reckless imprudence.
• Double Jeopardy: Yes. The dismissal of a valid information after the accused had pleaded not guilty and without her consent constitutes jeopardy barring further proceedings, and the prosecution's appeal cannot be sustained.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Illegal practice of medicine is a statutory offense (malum prohibitum) wherein criminal intent is taken for granted — a person may be convicted irrespective of intention, even if motivated by an honest desire to cure. However, when the patient dies as a result of the illegal practitioner's treatment, the practitioner should be equally responsible for the death, an offense independent of and distinct from illegal practice of medicine. The allegations that the accused acted with reckless negligence in diagnosing, prescribing for, and treating Susana Tam, knowing she lacked the necessary skill, sufficiently charged homicide through reckless imprudence, because ordinary diligence counsels one not to tamper with human life without the special skill and competence required, and harm or injury can reasonably be foreseen. The Court cited U.S. vs. Feliciano Divino, 12 Phil. 175, where a similarly accused was convicted of physical injuries through imprudence under the old Penal Code.

• Double Jeopardy: Although the trial court erred in dismissing the information, the appeal could not be sustained because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The information was valid and sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. Its dismissal by the court after the accused had pleaded not guilty, and without the accused's consent, constituted jeopardy barring further proceedings. The accused's failure to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy did not negate the application of Section 2, Rule 118, which provides that the People cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy. The Court noted that the unfortunate result could have been avoided had the trial court proceeded more deliberately, without allowing its judgment to be influenced by preconceived notions or undue haste.

• Double Jeopardy in Prosecution Appeals — A valid information, once dismissed after the accused has pleaded not guilty and without the accused's consent, bars further prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. The prosecution cannot appeal a dismissal if doing so would place the defendant in double jeopardy, regardless of whether the defendant raises the issue. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the appeal, even though the trial court's dismissal was erroneous, because the information was valid and sufficient to sustain a conviction and jeopardy had attached.

• Illegal Practice of Medicine as Malum Prohibitum — Illegal practice of medicine is a statutory offense in which criminal intent is taken for granted; a person may be convicted irrespective of intention, even if acting in good faith and without malice, as the offense consists in the mere act of practicing medicine in violation of the Medical Law, even if no injury or death results. The Court relied on this characterization to distinguish the offense of illegal practice from the separate offense of homicide through reckless imprudence that may arise when a patient dies.

• Homicide Through Reckless Imprudence by Unlicensed Practitioner — An unlicensed practitioner who causes the death of a patient through reckless treatment may be charged with homicide through reckless imprudence, as the lack of medical skill and knowledge supplies the negligence element. Ordinary diligence counsels against tampering with human life without the requisite competence, and harm or injury can reasonably be foreseen. The Court applied this principle to hold that the information sufficiently charged the offense, citing U.S. vs. Feliciano Divino, 12 Phil. 175.

• "the crime of illegal practice of medicine is a statutory offense wherein criminal intent is taken for granted, so that a person may be convicted thereof irrespective of his intention and in spite of his having acted in good faith and without malice" — This passage defines the nature of illegal practice of medicine as malum prohibitum and explains why criminal intent is irrelevant to the offense.

• "When, therefore, the patient dies, the illegal practitioner should be equally responsible for the death of his patient, an offense independent of and distinct from the illegal practice of medicine." — This establishes that death caused by an unlicensed practitioner's treatment constitutes a separate offense from illegal practice of medicine, supporting the sufficiency of the information.

• "The present information being valid and sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, the dismissal thereof by the court after the accused had pleaded not guilty to the charge and without his consent constitutes jeopardy as to bar further proceedings upon the case" — This articulates the ratio decidendi on double jeopardy: a valid information dismissed after plea without consent bars further prosecution.

• U.S. vs. Feliciano Divino, 12 Phil. 175 — Followed. The accused in that case was convicted of physical injuries through imprudence under the old Penal Code for similar conduct, supporting the proposition that an unlicensed practitioner's negligent treatment can constitute an imprudence offense.

• U.S. vs. Yam Tung Way, 21 Phil. 67 — Cited as supporting authority for the double jeopardy bar when a valid information is dismissed after plea without the accused's consent.

• People vs. Hernandez, 94 Phil. 49 — Cited as supporting authority for the double jeopardy principle.

• People vs. Ferrer, 100 Phil. 124 — Cited as supporting authority for the double jeopardy principle.

• People vs. Bao, 106 Phil. 243 — Followed. The Court held that the accused's failure to file a brief and raise double jeopardy did not negate the application of Section 2, Rule 118, which bars the People's appeal if it would place the defendant in double jeopardy.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Defines homicide through reckless imprudence as resulting from the performance of a lawful act done without exercising the care and diligence required by the circumstances. The Court clarified that the article can also apply to unlicensed practitioners whose lack of skill constitutes the negligence element, even though the trial court had read the provision as limited to lawful acts.

• Section 2678, Revised Administrative Code (Medical Law) — Defines illegal practice of medicine as the mere act of practicing medicine in violation of the Medical Law, even if no injury or death results. The Court applied this to characterize the offense as malum prohibitum in which criminal intent is taken for granted.

• Section 2, Rule 118, Rules of Court — Provides that the People cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy. The Court applied this provision to dismiss the prosecution's appeal, notwithstanding the accused's failure to raise the issue.

• Paragraph (a), Section 2, Rule 113, Rules of Court — Cited by the trial court as the basis for dismissing the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute the offense. The Supreme Court held this was erroneously applied.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concurred.