People vs. Go

A private person may be indicted and prosecuted alone for conspiracy to violate Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer co-conspirator died prior to the filing of the information, because the death merely extinguishes the deceased's individual criminal liability without negating the conspiracy itself or the legal basis for charging the surviving conspirator.

The controversy stems from the nullification by the Supreme Court in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. of the contracts awarded by the DOTC to PIATCO for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the NAIA IPT III. Following this nullification, Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman charging several individuals, including Henry T. Go, then Chairman and President of PIATCO, with violations of R.A. 3019 for their alleged roles in executing the disadvantageous agreements.

• The Alleged Offense: Henry T. Go, as Chairman and President of PIATCO, was charged with conspiring with the late DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile in entering into a Concession Agreement on or about July 12, 1997. The Information alleged that the agreement substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement under the BOT law (R.A. 6957, as amended by R.A. 7718), specifically regarding Public Utility Revenues and the government's assumption of PIATCO's liabilities upon default under Article IV, Section 4.04(b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06. These terms were alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.
• Procedural Posture: The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found probable cause to indict both Go and Secretary Enrile. However, Enrile died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause, leaving Go as the sole accused in the Information filed on January 13, 2005.
• Go's Submission to the Court: Prior to filing his Motion to Quash, Go posted bail for his provisional liberty and filed a Motion for Consolidation in a related case (Criminal Case No. 28091) involving a separate Side Agreement.
• The Sandiganbayan's Ruling: The Sandiganbayan initially questioned its jurisdiction over Go's person in an Order dated March 10, 2005, noting that Go was a private person and his alleged co-conspirator public officer was deceased. In its Resolution dated June 2, 2005, the court granted the Motion to Quash, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
• Related Case: Go invoked the Supreme Court's minute resolution dated August 31, 2005 in G.R. No. 168919 (pertaining to Criminal Case No. 28091), which denied the prosecution's petition questioning a similar quashal of information, arguing that the ruling should apply to the instant case.

• Indictment of Private Conspirators: Petitioner argued that a private person may be indicted alone for conspiracy under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer co-conspirator is dead. The death of the public officer extinguishes only his individual criminal liability, not the conspiracy itself or the basis for charging the private conspirator. The law requires only an allegation of conspiracy, not simultaneous indictment of both conspirators.
• Jurisdiction over Person: Petitioner maintained that the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over Go's person when he posted bail and filed a Motion for Consolidation, as these acts constitute voluntary submission to the court's jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the person, once acquired, is not divested by the subsequent filing of a motion to quash.
• Legislative Intent: Petitioner contended that the avowed policy of R.A. 3019 is to repress acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft. To bar prosecution merely because the public officer died would frustrate this legislative intent and grant impunity to private conspirators who outlive their public co-conspirators.
• Equal Protection: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan's ruling effectively created a distinction that would allow private conspirators to escape liability solely due to the death of their public co-conspirators, violating the equal protection clause.

• Lack of Jurisdiction over Person: Respondent countered that as a private person, he could not be prosecuted alone for a violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, an offense that by its terms applies to public officers. The death of Secretary Enrile, the only public officer alleged, left no one with whom he could be charged, divesting the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over his person.
• Nature of the Offense: Respondent argued that Section 3(g) applies exclusively to public officers entering into contracts on behalf of the government. Without a public officer co-defendant, the charge against a private individual cannot stand.
• Res Judicata: Respondent argued that the Supreme Court's denial of the petition in G.R. No. 168919 (related case) should be applied in the instant case, as both cases involve identical issues and circumstances.
• No Voluntary Submission: Respondent maintained that his actions did not constitute voluntary submission to jurisdiction, or alternatively, that the court lacked jurisdiction ab initio over a private person charged alone under Section 3(g).

• Prosecution of Surviving Conspirator: Whether a private person may be indicted for conspiracy to violate Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 when the alleged public officer co-conspirator died prior to the filing of the information.
• Jurisdiction over Person: Whether the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over Go's person notwithstanding his status as a private individual and the death of his alleged co-conspirator.
• Equal Protection: Whether the quashal of the information violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

• Prosecution of Surviving Conspirator: The indictment of a private person for conspiracy to violate Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 is not barred by the death of the public officer co-conspirator prior to the filing of the information. The requirement for charging a private person under the provision is merely an allegation of conspiracy with a public officer; the law does not mandate that the public officer must be indicted simultaneously. The death of the co-conspirator extinguishes only his individual criminal liability, not the conspiracy itself or the basis for the charge against the survivor. Conspiracy is viewed not as a separate indictable offense but as a rule for collectivizing criminal liability, rendering the act of one conspirator the act of all.
• Jurisdiction over Person: Jurisdiction over the person of the accused was acquired by the Sandiganbayan when Go posted bail and filed a Motion for Consolidation in a related case. Such acts constitute voluntary appearance and submission to the court's jurisdiction, waiving any objection thereto. A motion to quash filed subsequently cannot retroactively divest the court of jurisdiction already validly acquired.
• Equal Protection: The petition was found meritorious, and the Sandiganbayan's resolution was reversed, effectively rejecting the premise that the death of the public officer creates an impermissible distinction that bars prosecution of the private conspirator.

• Conspiracy as a Rule for Collectivizing Criminal Liability — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. While not generally a separate crime unless specifically penalized by law, once proved, all conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent of their individual participation. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that Go could be charged alone because the conspiracy charge survives the death of the public officer co-conspirator, and the act of the deceased in entering into the contract is imputable to Go.
• Effect of Death of Co-Conspirator — The death of one or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the surviving conspirator(s), provided the conspiracy and the participation of the deceased are proved. The death extinguishes only the deceased's individual criminal liability, not the conspiracy itself or the charge against the survivor.
• Waiver of Jurisdiction over the Person — Jurisdiction over the person of an accused in a criminal case may be waived expressly or impliedly by voluntary appearance, posting bail, or filing motions seeking affirmative relief. An objection to jurisdiction over the person must be raised at the earliest opportunity and cannot be invoked after voluntary submission. The Court applied this by finding that Go's posting of bail and filing of a Motion for Consolidation constituted voluntary submission to the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
• Liability of Private Persons under R.A. 3019 — Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted and held liable for violations of Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the law's avowed policy to repress graft among public officers and private persons alike.

• "The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer."
• "The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors."
• "Conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability."
• "The act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court."

• Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547, 155661 (2003) — Controlling precedent regarding the nullification of the NAIA IPT III contracts; provided the factual background for the graft charges.
• Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, 549 Phil. 783 (2007) — Prior case involving the same respondent; established the doctrine that private persons may be liable under R.A. 3019 when conspiring with public officers.
• Villa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 87186 et al. (1992) — Cited for the rule that the death of one conspirator does not prevent the conviction of the survivors.
• People v. Peralta, G.R. No. L-19069 (1968) — Controlling precedent on the nature of conspiracy as a rule for collectivizing criminal liability where the act of one is the act of all.
• Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 360 Phil. 559 (1998) — Cited for the principle that voluntary appearance and filing motions for affirmative relief constitute waiver of jurisdiction over the person.

• Section 3(g), Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Defines the corrupt practice of entering, on behalf of the government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same. The Court enumerated its elements: (1) the accused is a public officer; (2) he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) such contract is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
• Section 1, Republic Act No. 3019 — States the policy to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices.
• Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249 — Grants the Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of R.A. 3019 committed by public officers and private persons charged as co-principals, accomplices, or accessories with public officers.

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice), Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Lucas P. Bersamin, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose Catral Mendoza, Bienvenido L. Reyes. (Mariano C. Del Castillo took no part; Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen were on leave).