People vs. Givera

Implied conspiracy arises when participants perform specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design, even absent proof of a prior agreement, rendering each conspirator liable as a principal. Treachery cannot be appreciated where the victim was forewarned of the danger and was not oblivious to the impending attack at its inception.

Eusebio Gardon was killed on May 2, 1993, in Quezon City after being lured from his home by a group of four men. The group stoned the victim's house to provoke him, assaulted him, and ultimately stabbed him under a bridge. Accused-appellant Cesar Givera, along with Epifanio Gayon, Arturo Gayon, and Maximo Givera, were charged with the killing. The three companions were previously tried and convicted of murder in a separate case.

• The Provocation: Eusebio Gardon was sleeping inside his house after a drinking session when Cesar Givera stoned the house to force him out. When this failed, Epifanio Gayon entered the house and persuaded the disoriented victim to step outside.
• The Assault: Once outside, Cesar Givera pelted the victim with stones while Epifanio Gayon rained fistic blows on him. Cesar and Epifanio then ran away, luring the victim to chase them toward a bridge.
• The Killing: Upon reaching the bridge, Arturo Gayon and Maximo Givera were waiting. Arturo shouted "Sige, todasin na yan!" while Maximo stabbed the victim. Cesar and Epifanio continued to box and kick the victim during the stabbing. The victim sustained a fatal stab wound that pierced the pericardium and left ventricle of the heart, as well as abrasions and an incised wound.
• Defense Version: Accused-appellant claimed he was drinking at a cousin's house 30 meters away and was fetched to pacify an altercation between Maximo Givera and the victim. He alleged that after pacifying them, the victim returned to fight Maximo and was knocked down. He asserted that he fled when the victim's son arrived armed with a bolo, and that he did not see his companions do anything more than box the victim.

• Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant argued that his conviction was based on the incredible testimonies of prosecution witnesses and that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility of Witness: Accused-appellant contended that the testimony of Melinda Delfin should be discredited because she failed to execute a sworn statement before the police regarding the incident.
• Illegal Arrest: Accused-appellant claimed his arrest at the East Avenue Medical Center on May 4, 1996, was made without a warrant, asserting that the original warrant had already been returned unserved.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The prosecution maintained that minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of eyewitnesses do not impair credibility but rather strengthen it by negating the possibility of rehearsed testimony. It was also argued that the failure to execute a sworn statement does not discredit a witness if satisfactorily explained.
• Conspiracy and Abuse of Superiority: The prosecution argued that the coordinated acts of the group demonstrated a common purpose to kill the victim, establishing conspiracy. The victim was unarmed and clearly outnumbered by four assailants, one of whom was armed with a knife, warranting the appreciation of abuse of superior strength.
• Validity of Arrest: The prosecution asserted that a valid warrant had been issued and remained enforceable until executed, recalled, or quashed, and that the accused-appellant waived any objection to the legality of his arrest by failing to move to quash the information before pleading.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the failure of a witness to execute a sworn statement destroy their credibility.
• Conspiracy: Whether the acts of the accused-appellant and his companions constitute implied conspiracy.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Whether the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation attended the killing.
• Validity of Arrest: Whether the accused-appellant's arrest was illegal for lack of a valid warrant.
• Admissibility of Testimony: Whether the medico-legal testimony taken in a co-accused's trial is admissible against an accused who did not have the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Minor discrepancies referring to minor details and not touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of witnesses; rather, they tend to strengthen credibility by discounting the possibility of rehearsed testimony. Failure to execute a sworn statement does not discredit a witness where the failure is satisfactorily explained, such as being told by police that they would just be called later.
• Conspiracy: Implied conspiracy was established by the coordinated action of the group. Accused-appellant stoned the house to draw the victim out, boxed and kicked him, and lured him toward the bridge where the others were waiting. The act of each conspirator in furtherance of the common purpose is in contemplation of law the act of all.
• Qualifying Circumstances: Treachery cannot be appreciated because the victim was not oblivious to the impending attack; he had been forewarned by accused-appellant and showed he was prepared for the attack by coming out of his house and running after the assailants. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in an implied conspiracy absent proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out. However, abuse of superiority was correctly appreciated because the victim was unarmed and clearly outnumbered by four assailants, one of whom was armed with a knife.
• Validity of Arrest: The arrest was valid. A warrant of arrest remains enforceable until it is executed, recalled, or quashed; the ten-day period for its return is merely a directive to the executing officer. In any event, any objection involving a warrant of arrest is deemed waived when the accused fails to move to quash the information before entering a plea and participating in the trial.
• Admissibility of Testimony: The medico-legal testimony taken in the separate trial of the co-accused was declared inadmissible. Where the opposing party failed to cross-examine a witness due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is rendered incompetent. Nonetheless, the fact and cause of death were sufficiently proved by the accounts of two eyewitnesses corroborated by the death certificate.

• Implied Conspiracy — Exists when participants perform specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the death of the victim, even without direct proof of a prior agreement. The act of each conspirator in furtherance of the common purpose is in contemplation of law the act of all.
• Treachery at Inception — For treachery to be appreciated, it must be shown to be present at the inception of the attack. A victim who is forewarned of danger and pursues the assailants cannot be said to be completely unaware of the impending attack, negating the element of an unexpected assault.
• Evident Premeditation in Implied Conspiracy — Cannot be appreciated in an implied conspiracy absent proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, making it impossible to determine if the accused had sufficient time for reflection.
• Waiver of Objection to Warrant of Arrest — Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before entering a plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
• Incomplete Cross-Examination — Oral testimony is rendered incompetent if cross-examination is not and cannot be completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, as the uncompleted testimony denies the adverse party the opportunity to test its truth.

• "In conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the death of the victim."
• "For treachery to be appreciated, it must be shown to be present at the inception of the attack, otherwise, even if present at a subsequent stage, it cannot be considered."
• "Oral testimony may be taken into account only when it is complete, that is, if the witness has been wholly cross-examined by the adverse party or the right to cross-examine is lost wholly or in part thru the fault of such adverse party. But when cross-examination is not and cannot be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness, the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent."

• People v. Gayon, 269 SCRA 589 (1997) — Controlling precedent for the co-accused in the same incident; their conviction for murder with grave abuse of superior strength was affirmed with modification by the Supreme Court.
• People v. Magallanes, 275 SCRA 222 (1997) — Followed for the rule that treachery must be present at the inception of the attack to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
• Bachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. CIR, 86 SCRA 27 (1978) — Followed for the doctrine that uncompleted testimony is rendered incompetent when cross-examination cannot be done due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness.
• People v. Cabiles, 284 SCRA 199 (1998) — Followed for the rule that objections involving a warrant of arrest must be made before pleading, otherwise they are deemed waived.
• People v. Custodio, 91 Phil. 698 (1955) — Followed for the principle that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in implied conspiracy absent proof of planning and sufficient time for reflection.

• Rule 113, §4, Rules of Court — Cited in relation to the ten-day period provided for the officer executing a warrant to make a return to the court. The provision was applied as a mere directive, clarifying that the failure to return the warrant within ten days does not render the warrant invalid or unenforceable.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.