People vs. Gimena

Somnambulism does not constitute a valid defense to a criminal charge other than that embraced in a plea of insanity, and the burden of proving such a state rests upon the accused.

Juan N. Gimena was married to Crispina Diana and resided in the municipality of Ronda, Province of Cebu, in a house close to that of his father-in-law, Gregorio Diana. The case involves the criminal prosecution of Gimena for the death of his wife, raising the question of whether somnambulism can be invoked as an exonerating or mitigating circumstance under Philippine criminal law.

On the morning of April 9, 1930, Juan N. Gimena assisted his father-in-law, Gregorio Diana, in cleaning bamboo in the municipality of Ronda, Cebu. After finishing the task, Gimena returned to his own home, which was situated close to Diana's, and found his wife, Crispina Diana, sleeping on the floor with their two-week-old child. Shortly thereafter, Diana heard his daughter cry for help and rushed to Gimena's house. There, he discovered Gimena attacking Crispina with a bolo. With the assistance of Gimena's brother, Teodulo, Diana managed to disarm Gimena and tie him to a post of the house.

The authorities were notified, and the justice of the peace, chief of police, a sanitary inspector, and a policeman arrived at the scene. When the justice of the peace asked Gimena why he had attacked his wife, Gimena replied that it was because she had given P2.70 to one Apolinar Sereño, whom he suspected of having illicit relations with her. A few hours later, Crispina died from her injuries; a subsequent examination revealed ten wounds on different parts of her body. Gimena was charged with parricide.

• Somnambulism: Appellant argued that he was in a state of somnambulism when he attacked his wife, thereby seeking to avoid criminal liability for the act.

• Somnambulism as Defense: Whether somnambulism constitutes a valid defense to a charge of parricide absent proof of insanity.

• Somnambulism as Defense: No. Somnambulism does not constitute a defense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity, and the accused failed to prove he was in such a state.

• Somnambulism as Defense: The defense of somnambulism must be proven, and such proof was lacking in this case. By order of the trial court, the defendant was placed under observation by Dr. Luis B. Gomez, who did not discover any somnambulism on the part of the defendant. Relying on Wharton’s Criminal Law, the Court noted that while the defense of somnambulism has been recognized, the latest holding of courts is that it does not constitute a defense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity. Because the accused failed to substantiate his claim of somnambulism or insanity, the trial court's finding of guilt was upheld.

• Somnambulism as a Defense — Somnambulism is not recognized as an independent defense to a criminal charge; it is treated only insofar as it falls under a plea of insanity. The burden of proving somnambulism rests upon the accused, and absent medical or factual substantiation, the defense fails.

• "The defense that the offense charged was committed by the accused during the prevalence of or in a state of somnambulism has been recognized; but the latest holding of courts is to the effect that it does not constitute a defense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity." — This passage, quoting Wharton’s Criminal Law, defines the ratio decidendi by establishing the legal status of somnambulism as a defense in criminal law.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Johns, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.