People vs. Geronimo

Conspiracy must be proven as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself, and mere simultaneity of acts or relationship among the accused does not establish conspiracy. Where a co-accused's cooperation is not indispensable to the commission of the offense but merely facilitates it, such cooperation renders the actor liable as an accomplice, not as a co-principal.

The accused-appellants Jose Geronimo and Romeo Geronimo are brothers, while their co-accused Enrico Geronimo is their uncle, being a first cousin of their father. The deceased, Fermin Magbanua, is a first cousin of Jose and Romeo and a nephew of Enrico. The accused and the victim were charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code, with the information alleging conspiracy, superior strength, evident premeditation, and treachery as qualifying circumstances. Two other persons named in the information, Isidro Geronimo and Eleodoro Carlos, were never apprehended.

On April 6, 1966, at about 12:30 p.m. in Sitio Ilaya Ilaya, Poblacion Norte, Sigma, Capiz, accused-appellants Enrico Geronimo, Romeo Geronimo, and Jose Geronimo, together with the deceased Fermin Magbanua, arrived from the market place already drunk and stopped at the store of Fesertas Bacalangco to buy ten liters of tuba. After drinking, Fermin Magbanua and the accused started to go home, but after having gone several meters away from the store, Fermin was hit on the face by a sling shot wielded by Eleodoro Carlos. Fermin fell to the ground, and Romeo Geronimo ran to where he had fallen and held him, while Jose Geronimo went around and hit Fermin on the head with a stone, rendering him unconscious. While Fermin was held unconscious by Romeo, Enrico Geronimo took Fermin's bolo from his waist and hacked the latter on the right ankle joint, and Jose also boloed his left ankle joint, almost severing it. Fermin Magbanua died as a result of his wounds.

Before his death, Magbanua executed an ante-mortem declaration naming the accused as his assailants, stating that he was boloed by Enrico Geronimo, Jose Geronimo, and Romeo Geronimo, and that the cause was that "we have grudges before." Upon arraignment, Enrico Geronimo pleaded guilty to the charge but manifested that he alone inflicted the injuries of the deceased. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve years of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs in the sum of P12,000.00.

The prosecution's case rested mainly on the testimony of Bonifacio Bacalangco and Teresita Delfin, and on the ante-mortem declaration of the deceased. Bonifacio Bacalangco testified that while looking out of the window of the second floor of the house of Manuel Bacalangco, he saw the accused and the victim coming out of a store four meters away; that all of a sudden, Isidro Geronimo and Eleodoro Carlos hit Fermin successively by their sling-shots between his eyes and forehead; that Romeo at once embraced Fermin, and Jose, with a stone in his hand, approached Fermin and hit him twice on the right side of his head, rendering him unconscious; that Enrico approached Fermin, drew the latter's bolo from his waist, and hacked Fermin on his right ankle joint; and that Jose followed in hacking Fermin, this time on the latter's left ankle joint, which was almost severed. Teresita Delfin corroborated Bonifacio Bacalangco's version, with the only difference that according to her, Enrico hacked Fermin on the left ankle joint while Jose did it on the right ankle joint.

The defense gave a different version of the incident. Enrico, who pleaded guilty, maintained that it was he alone and nobody else who was responsible for the wounds inflicted on the deceased. Romeo and Jose categorically denied direct and active participation in the infliction of the injuries. Enrico testified that Fermin called him and offered a drink; that after drinking the tuba, Fermin told him to pick up a quarrel with one Pedro Bacalangco; that when he refused, Fermin got mad and hit him with his fist; that he got hold of a stone and threw it at Fermin, who was then running away; that he hit Fermin on the head and the latter fell face downward; and that it was at that moment when he hacked Fermin on the right and left ankle joints. Romeo testified that he carried Fermin in his arms and brought him to the hospital, and that he had nothing to do directly or indirectly with the killing. Jose corroborated the testimony of Romeo and maintained that it was he who pacified and stopped Enrico from further inflicting injuries on Fermin. The testimonies of Consolacion Banjao and Enrico de la Cruz corroborated those of Romeo and Jose.

The Court of First Instance of Capiz convicted the accused and sentenced each of Jose Geronimo and Romeo Geronimo to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Fermin Magbanua in the sum of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The weapon used in the commission of the offense was ordered confiscated. Hence, this appeal by Romeo and Jose Geronimo.

• Lack of Conspiracy: Appellants maintained that the element of conspiracy was never proven and nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution was it shown that there was an agreement relating to the commission of the offense; that the aggression was instantaneous and all of a sudden, which circumstance precludes the idea of a preconceived design to attack the deceased.
• Unbelievable Testimonies: Appellants claimed that the testimonies of the alleged eyewitnesses should not have been accepted as true since their testimonies tend to show that they were influenced by other persons into signing their affidavits, the contents of which they merely related during the hearing.
• Non-Participation of Romeo: Appellant Romeo Geronimo argued that according to the testimony of prosecution witness Bonifacio Bacalangco, he had no part in the fight, and that it was he who even brought the victim to the hospital.
• Murder Not Homicide: Appellants contended that if at all they are liable, they should not be convicted of murder because no circumstance was proven to qualify the offense as such, what actually took place being an instantaneous and sudden outburst of temper that led to the killing.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Appellants maintained that both should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, and as to appellant Romeo Geronimo, with the alternative mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

• Conspiracy Established: The prosecution claimed that Romeo and Jose conspired with their uncle Enrico to kill the victim; that their acts were concerted and cooperative; that Romeo's act of holding Fermin immobilized the latter, thus allowing Jose to hit Fermin's head with a stone, rendering him unconscious; and that these acts of Romeo and Jose enabled Enrico to hack with ease the prostrate Fermin.
• Treachery: The Solicitor General maintained that the killing was characterized by treachery since the deceased was already helpless, in fact unconscious, when he was boloed by Enrico and Jose Geronimo, and that Romeo's act of holding the victim contributed to the latter's helpless condition.

• Conspiracy: Whether the trial court erred in holding that Jose and Romeo Geronimo conspired with Enrico Geronimo in killing the deceased.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether both appellants were convicted upon testimonies which they brand as unbelievable and unworthy of credence.
• Participation of Romeo: Whether the trial court erred in convicting appellant Romeo Geronimo despite his alleged non-participation in the aggression against the deceased.
• Murder or Homicide: Whether the crime committed is murder or homicide.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether both appellants should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, and as to appellant Romeo Geronimo alone, with the alternative mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction.

• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not established, the prosecution having shown no clear proof that the killing was envisaged by the accused or done in furtherance of a common design. The aggression was instantaneous, and mere relationship and simultaneity of acts do not prove conspiracy.
• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's findings on the credibility of prosecution witnesses were sustained, there being no sufficient reason to discard them, and the witnesses having no proven motive to testify falsely.
• Participation of Romeo: No, but with modification. Romeo's act of holding the victim constituted cooperation that merely facilitated the commission of the crime, rendering him liable as an accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, not as a co-principal.
• Murder or Homicide: Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery, the victim being helpless and attacked from behind, with the wounds all inflicted at the back part of the body.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Partially. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong was appreciated only for Jose Geronimo, who alone inflicted injury without intent to cause death. Illiteracy alone does not constitute the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction for Romeo.

• Conspiracy: The Court ruled that conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself, and it must be real and not presumptive. While the rule is that when defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, conspiracy may be inferred, the Court found no such evidence here. All the accused and the victim were drinking together in a tuba store on the day of the incident, and no other evidence was presented to show conspiracy. Citing People vs. Portugueza, the Court ruled that although the defendants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy. In the absence of clear proof that the killing was in fact envisaged by them, and there being no satisfactory showing that the killing was done in furtherance of the conspiracy, they cannot be held responsible therefor.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court noted that the dying declaration of the deceased points to Romeo and Jose, together with Enrico, as his assailants who had grudges against him. A man at the threshold of death would not accuse his first cousins, who supposedly even helped him, as his would-be killers if the accusation does not sit with the truth. The medical certificate attesting to the injuries suffered by the victim supports the prosecution's theory, with Wound No. 4 more specially substantiating the reported participation of appellant Jose. Prosecution witnesses Bonifacio Bacalangco and Teresita Delfin narrated in detail the participation of Romeo and Jose, and these witnesses have no proven motive to testify falsely in court. Where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question for having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.

• Participation of Romeo: The Court held that actual participation in a fight or combat is not the only gauge to one's criminal responsibility. Romeo's holding or embracing of the victim when appellant Jose hit the latter with a stone on the head, and the hacking of the deceased by Enrico and Jose while Romeo was holding or embracing the victim, indicate that Romeo was very much involved in the fight. However, as the details of the commission of the offense do not satisfactorily support the finding of conspiracy, whatever responsibility was incurred by Romeo must be predicated on his act of holding the victim. While this act was undoubtedly one of help and cooperation, it is not indispensable for the commission of the offense, as the hacking could have been committed just the same without his holding the victim. Romeo's cooperation not being essential to the commission of the crime but merely to facilitate the same, he thereby cooperated in the commission thereof, and hence his liability is that of an accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court cited People vs. Tatlonghari for the proposition that in case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility.

• Murder or Homicide: The Court held that the record and the medical certificate show that the serious wounds inflicted upon the deceased were all at the back part of the body, indicating that the assailants were behind the deceased when they hacked the latter. In the situation pictured by the witnesses, there can hardly be any doubt as to the helpless condition of the victim when he received the injuries which caused his death. Treachery attended the killing where the nature and location of the wounds indicate that the victim was attacked from behind. For murder results from the presence of qualificative circumstances based upon the manner in which the crime was committed and not upon the state of mind of the accused. The Court cited People vs. Labis for the proposition that the killing was qualified by treachery where the victim was being held firmly, thereby preventing him from moving or making any defense when the assailant struck him from behind with a bolo.

• Mitigating Circumstances: The Court held that the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should have been appreciated by the trial court, but not for both, only for appellant Jose Geronimo who alone inflicted injury without intent to cause the death of the victim when appellant Romeo was holding him. The serious wounds of the deceased were all at the back part of the body, which shows that the intention, according to the defense, was not to kill, or else the blows should have been aimed against the vital parts of the body. Regarding the alternative circumstance of lack of education, while the evidence shows that appellant Romeo is unschooled, this circumstance alone is not sufficient. Illiteracy alone will not constitute such circumstance; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one's act. As held in People vs. Sari, it is not illiteracy alone, but the lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one's acts, which only the trial court can appreciate, that constitute this mitigating circumstance.

• Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself — Conspiracy must be real and not presumptive. Mere relationship among the accused and simultaneity of acts in attacking the victim do not prove conspiracy. When the aggression is instantaneous and all of a sudden, the circumstance precludes the idea of a preconceived design to attack the deceased. In the absence of clear proof that the killing was envisaged by the accused and done in furtherance of the conspiracy, they cannot be held responsible therefor.

• Liability of an accomplice — Under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code, an accomplice is one who cooperates in the commission of the offense by acts that are not indispensable to its commission but merely facilitate it. Where a co-accused's act of holding the victim was not essential to the commission of the crime, the hacking having been committed just the same without such holding, the cooperation merely facilitated the commission, rendering the actor liable as an accomplice rather than as a co-principal. In case of doubt, the courts naturally lean to the milder form of responsibility.

• Treachery as a qualifying circumstance — Treachery attends the killing where the nature and location of the wounds indicate that the victim was attacked from behind, the victim being helpless and unable to defend himself. Murder results from the presence of qualificative circumstances based upon the manner in which the crime was committed and not upon the state of mind of the accused.

• Mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong — Under Article 13, No. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, this mitigating circumstance is appreciated where the wounds inflicted are not aimed at vital parts of the body, showing that the intention was not to kill. It is appreciated only for the accused who inflicted injury without intent to cause death.

• Mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction — Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, illiteracy alone does not constitute the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. It must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one's act, which only the trial court can appreciate.

• "It has been laid down as a rule that when the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments, the court will be justified in concluding that said defendants were engaged in a conspiracy." — This passage states the general rule for establishing conspiracy through concerted acts, which the Court then distinguished from the facts of the case.

• "We do not agree with the Solicitor General that there was conspiracy among the accused. It should be noted that all the accused and the victim were drinking together in a tuba store on the day of the incident. No other evidence was presented by the prosecution to show conspiracy which according to the settled rule, must be proved as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. It must be real and not presumptive." — This passage articulates the Court's finding that conspiracy was not established, emphasizing the requirement that conspiracy be proven with the same clarity as the crime itself.

• "Although the defendants are relatives and had acted with some degree of simultaneity in attacking their victim, nevertheless, this fact alone does not prove conspiracy." — This quotation from People vs. Portugueza is the canonical formulation that mere relationship and simultaneity of acts do not establish conspiracy.

• "While this act was undoubtedly one of help and cooperation, it is not indispensable for the commission of the offense as the hacking could have been committed just the same without his holding the victim. Romeo's cooperation not being essential to the commission of the crime but merely to facilitate the same, he thereby cooperated in the commission thereof and hence his liability is that of an accomplice (Article 18, Revised Penal Code)." — This passage defines the distinction between a principal and an accomplice based on whether the cooperation was indispensable to the commission of the crime or merely facilitative.

• People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 64 — Cited for the rule that concerted and cooperative acts aimed at the same object justify a finding of conspiracy.
• People vs. Carbonell, 48 Phil. 868 — Cited for the same rule on conspiracy through concerted action.
• U.S. vs. Bundal, 3 Phil. 89 — Cited for the rule that when conspiracy has been proven, all conspirators are liable as co-principals for the wrongful act and its consequences.
• People vs. Portugueza, L-22604, July 31, 1967 — Controlling precedent for the proposition that relationship and simultaneity of acts alone do not prove conspiracy.
• People vs. Basisten, 47 Phil. 493; People vs. Cerdenia, 51 Phil. 393; People vs. Carillo, 85 Phil. 611; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598 — Cited for the rule that in the absence of clear proof that the killing was envisaged and done in furtherance of the conspiracy, the accused cannot be held responsible therefor.
• People vs. Tatlonghari, L-22094, March 28, 1969 — Cited for the rule on credibility of witnesses and for the proposition that in case of doubt, courts lean to the milder form of responsibility, supporting the accomplice liability of Romeo.
• People vs. Labis, L-22087, November 15, 1967 — Cited for the proposition that killing is qualified by treachery where the victim was held firmly, preventing him from moving or making any defense when struck from behind.
• People vs. Sari, L-7169, May 30, 1956 — Cited for the rule that illiteracy alone does not constitute the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one's acts.
• People vs. Ripas, L-6246, March 26, 1956; U.S. vs. Estorio, 35 Phil. 410; People vs. Joseph, 52 Phil. 206; People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87; People vs. Sedenio, L-6372, April 29, 1954 — Cited for the same rule on lack of instruction as a mitigating circumstance.

• Article 18, Revised Penal Code — Defines accomplices as those who cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts not indispensable to its commission. Applied to Romeo Geronimo, whose act of holding the victim merely facilitated the hacking and was not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
• Article 13, No. 3, Revised Penal Code — Defines the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. Appreciated in favor of Jose Geronimo, who inflicted injury without intent to cause death, the wounds being at the back part of the body and not aimed at vital parts.
• Article 15, Revised Penal Code — Defines the alternative mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction. Held not applicable to Romeo Geronimo, as illiteracy alone is insufficient; it must be accompanied by lack of sufficient intelligence and knowledge of the full significance of one's acts.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of murder, punishable with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Applied to the killing qualified by treachery.
• Article 3306, New Civil Code — Cited in the information for the damages claimed by the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P6,000.00.

Makalintal, Acting C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Makasiar, JJ., concurred. Barredo, J., concurred in the result. Antonio, J., took no part.