People vs. Gavarra

Where an offender commences but voluntarily desists from committing rape, he cannot be convicted of attempted rape, because the non-completion of the felony resulted from his own spontaneous desistance rather than from a cause or accident other than his own will.

Dominador Gavarra was a resident of Matnog, Sorsogon, where the victim, eight-year-old Celerina Lepiten Leyco, lived with her elder sister Elizabeth Leyco Gabelo and brother-in-law Eleno Gabelo. The extrajudicial confession at issue was executed on August 21, 1972, before the 1973 Constitution took effect, such that the presence of counsel or its waiver was not then required for admissibility. The case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review by operation of law, owing to the death penalty imposed by the Court of First Instance.

On the afternoon of August 19, 1972, at about two o'clock, eight-year-old Celerina Leyco, nicknamed "Baby," was sent by her elder sister Elizabeth Gabelo to fetch water from a well near the house of David Garcia, approximately one hundred meters away. To reach the well, the girl had to take a foot path crossing the dry bed of the Lamawan river. Fe Garcia, wife of David Garcia, saw Celerina pass by carrying an empty pail and, about five minutes later, noticed the accused Dominador Gavarra up a coconut tree some thirty-five to forty meters from the path the girl had taken. Fe thereafter saw Celerina on her way home, carrying a pail filled with water, but lost sight of her when she reached the river because of the bushes.

After about an hour of waiting, Elizabeth grew worried and went to the Garcia house to ask Fe whether she had seen Celerina. Fe reported that she had last seen the girl on her way home but had lost sight of her at the river. Elizabeth called her husband Eleno, who was gathering coconuts with David Garcia, and the three began searching along the path. They encountered Gavarra sitting on a stone inside a clearing he cultivated; Eleno asked whether he had seen Celerina, and Gavarra answered in the negative and refused to join the search, saying he had work to do. The search continued until late afternoon without success.

The following morning, the search resumed with the help of Barrio Captain Jose Bitonio and others. At about one o'clock in the afternoon of August 20, 1972, Bitonio discovered the girl's lifeless body in the thick growth of Atty. Joaquin Pagdagdagan's land in Sitio Lamawan, only about five arms' length from the stone where Gavarra had been seen sitting the previous afternoon. Bitonio summoned Gavarra and confronted him about his presence in the vicinity; Gavarra admitted having gathered coconuts about ten meters from where the body was found. The body was transported to the municipal building, where Dr. Adolfo J. Camposano conducted an autopsy. His findings included multiple deep incised wounds on the forehead, neck, and left shoulder, inflicted with a sharp instrument, and a genital examination showing the labia majora slightly congested with resistance to insertion of a finger. The cause of death was blood loss secondary to the multiple incised wounds.

That night, the vice-mayor and two policemen arrested Gavarra at his house and brought him to the municipal building for investigation. On the afternoon of August 21, 1972, Gavarra was brought before Municipal Judge Mayorico Gallanosa, before whom he signed an extrajudicial confession taken by T/Sgt. Nestor Bontigao. In his written statement, Gavarra admitted seeing "Baby" carrying a plastic pail, approaching her, taking her to the thicket near the river, and abusing her, though his "penis could not penetrate the vagina." He then hacked her with a bolo until she stopped breathing, recalling two hacks to the head and neck. At trial, Gavarra repudiated the confession, testifying that police had beaten him unconscious and forcibly guided his hand to sign. The trial court rejected this account, finding the signature firm and regular and crediting the municipal judge's testimony that he had explained the statement's contents to the accused and physically examined him for signs of injury, finding none.

• Involuntariness of Confession: The accused-appellant alleged that he was forced to sign the extrajudicial confession, testifying that police inflicted blows upon him until he lost consciousness and then forcibly guided his hand to sign the document before the municipal judge.

• Voluntariness of Confession: Whether the extrajudicial confession of the accused was admissible despite his claim that it was obtained through coercion and physical violence.
• Proper Classification of the Crime: Whether the accused was guilty of the complex crime of attempted rape with homicide, or of some other offense.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the death penalty could be imposed in light of the 1987 Constitution's abolition of capital punishment.

• Voluntariness of Confession: Yes. The extrajudicial confession was admissible, the trial court's finding of voluntariness having been sustained on review.
• Proper Classification of the Crime: No. The accused was not guilty of attempted rape with homicide; the only crime established was murder, qualified by treachery and superior strength.
• Proper Penalty: No. The death penalty could not be imposed; pursuant to Section 19, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty for murder was reduced to reclusion temporal in its maximum period, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law applied to set the minimum.

• Voluntariness of Confession: The extrajudicial confession was executed before the 1973 Constitution took effect, so the presence of counsel or its waiver was not required for admissibility. The governing requirement was that the confession be made freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement, or hope of reward. The trial court found the accused's claim of forced signature incredible, noting that his signature on the confession was "firm and regular in pressure, showing no evidence of tremor or inordinate dragging of the pen," and bore a striking resemblance to his signatures on the certificate of arraignment and notice of trial. The municipal judge testified that he explained the contents of the statement to the accused before the latter signed and that he physically examined the accused and found no visible injuries, certifying this finding on the confession itself. Although the police engaged in sadistic behavior after the confession was signed—publicly displaying the accused with outstretched hands tied to posts and a placard on his chest—the trial court held, and the Supreme Court agreed, that this post-confession misconduct could not affect the confession's admissibility, as it occurred after and resulted from the confession rather than preceding or producing it.

• Proper Classification of the Crime: Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, an attempted felony requires that the offender commence the commission directly by overt acts but fail to perform all acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The accused admitted in his confession that his penis could not penetrate the victim's vagina, but the physician testified that penetration was physically possible, though it would have caused laceration. From this, the Court concluded that the accused could have completed the rape but voluntarily desisted. Because the non-completion was attributable to his own spontaneous desistance rather than to a cause or accident apart from his will, the elements of attempted rape were not satisfied. The medical finding of slight congestion of the labia majora was inconclusive, as the physician testified it could have been caused by contact with a hard object or by the rubbing of clothes. The fact that the victim's panty was still on when the body was found further undercut the inference of sexual penetration. The only crime proved was murder: the killing of a defenseless eight-year-old girl was attended by treachery and superior strength.

• Proper Penalty: Section 19, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty. The penalty for murder under the Revised Penal Code, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, was accordingly reduced to reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term was set within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., reclusion temporal in its medium and minimum period, resulting in an indeterminate sentence of twelve years and one day as minimum to eighteen years as maximum.

• Voluntariness of Extrajudicial Confessions — Before a confession may be admitted, it must be shown that it was made freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement, or hope of reward of any sort. The admissibility of a confession depends in each case upon the facts and circumstances surrounding its execution. Where the confession was made before the 1973 Constitution took effect, the presence of counsel or its waiver was not required. The Court applied this doctrine by sustaining the trial court's finding of voluntariness, anchored on the firm and regular signature of the accused, the municipal judge's testimony that he explained the statement's contents and examined the accused for injuries, and the fact that police misconduct occurred after rather than before the confession.

• Attempted Felony and Spontaneous Desistance — Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony is attempted when the offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Where the offender could have completed the felony but chose not to, his voluntary desistance precludes conviction for the attempted felony. The Court applied this principle to hold that because penetration was physically possible and the accused nonetheless stopped, his desistance was spontaneous and voluntary, foreclosing a conviction for attempted rape.

• Abolition of the Death Penalty — Section 19, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution abolished the death penalty, such that the maximum imposable penalty for murder became reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Where no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were shown, the proper penalty was reclusion temporal in its maximum period, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law applied to fix the minimum.

• "In an attempted crime, the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance." — This passage states the controlling legal standard for attempted felonies under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, which the Court applied to reject the trial court's conviction for attempted rape.

• "His desistance was a voluntary act on his part, hence, he cannot be held guilty of attempted rape." — This is the ratio decidendi for the modification of the conviction: because the accused's failure to complete the rape was due to his own will rather than an external cause, the elements of attempted rape were not satisfied.

• "We hold that the only crime the accused can be found guilty of committing is murder. It is clear that in killing an 8-year old defenseless girl, he did so with treachery, taking advantage of his superior strength." — This passage defines the final characterization of the offense and identifies the qualifying circumstances of treachery and superior strength.

• U.S. vs. De Leon, 27 Phil. 506, 511 — Cited as authority for the proposition that before an extrajudicial confession may be admitted, it must be shown to have been made freely and voluntarily, without compulsion, inducement, or hope of reward. The Court relied on this case to frame the voluntariness standard applied to the accused's confession.

• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines an attempted felony as one where the offender commences the commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Applied to hold that the accused's voluntary desistance from completing rape precluded a conviction for attempted rape.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. Applied to convict the accused of murder, qualified by treachery and taking advantage of superior strength in killing a defenseless eight-year-old girl.

• Section 19, Article IV, 1987 Constitution — Abolishes the death penalty unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, as determined by Congress. Applied to reduce the penalty from death to reclusion temporal in its maximum period.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Authorizes imposition of an indeterminate penalty with a minimum and maximum term. Applied to set the minimum at twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal and the maximum at eighteen years of reclusion temporal.

Teehankee, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padila, Bidin, Sarmiento, and Cortes, JJ. Gancayco, J., was on leave.

• Melencio-Herrera, J. — The dissent argued that the crime committed was consummated rape with homicide, not merely murder. Relying on the well-settled rule that the slightest penetration, even without emission, is sufficient to consummate rape, and that complete penetration and rupture of the hymen are not essential, the dissent maintained that the accused's admission that his penis "could not penetrate the vagina" did not signify voluntary desistance but rather physical inability to achieve full penetration after some entry had already occurred. The medical finding of slight reddish appearance of the labia majora, which the physician attributed to possible contact with an erect penis, supported the inference that the victim's panty had been removed and replaced. The dissent characterized the physician's statement that penetration "would have been possible" as a theoretical possibility insufficient to establish voluntary desistance. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of rape with homicide would have been punishable by death, but with the abolition of capital punishment, the imposable penalty would be reclusion perpetua.