People vs. Gatong-o

A police operation constitutes valid entrapment, not instigation, when the criminal intent originates from the accused and the peace officers merely employ ways and means to capture the lawbreaker in flagrante delicto. The crime is consummated by the delivery of the prohibited goods, and the absence of marked money handed to the accused does not negate the validity of the entrapment.

The appellants were charged under Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, for the illegal sale and delivery of dried marijuana flowering tops. The case arose from a police entrapment operation conducted by the Narcotics Unit of the Angeles City Police, acting on information from a civilian informer that three Igorots were arriving in the city to sell twelve kilograms of marijuana. The operation was designed to apprehend drug peddlers, a category of crime for which entrapment has proven to be an effective means of apprehension.

At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of May 30, 1984, Pat. Celestino de la Cruz of the Narcotics Unit of the Angeles City Police received word from a civilian informer that three Igorots were arriving in Angeles City later that evening to sell twelve kilograms of marijuana to interested buyers. At 11:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, the civilian informer went to the police station to relay the information to the policemen on duty. The information was transmitted to the station commander, Captain Paras, who directed Pat. de la Cruz, Sgt. Edgardo Raquidan and Pat. Pedro Hernandez to prepare an entrapment operation for the suspects, with Sgt. Raquidan acting as poseur-buyer.

At midnight, the civilian informer called the police station, informing the policemen assigned to the case that he had already gotten in touch with the three suspects and that they were ready to deal with him. The informer asked the policemen to proceed to Deang's Marketing & Commercial establishment along MacArthur Highway, Angeles City. The policemen arrived at the designated place at around 12:30 in the early morning of May 31, 1984. Only Sgt. Raquidan alighted from their car.

Several minutes thereafter, the civilian informer arrived on board a tricycle and told Raquidan that the suspects were waiting in a nearby hotel and that the sum of P1,600.00 was needed for the entrapment. Pat. de la Cruz instructed the civilian informer to tell the suspects that an interested buyer was waiting for them at the Deang's Marketing Store. After the civilian informer left, the policemen drove their car to a distance of about fifteen meters, leaving Raquidan alone in front of the Deang's Marketing Store. The civilian informer then returned accompanied by the suspects and introduced Raquidan to one of the suspects, Bert Bacbac. After some preliminary negotiations, Raquidan agreed to purchase marijuana from Bacbac. Thereafter, the two other suspects handed over to Raquidan a plastic bag containing one kilogram of marijuana.

Upon ascertaining the contents of the plastic bag, Raquidan gave the signal to the other policemen by putting his hand on his head. The policemen approached the suspects, introduced themselves as police officers, and arrested them. They were brought to the police station for investigation and thereafter detained at the Angeles City Jail. The policemen conducted a search at the hotel room where the suspects were billeted but failed to find any evidence incriminating the suspects.

The defense presented a different version of events. The appellants claimed that on the evening of May 30, 1984, they were on their way to San Fernando, Pampanga to work in a certain Jun-Jun Bakery in Barangay San Isidro where Bacbac was once employed. They got out of the bus upon reaching Dau, Pampanga and took supper at a restaurant in Angeles City. Immediately after they left the restaurant, they were arrested by the police officers and forced to board their vehicle. They were brought to a grassy place where they were asked if they had any marijuana with them. The appellants denied having marijuana in their possession, so they were brought to the police station where they were mauled and thereafter detained in the Angeles City Jail.

The trial court found the accused guilty, and the appellants appealed, assailing the trial court's decision to give credence to the evidence for the prosecution instead of that of the defense. The trial court had also made an observation that Angeles City was known to be a "drop area" for marijuana due to the presence of Clark Air Base, a statement the Supreme Court found had no support in the records.

• Credibility of the Civilian Informer: Appellants argued that it is not credible that the police operatives would not know the name of their civilian informer, suggesting that the failure to identify the informer casts doubt on the existence of such an informer and the legitimacy of the operation.

• Improbability of the Transaction: Appellants argued that it is beyond human understanding that any of them would have parted with precious merchandise and handed the same to a person they met for the first time without receiving the corresponding payment therefor, noting that the police officers did not have the P1,600.00 with them during the incident.

• Lack of Secrecy and Care: Appellants observed that the operation was not conducted in characteristic secrecy and care, rendering it incredible, because the transaction was conducted at the Deang's Marketing store in front of the Remedian Barbecue Plaza where there were people around, and the loud voices of the appellants during the negotiation could be heard by the operatives who were hidden ten meters away.

• Impossibility of Seeing the Signal: Appellants contended that it was not possible for the two other operatives to have seen the signal of Raquidan when they were ten to fifteen meters away and the place was dimly lit.

• Inconsistencies in Testimony: Appellants faulted the testimony of Raquidan for his inability to recall who among the appellants handed the marijuana to him, and assailed the testimony of Pat. de la Cruz for his failure to recall the name of the hotel where the appellants were billeted, considering that the hotel is located in Angeles City where de la Cruz resides.

• Improper Trial Court Observation: Appellants correctly pointed out that the trial court's observation that Angeles City has been known to be a "drop area" for marijuana due to the presence of Clark Air Base had no basis in the record.

• Positive and Clear Prosecution Case: The prosecution's case was positive and clear, as the examination of the contents of the plastic bag taken from the appellants proved to contain marijuana, and the appellants were caught in the act of selling marijuana to Raquidan.

• No Motive for False Charge: The appellants failed to show any cogent motive for the police officers to falsely charge them for peddling marijuana.

• Entrapment vs. Instigation: Whether the police operation constituted valid entrapment or improper instigation, given that the criminal intent to sell marijuana allegedly originated from the appellants and the police merely provided the opportunity for the crime to be committed.

• Effect of the Trial Court's Improper Observation: Whether the trial court's unsupported observation that Angeles City was a "drop area" for marijuana, due to the presence of Clark Air Base, undermined the validity of the conviction.

• Entrapment vs. Instigation: Yes. The operation constituted valid entrapment. The criminal intent to sell marijuana originated from the appellants, who were ready to deal with interested buyers, and the police merely employed ways and means to capture them in flagrante delicto. The crime was consummated by the delivery of the goods, and the absence of marked money did not negate the validity of the entrapment.

• Effect of the Trial Court's Improper Observation: No. The trial court's observation that Angeles City was a "drop area" for marijuana had no support in the records and was improper, but it did not in the least minimize the guilt of the appellants for the crime they committed, as the prosecution's case remained positive and clear.

• Entrapment vs. Instigation: The Court distinguished entrapment from inducement or instigation. In entrapment, the idea to commit the crime originates from the accused, and nobody induces or prods him into committing the offense; a criminal is caught committing the act by ways and means devised by peace officers. In instigation, the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator, and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him; the instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, the crime had already been committed, while in instigation, it was not and could not have been committed were it not for the instigation by the peace officer. Applying these principles, the Court found that the appellants were ready to deal with interested buyers, and the police merely provided the opportunity for the transaction. The Court rejected the appellants' argument that the transaction was improbable because no payment was made, holding that the crime was consummated by the delivery of the goods, and there was no need to hand the marked money to the appellants in payment thereof. The Court also dismissed the appellants' other arguments: the failure to identify the civilian informer did not establish that no such informer existed, as the police operatives may have been familiar with the informer without bothering to inquire about his name, or may have refused to reveal his identity for his personal safety; the transaction occurred past midnight when there were few people around, explaining why the conversation was loud; the distance and light were sufficient for the operatives to see Raquidan's signal; and the minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses did not undermine the positive identification of the appellants. The Court found the defense's version of events far from credible, as the appellants failed to show any cogent motive for the police officers to falsely charge them for peddling marijuana.

• Effect of the Trial Court's Improper Observation: The Court acknowledged that the trial court's observation about Angeles City being a "drop area" for marijuana had no support in the records and was improper. However, this error did not affect the validity of the conviction, as the prosecution's case was positive and clear, and the appellants were caught in the act of selling marijuana to Raquidan.

• Entrapment vs. Instigation — Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker, where the idea to commit the crime originates from the accused and nobody induces or prods him into committing the offense. Instigation, on the other hand, occurs when the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. In entrapment, the crime had already been committed, while in instigation, it was not and could not have been committed were it not for the instigation by the peace officer. The Court applied this distinction to uphold the validity of the police operation, finding that the appellants' criminal intent to sell marijuana existed independently of the police's actions.

• Consummation of the Crime of Illegal Sale of Drugs — The crime of illegal sale of drugs is consummated by the delivery of the goods. The absence of payment or the failure to hand marked money to the accused does not negate the validity of the entrapment, as the delivery of the prohibited goods completes the offense.

• "Entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Oftentimes it is the only effective way of apprehending a criminal in the act of the commission of the offense. In entrapment the Idea to commit the crime originated from the accused. Nobody induces or prods him into committing the offense. A criminal is caught committing the act by ways and means devised by peace officers." — This passage defines the doctrine of entrapment and distinguishes it from instigation, forming the core of the Court's reasoning in upholding the conviction.

• "It must be distinguished from inducement or instigation wherein the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the Commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante delicto." — This passage articulates the critical distinction between entrapment and instigation, which is the central legal question in the case.

• "The crime was consummated by the delivery of the goods." — This concise statement establishes the rule that delivery of the prohibited drugs completes the offense of illegal sale, regardless of whether payment was made.

N/A — The decision does not cite any specific case precedents.

• Section 4, Article II, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) — The provision under which the appellants were charged and convicted for the illegal sale and delivery of dried marijuana flowering tops. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction, finding that the prosecution had established the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concurred. Narvasa, J., was on leave.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the decision.