People vs. Gabo

A judge's erroneous application of the equipoise rule at the probable cause stage, rather than after trial, constitutes at most an error of judgment correctible by appeal — not grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari — provided the judge personally evaluated the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence as required under Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The case arose from a fire that razed the Sanyoware Plastic Products Manufacturing Corporation plant in Bocaue, Bulacan on May 14, 2001. Sanyoware and New Unitedware Marketing Corporation occupied adjoining portions of a single-storey building divided by a concrete firewall. Investigations by the CIDG and the Inter-Agency Anti-Arson Task Force led to the filing of a complaint for destructive arson against several corporate officers of Sanyoware and Unitedware, premised on sworn statements of employees and investigators suggesting the fire was deliberately set to conceal bankruptcy and defraud creditors. The Bocaue Fire Station's own investigation, however, pointed to faulty electrical wiring as the cause.

On May 14, 2001, around 12:15 a.m., a fire broke out inside the plant of Sanyoware Plastic Products Manufacturing Corporation in Bocaue, Bulacan. The plant contained four single-storey buildings enclosed in concrete walls with steel trusses and galvanized iron roofing. The building razed by fire — Sanyoware 2, Warehouse 2 — was located at the right innermost portion of the plant facing north. Sanyoware occupied the right, western portion, while New Unitedware Marketing Corporation rented the left, eastern portion. A tall concrete firewall with a steel gate divided the two halves.

Investigations were conducted by the CIDG and the Inter-Agency Anti-Arson Task Force. Based on sworn statements from several Sanyoware employees and a fireman, the DOJ charged Wilson Cua Ting (Plant Manager), Edward Ngo Yao (President of Unitedware), Willy So Tan (Vice-President for Operations), Carol Fernan Ortega (Assistant to the External Vice-President), and two John Does with destructive arson. The prosecution's witnesses offered circumstantial evidence of motive and opportunity: Richard Madrideo, a supervisor, claimed there were two separate fires and that respondents instructed him to attribute the cause to defective wiring; Jaime Kalaw, a former maintenance head, asserted the warehouse was relatively new with circuit breakers shut down, making faulty wiring unlikely, and noted that unserviceable molds were transferred to the burned warehouse a week before the fire while expensive finished products were loaded onto delivery trucks the day before; Raymond Dy, a warehouse supervisor, stated that saleable products were transferred out of the burned warehouse while unusable components were moved in, allegedly upon orders of the plant manager; and Shanda Amistad, a former stay-in worker, observed Yao making unusual visits to Sanyoware the day before the fire. SPO1 Valeriano Dizon and Inspector Allan Barredo alleged that Sr. Supt. Enrique Linsangan took their witness statements and compelled them to sign a Final Investigation Report they had not prepared.

Respondents countered with a detailed Counter-Affidavit. They alleged that a representative of CRM Adjustment Corporation had offered money and jobs to persons to fabricate perjured statements implicating them in arson. Richard Madrideo himself had executed a subsequent "Salaysay" admitting he received ₱1,000 and later ₱15,000 from Atty. Lugtu, was given a cellphone, and was promised a job in exchange for testifying about simultaneous fires. Respondents denied the transfers of saleable and unusable products, asserted that the company was profitable and its loans fully secured by real estate mortgages, and pointed out that the Bocaue Fire Station's own investigation — including laboratory examination of specimens — found no flammable substances and attributed the fire to faulty electrical wiring. Wilson Ting explained his Sunday presence at the plant as routine for an operations manager checking delivery trucks against theft, and Edward Yao explained his visits as being to collect chairs and drawers for his mother-in-law.

After preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Pormento recommended filing an Information for Destructive Arson. The Information was filed with RTC Malolos, Branch XI, docketed as Criminal Case No. 300-47M 2002. Before arraignment, respondents filed a Motion to Conduct Hearing to Determine Probable Cause. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of probable cause under Section 6, Rule 112, applying the equipoise rule because the sworn statements from both sides contained contradictory positions. The RTC noted that the Chemistry Report found no flammable substance, that official fire investigation reports pointed to faulty wiring, and that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty had not been overcome. The RTC's factual findings were affirmed by the CA, which found no grave abuse of discretion.

• Propriety of the Equipoise Rule: Petitioner argued that the equipoise rule cannot be applied by the RTC merely after the filing of the Information, as the rule properly comes into play only after the parties have concluded the presentation of their respective evidence, when the court can assess and weigh evidence and determine preponderance.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner contended that the CA patently and grossly abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting the equipoise rule in the case at bar.

• Certiorari as Substitute for Lost Appeal: Respondents argued that certiorari does not lie because it is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, or more importantly, a lapsed appeal, as petitioner had allowed the reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Rule 45 to lapse.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is proper given that petitioner allowed the period for appeal under Rule 45 to lapse.
• Application of the Equipoise Rule: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying the equipoise rule to dismiss the case at the probable cause stage, before the parties had presented their evidence.
• Sufficiency of Probable Cause Determination: Whether the RTC complied with its duty under Section 6, Rule 112 to personally evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence, such that its dismissal for lack of probable cause was not attended by grave abuse of discretion.

• Propriety of Certiorari: No. Certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal; petitioner received the assailed CA Resolution on October 10, 2003, had fifteen days to file a Rule 45 petition, but allowed the period to lapse.
• Application of the Equipoise Rule: No, the equipoise rule was misplaced at the probable cause stage, as it is generally applied only after the parties have concluded presentation of evidence. However, this misapplication constituted at most an error of judgment, not grave abuse of discretion.
• Sufficiency of Probable Cause Determination: No grave abuse of discretion. The RTC personally evaluated the prosecutor's resolution and supporting evidence, and its factual findings — including the chemistry report finding no flammable substance and official fire reports attributing the cause to faulty wiring — were supported by the record and affirmed by the CA.

• Propriety of Certiorari: A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner received the assailed CA Resolution on October 10, 2003, and had until October 25, 2003 to file a petition for review under Rule 45. Instead of filing the appeal, petitioner allowed the reglementary period to lapse and then filed a certiorari petition. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The petition was thus dismissible on this ground alone.

• Application of the Equipoise Rule: The equipoise rule provides that where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise, or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The Court acknowledged petitioner's position that the rule has been generally applied only after the parties have concluded the presentation of their respective evidence, as shown in Abarquez vs. People, Tin vs. People, and People vs. Leano. The RTC's reliance on the equipoise rule was therefore misplaced. However, this misapplication did not equate to grave abuse of discretion but at most an error of judgment. Grave abuse of discretion implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. The RTC's conclusions were not outrageously wrong, manifestly mistaken, or whimsically arrived at; they were at most fairly debatable.

• Sufficiency of Probable Cause Determination: Under Section 6, Rule 112, the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence and may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. The RTC had complied with this duty, as evidenced by its detailed discussion of the chemistry report finding no flammable substance, the official fire investigation reports attributing the cause to faulty wiring, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, and the contradictory nature of the witnesses' sworn statements. The RTC's factual findings were accorded great weight and respect, more so because they were affirmed by the CA. In a petition for certiorari, questions of fact are not entertained; the sole office of the writ is correction of errors of jurisdiction, not correction of the public respondent's evaluation of evidence and factual findings. An error of judgment committed in the exercise of jurisdiction is not correctible through certiorari. Furthermore, the dismissal for lack of probable cause does not result in acquittal, and double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused had not been arraigned and the dismissal was upon his express motion.

• Certiorari as Not a Substitute for a Lost Appeal — A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be allowed when a party fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the petition on procedural grounds, as petitioner had allowed the reglementary period for a Rule 45 petition for review to lapse before filing the certiorari petition.

• Equipoise Rule — Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise, or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence and the other with guilt. The Court clarified that this rule has been generally applied only after the parties have concluded the presentation of their respective evidence, not at the probable cause stage. Its misapplication at the pre-arraignment stage constitutes at most an error of judgment, not grave abuse of discretion.

• Probable Cause for Issuance of Warrant of Arrest — Probable cause is such a set of facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. It demands more than suspicion but requires less than evidence that would justify conviction. The judge's determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant of arrest is distinct from the preliminary investigation proper, which is the function of the investigating prosecutor. Under Section 6, Rule 112, the judge may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. An error of judgment in the exercise of jurisdiction is not correctible through certiorari.

• Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duty — Official investigation reports and findings carry the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed. A mere affidavit cannot overcome this presumption, and strong evidence is necessary to rebut it. The RTC relied on this presumption in giving weight to the Bocaue Fire Station's investigation report and the chemistry report finding no flammable substance.

• "It is well settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lies only when, 'there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,' and certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for a lost appeal." — This passage states the procedural ground for dismissal, reaffirming the doctrine that certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal.

• "While the use of the equipoise rule was not proper under the circumstances of the case at bar, the same, however, does not equate to an abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, but at most, merely an error of judgment." — This is the ratio decidendi on the substantive issue: the misapplication of the equipoise rule at the probable cause stage is an error of judgment, not grave abuse of discretion, and thus not correctible by certiorari.

• "The sole office of writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and does not include correction of public respondent's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon." — This passage defines the scope and limits of certiorari, distinguishing errors of jurisdiction from errors of judgment.

• Baltazar vs. People, G.R. No. 174016, July 28, 2008 — Cited for the definition of probable cause and the judge's task of determining its existence for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
• Abarquez vs. People, G.R. No. 150762, January 20, 2006 — Cited to show that the equipoise rule has been generally applied only after the parties have concluded the presentation of their respective evidence.
• Tin vs. People, 415 Phil. 1 (2001) — Cited both for the equipoise rule's definition and as authority that the rule is applied after trial, not at the probable cause stage.
• People vs. Leano, 419 Phil. 241 (2001) — Cited alongside Abarquez and Tin as authority that the equipoise rule is applied after the parties have presented their evidence.
• Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106153, July 14, 1997 — Cited for the doctrine that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.
• People vs. Monteiro, G.R. No. 49454, December 21, 1990 — Cited for the proposition that double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and the case was dismissed upon his express motion.

• Section 6, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting evidence and may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause. The RTC relied on this provision in dismissing the arson case, and the Supreme Court confirmed that the RTC had complied with its duty thereunder.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the special civil action for certiorari, available only when there is no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied this rule to dismiss the petition, as petitioner had a lost appeal under Rule 45.

Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice, Chairperson), Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura (Associate Justice), Roberto A. Abad (Associate Justice), Jose Catral Mendoza (Associate Justice).