People vs. Gabiosa

The constitutional phrase "after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" does not require the issuing judge to examine both the complainant and the witnesses. Examination of either the complainant or the witness is sufficient as long as the judge personally determines the existence of probable cause. Additionally, the determination of whether questions are "searching and probing" depends on the totality of the examination and the judge's satisfaction of probable cause, not on a rigid formula or the examination of both parties.

Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero, Officer-in-Charge of the Kidapawan City Police Station, applied for a search warrant against Roberto Rey E. Gabiosa, Sr. based on intelligence reports that Gabiosa was selling methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) from his residence at Apo Sandawa Homes Phase 1, Barangay Poblacion, Kidapawan City. The application was supported by the affidavit of PO1 Rodolfo M. Geverola, who conducted surveillance and a successful test buy operation on January 18, 2017, purchasing shabu from Gabiosa for P1,000.00, which subsequently tested positive for illegal drugs.

• On January 20, 2017, Police Superintendent Leo Tayabas Ajero, Officer-in-Charge of the Kidapawan City Police Station, applied for a search warrant against Roberto Rey E. Gabiosa, Sr. before Executive Judge Arvin Sadiri B. Balagot.
• The application was supported by the affidavit of PO1 Rodolfo M. Geverola, who alleged that on January 18, 2017, he conducted a test buy operation at Gabiosa's house where he purchased one small sachet of suspected shabu for P1,000.00 from Gabiosa himself.
• PO1 Geverola's affidavit stated that the substance purchased tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride per Chemistry Report No. PC-D-004-2017 dated January 18, 2017.
• Judge Balagot conducted a preliminary examination of PO1 Geverola under oath, asking questions regarding the test buy operation, the description of Gabiosa's house (two-storey, concrete, with red steel gate), the vehicle used, and the basis for believing Gabiosa still possessed illegal drugs.
• During the examination, PO1 Geverola confirmed he personally dealt with Gabiosa, that Gabiosa did not suspect he was a police officer, and that they had a man observing Gabiosa to confirm continued possession.
• Judge Balagot issued Search Warrant No. 149-2017 on January 20, 2017, finding probable cause based on the examination.
• The warrant was subsequently served on Gabiosa, leading to the seizure of evidence and his subsequent prosecution.
• Gabiosa filed a Motion to Quash before the RTC, arguing that the warrant was invalid because Judge Balagot examined only the witness (PO1 Geverola) and not the complainant (P/Supt Ajero), and that the questions propounded were merely a rehash of the affidavit and not probing or searching.
• The RTC denied the motion, ruling that the judge was not required to examine both the complainant and the witness, and that the examination satisfied the requirements for establishing probable cause.
• The CA reversed the RTC, holding that the constitutional use of "and" between "complainant" and "witnesses" required examination of both parties, and that the questions asked were superficial and perfunctory.

• The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution to require the issuing judge to examine both the complainant and the witnesses; established jurisprudence holds that examination of either is sufficient as long as probable cause is established.
• The RTC correctly ruled that the judge need not examine the complainant if the witness's testimony is sufficient to establish probable cause, especially where the complainant lacks personal knowledge of the facts.
• The questions propounded by Judge Balagot were sufficiently probing and searching when viewed in their totality, as they established that PO1 Geverola had personal knowledge of the facts and that probable cause existed.
• The CA committed reversible error in setting aside the search warrant and finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC.

• The search warrant was constitutionally defective because Judge Balagot failed to examine the complainant (P/Supt Ajero) and only examined the witness (PO1 Geverola).
• The constitutional provision uses the conjunction "and" between "complainant" and "witnesses," which requires the judge to examine both parties, not just one or the other.
• The questions propounded by Judge Balagot were superficial and perfunctory, merely rehashing the averments in the affidavit without probing into the details or verifying the witness's personal knowledge.
• PO1 Geverola admitted during examination that the information regarding continued possession of drugs was based on another person's observation (the "man observing"), not on his personal knowledge, undermining the basis for probable cause.
• The CA correctly declared the search warrant null and void and suppressed the evidence obtained therefrom.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion or reversible error in granting the Petition for Certiorari and declaring Search Warrant No. 149-2017 null and void.
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the constitutional requirement that a judge examine "the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" mandates the examination of both the complainant and the witnesses, or whether examination of either is sufficient.
  • Whether the questions propounded by the issuing judge during the preliminary examination were sufficiently probing and searching to establish probable cause.

• Procedural: The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in granting the Petition for Certiorari. The Regional Trial Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Gabiosa's Motion to Quash. The Supreme Court set aside the CA Decision dated February 13, 2019 and Resolution dated July 10, 2019, and reinstated the RTC Resolution dated September 26, 2017.
• Substantive:
  • The word "and" in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution does not require the judge to examine both the complainant and the witnesses. Examination of either the complainant or the witness is sufficient provided the judge is personally satisfied that probable cause exists. The primordial consideration is the judge's determination of probable cause, not the number of persons examined.
  • The questions propounded by Judge Balagot were sufficiently probing and searching when viewed as a whole. The judge satisfied himself that PO1 Geverola had personal knowledge of the facts by asking specific questions about the test buy, the description of the house, and the basis for believing drugs were still in possession. The examination was not merely routinary or perfunctory.

• Probable Cause Determination in Search Warrants — The fundamental protection of the search and seizure clause requires that a magistrate determine probable cause personally before issuing a warrant. The judge must be satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that the evidence sought is in the place to be searched.
• Examination Under Oath Requirement — The constitutional mandate that a judge examine "the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" is satisfied by examining either the complainant or the witness, not necessarily both. The purpose is to enable the judge to determine probable cause; if the complainant's affidavit is based on hearsay, the examination of a witness with personal knowledge is necessary and sufficient.
• Personal Knowledge Requirement — Affidavits and testimony in support of search warrants must be based on personal knowledge, not hearsay. If the applicant lacks personal knowledge, the judge must examine witnesses who have direct personal knowledge of the facts.
• Probing and Searching Questions Standard — While there is no hard-and-fast rule governing the conduct of examination, the questions must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory, or pro-forma. The determination depends on the totality of the examination and whether the judge was satisfied of probable cause.

• "The purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses." — Citing Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, explaining that examination of either party suffices.
• "If the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal knowledge of the facts is necessary." — On the distinction between personal knowledge and hearsay in warrant applications.
• "The poorest and most humble citizen or subject may, in his cottage, no matter how frail or humble it is, bid defiance to all the powers of the state; the wind, the storm and the sunshine alike may enter through its weather-beaten parts, but the king may not enter against its owner's will." — Citing U.S. v. Arceo on the sanctity of the home.
• "The searching questions propounded to the applicant and the witnesses depend largely on the discretion of the judge... The examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary, general, peripheral, perfunctory or pro-forma." — On the standard for judicial examination in warrant proceedings.
• "The determination of probable cause does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. As the term implies, probable cause is concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty."

• Alvarez v. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 64 Phil. 33 (1937) — Established that examination of either the complainant or the witness is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirement if probable cause is established; distinguished between cases where the complainant has personal knowledge versus mere hearsay.
• U.S. v. Arceo, 3 Phil. 381 (1904) — Cited for the historical and philosophical basis of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the inviolability of the home.
• People v. Choi, 529 Phil. 538 (2006) — Established the standard that questions must be probing and exhaustive, not routinary or perfunctory, and that the determination of probable cause depends on the judge's discretion based on the totality of circumstances.
• People v. Tiu Won Chua, 453 Phil. 177 (2003) — Cited for the enumeration of the four requirements for a valid search warrant under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.

• Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution — Provides the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the requirements for issuance of warrants (probable cause, personal determination by judge, examination under oath of complainant and witnesses, particular description of place and things).
• Section 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requisites for the issuance of a search warrant (implied in the discussion of probable cause and examination requirements).