People vs. Francisco

A search warrant that authorizes a search of a specific address cannot be executed at a different address, even if the officers believe the latter to be the intended target; the description in the warrant alone determines the place that may be searched, and any evidence obtained from a search at an undescribed location is inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.

Police confirmed through a test-buy operation that Federico Verona and his live-in partner, accused-appellant Annabelle Francisco, were engaged in selling shabu. After further surveillance, officers from OADDI-WPDC, Manila, applied for a search warrant before the RTC of Manila, Branch 23, to search premises at No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. The application was supported by an After-Surveillance Report and a description of the house provided by a police asset. The warrant was issued authorizing the search of shabu and paraphernalia at No. 122 M. Hizon St. On March 30, 1996, the warrant was enforced at No. 120 M. Hizon St., the compound where accused-appellant resided.

• The Application and Warrant: SPO2 Teneros applied for a search warrant specifically for No. 122 M. Hizon St., Caloocan City. The application included a sketch of the area and a description from police asset Dante Baradilla, who depicted the target as a two-storey semi-concrete cream-colored house with steel-barred windows, a terrace, and a vehicle used for shabu deliveries. The warrant issued accordingly.

• Ocular Inspection and Actual Addresses: The trial court’s ocular inspection disclosed that No. 122 M. Hizon St. was a concrete two-storey residential building (owner Joseph Ching) matching the asset’s description; it bore no house number and stood two houses away from accused-appellant’s residence. No. 120 M. Hizon St. was a compound of three apartment units enclosed by a single gate marked “120.” The units were not separately numbered. Accused-appellant rented the third unit at the rear, accessible only through the common gate; occupants routinely identified their address as No. 120.

• The Search and Seizure: On March 30, 1996, eight policemen forcibly entered No. 120 M. Hizon St. Accused-appellant, nine months pregnant, was resting in the master’s bedroom. The search lasted about an hour and yielded 230 grams of shabu, several plastic bags, aluminum foil, improvised tooters and burners, measuring weights, cellular phones, a monitoring device, and P22,990.00 in cash. Allegedly, P180,000.00, a Fiat car, jewelry, keys, an ATM card, bank books, and car documents were also taken, but not all were reflected in the return. The return falsely stated the warrant was served at No. 122 M. Hizon St. SPO2 Teneros later admitted he thought the house to be searched was No. 122 instead of No. 120.

• Trial Court’s Justification: The RTC denied the motion to quash and upheld the search, reasoning that SPO2 Teneros had conducted prior surveillance and could, with reasonable effort, identify the intended place. It invoked People v. Veloso for the proposition that a description is sufficient if the officer can ascertain the location.

• Sufficiency of Description: The People maintained that the warrant was validly served because SPO2 Teneros, through prior surveillance, knew which house was meant to be searched. The discrepancy in the house number was argued to be a minor error that did not defeat the constitutional particularity requirement, as the officer could with reasonable effort identify the correct premises.

• Admissibility of Evidence: The prosecution asserted that the seized items were properly admitted and that the shabu and paraphernalia proven in court established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Illegality of Search: Accused-appellant contended that the search was unconstitutional because the warrant authorized a search exclusively of No. 122 M. Hizon St., yet the actual search was conducted at No. 120 M. Hizon St.

• Inadmissibility and Insufficiency: She argued that all evidence obtained from the illegal search should have been excluded; without it, the prosecution’s case lacked any basis for conviction.

• Validity of Search Warrant Execution: Whether the search conducted at No. 120 M. Hizon St. pursuant to a warrant describing No. 122 M. Hizon St. violated the constitutional requirement that the warrant particularly describe the place to be searched.

• Validity of Search Warrant Execution: The search was invalid. The description in the warrant — No. 122 M. Hizon St. — was insufficient to direct the officers to No. 120 M. Hizon St., which was an entirely different building two houses away. The police asset’s description likewise matched No. 122, not No. 120. The controlling subject of a search warrant is the place stated in the warrant itself, not the place the officers had in mind. Executing officers cannot enlarge, modify, or substitute the description based on their personal knowledge or the supporting evidence they submitted. Permitting such substitution would confer upon them the very discretion the particularity clause was designed to eliminate. All items seized during the illegal search are therefore inadmissible under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution. With the exclusion of that evidence, the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Particularity of Description of Place to be Searched — A search warrant must describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity that the officer serving it can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the location and distinguish it from other places. The description in the warrant is exclusive and controlling; it may not be amplified or changed by the executing officer’s personal knowledge or by the evidence supporting the application. (Citing Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 273.)

• Exclusionary Rule (Fruit of the Poisonous Tree) — Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional guarantee.

• Search Warrant as Limited Authority — A search warrant is not a sweeping license to conduct a fishing expedition; it authorizes seizure only of the items specifically described therein.

• “What is material in determining the validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. … The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the officers’ own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of their application for the warrant.”

• “I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.”

• “As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully seized evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. Verily, they are the ‘fruits of the poisonous tree.’ Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence.”

• **Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines v. Asuncion, 307 SCRA 273 (1999) — Followed as controlling authority; held that the place to be searched cannot be changed by the executing officers and that the warrant’s particularity must be strictly observed.
• People v. Veloso, 48 Phil. 169 (1925) — Distinguished. In Veloso, the warrant’s description exactly matched the place searched; here, a substantial discrepancy existed, and the officer could not with reasonable effort identify the correct location from the warrant alone.
• **People v. Del Rosario, 234 SCRA 246 (1994) — Cited for the principle that a search warrant is not a sweeping fishing-expedition authorization.
• **Uy v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, 344 SCRA 36 (2000) — Cited for the requisites of a valid search warrant.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures; mandates that a search warrant particularly describe the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Applied to invalidate the search because the warrant described a different address from the one actually searched.
• Section 3(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Exclusionary rule; any evidence obtained in violation of the search and seizure clause is inadmissible for any purpose. Applied to exclude all evidence seized from the illegal search.
• Section 16, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended — The offense of illegal possession of a regulated drug. The prosecution could not prove the elements of the crime because the seized drugs were rendered inadmissible.

Vitug, J., and Austria-Martinez, J., concurred. Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), on official leave.