People vs. Francisco

Conspiracy may be inferred from the mode and manner of perpetration and from acts showing a joint or common purpose, concerted action, and community of interest; once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all. But a person may be held as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy only if he performed an overt act in furtherance thereof, and a mere shout from a distance, without more, does not establish beyond reasonable doubt that he gave moral assistance to the actual assailants.

Ricardo, Reynaldo, Teodoro, and Efren Francisco are brothers; Antonio Sioco was among their companions. Efren was diagnosed with psychosis or insanity classified as schizophrenia and found incompetent to stand trial, so the cases against him were suspended and he was confined at the National Center for Mental Health. The remaining accused faced two amended informations for murder and frustrated murder, with the prosecution invoking conspiracy, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength.

On October 27, 1992, at about midnight, Ariel De Dios and Serafin Mangali went to the house of Manny Pascual at Naval Street, Navotas. After a short talk at the gate, the three proceeded to a nearby store on board a jeep, ordered San Miguel Pale Pilsen, sat on a bench, and continued their conversation. Efren Francisco, seated on Ariel’s right, spat at Ariel. Ariel asked Manny why the man was acting that way and whether he knew him; Manny told Ariel not to mind him. Efren spat at Ariel’s right arm again. Ariel told Manny they better go home, paid the bill, and told Manny and Serafin to board the jeep. Ariel then talked to Efren and asked why he spat at him; Efren did not answer and kept smiling. Ariel hit Efren on the nape, and Efren ran away. With Serafin at the wheel, the three proceeded to Manny’s house; after talking for about five minutes at the gate, Serafin and Ariel boarded the jeep while Manny went inside.

Ariel narrated that Serafin maneuvered the jeep along M. Naval on the way to Malabon; upon passing Manny’s gate, Ariel saw Antonio Sioco a few meters from the gate pointing at them and saying “Heto na sila, heto na sila.” Immediately thereafter, the headlights of a coming jeep occupying their lane were turned on. Serafin stepped on the brakes and their jeep stopped about two feet from the other jeep. There were about seven persons in the other jeep: the driver, two in front, one on the left front fender, and two or three at the back. The one on the fender, Ricardo Francisco, alighted first, followed by the rest. Ricardo went to Serafin, grabbed him by the neck, and said “Putang ina mo, bumaba ka diyan”; Serafin held the steering wheel and resisted the pull. Another person from the jeep grabbed Serafin by the arm and tried to loosen his grip. Teodoro Francisco then came with a knife-like instrument and stabbed Serafin on the left armpit. Ariel was stunned and held on to the bar. Reynaldo Francisco suddenly pulled Ariel’s right arm and ordered him to get down; when Ariel was alighting, with his right foot already out, Reynaldo stabbed him on the left part of the stomach. Ariel asked why he was stabbed, but Reynaldo was stunned and did not answer. Ariel pushed Reynaldo, ran to the rear of the jeep, and told Serafin, “Pare, takbo na tayo.” Serafin was being mauled beside the jeep. Ariel ran toward Manny’s gate, knocked twice, and called Manny’s name twice. Teodoro and Efren chased Ariel; Ariel went into the dark pathway toward the garage but after two or three steps returned to the street, where he saw Serafin sprawled on the ground and saw Teodoro. Ariel ran to the back garage and called Manny’s father; when no one answered, he scaled the wall, went up the roof, knocked on the window, and asked for help. Manny’s father came out with his daughter; Ariel told them to help Serafin, who was being mauled. Manny’s father went out and later returned, saying Serafin was okay and had been brought to the hospital by Manny. Ariel was later brought to Manila Doctors Hospital.

Manny testified that after Serafin and Ariel left, he proceeded toward their main door; while still knocking, he heard Ariel call his name twice. He walked toward the gate and opened it; he saw people in front and somebody pointed to the right. He saw Ariel’s jeep, walked faster, and saw a body under the jeep. While running, Teodoro, a few feet from the jeep, told him “Pati lokoloko pinapatulan nila.” There were other persons in the area, but Manny recognized only two, Boy and Tenok, who turned out to be Ricardo and Reynaldo. He saw Serafin full of blood and asked where Ariel was, but Serafin did not answer. Manny carried Serafin into the jeep and brought him to Saint Joseph’s Clinic; because there were no facilities, he brought Serafin to Martinez Hospital. After a few phone calls, the doctor informed him that Serafin was already dead. Manny noticed that Serafin’s two front teeth were broken.

Dr. Ludivino J. Lagat, the NBI medical specialist who conducted the autopsy, testified that Serafin sustained a linear abrasion on the right cheekbone and a stab wound on the left side of the body below the armpit. The stab wound was 2.0 cm big and 12 cm deep, with one sharp and one blunt extremity, directed backward, medially, and downward; it entered the thoracic cavity, penetrated the lower lobe of the left lung, and 1,600 cc of blood was recovered inside. The wound could have been caused by one bladed sharp-pointed instrument and was the cause of death. Serafin Mangali, Sr. testified that his son was a Department of Agrarian Reform employee with an annual income of P22,524.00; he spent P29,500.00 for funeral services and an additional P15,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses during the wake, and would pay P50,000.00 for his share in legal services. Dr. Joaquin Tan, a dentist at the Department of Agrarian Reform, testified that on May 8, 1992 he made a thorough dental examination on Serafin and that the latter’s upper and lower teeth were complete, as shown by a certification issued on March 16, 1994. Dr. Dominador Chansiopen of Manila Doctors Hospital testified that he attended to Ariel at 1:30 in the early morning of October 27, 1992; Ariel sustained a wound at the mid-clavicular line, post-gastric stomach, perforating the colon through and through, caused by a stab thrust, which required operation for gastric repair and repair of the transverse colon. The wound, if left untreated, would have caused Ariel’s death. Dr. Chansiopen also noted a lacerated wound on Ariel’s finger and abrasions on the side of the abdomen and a small area of the hand.

The defense witnesses confirmed the presence of Antonio Sioco and the Francisco brothers at the scene. Raul Sosa, a compadre of Teodoro and Ricardo, testified that while he and Rogelio Pineda were waiting for a ride, Teodoro alighted from the jeep heading for Navotas and immediately approached Serafin, the driver of the jeep heading for Malabon, and pulled him out, while Reynaldo approached Ariel and stabbed him. Ariel alighted and ran away; Teodoro dropped Serafin and chased Ariel but failed to overtake him; Teodoro returned with Manny Pascual. There was a commotion on the jeep, but Sosa focused on Teodoro and Ariel; he did not see Efren during the incident and saw Antonio on the way to the jeep. Rogelio Pineda corroborated Sosa and further testified that while Teodoro was chasing Ariel, Serafin alighted and went to the back of the jeep, where he met Ricardo; the two had an argument, and moments later Ricardo stabbed Serafin. When Serafin sprawled on the ground, Ricardo disappeared and his companion scampered away; during the stabbing, Efren was standing nearby while Antonio was in front of the jeep; Ricardo, Efren, and Antonio left together.

Antonio testified that he was with Teodoro, Reynaldo, Ricardo, and some companions drinking beer in a store when Teodoro was informed by a saleslady that their brother Efren had been kicked and hit on the nape by three persons who left on board a vehicle. Teodoro then talked about going after the three persons to confront them. The Franciscos and some companions hurriedly boarded a jeep while Antonio was left behind; upon hearing the skidding sound of the jeep coming to a halt, Antonio followed his companions. On arrival, he saw Ariel standing beside the jeep in confrontation with Reynaldo and Ricardo, while Serafin was still at the steering wheel in confrontation with Teodoro and two others. When Ariel was about to hit Reynaldo, the latter stabbed Ariel; Ariel ran and Teodoro chased him. Serafin alighted and a commotion ensued; when Serafin went near Ricardo, Ricardo stabbed Serafin. Ricardo claimed that upon hearing the report that Efren had been ill-treated, Teodoro told him and Reynaldo to stay behind and not follow because he would just talk to the persons concerned, but he and Reynaldo insisted on going. During the confrontation, Ariel was about to hit Reynaldo with a black hard thing when Reynaldo stabbed Ariel; Ariel ran and Teodoro chased him. Serafin alighted and attacked Ricardo with a bottle of Coke that landed on his left shoulder; when Serafin was about to draw something from his waist and uttered “I will kill you, I will kill you,” Ricardo immediately stabbed him. Ricardo said he had a knife because he was peeling a mango during their drinking spree and forgot to leave it. Teodoro corroborated that Reynaldo merely acted in self-defense when he stabbed Ariel and stated that he ran after Ariel to help him.

• Identification and Credibility: Accused-appellants argued that Ariel De Dios’s testimony, as the lone prosecution witness, needed corroboration and was erratic and unreliable; his identification at the hospital was not positive because it was made after a warrantless arrest and was suggestively “fed” by the police, the brothers resembled one another, Ariel’s view was obstructed by Serafin’s assailant, and the glare of the headlights would have temporarily blinded him. They also contended that Ariel was biased and ill-motivated because he had been injured.
• Manny Pascual’s Testimony: Accused-appellants attacked Manny Pascual’s veracity, claiming he lied when he said he did not know Efren despite the Francisco brothers being his neighbors since he was a kid, and that Manny’s sudden decision to leave the eatery could be explained by his having warned Ariel of the Francisco brothers’ presence and possible retaliation.
• Defense Version of the Stabbing: Accused-appellants maintained that Serafin was stabbed not while seated at the steering wheel but while standing beside the jeep after alighting and arguing with them; Raul Sosa’s testimony showed that Ricardo, John Doe, and Teodoro approached Serafin and demanded an explanation, that Ariel ran away, and that Teodoro was already chasing Ariel when Ricardo and John Doe stabbed Serafin, making it improbable that Teodoro stabbed Serafin. They also invoked Ricardo’s open-court admission that he stabbed Serafin as a judicial admission under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, and argued that the medico-legal findings on the horizontal, downward direction of the wound supported their version and showed Teodoro, who was unarmed, could not have inflicted it.
• Conspiracy: Accused-appellants argued that conspiracy was not proved; being companions in a drinking spree did not make them conspirators, there was no clear and convincing proof of a common criminal design, and their act of looking for the person who allegedly ill-treated Efren was a natural reaction and not indicative of an intent to kill.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Accused-appellants argued that abuse of superior strength was not attendant; numerical superiority was not the sole criterion, only one knife was used, and that knife was the one Ricardo admitted using to stab Serafin and previously to peel mangoes, so the killing should be homicide and only the actual perpetrator liable.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Accused-appellants claimed that Ricardo’s limp due to polio should be considered a physical defect analogous to Article 13(8) or (10) of the Revised Penal Code; that lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong should mitigate because the stabbing arose from uncontrolled impulse rather than deliberate design; and that Ariel’s admission of hitting Efren’s nape was sufficient provocation.
• Sufficiency of the Information for Frustrated Murder: Accused-appellants argued that the information for frustrated murder was defective for failing to allege intent to kill under Section 6, Rule 110; the allegations, not the caption, determine the offense, and the absence of an allegation of intent to kill violated their right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation under Section 14, Article III of the Constitution. They also argued that Ariel’s abdominal stab wound was insufficient to cause death because he could still run and climb the roof of a house.
• Antonio Sioco’s Participation: Antonio Sioco argued separately that the RTC erred in finding him guilty as a conspirator; Teodoro’s plan was only to talk to those who harmed Efren, there was no agreement or common design, Teodoro addressed nobody in particular, Antonio and two others were left behind, and Ariel’s uncorroborated testimony that Antonio shouted “Heto na sila, heto na sila” bordered on physical impossibility and was not confirmed by any other witness. He also claimed he opted to stay behind and followed only when the vehicles were already at the scene and the protagonists were shouting at each other.

• Guilt and Identification: Appellee maintained that guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt; Ariel positively identified accused-appellants as his and Serafin’s assailants; the street was well lighted; his testimony was supported by physical evidence and the medico-legal report; Ariel was not biased or motivated to falsely testify; his testimony was convincing, trustworthy, and sufficient to convict.
• Ricardo’s Admission: Appellee argued that Ricardo’s admission that he stabbed Serafin was unworthy of weight because it was made not only to support his claim of self-defense but also to absolve Teodoro of responsibility, so it was not an admission against interest.
• Conspiracy and Antonio’s Liability: Appellee contended that Antonio was guilty as a conspirator because the prosecution witnesses showed that the accused-appellants had a common design to kill Serafin and Ariel.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Appellee argued that the RTC correctly appreciated abuse of superior strength; the accused-appellants relied not only on numerical superiority but also on the fact that Ricardo and Teodoro were armed with deadly weapons when they attacked Serafin and Ariel.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Appellee argued that the claimed mitigating circumstances deserved scant consideration: there was no showing that Ricardo’s limp restricted his means of defense or action or communication with his fellow beings; lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated when the wounds inflicted were serious enough to cause and in fact caused the crime charged; and the murder and frustrated murder were in great disparity with the provocation, ample time had lapsed, and the provocation did not originate from Ariel and Serafin but from Efren.

• Identification and Credibility: Whether Ariel De Dios’s identification of the accused-appellants was positive and reliable, and whether his testimony as a lone witness was sufficient to sustain conviction despite the hospital identification, alleged suggestiveness, and claimed bias.
• Conspiracy and Collective Liability: Whether conspiracy existed among the accused-appellants such that they are collectively liable for murder and frustrated murder.
• Antonio Sioco’s Participation: Whether Antonio Sioco performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, or gave moral assistance to the Francisco brothers, through his utterance “Heto na sila, heto na sila.”
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superior strength qualified the killing of Serafin and the stabbing of Ariel to murder.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether Ricardo’s physical disability, lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, and the offended party’s provocation should be appreciated as mitigating circumstances.
• Sufficiency of the Information for Frustrated Murder: Whether the information for frustrated murder was sufficient despite the absence of an allegation of intent to kill.
• Penalties and Damages: Whether the penalties and civil liability imposed by the RTC should be modified.

• Identification and Credibility: Yes. Ariel’s identification was positive and reliable; the hospital identification was not shown to have been suggested by the police, no police line-up was required, the street was well lighted, and his testimony was corroborated by the autopsy and Manny Pascual. A credible lone witness may suffice for conviction.
• Conspiracy and Collective Liability: Yes. Conspiracy existed among Ricardo, Reynaldo, and Teodoro; their distinct but simultaneous acts of grabbing, stabbing, and chasing showed a unity of purpose, and the act of one was the act of all.
• Antonio Sioco’s Participation: No. Antonio’s shout of “Heto na sila, heto na sila” from a distance, without more, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that he performed an overt act or gave moral assistance to the conspiracy; he was acquitted.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. The Francisco brothers took advantage of their numerical superiority and the fact that two of them were armed with bladed weapons against Serafin and Ariel, who were unarmed and seated inside the jeep.
• Mitigating Circumstances: No. Ricardo’s physical defect was not shown to restrict his means of action, defense, or communication; lack of intent was belied by the location of the stab wounds; and the provocation was not immediate and was grossly disproportionate.
• Sufficiency of the Information for Frustrated Murder: Yes. The information was sufficient despite the absence of an allegation of intent to kill; it stated the designation of the offense by statute, the acts constituting the felony, and the stage of commission, and intent to kill could be inferred from the allegation that the stab wound would have caused death.
• Penalties and Damages: Modified. For murder, reclusion perpetua; for frustrated murder, the indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor minimum as minimum to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum; and the damages were fixed at P50,000.00 moral damages, P50,000.00 death indemnity, P29,000.00 actual damages, and P383,078.00 for loss of earning capacity.

• Identification and Credibility: The SC rejected the attack on Ariel’s identification. The transcript showed that the police merely asked Ariel whether he could recognize the suspects and whether they were his assailants; Ariel pointed to them, first the one in a yellow shirt and then the other two. The SC held that the hospital identification did not affect its validity because no law requires a police line-up as essential to proper identification, provided the identification was not suggested by the police, citing People vs. Silvestre. It found nothing in Ariel’s testimony showing that the police suggested the suspects were his assailants. Ariel could not have been mistaken because the street was well lighted, and his identification was corroborated by Manny Pascual, who identified the accused-appellants as present in the vicinity, and by Ariel’s positive in-court identification. The SC found no basis to rule Ariel’s testimony incredible; the RTC was in the best position to assess credibility, and no improper motive was shown. A single witness, when credible and trustworthy, is sufficient to convict, and the fact that the principal witness was the victim did not make him biased, citing People vs. Siguin. The autopsy report corroborated Ariel’s account that Serafin was seated at the steering wheel when stabbed, because the location of the stab wound corresponded to that position, with the left portion of Serafin’s body exposed to anyone beside the driver’s door.
• Conspiracy and Collective Liability: The SC ruled that conspiracy existed among Ricardo, Reynaldo, and Teodoro. Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence; it may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding, and it is not necessary to show that they met and entered into an explicit agreement. It may be deduced from the mode and manner of perpetration or from acts showing a joint or common purpose, concerted action, and community of interest, citing People vs. Sanchez and People vs. Andales. The circumstances showed that when Serafin refused to get down after Ricardo grabbed his neck, John Doe tried to loosen Serafin’s grip on the steering wheel, Teodoro stabbed Serafin, Reynaldo pulled Ariel’s arm and stabbed him, and Teodoro chased Ariel. These were distinct but simultaneous acts which, pieced together, showed unity of purpose and design. It was irrelevant who among them actually stabbed Serafin because in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, citing People vs. Abdul. Even if Ariel was mistaken and Ricardo stabbed Serafin, Teodoro was still liable because a conspiracy existed.
• Antonio Sioco’s Participation: The SC disagreed with the RTC’s finding that Antonio was part of the conspiracy. To hold an accused liable as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy; the overt act may be active participation in the crime, moral assistance by being present at the time of the commission, or moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute the conspiracy, citing People vs. Berroya. Antonio’s participation was limited to shouting from a distance the words “Heto na sila, heto na sila.” In a case involving the phrase “andiyan na,” which has a similar import, the SC ruled that the phrase does not have conclusive conspiratorial meaning because the utterances are susceptible of varied interpretations, citing People vs. Cruz. The SC found that the evidence did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Antonio uttered those words to give moral assistance to the Francisco brothers in the absence of any other concrete evidence of complicity.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: The SC held that the RTC properly appreciated abuse of superior strength and correctly convicted the Francisco brothers of murder. The accused-appellants took advantage of their numerical superiority and the fact that two of them were armed with bladed weapons when they attacked Serafin and Ariel, citing People vs. Felix. Serafin and Ariel were unarmed and seated inside the jeep without any means of defending themselves, and they were no match to their four assailants who overpowered them.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The SC rejected the claimed mitigating circumstances. Ricardo’s limp was not shown to restrict his means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings as required by Article 13(8) of the Revised Penal Code; no evidence was presented other than the bare allegation of the physical defect. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong could not be appreciated because Serafin was stabbed on his torso and Ariel in his stomach with a bladed weapon; the location of the stab wounds manifested an intention to kill and belied the claim, citing People vs. Nepomuceno, Jr. The mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party could not be considered absent proof that it immediately preceded the act and was adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong, which must be proportionate in gravity, citing Pepito vs. Court of Appeals. Ariel’s act of hitting or kicking Efren may have provoked the accused-appellants, but their retaliation was grossly disproportionate; if there was provocation, it was Efren who started it by spitting at Ariel.
• Sufficiency of the Information for Frustrated Murder: The SC held that the information for frustrated murder was sufficient despite the absence of an allegation of intent to kill. Under Section 6, Rule 110, an information is sufficient if it states the designation of the offense by statute; if there is no such designation, reference should be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it, citing Section 8, Rule 110. The information stated that the accused, armed with a bladed weapon, conspiring and helping one another, with evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, attacked, assaulted, and stabbed Ariel, hitting him on the abdomen and left finger, performing all the acts of execution which would produce murder but which did not produce it because of timely medical attendance. It contained the acts constituting the felony, the name of the crime by statute, and the stage of commission. The absence of an averment of intent to kill may be inferred from the allegation that the stab wound would have caused death, citing People vs. Pilpa. Under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, a felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Dr. Chansiopen’s unrebutted testimony that Ariel’s wound was sufficient to cause death if left untreated sustained the conviction for frustrated murder, citing People vs. Sabalones.
• Penalties and Damages: The SC modified the penalties and damages. Before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659, murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code was punishable by reclusion temporal maximum to death; under Article 64(1), the Francisco brothers should suffer reclusion perpetua, the medium period of the imposable penalty, citing People vs. Andales. The penalty for frustrated murder is the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the consummated felony, which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium, citing People vs. Ravanes. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and absent any modifying circumstance, the penalty for frustrated murder should be eight years of prision mayor minimum as minimum to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum, citing People vs. Sabalones. For Serafin’s death, Ricardo, Reynaldo, and Teodoro were liable for P50,000.00 moral damages, P50,000.00 death indemnity, P29,000.00 actual damages for funeral expenses supported by receipt, and P383,078.00 for loss of earning capacity, computed under the formula in People vs. Silvestre: net earning capacity = [2/3 (80 - age at death)] x (gross annual income - 50% of GAI), using Serafin’s age of 29 and annual income of P22,534.00.

• Conspiracy — A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Proof need not rest on direct evidence; it may be inferred from conduct showing a common understanding, and from the mode and manner of perpetration or acts showing joint or common purpose, concerted action, and community of interest. The SC applied it to Ricardo, Reynaldo, and Teodoro because their distinct but simultaneous acts of grabbing, stabbing, and chasing showed unity of purpose; once conspiracy was established, the act of one was the act of all.
• Overt act requirement for co-conspirators — To hold an accused liable as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the prosecution must show that he performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. The overt act may be active participation in the crime, moral assistance by being present at the time of its commission, or moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to execute the conspiracy. Antonio’s lone shout from a distance did not satisfy this requirement.
• Abuse of superior strength — Abuse of superior strength qualifies a killing when the assailants take advantage of their numerical superiority and their possession of deadly weapons against unarmed victims who have no means of defense. The SC applied it because the Francisco brothers were numerically superior, two were armed with bladed weapons, and Serafin and Ariel were unarmed and seated inside the jeep.
• Physical disability as a mitigating circumstance — Under Article 13(8) of the Revised Penal Code, physical disability mitigates only if it restricts the offender’s means of action, defense, or communication with his fellow beings. Ricardo’s limp was not shown to have such an effect; the bare allegation was insufficient.
• Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong — This mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated when the location and nature of the wounds show an intent to kill. The SC rejected it because Serafin was stabbed in the torso and Ariel in the stomach with a bladed weapon.
• Sufficient provocation — Provocation mitigates only if it immediately preceded the act and was adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong, and the retaliation must be proportionate in gravity. The SC rejected it because the retaliation was grossly disproportionate and any provocation came from Efren, who spat at Ariel.
• Sufficiency of an information — An information is sufficient if it states the designation of the offense by statute; if there is no designation, reference should be made to the section or subsection punishing it. The absence of an allegation of intent to kill does not make an information for frustrated murder insufficient because intent may be inferred from the allegation that the stab wound would have caused death.
• Frustrated felony — A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony but which do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. Ariel’s wound would have caused death if untreated, so the crime was frustrated murder.
• Loss of earning capacity — Net earning capacity is computed as [2/3 (80 - age at death)] x (gross annual income - 50% of GAI). The SC applied it to Serafin, 29 years old and earning P22,534.00 per annum, yielding P383,078.00.

• “A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it.” — The SC uses this definition from Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code before holding that conspiracy may be inferred from the Francisco brothers’ concerted acts.
• “Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense.” — This explains why the SC sustained the conspiracy finding despite the absence of an explicit agreement among the Francisco brothers.
• “In order to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy.” — The SC uses this requirement to acquit Antonio Sioco because his mere shout from a distance was not enough.
• “We hold that the fact that the information for frustrated murder failed to allege “intent to kill” did not make the information insufficient.” — The SC rejects the accused-appellants’ claim that the information for frustrated murder was defective for omitting intent to kill.

• People vs. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68 [1999] — Relied on for the rule that a police line-up is not essential to proper identification absent police suggestion, for the sufficiency of a credible lone witness, and for the formula on loss of earning capacity.
• People vs. Sanchez, G.R. No. 118423, June 16, 1999 — Relied on for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from conduct and for the award of death indemnity.
• People vs. Andales, G.R. No. 130637, August 19, 1999 — Relied on for the inference of conspiracy from concerted acts and for the penalty and damages.
• People vs. Abdul, G.R. No. 128074, July 13, 1999 — Relied on for the rule that in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
• People vs. Berroya, 283 SCRA 111 [1997] — Relied on for the overt act requirement before an accused may be held liable as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy.
• People vs. Cruz, 191 SCRA 377 [1990] — Relied on for the ruling that a phrase similar to “Heto na sila” does not have conclusive conspiratorial meaning.
• People vs. Felix, 297 SCRA 12 [1998] — Relied on for the appreciation of abuse of superior strength.
• People vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81 [1977] — Relied on for the rule that the absence of an averment of intent to kill may be inferred from the allegation that the stab wound would have caused death.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as an agreement between two or more persons to commit a crime and a decision to commit it; applied to infer conspiracy among Ricardo, Reynaldo, and Teodoro from their concerted acts.
• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines a frustrated felony as one where the offender performs all acts of execution that would produce the felony but it is not produced by causes independent of the offender’s will; applied to Ariel’s stabbing because the wound would have caused death if untreated.
• Article 13(8), Revised Penal Code — Treats physical disability as a mitigating circumstance; rejected because Ricardo’s limp was not shown to restrict his means of action, defense, or communication.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Before R.A. No. 7659, prescribed reclusion temporal maximum to death for murder; applied to fix the penalty for Serafin’s killing.
• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — Requires imposition of the medium period when there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances; applied to impose reclusion perpetua for murder.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to frustrated murder to fix the minimum and maximum terms of the indeterminate penalty.
• Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Requires an information to state the designation of the offense by statute; applied to hold the information for frustrated murder sufficient despite the absence of an allegation of intent to kill.
• Section 8, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides that if there is no designation of the offense, reference should be made to the section or subsection punishing it; applied together with Section 6.
• Article III, Section 14, Constitution — Guarantees the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; the SC held it was not violated because the information sufficiently designated frustrated murder.
• R.A. No. 7659 — Mentioned as the law whose effectivity date determines the penalty for murder; the SC applied the penalty under Article 248 before R.A. No. 7659 took effect.