People vs. Flores

Treachery cannot qualify a killing to murder where the victim was forewarned of the danger to his life and attempted to flee before the fatal shot was fired, as the element of surprise essential to treachery is absent.

Irving Flores y Dichoso was a security guard employed by Kossaks Investigation, Security and Detective Agency and designated officer-in-charge of four security guards assigned to the Mariposa Bed Factory in Lawang-Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. He was charged separately with Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm under P.D. 1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, both arising from a shooting incident on July 6, 1991 that resulted in the death of Edwin Alberto y Baylon. The two cases were tried jointly.

On July 6, 1991, at around 11:45 p.m., Edwin Alberto and Demetrio Mendoza, both residents of #3 Silverio Domingo Apartment in Lawang-Bato, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, took out the garbage from their house and walked toward a vacant lot near the Mariposa Bed Factory to dispose of it. After disposing of the garbage and while en route home, accused-appellant Irving Flores, a security guard of the Mariposa Bed Factory, emerged from the factory compound. Apparently drunk and carrying a gun, accused-appellant suddenly and for no apparent reason fired at Alberto and Mendoza. Sensing danger, both men ran for their lives. Accused-appellant chased them and, at a distance of about fifteen meters, fired again. Alberto, who was hit in the back, exclaimed to Mendoza: "Demet, I was hit." Mendoza immediately brought his wounded friend to the hospital, but Alberto was pronounced dead on arrival. The cause of death was hemorrhage resulting from a gunshot that lacerated his lungs. Mendoza was interviewed by the police and, in his sworn statement dated July 7, 1991, narrated the shooting incident and identified accused-appellant as the person responsible for Alberto's death.

Approximately two hours after the incident, at about 1:35 a.m., Patrolmen Federico Patag and Reynaldo Tapar proceeded to the scene after receiving a report about the shooting. Residents informed them that the person involved had gone inside the Mariposa Bed Factory compound. The officers went to the factory and inquired from security guard Danilo Eman about the identity of the gunman. Eman pointed to accused-appellant, who was drunk and was also coming toward them. Accused-appellant handed to Pat. Patag a .38 caliber Taurus revolver with serial number 2140012. Security guard Eman also handed over the firearm's license, which showed that the subject firearm was regularly issued in the name of the security agency employing accused-appellant.

For his defense, accused-appellant presented a different version. He testified that on said date and time, he was conducting a roving inspection of the factory premises, accompanied by security guards Danilo Eman and Rey Nargatan, all of whom were armed. During the inspection, Eman informed him that three unidentified men were roaming in front of the factory gate. Accused-appellant went out to verify their identity, and the three men represented themselves as relatives of the factory owner. Noting that it was almost midnight, accused-appellant informed them that the owner was not around and instructed them to return the next day. When the three still insisted on entering, accused-appellant refused. One of the men cursed him: "Putang-ina mo, guwardiya ka lang." The two other men then started scaling the factory fence. Accused-appellant instructed Eman to go to the guardhouse on top of the factory gate and assist him, and, still standing outside the gate, fired two successive warning shots in the air. Frightened, the two men climbed down the fence and fled. A few hours later, when the police arrived, accused-appellant claimed he voluntarily surrendered himself and his service firearm.

The trial court acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm, finding the subject firearm properly licensed and the accused authorized to possess it. However, it found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, crediting the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Mendoza, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with ₱50,000 indemnity to the victim's heirs.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Accused-appellant faulted the trial court for giving credence to the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Mendoza, arguing that the sworn statement was taken almost three hours after the incident, at which time Mendoza allegedly had enough time to compose himself and narrate an entirely different story.
• Absence of Motive: Accused-appellant stressed that the prosecution failed to show that he had any motive or reason to shoot at Mendoza and Alberto.
• Identification in the Dark: Accused-appellant claimed that at the time of the shooting, there was no light at the scene of the crime that could have aided Mendoza in identifying him as the culprit.
• Absence of Treachery: Assuming arguendo that he should be held liable, accused-appellant maintained that the killing was not qualified by treachery and should only constitute homicide.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Accused-appellant claimed entitlement to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of property or rights of a stranger, asserting that he acted in the performance of his duty as a security guard in trying to prevent the victim and companions from scaling the factory wall. He further claimed the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, alleging that he approached the police and voluntarily surrendered himself when they arrived at the factory.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Whether the killing of the victim is qualified by treachery so as to constitute murder.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the accused-appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of incomplete defense of property or rights of a stranger and voluntary surrender.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The guilt of accused-appellant for the death of the victim was established beyond reasonable doubt through the positive and credible testimony of prosecution eyewitness Mendoza, a survivor of the assault, whose identification of the accused was sufficiently established despite the defense's claims.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: No. Treachery was absent because the victim was forewarned of the danger by the first gunshot and had attempted to flee; the element of surprise essential to treachery was lacking. The conviction was modified from murder to homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Mitigating Circumstances: No. Neither incomplete defense of property nor voluntary surrender was appreciated. Unlawful aggression—the indispensable element of any defense—was absent because the accused-appellant was himself the aggressor. Voluntary surrender was likewise unavailing because the police came looking for him and he had no choice but to go with them.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The contention that accused-appellant was convicted solely on the basis of Mendoza's sworn statement was incorrect; the trial court examined Mendoza's testimony in open court, where he recounted in detail the events leading to the victim's death. His testimony was substantially congruent with his sworn statement, with no material inconsistency, and withstood rigid cross-examination. The absence of a proven motive was of no moment, as proof of motive is crucial only where the identity of the accused is not sufficiently established. Here, the identity of accused-appellant as the author of the crime was positively and categorically established by Mendoza, who was himself a survivor. The claim that the scene was unlit was belied by Mendoza's testimony that the crime scene was adequately illuminated by a Meralco lamp post near the factory gate; Mendoza even described accused-appellant as wearing a light blue uniform. The accused-appellant's own version of events was found to be uncorroborated, self-serving, and contrary to ordinary human experience—it was inconceivable that three men would claim to be relatives of the factory owner and insist on entering at 11:45 p.m., unthinkable that they would persist after being told the owner was absent, and unbelievable that they would scale the fence in the presence of two armed security guards. The Court took judicial notice that inebriated persons are inclined to be pugnacious, irrational, and quarrelsome for no sensible reason.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: The mere fact that the victim was shot in the back while attempting to run away does not per se qualify the crime to murder. The evidence established that accused-appellant, apparently drunk, emerged from the factory and fired upon the victim and his companion, who were innocently passing by. Sensing imminent danger, the two started to run. The next gunshot hit the victim in the back and caused his death. With the first gunshot, the victim had been placed on guard and had in fact attempted to flee. There could thus be no treachery, since prior to the attack the victim had been forewarned of the danger to his life and had even attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to escape. Moreover, there was absolutely no evidence that accused-appellant consciously and deliberately employed a specific form of attack which would specially and directly ensure its commission without impunity, as required under Article 14(16) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Mitigating Circumstances: The justifying circumstance of defense of property or rights of a stranger requires the concurrence of three requisites: (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) the person defending is not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. Absent either or both of the last two requisites, the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a stranger may be appreciated. However, unlawful aggression is always an essential element—without it, there can never be a defense, complete or incomplete. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was the aggressor. Appreciation of the mitigating circumstance would require accepting the defense's version of the incident, which the trial court rejected and which this Court likewise found incredible. As for voluntary surrender, the evidence showed that the police authorities came to the factory looking for accused-appellant; he was pointed out to them and, seeing the police approaching, did not offer resistance and peacefully went with them. With the police closing in, accused-appellant had no choice but to go with them—no spontaneous surrender was made.

• Motive is dispensable when identity is established — Proof of motive is crucial only where the identity of the accused is not sufficiently established. Where the identity of the accused as the author of the crime has been positively and categorically established by the testimony of an eyewitness, the absence of a proven motive does not affect the credibility of the prosecution evidence. Applied in this case to reject the argument that the prosecution's failure to show motive should negate accused-appellant's guilt.

• Treachery requires that the victim was not forewarned — Treachery cannot be appreciated where the victim was forewarned of the danger to his life and attempted to flee before the fatal shot. The element of surprise is essential; where the first gunshot placed the victim on guard and the victim attempted to escape, the subsequent fatal shot, even if fired at the back, does not qualify the killing to murder. Additionally, there must be evidence that the accused consciously and deliberately employed a specific form of attack to ensure its commission without impunity.

• Unlawful aggression is indispensable for defense of property or rights of a stranger — The justifying circumstance of defense of property or rights of a stranger (Article 11, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code) requires: (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) the person defending is not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. Without unlawful aggression, there can never be a defense, complete or incomplete. Where the accused is himself the unlawful aggressor, no mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense can be appreciated.

• Voluntary surrender requires spontaneity — Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance requires that the accused spontaneously submitted himself to the authorities, not that he was located and approached by police with no choice but to accompany them. Where the police came looking for the accused and he had no option but to go with them, no voluntary surrender occurred.

• "The mere fact that the victim was shot at the back while attempting to run away from his assailant would not per se qualify the crime to murder." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on treachery: a shot to the back of a fleeing victim does not automatically constitute treachery where the victim was forewarned and attempted to escape.

• "There could thus be no treachery since, prior to the attack, the victim has been forewarned of the danger to his life and has even attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to escape." — This is the canonical formulation of the rule that forewarning negates treachery, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the qualifying circumstance.

• "It has been held that without unlawful aggression, there could never be a defense, complete or incomplete." — This states the indispensable-element rule for defense of property or rights of a stranger, establishing that unlawful aggression is the sine qua non of any defense claim.

• "Indeed, we have taken judicial notice of the fact that inebriated persons are inclined to be pugnacious, irrational and quarrelsome for no sensible reason." — This passage explains why the absence of motive did not undermine the prosecution's case, the accused having been intoxicated at the time of the incident.

• People vs. Canceran, G.R. No. 104866, January 31, 1994, 229 SCRA 581 — Cited for the proposition that proof of motive is crucial only where the identity of the accused is not sufficiently established.
• People vs. Javar, G.R. No. 82769, September 6, 1993, 226 SCRA 103 — Cited alongside Canceran for the same rule on motive.
• People vs. Ocaña, G.R. No. 63009, January 19, 1994, 229 SCRA 341 — Cited for the requirement that treachery demands a conscious and deliberate employment of a specific form of attack to ensure commission without impunity.
• People vs. Amaguin, G.R. Nos. 54344-45, January 10, 1994 — Cited alongside Ocaña on the same treachery principle.
• People vs. Layam, G.R. No. 102308, July 25, 1994 — Cited for the rule that without unlawful aggression, there can never be a defense, complete or incomplete.
• People vs. Aguiluz, G.R. No. 91662, March 11, 1992, 207 SCRA 187 — Cited in support of the judicial notice that inebriated persons are inclined to be pugnacious, irrational, and quarrelsome for no sensible reason.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of homicide with the penalty of reclusion temporal. Applied as the proper conviction in lieu of murder, treachery having been found absent.
• Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as a qualifying circumstance, requiring that the offender employ means, methods, or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. Applied to determine that treachery was not present.
• Article 11, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Sets forth the justifying circumstance of defense of property or rights of a stranger, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of evil motive. Applied to reject the claim of incomplete defense of property.
• Article 13, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Referenced by accused-appellant for the mitigating circumstance of incomplete justifying circumstance. Not applied, as no justifying circumstance was established.
• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present, the penalty shall be the medium period. Applied to fix the imposable penalty at the medium period of reclusion temporal.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the indeterminate sentence of ten years and one day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, J., and Mendoza, J., concurred. Padilla, J., was on leave.