People vs. Florentino Eduarte

The justifying circumstance of defense of relatives requires proof of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and, in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein. The defense fails where the accused's testimony of unlawful aggression is self-serving and uncorroborated, and where the trial court's factual findings discredit the accused's version.

The accused-appellant Florentino Eduarte, together with his brothers Fredeswindo and Julie Eduarte, were residents of Dolores, Abra. Fredeswindo Eduarte was married to the sister of the victim, Roberto Trinidad, making the parties relatives by affinity. The case arose from a shooting incident on the night of December 4, 1984, following a domestic quarrel between Fredeswindo and his wife. The accused-appellant invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives under Article 11, subparagraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code, which required him to prove unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and that he had no part in any provocation given by the person attacked.

Florentino Eduarte, Fredeswindo Eduarte, and Julie Eduarte were brothers residing in Dolores, Abra. Fredeswindo was married to the sister of Roberto Trinidad, the victim. On the night of December 4, 1984, Fredeswindo, Roberto Trinidad, and Sonny Testado were drinking liquor in Roberto's house. Fredeswindo, suspecting his wife of an illicit relationship, quarrelled with her, became violent, and grabbed a scissor. When Roberto Trinidad pacified him, Fredeswindo thrust the scissor at his brother-in-law. Vicente Trinidad and his brothers rescued Roberto and wrestled the scissor away. Roberto then drove his jeep with Sonny Testado to the Municipal Building to seek police help.

On their way back, while approaching the house, Roberto and Sonny saw Fredeswindo lying flat on the road through the jeep's headlights. Roberto stopped the jeep and, without turning off the lights, alighted to help Fredeswindo. As Roberto was extending assistance, Florentino Eduarte, who was beside the road, shot him, causing his death. Police authorities arrived shortly after but failed to locate Florentino.

The defense presented a different version. According to the accused-appellant, he was working in the house of his uncle Maximino Bañaga when his brother Julie arrived and informed him that their older brother Fredeswindo was being killed. Florentino rushed to their house, got a gun from a trunk owned by his late father, and went directly to the scene. When he arrived, he saw Roberto Trinidad clubbing his brother Fredeswindo, who was lying face downward with his shirt soaked in blood. It was when Roberto was about to deliver the final blow that Florentino shot him.

Earlier that day, at about 4:30 p.m., Fredeswindo had been drinking with Roberto Trinidad, a cousin Jimmy Trinidad, and Sonny Testado. Fredeswindo confronted his wife about her illicit relationship, and Roberto berated him. An altercation ensued, and Fredeswindo defended himself with a scissor. The victim's wife sought help from the other Trinidad brothers, Roque and Bienvenido. Julie Eduarte saw the four Trinidad brothers ganging up on Fredeswindo, stoned the house, and was chased by two of the brothers. He then proceeded to the house of their uncle Maximino Bañaga to secure assistance from Florentino.

The trial court discredited the accused-appellant's version, observing that Roberto would not have stopped his jeep and alighted if he intended harm, that he left the headlights on showing his intention to assist, that Florentino fled and never presented himself to the authorities, and that Florentino and Larry Bañaga ran away without verifying Fredeswindo's condition. The accused-appellant himself stated in open court that when he saw his brother soaked with blood, he thought Fredeswindo was already dead.

• Defense of Relatives: The accused-appellant maintained that he was innocent, invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives under Article 11, subparagraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code. He argued that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto Trinidad, who was clubbing Fredeswindo when he arrived at the scene.
• Reasonable Necessity: The accused-appellant contended that the use of a gun at that pressing moment was reasonable and necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression against his brother.
• No Part in Provocation: The accused-appellant argued that the third requisite was present since he was clearly not part of the melee that led to the killing incident.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the prosecution's arguments on appeal beyond the factual narrative presented in the Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee.

• Defense of Relatives: Whether the accused-appellant validly invoked the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives under Article 11, subparagraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing so as to qualify the crime to murder.

• Defense of Relatives: No. The justifying circumstance of defense of relatives was not established because the accused-appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. His testimony was self-serving and uncorroborated, and the trial court's findings discredited his version.
• Treachery: No. Treachery did not qualify the killing to murder because the records were bereft of proof that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the accused-appellant to ensure the killing would be executed without risk to himself. The act was more the product of an impulse rather than a conscious and discerning mind.

• Defense of Relatives: For the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives to prosper, the accused must prove three essential requisites: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein. The Court found that the accused-appellant's testimony of unlawful aggression was self-serving and uncorroborated. The trial court's observations discredited his version: Roberto would not have stopped his jeep and alighted if he intended harm, the headlights remained lighted showing his intention to assist, Florentino fled and never presented himself to the authorities, and Florentino and Larry Bañaga ran away without verifying Fredeswindo's condition. The accused-appellant himself stated he thought his brother was already dead, and defense witness Larry Bañaga testified that Julie informed them Fredeswindo had been killed. The Court held that flight is indicative of guilt, and in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, the trial court's findings on credibility are entitled to the highest respect. Thus, for lack of clear unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed, the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives could not be availed of.

• Treachery: For treachery to exist, there must be evidence showing that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate, pursuant to Article 14, subparagraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court found the records bereft of any proof that the mode of attack was consciously adopted. The act of the accused-appellant in taking a gun on his way to the scene, coupled with the circumstances that he was working when his brother related the slaying and that he knew nothing about the earlier brawl, showed that the shooting was more the product of an impulse rather than a conscious and discerning mind. Accordingly, treachery did not qualify the killing to murder.

• Defense of Relatives — A justifying circumstance under Article 11(2) of the Revised Penal Code requiring three essential requisites: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein. The Court applied this doctrine by requiring the accused-appellant to prove all three requisites, and found that the first and second were not established because his testimony of unlawful aggression was self-serving and uncorroborated.
• Treachery — Defined under Article 14, subparagraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The Court held that for treachery to exist, there must be evidence showing that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. The Court found the killing was impulsive, not consciously adopted.
• Flight as Evidence of Guilt — The flight of an accused after committing a crime is indicative of guilt. The Court applied this principle to discredit the accused-appellant's claim of defense of relatives, noting that he fled without presenting himself to the authorities or verifying his brother's condition.

• "For this justifying circumstance to prosper, the evidence adduced must be persuasive. Although it is true that the accused-appellant took no part in the provocation that led to the killing incident, his testimony that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Roberto was self-serving and uncorroborated." — This passage articulates the standard of proof required for the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives and identifies the fatal weakness in the accused-appellant's case.
• "For treachery to exist, there must be evidence showing that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate." — This is the canonical formulation of the treachery requirement, which the Court applied to find that the killing was impulsive rather than consciously adopted.
• "No better test has yet been found to measure the value of a witness' testimony than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind." — This principle guided the Court's assessment of the accused-appellant's credibility and the trial court's factual findings.

• People vs. Norberto Clores y Coral, G.R. No. 82362, April 26, 1990 — Cited for the principle that findings of fact of the trial court as to the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect.
• People vs. Rolando Caldito, et al., G.R. Nos. 78432-33, February 9, 1990 — Cited for the same principle on trial court credibility findings.
• People vs. Pedrosa, 169 SCRA 545 [1989] — Cited for the principle on trial court credibility findings.
• People vs. Ramos, 167 SCRA 476 [1988] — Cited for the principle on trial court credibility findings.
• People vs. Sagre, 89 SCRA 570 [1979] — Cited in support of the conclusion that the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives cannot be availed of for lack of unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity.
• People vs. Reynaldo Lingatong, G.R. No. 34019, January 29, 1990 — Cited in support of the same conclusion.
• People vs. Maribung, 149 SCRA 292 [1987] — Cited for the principle that the value of a witness' testimony is measured by its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.
• People vs. Wilfredo Malinao alias "Welly", et al., G.R. No. 63735, April 5, 1990 — Cited for the principle that flight is indicative of guilt.
• People vs. Cesario Degamo, et al., G.R. No. 60945, March 6, 1990 — Cited for the same principle on flight.
• People vs. Aurelio Espinosa alias "Rolly", et al., G.R. No. 72883, December 20, 1989 — Cited for the same principle on flight.
• People vs. Noelito Manzanares, G.R. No. 82696, September 8, 1989 — Cited for the same principle on flight.
• People vs. Virgilio Uribe, G.R. No. 76493-94, Feb. 26, 1990 — Cited for the definition of treachery, citing People vs. Crisostomo.
• People vs. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47 [1988] — Cited for the definition of treachery requiring conscious adoption of the mode of attack.

• Article 11, subparagraph (2), Revised Penal Code — The justifying circumstance of defense of relatives, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and that the one making the defense had no part in any provocation given by the person attacked. The Court applied this provision to determine that the accused-appellant failed to prove the requisites.
• Article 14, subparagraph 16, Revised Penal Code — The qualifying circumstance of treachery, which exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms tending directly and specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk to himself. The Court applied this provision to find that treachery was not established because the attack was impulsive.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied by the Court in sentencing the accused-appellant for homicide, imposing a minimum of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor and a maximum of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided text.