People vs. Florague

Wounds located at the back of the deceased do not by themselves establish treachery; there must be clear proof that the means of execution was deliberately adopted to deprive the victim of any opportunity to defend or retaliate. Because the manner in which the aggression commenced was not proven, the killing was homicide under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, not murder, with voluntary surrender appreciated as mitigating.

Herson Florague y Estalilla was the nephew of Egilberto Estalilla, the 39-year-old family driver of his mother Agripina Estalilla, then Vice-Mayor of Caba, La Union. The charge was murder qualified by treachery and abuse of superior strength allegedly committed with a .38 caliber handgun through conspiracy among Herson, his brother Christopher Florague, and Leonardo Alcantara. Resolution turned on the Revised Penal Code provisions distinguishing murder from homicide and on the requisites for self-defense and treachery.

On August 13, 1995, Egilberto Estalilla, Herson Florague y Estalilla, and Danilo Picardo drank gin from about 2 to 3 o'clock in the afternoon at the house of Villie Alajari in Barangay San Benito Norte, Aringay, La Union. Picardo and Herson thereafter went home while Egilberto remained. According to Villie, Herson later returned with blood on his hands, said he had hacked his brother Christopher, and asked Egilberto, his uncle, to help him surrender in Caba; after about ten minutes Herson left for his house about 100 meters away in Gana, Caba, followed by Egilberto, and fifteen minutes later Villie learned Egilberto had been killed.

According to prosecution eyewitnesses, the killing occurred near the houses of Leonardo Alcantara and the Floragues. Dominic Tabafunda testified he saw Herson and Egilberto wrestling for a gun about 40 meters away, ran home in fear, then heard two gunshots and later saw Egilberto lying face down in front of Herson's house. Rodolfo Dulay testified that from the Alcantara furniture shop east of the national highway he heard gunshots from the west, saw Christopher Florague and Leonardo Alcantara running after Egilberto followed by Herson, saw Christopher stab Egilberto on the left neck and Leonardo strike his back with wood, saw Egilberto fall, then heard further shots and saw the three flee westward.

For his part, Herson testified that after morning drinking with Egilberto and others until 2:30 to 3 o'clock, he went home, was later summoned by Egilberto, refused Egilberto's order to shoot one Isagani Mino, was slapped and doused with gin, fled, was shot at twice and missed, was caught between the houses of Anacleto and Leonardo Alcantara with Egilberto's gun pressed to his forehead, boxed Egilberto, wrestled for the gun, fell with Egilberto face down, twisted Egilberto's hand behind his back, and the gun went off once before he fled to the woods and later to Barangay Sandoy, Alaminos, surrendering in September 1995 to Maj. Chan at Camp Diego Silang. Defense witnesses offered alibi for Christopher and Leonardo and corroboration that Herson and Egilberto grappled.

Dr. Arturo G. Llavore, NBI medico-legal officer, autopsied the body on August 15, 1995 and found abrasions, contusions, contused abrasions, lacerations, two superficial incised wounds, and three gunshot wounds, all entering from behind. Gunshot wound no. 1 entered the right posterior chest, fractured the 4th rib, lacerated the heart and right lung, and exited the left anterior chest; gunshot wounds nos. 2 and 3 entered the right buttocks with upward trajectories, one lodging near the sacrum and the other fracturing the sacrum and perforating small intestine before exiting the left lower abdomen. The cause of death was cardiac tamponade secondary to gunshot wound no. 1, sufficient alone to cause death, with minimal vital reaction in wound no. 2 indicating weakening of the heart and successive shots as the victim fell, fired from more than 24 inches away. Agripina Estalilla testified her son earned P6,000.00 monthly as family driver and that she spent P15,000.00 for the tomb and P100,000.00 for wake and funeral.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in convicting him based on flimsy circumstantial evidence.
• Self-Defense and Accident: Petitioner maintained that he was responsible for the shooting but the gun went off and hit the victim as they grappled for possession of the firearm, after the victim as aggressor shot at him twice, pressed the gun to his forehead, and forced him to defend himself.

• Self-Defense and Accidental Shooting: Whether accused-appellant proved by clear and convincing evidence that the victim was the unlawful aggressor and that the shooting was in self-defense or accidental during grappling for the gun.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing so as to qualify it as murder where the fatal wounds were inflicted on the back of the victim.
• Penalty and Civil Liability: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua and indemnity of P400,000.00 were correct, considering voluntary surrender and controlling rulings on damages.

• Self-Defense and Accidental Shooting: No. Self-defense was not established for failure to prove unlawful aggression, and the accidental-discharge claim was contradicted by three back wounds, trajectories, and distance.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not established, the manner of commencement of the attack not having been proven and back wounds alone being insufficient to qualify the killing as murder.
• Penalty and Civil Liability: No. The crime is homicide under Art. 249 with voluntary surrender mitigating, punishable by an indeterminate sentence, and civil indemnity and moral damages are each P50,000.00.

• Self-Defense and Accidental Shooting: One invoking self-defense must show by clear and convincing evidence non-aggression, lack of sufficient provocation, and reasonable means to repel, with unlawful aggression by the victim indispensable. No reliable evidence showed the victim's gun had been returned after turnover to Nick Tirado, and deference was due the trial court's rejection of Herson's account. Self-defense and accident are incompatible, since deliberate use to repel aggression negates accident. In any event, the claim of a single accidental downward discharge with the victim face down was belied by three gunshot wounds from behind, an almost horizontal trajectory for wound no. 1 and upward trajectories for nos. 2 and 3, and a distance beyond 24 inches rather than close-range grappling.
• Treachery: Treachery requires (1) means of execution giving the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate and (2) deliberate and conscious adoption thereof. Although several wounds were at the back, location alone does not compel treachery. Absent particulars on how the aggression commenced, no showing was made that the mode was employed to eliminate danger from the victim's defense. The doubt required classification as homicide under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Penalty and Civil Liability: Voluntary surrender was credited because accused-appellant surrendered to Police Chief Inspector Marlou Cortez Chan although a warrant had issued and before arrest. Homicide is punished by reclusion temporal, imposed in its minimum period of twelve years and one day to fourteen years and eight months under Art. 64(2), with the Indeterminate Sentence Law minimum taken from prision mayor, yielding ten years and one day of prision mayor to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal. The P400,000.00 indemnity was excessive under controlling rulings, reduced to P50,000.00 civil indemnity plus P50,000.00 moral damages.

• Self-defense; burden and elements — One invoking self-defense must prove by clear and convincing evidence (1) non-aggression on his part, (2) lack of sufficient provocation, and (3) reasonable means to prevent or repel aggression, with proof of unlawful aggression by the victim indispensable as the foundation of necessity. The defense failed here for lack of reliable proof the victim was the aggressor and for contradiction by autopsy findings.
• Incompatibility of self-defense and accident — Self-defense and accidental shooting cannot both be raised, since deliberate use of a gun to repel aggression excludes accident, while accident renders inquiry into reasonableness of means immaterial. Even treating the claim as combat ending in accidental discharge, the evidence fell short of the required proof.
• Credibility; deference to trial court — Appellate courts accord the highest respect to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility for its firsthand observation of demeanor, and will not disturb it unless facts of substance and value were overlooked that might affect the result. Deference was applied to sustain rejection of accused-appellant's version.
• Treachery; requisites — Treachery requires employment of means of execution giving the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, deliberately and consciously adopted. Applied in People vs. Florague, mere location of fatal wounds at the back, without particulars of how the attack commenced, did not satisfy the requisite deliberate adoption to qualify the killing as murder.
• Voluntary surrender as mitigating — Voluntary surrender mitigates even where a warrant of arrest had issued, so long as the accused surrendered before actual arrest. It was credited because accused-appellant surrendered to police authority without having been arrested, lowering the homicide penalty to the minimum period with indeterminate sentencing.

• "Proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is indispensable since the theory of self-defense is based on the necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the aggression." — States the indispensable foundation of self-defense and why accused-appellant's failure to prove the victim was the aggressor defeated the defense.
• "There must be a clear showing that the mode of attack was employed to reduce, if not eliminate, the danger arising from the defense that the victim might offer." — Defines the evidentiary threshold for treachery and explains why back wounds alone did not qualify the killing as murder.
• "unless the trial judge overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses." — States the deference rule supporting affirmance of the trial court's rejection of the self-defense and accident narrative.

• People vs. Caber, G.R. No. 129252, Nov. 28, 2000 — Cited for the elements and burden of proof in self-defense, including indispensability of unlawful aggression.
• People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 122769, Aug. 3, 2000 — Cited for deference to the trial court's credibility assessment absent overlooked facts of substance and value.
• People vs. Tapeno, 164 SCRA 696 (1988) — Cited for the incompatibility of simultaneously invoking self-defense and accidental shooting.
• People vs. Albacin, G.R. No. 133918, Sept. 13, 2000 — Cited for the two requisites of treachery.
• People vs. Belga, 258 SCRA 583 (1996) — Cited for the rule that back wounds alone do not by themselves compel a finding of treachery.
• People vs. Llanes, 324 SCRA 727 (2000) — Cited for requiring proof of manner of commencement of aggression and for classifying the killing as homicide under Art. 249 absent treachery.
• People vs. Antonio, G.R. No. 128900, July 14, 2000 — Cited for imposing the indeterminate penalty from prision mayor to reclusion temporal minimum period with a mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Ronas, G.R. Nos. 128088 & 146639, Jan. 31, 2001; People vs. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 128362, Jan. 16, 2001; People vs. Mendoza, G.R. No. 134004, Dec. 15, 2000 — Cited as rulings supporting reduction of indemnity to P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages.

• Art. 249, Revised Penal Code — Punishes homicide; applied after treachery was rejected, fixing the basic penalty as reclusion temporal.
• Art. 64(2), Revised Penal Code — Requires imposition of the minimum period when only one mitigating circumstance is present without aggravating circumstances; applied with voluntary surrender to fix reclusion temporal from twelve years and one day to fourteen years and eight months.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Requires a minimum taken from the penalty next lower in degree; applied to impose prision mayor as the minimum alongside the reclusion temporal maximum.

Bellosillo, J., Buena, J., and De Leon, Jr., J., concur. Quisumbing, J., on official business.