People vs. Faller

Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but merely a mode of committing a crime, which determines a lower degree of criminal liability. Consequently, an information charging a willful and malicious felony may validly result in a conviction for the same crime committed through reckless imprudence, provided the information alleges that the accused acted unlawfully and criminally, which includes the charge of negligence.

The accused, Restituto Faller, was charged before the Court of First Instance of Rizal with the crime of damage caused to another's property maliciously and willfully. The offended party was Ramon Diokno. The case arose from a vehicular collision between a truck and an automobile, which occurred at a bridge ramp of very narrow dimensions. The Revised Penal Code provisions on malicious mischief (Article 327) and on reckless imprudence (Article 365) were the governing statutory framework for the prosecution.

Restituto Faller was charged with the crime of damage caused to another's property maliciously and willfully, with Ramon Diokno as the offended party. The incident involved a collision between a truck and an automobile at a bridge ramp of very narrow dimensions. After hearing the evidence, the Court of First Instance of Rizal found that the damage was not caused maliciously and willfully, but through reckless imprudence.

The trial court sentenced Faller under paragraph 3 of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as principal in the crime of damage through reckless imprudence, to pay a fine of P38 and to indemnify the offended party in the same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The defense, as recounted in the lower court's decision, rested on three points: first, that the site where the collision occurred was of very narrow dimensions, making the accident unsurprising; second, that the accused could not be convicted of damage to property under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code but at most for damage to property through reckless imprudence, because it did not appear that the accused had acted deliberately or with malice; and third, that the amount of damages was disputed, with the defense claiming they should not exceed ten pesos.

The trial court responded to the first point by noting that precisely because the bridge ramp was narrow, the accused should have exercised greater care before setting the bus in motion. On the second point, the trial court agreed with the defense that the provisions of Chapter Nine of the Revised Penal Code regarding damage were not applicable to the present case. From this decision, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court.

• Error in Conviction for Uncharged Crime: The appellant assigned as sole error the fact that he was sentenced for a crime with which he was not charged, contending that a crime maliciously and willfully committed is different from one committed through reckless imprudence.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The Office of the Solicitor-General, representing the appellee, maintained that the conviction was proper, the information having alleged that the appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and criminally, and no objection having been interposed to the information.

• Conviction for a Different Crime: Whether the appellant was erroneously convicted of a crime with which he was not charged when he was prosecuted for malicious mischief under Article 327 but convicted of damage to property through reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Conviction for a Different Crime: No. The appellant was convicted of the same crime of damage to property with which he was charged. Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing a crime and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability. The allegation in the information that the appellant acted unlawfully and criminally includes the charge that he acted with negligence.

• Conviction for a Different Crime: The Court reasoned that reckless imprudence is not a separate and distinct crime but rather a mode of committing a crime. It functions to determine a lower degree of criminal liability when a felony results from negligence rather than malice. The information in this case alleged that the appellant acted willfully, maliciously, unlawfully, and criminally. Since no objection was interposed to this information, and negligence is a punishable criminal act when it results in a crime, the allegation that the appellant committed the acts charged unlawfully and criminally was sufficient to include the charge that he acted with negligence. The Court thus found no error in the trial court's conviction of the appellant under Article 365, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

• Reckless Imprudence as a Mode of Committing a Crime — Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself; it is simply a way of committing a crime and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that a conviction for damage to property through reckless imprudence was valid even though the information charged malicious mischief, because the allegation of acting unlawfully and criminally encompasses negligence.

• "Reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself. It is simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability." — This passage states the core ratio decidendi of the decision, establishing the principle that reckless imprudence is a mode of committing a crime rather than a distinct offense.
• "Negligence being a punishable criminal act when it results in a crime, the allegation in the information that the appellant also committed the acts charged unlawfully and criminally includes the charge that he acted with negligence." — This passage defines the sufficiency of the information, holding that the phrase "unlawfully and criminally" encompasses a charge of negligence.

• United States vs. Solis, 7 Phil., 195 — Cited in Justice Laurel's concurring opinion as authority for the rule that offenses which are at least akin to each other justify conviction for a lesser or related offense.
• United States vs. Quevengco, 2 Phil., 412 — Cited in Justice Laurel's concurring opinion, together with United States vs. Solis, as supporting the application of the rule on akin offenses.

• Article 365, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — The provision under which the appellant was convicted for damage to property through reckless imprudence; the Court held that this provision properly applied because reckless imprudence is a mode of committing the crime charged.
• Article 327, Revised Penal Code — The provision on malicious mischief under which the appellant was originally charged; the trial court found this provision inapplicable because the damage was not caused maliciously and willfully.
• Paragraph 17, Section 1, Article III, Constitution of the Philippines — Cited in Justice Laurel's concurring opinion as the constitutional guarantee that an accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
• Section 15, paragraph 2, and Section 6, paragraph 3, General Orders, No. 58 — Cited in Justice Laurel's concurring opinion in relation to the constitutional right to be informed of the accusation and the requirement that a complaint or information charge but one offense.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, and Moran, JJ., concurred in the decision of Chief Justice Avanceña.

• Justice Laurel (concurring in the result) — Justice Laurel concurred in the result but on different grounds. He reasoned that if malicious mischief under Article 327 is an offense distinct from damage to property by reckless imprudence under Article 365, and the latter is not necessarily included in the former, then the conviction under Article 365 notwithstanding prosecution under Article 327 would be erroneous, given the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. However, he found two reasons to affirm: first, the constitutional and legal purpose was amply served because the accused himself, during trial, put up the defense that he was at most responsible for the offense of damage to property by reckless imprudence; and second, assuming the two offenses are distinct, they are at least akin to each other, justifying the application of the rule laid down in United States vs. Solis and United States vs. Quevengco.