People vs. Evangelista

No application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction. The perfection of an appeal from the trial court’s judgment of conviction operates as an absolute bar to probation; the law does not distinguish between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals, and the filing of a probation application is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.

On May 26, 1988, Grildo S. Tugonon stabbed Roque T. Bade with a knife. He was charged with frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 21. After trial, the RTC found him guilty and appreciated incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender as mitigating circumstances. The sentence imposed—one year of prision correccional in its minimum period—was probationable. Tugonon appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty to an indeterminate term of two months of arresto mayor as minimum to two years and four months of prision correccional as maximum. Both the original and modified penalties fell within the probationable range. Following the appellate decision, the case was remanded for repromulgation. On December 28, 1992, four days after the RTC set the case for repromulgation, Tugonon filed a petition for probation.

• Nature of the charge and conviction: Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonon was charged with frustrated homicide for stabbing Roque T. Bade on the evening of May 26, 1988. The information alleged that Tugonon inflicted a stab wound in the right iliac area, penetrating but not perforating the posterior peritoneum, and that timely medical attendance prevented death.
• Trial court judgment: After trial, the RTC found Tugonon guilty and sentenced him to one year of prision correccional in its minimum period, with an award of ₱5,000.00 for medical expenses. The RTC appreciated incomplete self-defense as a privileged mitigating circumstance and voluntary surrender as an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
• Appeal and modification: Tugonon appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty to an indeterminate sentence of two months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. Both the original and modified sentences were probationable. The appellate decision was dated January 23, 1992.
• Repromulgation and probation application: On December 21, 1992, Judge Antonio C. Evangelista set the case for repromulgation of the modified judgment on January 4, 1993. On December 28, 1992, before promulgation, Tugonon filed a petition for probation. He alleged, among other grounds, that the Court of Appeals had not acted on a prior probation petition he had filed with it and that he possessed all qualifications for probation. He invoked Santos To v. Paño, 120 SCRA 8 (1983), for the proposition that an accused may still apply for probation despite having appealed.
• Probation Officer’s recommendation: The Chief Probation and Parole Officer recommended denial. The officer distinguished Santos To, noting that in that case the penalty became probationable only after reduction on appeal, whereas Tugonon’s original sentence was already probationable and he could have applied at the first instance. The officer argued that by appealing, Tugonon waived the right to apply for probation under the amended law.
• RTC’s grant of probation: On April 23, 1993, the RTC set aside the probation officer’s recommendation and granted the application. The RTC reasoned that Tugonon had not perfected an appeal against the Court of Appeals decision, hence he was not covered by the prohibition in P.D. No. 1990.

• Violation of Section 4, P.D. No. 968 as amended: Petitioner maintained that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because Tugonon had perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction, which under the plain language of Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, barred him from being granted probation.
• Purpose of the 1986 amendment: Petitioner argued that the law was amended precisely to prevent accused persons from using appeal as a first option and probation as a fallback, contrary to the design of probation as a means of immediate reformation.

• Distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals: Private respondent argued that his appeal was meritorious, as shown by the reduction of his sentence, and that the prohibition should apply only to unmeritorious or dilatory appeals.
• No perfection of appeal from the appellate court’s decision: Respondent contended that he had not appealed the Court of Appeals decision and therefore had not perfected an appeal within the meaning of Section 4, making him eligible for probation. The RTC adopted this reasoning in granting the application.
• Reliance on Santos To v. Paño: Respondent invoked the earlier ruling that an accused could still apply for probation after appeal, especially where the appellate court reduced the penalty.

• Probation after appeal: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting probation to an accused who had previously appealed his conviction, given the prohibition under Section 4 of the Probation Law as amended by P.D. No. 1990.

• Probation after appeal: The grant of probation constituted grave abuse of discretion. Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990, unambiguously provides that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction” and that “the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.” The perfection of appeal referred to is the appeal from the trial court’s judgment of conviction, not from the appellate court’s decision. P.D. No. 1990 was enacted specifically to eliminate the practice of appealing a conviction first to seek acquittal and resorting to probation only upon failure, a practice permitted under the pre-amendment law as interpreted in Santos To v. Paño. The law draws no distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals; if the appeal were truly meritorious, the accused would be acquitted, not placed on probation. Because Tugonon’s original sentence was already probationable and he nevertheless appealed, he took his chances and fell squarely within the prohibition. The earlier ruling in Santos To applied the old text, which allowed probation so long as the sentence had not begun to be served; the 1986 amendment superseded that rule, as confirmed in Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566 (1989).

• Bar of perfected appeal to probation: Under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended by P.D. No. 1990 (effective January 15, 1986), an application for probation shall not be entertained or granted if the accused has perfected an appeal from the trial court’s judgment of conviction. The prohibition is absolute and does not admit of distinctions based on the supposed merit of the appeal. The filing of a probation application is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, underscoring the intent that probation be availed of at the first opportunity, not as an “escape hatch” after an unsuccessful appeal.
• Purpose of the 1986 amendment: The amendatory decree sought to prevent the abuse of probation by accused persons who would appeal their conviction hoping for acquittal and apply for probation only after failing. As stated in the preamble to P.D. No. 1990, “probation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated.”

• “The law does not make any distinction and so neither should the Court. In fact if an appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free and not only given probation.” — This passage undercuts the argument that a meritorious appeal should exempt an accused from the prohibition.
• “The perfection of the appeal referred in the law refers to the appeal taken from a judgment of conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under the law an application for probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same ‘after it shall have convicted and sentenced [the] defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal.’” — The Court clarified which appeal triggers the bar, rebutting the RTC’s erroneous interpretation.
• “[P]robation was not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated.” — The preamble to P.D. No. 1990, quoted with approval, captures the legislative policy behind the amendment.

• Santos To v. Paño, 120 SCRA 8 (1983) — Distinguished. This case applied the earlier version of Section 4, which allowed probation even after appeal provided the sentence had not been served. The 1986 amendment (P.D. No. 1990) superseded that rule.
• Llamado v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 566 (1989) — Followed. The Court applied the amended law to bar probation where the petitioner had appealed his sentence before seeking probation, confirming the legislative intent.

• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended by P.D. No. 1990 — Provides that no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction, and that filing an application is deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. Applied to Tugonon, whose appeal from the trial court’s conviction had been perfected and who applied for probation only after the appellate court affirmed his conviction.
• Section 3, P.D. No. 1990 — States that the amended provisions do not apply to those who had already filed applications for probation at the time of the decree’s effectivity. Tugonon filed his application after the effectivity of P.D. No. 1990, so the prohibition applied.

Justices Florenz D. Regalado, Flerida Ruth P. Romero, and Ricardo J. Puno concurred.