People vs. Espina

Murder qualified by treachery is established when the offender, without any provocation from the victim, deliberately and suddenly shoots an unarmed companion at close range during a drinking spree, rendering the victim unable to defend or retaliate. A duly registered death certificate, being a public document, requires no authentication by a medical expert to be admissible in evidence.

The case involves a criminal prosecution for murder arising from a shooting incident on May 26, 2005 in Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig City. The accused-appellant, Ponciano Espina y Balasantos, was charged under an Information dated September 3, 2007 with killing Ernando Reyes, Jr. by shooting him in the trunk with a .45-caliber gun, with the killing allegedly qualified by treachery and abuse of superior strength and aggravated by nighttime and use of a firearm. At the time of the incident, Espina and the victim were among a group sharing a drinking spree inside the house of a certain Pio Manjares.

On May 26, 2005, around 8:30 in the evening, Ponciano Espina, Ernando Reyes, Jr., Russel Michael, Pio Manjares, and a certain Dante were having a drinking spree inside Pio's house in Ibayo, Tipas, Taguig City. At some point during the gathering, Espina left. When he returned, he showed his drinking companions a .45-caliber gun and asked them to hold it, which they did. He later retrieved the gun and tucked it on his waist.

Shortly after, Espina pulled out the gun and pointed it close to Ernando's chest, posing the questions "Ano gusto? Patay buhay?" Without waiting for a response, he immediately shot Ernando in the upper right chest. The other members of the group scampered away. Russel returned shortly after and helped rush Ernando to the Rizal Medical Center, where Ernando later died. His wife Evelyn Reyes and his relatives incurred funeral expenses of P25,500.00. The Medico Legal Report stated that Ernando sustained one gunshot wound, through and through, causing laceration of his right lung, diaphragm, liver, and stomach. The cause of death was "Gunshot wound, trunk."

Espina denied the charge and even denied knowing Ernando, Evelyn, Russel, or Pio. According to him, in 2005 he resided in Las Piñas City and had never before been to Taguig City, having only started staying in his cousin's house at DC Clamp Compound, Ibayo Tipas, Taguig City on August 27, 2006. On September 14, 2006, he was involved in a stabbing incident in Brgy. Kalawaan, Pasig City, surrendered to barangay officials, and was turned over to the nearest police station, where he was charged with frustrated homicide. Four days later, on September 18, 2006, a warrant of arrest for the present murder charge was served on him. He was acquitted in the frustrated homicide case on February 6, 2012 but remained under custody for the alleged murder of Ernando.

The trial court found Espina guilty of murder qualified by treachery, rejecting his bare denial and alibi in light of the prosecution's positive and categorical evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification, finding all elements of murder present and ruling that the victim was not shown to have initiated any aggression or provocation. Both lower courts correctly ruled out nighttime and use of firearm as aggravating circumstances, these not having been proved despite being alleged in the Information.

• Inadmissibility of Death Certificate: Appellant argued that the failure of a medical expert to authenticate Ernando's death certificate rendered the same inadmissible in evidence.
• Lack of Intent to Kill: Appellant averred that there was no competent proof on record to establish intent to kill.
• General Claim of Reasonable Doubt: Appellant faulted the trial court for convicting him of murder despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Positive Identification: The OSG countered that appellant was positively identified as the one who slew Ernando.
• Presence of Treachery: The OSG argued that treachery attended Ernando's killing.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Murder: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed appellant's conviction for murder.
• Admissibility of Death Certificate: Whether the death certificate was inadmissible for lack of authentication by a medical expert.
• Intent to Kill: Whether intent to kill was sufficiently established on record.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing of Ernando Reyes, Jr.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Murder: No. The appeal was denied; the conviction for murder was affirmed, all elements being duly established by positive identification and corroborating documentary evidence.
• Admissibility of Death Certificate: No error. A duly registered death certificate is a public document requiring no authentication by a medical expert; its issuance by the Office of the Civil Registry is sufficient proof of death.
• Intent to Kill: Yes, intent to kill was sufficiently established. When the victim died because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.
• Treachery: Yes, treachery attended the killing. The sudden, unprovoked shooting of an unarmed victim at close range during a drinking spree deprived the victim of any opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Murder: The prosecution established through the positive testimony of Russel Michael that appellant suddenly shot Ernando in the chest during a drinking spree. The fact of death was established by the death certificate, and the cause of death was confirmed by the Medico Legal Report. Appellant's denial and alibi were rejected in light of the prosecution's positive and categorical evidence. The elements of murder — the killing of a person, with intent to kill, and with qualifying circumstances — were all present.

• Admissibility of Death Certificate: A duly registered death certificate is considered a public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. As such, there is no need for a medical expert to authenticate or verify it. Its issuance by the Office of the Civil Registry concerned is sufficient proof of the death of the person named therein. Under Rule 132, Section 23, documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

• Intent to Kill: Although appellant raised the theory of lack of intent to kill for the first time on appeal, the Court noted that a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change that theory on appeal. Allowing otherwise would be unfair to the adverse party. In any event, changing postures of defense betray a guilty mind and sheer lack of credibility. Substantively, intent to kill is discerned through external manifestations. Drawing from Rivera vs. People, intent to kill may be proved by: (1) the means used by the malefactor; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactor before, during, or immediately after the killing; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed. Here, appellant left the drinking spree, returned with a .45-caliber gun, pointed it at Ernando's chest asking "Ano gusto? Patay buhay?", and immediately shot the unarmed victim. The victim sustained a through-and-through gunshot wound causing laceration of vital organs. If the victim died because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.

• Treachery: Treachery requires two elements: (1) employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (2) such means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Its attendance cannot be presumed and must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself. Here, Russel positively testified that appellant and Ernando had no prior conflict or quarrel. Appellant left the drinking spree and returned carrying a gun, which he showed to his companions. After retrieving it, he tucked it on his waist, then instantly drew it and pointed it at Ernando's chest. Without waiting for a response, he swiftly shot the unarmed victim. Ernando was left without any chance to defend himself or run away. The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim without the slightest provocation, where the victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack. Appellant employed means which ensured the commission of the crime without exposing himself to any risk from Ernando's possible retaliation or defense.

• Treachery (alevosia) — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender from the offended party's act of retaliation in self-defense. Treachery has two elements: (1) employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (2) such means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. Its attendance cannot be presumed; it must be proven as indubitably as the crime itself. The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim without the slightest provocation on the latter's part, where the victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack. In this case, treachery was established because appellant deliberately returned with a gun, pointed it at the victim's chest, and shot him without warning, depriving the unarmed victim of any opportunity to defend himself.

• Intent to Kill — Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by courts only through external manifestations. It must be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence which may consist of: (1) the means used by the malefactor; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactor before, during, or immediately after the killing; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed. Motive of the offender and words uttered at the time of inflicting injuries are also determinative factors. If the victim died because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. In this case, the means used (a .45-caliber gun), the nature and location of the wound (through-and-through gunshot to the right chest lacerating vital organs), the conduct of appellant (leaving and returning with a gun, uttering "Ano gusto? Patay buhay?" before shooting), and the circumstances (unprovoked attack during a drinking spree) all established intent to kill.

• Death Certificate as Public Document — A duly registered death certificate is considered a public document under Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court. To be admissible in evidence, there is no need for a medical expert to authenticate or verify it. Its issuance by the Office of the Civil Registry concerned is sufficient proof of the death of the person named therein. Under Rule 132, Section 23, such entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

• Change of Theory on Appeal — A party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case is tried and decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change that theory on appeal. Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court will not be considered by the reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such a late stage. To allow otherwise would be unfair to the adverse party who would have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory. Changing postures of defense betray a guilty mind and sheer lack of credibility.

• Damages in Murder Cases — When the amount of actual damages proved during trial is less than the sum allowed by the Court as temperate damages, the latter sum should be awarded. In murder cases, civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages of P75,000.00 each are awarded, with temperate damages of P50,000.00 in lieu of actual damages when the latter is less than P50,000.00. All monetary awards shall earn 6% interest per annum from finality of judgment until fully paid.

• "In this jurisdiction, a duly registered death certificate is considered a public document. To be admissible in evidence, there is no need for a medical expert to authenticate or verify. Its issuance by the Office of the Civil Registry concerned is sufficient proof of the death of the person named therein." — This passage establishes the rule on the admissibility of death certificates without expert authentication, resolving appellant's contention that the death certificate was inadmissible.

• "Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations." — This formulation opens the Court's analysis of how intent to kill is proved, setting out the four-factor framework derived from Rivera vs. People that governs the determination of intent in homicide and murder cases.

• "The essence of treachery is the sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim, without the slightest provocation on the latter's part. The victim must not have known the peril he was exposed to at the moment of the attack." — This passage articulates the core principle of treachery as applied to the facts, explaining why the sudden shooting during a drinking spree qualified the killing as murder.

• "It has been settled that if the victim died because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed." — This statement provides the conclusive presumption rule that, combined with the circumstantial evidence framework, resolved the intent-to-kill issue.

• Rivera vs. People, 515 Phil. 824 (2006) — Followed. Established the four-factor framework for proving intent to kill through circumstantial evidence: means used, nature/location/number of wounds, conduct of the malefactor, and circumstances of the crime.
• People vs. Kalipayan, G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018 — Followed. Cited for the two elements of treachery: (1) employment of means giving the victim no opportunity to defend or retaliate, and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of such means.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Followed. Cited as authority for the prevailing jurisprudential amounts of damages in murder cases, which the Court used to increase the awards of moral and exemplary damages.
• People vs. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017 — Followed. Cited for the rule that when actual damages proved are less than the temperate damages allowed, the latter sum should be awarded instead.
• Etino vs. People, G.R. No. 206632, February 14, 2018 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that if the victim died because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent to kill is conclusively presumed.
• Philippine Veterans Bank vs. NLRC, 631 Phil. 202 (2010) — Followed. Cited for the rule that a party may not change theories on appeal.
• Maxicare PCIB CIGNA Healthcare vs. Contreras, MD., 702 Phil. 688 (2013) — Followed. Cited to support the principle that allowing a change of theory on appeal would be unfair to the adverse party.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating circumstance proven, appellant was correctly sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
• Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery (alevosia) as an aggravating circumstance: "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." Applied to qualify the killing as murder.
• Rule 132, Section 19, Rules of Court — Classifies documents as public or private. Public documents include written official acts or records of official acts of sovereign authority, official bodies, tribunals, and public officers. Applied to classify the death certificate as a public document.
• Rule 132, Section 23, Rules of Court — Provides that documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. Applied to establish the admissibility and probative value of the death certificate.
• A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC — Guidelines for the proper use of the phrase "without eligibility for parole" in indivisible penalties. Provides that in cases where the death penalty is not warranted, there is no need to use the phrase "without eligibility for parole" to qualify reclusion perpetua, as it is understood that persons penalized with an indivisible penalty are not eligible for parole.

Carpio (Senior Associate Justice, Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and J. Reyes, Jr. concurred.