People vs. Escarlos

When an accused pleads self-defense and admits the killing, the burden of proof shifts to the defense; self-defense fails where unlawful aggression has ceased after the accused disarms the victim, and treachery cannot qualify the killing to murder where a prior heated exchange placed the victim on guard as to the impending attack.

Timoteo Escarlos and Antonio Balisacan were barangay mates in Domampot, Asingan, Pangasinan, with a history of animosity between them. Balisacan had been one of several persons who filed a malicious mischief case against Escarlos five months before the killing. On the evening of July 1, 2000, both were present at a benefit dance held in the yard of Jaime Ulep, an event sponsored by the Mr. & Mrs. Association, which was headed by Escarlos's brother, Cesario.

Around nine o'clock in the evening of July 1, 2000, Antonio Balisacan, a barangay kagawad, went to the residence of Jaime Ulep in Domampot, Asingan, Pangasinan, to attend a benefit dance sponsored by the Mr. & Mrs. Organization. His son, Crisanto Balisacan, was also at the dance with friends, standing beside the emcee, Cesario Escarlos, the appellant's brother and president of the sponsoring organization. While Cesario was calling Antonio to come to the stage, Crisanto heard people behind him shout "Ay!" Turning, and with the area illuminated by a 50- to 100-watt bulb, Crisanto saw appellant Timoteo Escarlos stab his father several times from a distance of five to six meters. Jesus Dismaya, also beside Cesario, likewise saw appellant stab Antonio four times with a ten-inch knife from about four meters away. Antonio's brother, Marcelo Balisacan, who was about fifteen meters away on the Asingan-Urdaneta road, heard the commotion, rushed to the scene, and asked the bloodied Antonio who had stabbed him; the victim replied, "Tomy Escarlos." Antonio was brought to Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital, where he expired shortly after arrival.

Dr. Noemi Taganas conducted an autopsy and found four external stab wounds — below the right clavicle, at the left armpit, at the mid lumbar area, and between the right first and second finger — as well as internal findings of cutting of the upper and lower lobes of the right lung and the lower lobe of the left lung. She identified the second stab wound as fatal due to lung penetration. NBI medico-legal officer Dr. Ronald Bandonil confirmed the autopsy findings on the exhumed body and concluded that the first and second wounds were fatal, causing death by hypovolemic shock or massive blood loss.

Appellant did not deny the killing but interposed self-defense. He testified that while watching the benefit dance, the victim, who appeared drunk, passed in front of him and said, "You are here again to create trouble." Appellant answered back, and the victim retorted with an invective and boxed him on the forehead, leaving a scar about an inch above the right eyebrow. When appellant intended to hit back, he noticed the victim drawing a kitchen knife from his left side. Claiming fear for his life, appellant grabbed the knife handle, wrested it from the victim, and stabbed him twice; when the victim was about to fall, appellant struck a third time. His testimony was corroborated by Cesario Escarlos, who testified that he heard Antonio utter provocative words to Timoteo, then saw the two wrestling before Antonio fell bloodied to the ground.

The trial court rejected the plea of self-defense, finding no unlawful aggression on the victim's part. It relied on the prior malicious mischief case filed by the victim against appellant as establishing motive, and pointed to the nature, number, and location of the wounds — four stab wounds, including one inflicted as the victim was about to fall — as belying self-defense and indicating a determined intent to kill. The trial court further found that the location of the wounds suggested appellant was behind the victim, and convicted appellant of murder qualified by treachery, sentencing him to death.

• Treachery: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution having failed to prove its attendance.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant contended that the testimony of the supposed eyewitnesses for the prosecution regarding treachery was flawed and unworthy of belief.
• Self-Defense: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in not giving exculpatory weight to his theory of self-defense, asserting that the victim was the first to assault him.
• Victim as Initial Aggressor: Appellant argued that the trial court committed grave error in not finding that the victim was the first to assault him.
• Motive: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in considering motive to establish his guilt.
• Proper Offense: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder instead of acquitting him or, at most, convicting him of homicide.

• Insufficiency of Self-Defense: The Office of the Solicitor General recommended that appellant be convicted only of homicide, agreeing that treachery was not sufficiently established, while maintaining that self-defense was not adequately proven.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The prosecution argued that the fact of killing and the identity of the killer were established beyond reasonable doubt through the testimonies of eyewitnesses Crisanto Balisacan and Jesus Dismaya, and the dying declaration of the victim identifying "Tomy Escarlos" as his assailant.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the prosecution's evidence sufficiently established the fact of killing and the identity of the killer beyond reasonable doubt.
• Self-Defense: Whether appellant's plea of self-defense was valid, particularly whether unlawful aggression on the part of the victim existed and whether the means employed were reasonably necessary.
• Treachery: Whether treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance to elevate the crime from homicide to murder.
• Proper Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalty imposed and the damages awarded by the trial court were proper.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Yes. The fact of killing and the identity of the killer were duly established beyond reasonable doubt through eyewitness testimony and the victim's dying declaration, and appellant himself admitted authorship of the killing.
• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established because unlawful aggression had ceased once appellant disarmed the victim, rendering the subsequent stabbing unlawful; the number, nature, and location of the wounds further disproved reasonable necessity of the means employed.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was negated by the prior heated verbal and physical exchange between appellant and the victim, which placed the latter on guard and afforded him an opportunity to defend himself; the prosecution also failed to prove deliberate adoption of a treacherous mode of attack.
• Proper Penalty and Damages: The penalty was modified to an indeterminate sentence for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code; the award of moral and exemplary damages was deleted, while civil indemnity of P50,000 and actual damages of P28,650 were awarded.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: An automatic appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case for review, especially where the death penalty has been imposed. The testimony of Crisanto Balisacan, who identified appellant as the assailant under adequate illumination from a 50- to 100-watt bulb at a distance of five to six meters, together with the corroborating testimony of Jesus Dismaya and the victim's identification of "Tomy Escarlos" to his brother Marcelo, established both the fact of killing and the identity of the killer beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant himself openly admitted that he had killed the victim.

• Self-Defense: By pleading self-defense, appellant admitted authorship of the killing, thereby shifting the burden of proof to him to establish the justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. The essential requisites of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Unlawful aggression is the conditio sine qua non; without it, the other two requisites have no basis. While the victim initiated the confrontation with a fist blow, the alleged drawing of a knife did not place appellant in imminent danger, as aggression requires actual, sudden, unexpected, or imminent peril — not merely threatening or intimidating action. Even assuming some danger existed, it ceased the moment appellant successfully wrested the knife from the victim. After disarmament, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to repel, and appellant became the unlawful aggressor when he proceeded to stab the victim. The means employed were also excessive and disproportionate: appellant inflicted four stab wounds, including a third strike when the victim was about to fall, demonstrating a determination to kill rather than a measured act of self-preservation.

• Treachery: Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) employment of a means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation, and (2) deliberate and conscious adoption of that means. There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words or when the victim is aware of the assailant's hostility. The verbal and physical squabble prior to the stabbing proved that the victim was aware of the imminent danger and was afforded an opportunity to defend himself. The existence of a struggle before the fatal blows showed the victim was forewarned. The prosecution likewise failed to establish that appellant deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of attack. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous, and any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused. Evident premeditation was also absent, as the confrontation was spontaneous and casual rather than the product of cool thought and reflection; none of the three elements — the time of decision, an overt act indicating determination, and a sufficient lapse of time for reflection — was established.

• Proper Penalty and Damages: Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. With neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the appropriate penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, with appellant entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The trial court's award of moral damages was deleted because, unlike in rape cases, moral damages are not automatically granted in murder or homicide absent proof thereof. The award of exemplary damages was likewise deleted because no aggravating circumstance was proven. The award of actual damages in the amount of P28,650 was sustained, and civil indemnity of P50,000 was awarded consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Burden of Proof in Self-Defense — When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts from the prosecution to the defense, which must then establish the justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence, relying on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. The reason is that even if the prosecution's evidence were weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused admits the fact of stabbing the victim.

• Elements of Self-Defense — The essential requisites are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Unlawful aggression is the conditio sine qua non; without it, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete.

• Unlawful Aggression Defined — Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected, or imminent danger — not merely threatening and intimidating action. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not speculative. When unlawful aggression has ceased to exist, the person resorting to self-defense has no right to kill or wound the former aggressor.

• Reasonable Necessity of Means Employed — The means employed by a person invoking self-defense must be rationally necessary and commensurate to the nature and extent of the attack sought to be averted. The nature, number, and location of wounds inflicted are important indicia disproving or supporting self-defense.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery requires: (1) employment of a means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation, and (2) deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words, when the victim is aware of the assailant's hostility, or when a struggle precedes the fatal blows. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous, and any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.

• Evident Premeditation — The elements are: (a) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to the determination to commit the crime; and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and execution sufficient to allow reflection upon the consequences. Absent proof of how and when the plan to kill was decided or how much time elapsed, there is no evident premeditation.

• "Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger -- not merely threatening and intimidating action." — This passage defines the threshold of unlawful aggression, the conditio sine qua non of self-defense, and explains why the victim's mere drawing of a knife, without more, did not constitute imminent peril warranting lethal counteraction.

• "When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor." — This formulation articulates the principle that self-defense is unavailable once the peril has ceased, particularly where the accused has already disarmed the victim.

• "There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former." — This passage states the controlling rule negating treachery where prior altercation places the victim on guard, directly supporting the reduction of murder to homicide.

• People vs. Obordo, G.R. No. 139528, May 9, 2002 — Followed for the proposition that the means employed in self-defense must be rationally equivalent to the means of attack; stabbing a victim who used only bare fists was held unreasonable and unnecessary.
• People vs. Cariño, 416 Phil. 276, August 28, 2001 — Followed as directly analogous: the Court reduced murder to homicide because treachery was not conclusively established where a heated argument preceded the killing and the victim was on guard.
• Macalino vs. People, 340 SCRA 11, September 7, 2000 — Followed for the doctrine that pleading self-defense shifts the burden of proof to the accused, who must rely on the strength of his own evidence.
• People vs. Rabanal, 349 SCRA 655, January 19, 2001 — Cited for the definition of unlawful aggression as requiring actual, sudden, unexpected, or imminent danger.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder; the Information charged appellant under this provision, but the Court found the qualifying circumstances absent and convicted him of the lesser offense.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide with reclusion temporal; applied as the proper penalty after treachery and evident premeditation were not established.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Appellant was held entitled to its benefits, resulting in an indeterminate penalty ranging from prison mayor medium to reclusion temporal medium.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concurred. Puno and Azcuna, JJ., were on official business.