People vs. Enriquez

The delivery of prohibited drugs under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, is consummated even if the place of destination is not reached, because the crime is penalized by a special law to which the stages of consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are inapplicable.

Ernesto Enriquez and Wilfredo Rosales were cousins residing in Tondo, Manila. Enriquez operated an oil sludge collection service at the North Harbor under the business name Nie-Men R. Enriquez Enterprises and was Vice-President of a civic organization of Tondo residents. Rosales had come from Bohol in April 1990 and stayed with Enriquez while working as an extra porter for William Lines. The prosecution was conducted under the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425), as amended, which penalized the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and transportation of prohibited drugs. The offense was committed prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659.

On the morning of June 5, 1990, Sgt. Pedro Cerrillo, Jr., Officer-in-Charge of the Intelligence and Drug Law Enforcement Unit of Police Station No. 2 in Tondo, Manila, was scouting for information from civilian informants near Pier 10 at the North Harbor. A porter and member of the Anti-Drug Abuse Movement named "Danny" informed him that a freelance porter known as "Bulag" was looking for prospective buyers of marijuana. Sgt. Cerrillo conceived a buy-bust operation and instructed Danny to tell Bulag that a couple was interested in buying. He procured ten ₱100 bills from his home, had photocopies made showing the serial numbers, and noted the numbers in his notebook. Because most officers were deployed at a rally at the U.S. Embassy, Sgt. Cerrillo enlisted the help of ADAM members Joseph Mendoza, Amado Betita, and Alex Trinidad. Patrolwoman Shirley Maramot was designated the poseur-buyer, with Mendoza posing as her husband; Sgt. Cerrillo, Trinidad, and Betita served as back-up.

The team proceeded to the vicinity of Pier 10. Maramot and Mendoza sat on a bench while Danny went to fetch Bulag, later identified as Wilfredo Rosales. Rosales spoke with the poseur-buyers and then led them through an alley to house No. 1349. A half-naked man in green shorts, later identified as Ernesto Enriquez, emerged and asked Maramot in Visayan, "Dala mo ba ang pera?" Maramot showed the bundle of marked money, and Enriquez allowed the group inside. Enriquez locked the door, asked how much money Maramot had, and she replied ₱1,000. She was told she could get the lot for ₱4,500. She agreed to pay the balance later if trusted. Enriquez accepted and took the ₱1,000. He was about to hand over the marijuana but decided instead to have Rosales personally deliver it. The group exited through the back door, with Rosales carrying a plastic sack. Sgt. Cerrillo followed until they reached a nearby waiting shed, where Maramot announced she was a policewoman. Sgt. Cerrillo seized Rosales and the sack, which contained marijuana wrapped in plastic. The team returned to house No. 1349 but Enriquez had fled. After scouring the pier area, a security guard supervisor spotted Enriquez, and Sgt. Cerrillo apprehended him and brought him to the Lakandula detachment. Enriquez's wife Minda arrived; at Enriquez's request she had been fetched to "bring the money." She took out her wallet and three of the marked ₱100 bills were found among its contents. Minda became hysterical and begged Sgt. Cerrillo to forgive her husband.

The NBI forensic chemist certified on June 6, 1990, that the specimen tested positive for marijuana, weighing six kilograms. On June 7, 1990, the station commander endorsed the case to the City Prosecutor, and the inquest fiscal recommended charging both accused with violation of Section 4, Article II, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The defense presented a different version. Rosales testified that he was on his way home from work when a man asked him to carry a white sack smelling of dried fish for ₱20; at a junction, a security guard blocked and pushed him into a vehicle where he was handcuffed, and the sack's owner disappeared. He claimed Sgt. Cerrillo demanded ₱20,000 for his release. Enriquez testified that he left his house at around 11:45 a.m. to meet his brother at Pier 10, carrying ₱2,000 in ₱100 denominations. He said a security guard, Homer Ciesta, lured him to the Parola squatter's area with a promise of "extra money," where Sgt. Cerrillo handcuffed him and demanded ₱20,000. When he refused, he was brought to the detachment, and the ₱2,000 from his wallet was presented as buy-bust money. On January 24, 1991, the trial court credited the prosecution's evidence and found both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, sentencing each to life imprisonment and a fine of ₱30,000.

• Frame-Up and Extortion: Enriquez argued that Sgt. Cerrillo and Pat. Maramot framed him and Rosales for selfish motives, and that the six-day delay in filing the information was attributable to an extortion attempt by the arresting officers.
• Credibility of Police Witnesses: Enriquez assailed the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, asserting it was incredible for Cerrillo and Maramot to have abandoned Police Station No. 2 while the Station Commander and other officers were deployed at a rally at the U.S. Embassy, and noting that Maramot was unarmed and could not effect an immediate arrest.
• Use of Personal Funds: Enriquez questioned Sgt. Cerrillo's use of his own money as marked money in the buy-bust operation.
• Delay in Filing: Enriquez questioned the six-day delay in the filing of the information, attributing it to an extortion attempt.
• Failure to Establish Sale: Rosales argued that the prosecution failed to clearly establish the sale of marijuana, which he asserted was necessary for conviction.
• Lack of Knowledge: Rosales contended that while criminal intent need not be proved in mala prohibita, knowledge that the sack contained a prohibited drug must be established, and the prosecution failed to prove such knowledge.
• Attempted Delivery Only: Rosales argued that since the sack was still within his control when intercepted, he should only be held liable for attempted delivery, as he was still in the subjective phase of the crime.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Sgt. Cerrillo and Pat. Maramot, should be disturbed.
• Frame-Up and Extortion: Whether the defense of frame-up and extortion was sufficiently substantiated to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties.
• Delay in Filing Information: Whether the six-day delay in filing the information was undue and prejudicial.
• Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi can prevail over the positive identification of the accused.
• Consummated vs. Attempted Delivery: Whether the crime of delivery of prohibited drugs under a special law is consummated even if the destination is not reached, or whether it is only attempted.
• Knowledge of the Prohibited Drug: Whether the prosecution established that Rosales knowingly delivered the prohibited drug.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between Enriquez and Rosales was established.
• Proper Penalty: Whether R.A. No. 7659 should be applied retroactively, and what penalty should be imposed.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The trial court's assessment of witness credibility is accorded great respect, the trial judge being in the best position to observe demeanor and deportment, and the Court found no justification to hold differently.
• Frame-Up and Extortion: No. The claim of frame-up was unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, and the bare allegation of extortion was unsupported by any criminal or administrative charge filed against the officers, nor did it appear in Enriquez's counter-affidavit or sworn affidavit.
• Delay in Filing Information: No. There was no undue delay; the station commander filed the case with the prosecutor on June 7, 1990, the same day the NBI forensic chemist's report was released, and the inquest fiscal recommended the charge on the same date.
• Alibi: No. Alibi is a weak defense that crumbles in the face of positive identification, and Enriquez admitted his residence was only half a kilometer from Pier 10, negotiable by a thirty-minute walk.
• Consummated vs. Attempted Delivery: The crime is consummated. The stages of consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are inapplicable to offenses governed by special laws; the act of conveying prohibited drugs is punishable regardless of whether the destination is reached.
• Knowledge of the Prohibited Drug: Yes. It was sufficiently shown that Rosales knew all along that the deal between Enriquez and the poseur-buyers concerned marijuana, as he brought the poseur-buyers to Enriquez and carried the sack upon Enriquez's instruction.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was inferred from the concerted acts of the accused — Rosales brought the poseur-buyers to Enriquez, and upon Enriquez's instruction, Rosales carried the sack of marijuana to the supposed residence of the buyers.
• Proper Penalty: Life imprisonment and a fine of ₱30,000. R.A. No. 7659 was not applied retroactively because it would not be beneficial to the appellants, as it would impose reclusion perpetua to death and a higher fine, carrying with it accessory penalties.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The evaluation of witness credibility by the trial court is viewed with respect on appeal, the trial judge having the distinct advantage of observing demeanor and deportment firsthand. The Court scrutinized the records and found no justification to depart from the trial court's findings. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties further supported the prosecution's case.

• Frame-Up and Extortion: The contention of frame-up is commonly raised in drug cases and must be supported by clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials performed their duties regularly. Enriquez failed to substantiate his allegations. The claim of extortion was likewise unsupported; no criminal or administrative charges were filed against the officers, and the allegation did not appear in Enriquez's counter-affidavit or sworn affidavit prepared by his counsel, suggesting it was a fabrication or afterthought.

• Delay in Filing Information: The Court found no undue delay. The station commander filed the case with the prosecutor on June 7, 1990, the same day the NBI forensic chemist's official report was released. The transmittal letter bore the inquest fiscal's recommendation, also dated June 7, 1990. The six-day period was thus explained by the time needed for laboratory examination and report preparation.

• Alibi: Alibi requires proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the locus criminis. Enriquez admitted his residence was only half a kilometer from Pier 10, negotiable by a thirty-minute walk, making it physically possible for him to be present at the crime scene. The defense of alibi crumbles in the face of positive identification by prosecution witnesses.

• Consummated vs. Attempted Delivery: Section 4, Article II of R.A. No. 6425 penalizes not only sale but also delivery of prohibited drugs. The law defines "deliver" as a person's act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise, by any manner, with or without consideration. The stages of consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code are inapplicable to offenses governed by special laws. The act of conveying prohibited drugs to an unknown destination has been held punishable, and it is immaterial whether the place of destination is reached. Rosales's claim of being in the subjective phase was thus inconsequential.

• Knowledge of the Prohibited Drug: Section 2(f) of the Dangerous Drugs Law requires that a person who delivers a prohibited drug must "knowingly" pass the contraband. Rosales incorrectly assumed or gave the impression of being unaware of the drug, but the evidence sufficiently showed he knew all along that the deal concerned marijuana. He brought the poseur-buyers to Enriquez, participated in the negotiations, and carried the sack upon Enriquez's instruction.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy was inferred from the acts of the accused, whose conduct before, during, and after the commission of the crime showed its existence. Rosales brought the poseur-buyers to Enriquez for the purchase of marijuana, and upon Enriquez's instruction — apparently to retain control of the unpaid portion — Rosales was to carry the sack to the supposed residence of the buyers. In conspiracy, the act of one conspirator is the act of the other.

• Proper Penalty: R.A. No. 7659 provides that if the quantity of drugs exceeds the specified amounts (750 grams for marijuana), the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death must be imposed. However, an amendatory law may only be applied retroactively if beneficial to the accused. Applying R.A. No. 7659 would not be favorable because reclusion perpetua carries accessory penalties and a higher fine. Following People vs. Ballagan, the Court imposed life imprisonment and the fine of ₱30,000 as originally meted by the trial court.

• Presumption of Regularity in the Performance of Official Duties — Government officials are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner; a claim of frame-up or extortion must be supported by clear and convincing evidence to overcome this presumption. The Court applied this by rejecting Enriquez's unsubstantiated allegations of frame-up and extortion.

• Respect for Trial Court's Assessment of Credibility — The trial judge, who observes witnesses' demeanor and deportment firsthand, is in the best position to determine truthfulness; appellate courts accord great respect to such assessments unless the trial court overlooked or missed facts of substance that would alter the judgment. The Court found no reason to disturb the trial court's credibility findings.

• Inapplicability of Article 6 RPC Stages to Special Laws — The distinctions among consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code apply only to felonies under the Revised Penal Code, not to offenses governed by special laws. The delivery of prohibited drugs under R.A. No. 6425 is consummated upon the act of conveying the drugs, regardless of whether the destination is reached.

• Conspiracy Inferred from Concerted Acts — Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence; it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime showing a common purpose. Once conspiracy is established, the act of one conspirator is the act of all.

• Retroactivity of Penal Laws Only When Beneficial — An amendatory law increasing penalties may not be applied retroactively if it is not beneficial to the accused. Because R.A. No. 7659 would impose reclusion perpetua (carrying accessory penalties) and a higher fine, it was not applied retroactively, and life imprisonment was maintained.

• "These rules are inapplicable to offenses governed by special laws." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on why Rosales's claim of attempted delivery fails: the stages of felonies under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code do not apply to special-law offenses such as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

• "The act of conveying prohibited drugs to an unknown destination has been held to be punishable, and it is immaterial whether or not the place of destination of the prohibited drug is reached." — This formulation establishes that delivery of prohibited drugs is consummated upon the act of conveyance, regardless of completion of transport to a destination, a principle frequently cited in subsequent drug cases.

• "For this claim to prosper, the evidence adduced must be clear and convincing in order to overcome the presumption that government officials have performed their duties in a regular and proper manner." — This states the standard for overcoming the presumption of regularity when frame-up is alleged in drug cases, a commonly invoked principle in buy-bust jurisprudence.

• "In conspiracy, the act of one conspirator could be held to be the act of the other." — This articulates the fundamental rule of conspiracy liability as applied to the concerted acts of Enriquez and Rosales in the sale and delivery of marijuana.

• People vs. Gabris, 258 SCRA 663 — Cited for the principle that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is accorded great respect on appeal.
• People vs. Lua, 256 SCRA 539 — Cited for the requirement that a frame-up defense must be supported by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Doroja, 235 SCRA 238 — Cited for the proposition that a claim of extortion by police officers, if true, should have prompted the filing of charges against the erring officers.
• People vs. Libag, 184 SCRA 707 — Cited for the principle that knowledge of the prohibited nature of the drug is an essential ingredient of the offense of delivery, and that the testimony of the poseur-buyer may be indispensable to establish such knowledge.
• People vs. Leangsiri, 252 SCRA 213 — Cited twice, for the propositions that the act of conveying prohibited drugs to an unknown destination is punishable and that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused.
• People vs. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122 — Cited for the rule that it is immaterial whether the place of destination of the prohibited drug is reached.
• People vs. Ballagan, 247 SCRA 535 — Controlling precedent on the penalty issue; the Court followed Ballagan in imposing life imprisonment rather than reclusion perpetua, because the amendatory law (R.A. No. 7659) would not be beneficial to the accused if applied retroactively.
• U.S. vs. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209 — Cited for the definition of the subjective phase in the commission of a felony under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Section 4, Article II, R.A. No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972), as amended — Penalizes the sale, administration, delivery, distribution, dispatch in transit, or transportation of prohibited drugs, or acting as a broker in such transactions, with life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from ₱20,000 to ₱30,000. Applied to convict both accused for selling and delivering six kilograms of marijuana.
• Section 2(f), Article I, R.A. No. 6425 — Defines "deliver" as a person's act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another personally or otherwise, and by any manner, with or without consideration. Applied to establish that delivery is a punishable act independent of sale and may occur with or without consideration.
• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies and the subjective phase of felony execution. Discussed but held inapplicable to the offense charged, which is governed by a special law.
• Sections 4 and 20, R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659 — Provides that if the quantity of drugs exceeds specified amounts (750 grams for marijuana), the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death must be imposed. Not applied retroactively because it would not be beneficial to the accused.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concurred.