People vs. Enoja

Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of an agreement; the concerted conduct of the malefactors before, during, or after the commission of the crime is sufficient, and once established, the act of one becomes the act of all, rendering each conspirator liable as co-principal regardless of the extent or degree of participation. The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with a simultaneous plea of alibi, as the former presupposes participation in the act while the latter denies presence at the scene.

The five appellants — Nicasio Enoja, Jose Enoja, Antonio Galupar, Ronnie Enoja, and Yolly Armada — were all farmers and residents of Barangay Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, related to each other by blood or affinity. Jose Enoja was Nicasio's brother, Ronnie was Nicasio's son, Yolly Armada was Nicasio's first cousin, and Antonio Galupar was a "kumpadre." The victim, Siegfred G. Insular, was a suspected commander of the New People's Army. A day before the incident, the house of Romulo Enoja, brother of the Enojas, was allegedly sprayed with bullets by the NPA, killing Romulo's daughter and son; before that, the house of Catelina Enoja, mother of the Enojas, at Barangay Caraudan, was allegedly burned by the NPA. Three other accused — Joel Enoja @ "Mike," Melvin Castor, and Antonio Enoja — remained at-large throughout the proceedings.

On July 2, 1987, at around 4:30 in the afternoon, Siegfred Insular and his wife Paterna were walking home from the market along a ricefield at Barangay Caraudan, Janiuay, Iloilo, when they saw Yolly Armada carrying a long firearm on the other side of the field, walking in the same direction. Paterna did not at first recognize Armada and called her husband's attention to the armed man, but Siegfred recognized him and told her, "never mind, he is Yolly Armada." The spouses and Armada continued walking until they met near the ricemill of Teodoro Salamanca by the chapel. Siegfred greeted Armada with a nod, which Armada returned. As the couple prepared to leave, Armada blocked them, pointed his firearm at Siegfred with the barrel touching the left side of Siegfred's body, and suddenly fired. As Siegfred turned to run, Armada fired successive shots, causing him to fall wounded.

Almost simultaneously, several armed men appeared and took turns firing at Siegfred. Among them were Nicasio Enoja, Jose Enoja, Antonio Galupar, and Ronnie Enoja. The victim's body jerked as the accused took turns shooting him. Afterward, the accused turned to Paterna and attempted to shoot her, but Paterna hugged Teodoro Salamanca, who was present and shouted, "do not include the girl." The accused heeded the plea and spared Paterna. Jose Enoja then turned to his brother Antonio Enoja and fired at him, hitting him on the thigh. Jose approached the prostrate Siegfred, placed the gun he had used to shoot Antonio near the victim's hand, and placed live bullets into the victim's pocket. Jose called for a hammock, which was promptly brought to transport Antonio to the hospital. Siegfred's body was left lying on the ground. Nicasio announced that they would bring Paterna and Salamanca to the ricefield to spend the night, but Paterna pleaded to be brought to the house of Patria Alcantara about five meters away. The accused granted the request and warned them not to leave or they would be shot. Paterna and Salamanca were only able to leave the following morning when policemen and PC soldiers arrived.

The shooting was reported to the Janiuay police station by Alfredo Galupar. A joint PC-INP team arrived at Barangay Caraudan at around 8:00 a.m. on July 3, 1987, and found the victim's body still lying at the scene. They recovered several empty shells of different calibers and a short homemade .30 caliber firearm with one empty shell in its chamber, found near the left arm of the victim. Dr. Tito Doromal, the medico-legal officer, testified that the victim suffered five gunshot wounds in the head and neck area, six in the thoraco-abdominal regions, and two in the extremities. The cause of death was maceration of the brain, secondary to gunshot wounds.

For the defense, Armada pleaded self-defense, claiming that he was on his way to attend the wake of his niece and nephew when he heard gunshots near the chapel. Upon going to the place, he saw Galupar lying wounded, allegedly shot by Siegfred. When Siegfred attempted to shoot Armada, Armada fired first with his M-2 automatic carbine. He denied seeing Paterna in the vicinity and claimed he surrendered to the PC station afterward. The other appellants admitted being in the vicinity but denied participation. Nicasio claimed he was inside Salamanca's ricemill milling palay with his son Arnold, but Salamanca testified that no milling was ongoing at the time. Ronnie testified he was doing household chores at home, where his brother and sister were lying in state, when he heard explosions; he later brought a hammock to the scene and, on the way to the hospital, looked back and saw his uncle Joel Enoja and friend Melvin shooting the victim's body. Galupar claimed he was at home the whole night and was implicated because he refused to act as a prosecution witness.

The trial court rejected Armada's self-defense claim, noting that empty shells from firearms of different calibers were recovered and that the homemade firearm found near the victim could not have been used by the victim since it only had one empty shell in its chamber and the victim was right-handed. The court also found it highly suspicious that Antonio, who was allegedly shot by the victim and could have corroborated Armada's self-defense story, went into hiding and never surfaced.

• Error in Finding Conspiracy: Appellants assailed the trial court's finding of conspiracy by pointing out alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Salamanca and Paterna, arguing that Salamanca testified the other appellants arrived only after Armada shot the victim, while Paterna testified that the appellants fired successive shots, implying all were already present when Armada fired.
• Error in Finding Guilt: Appellants maintained their innocence, interposing the defenses of denial and alibi, claiming they were elsewhere during the shooting and had no participation in the killing.
• Error in Not Appreciating Impossible Crime: Appellants alternatively argued that even assuming they participated in the killing, they should only be held liable for an impossible crime under Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, theorizing that the shots fired by Armada already resulted in the victim's death, so their subsequent shooting merely constituted the impossible crime of killing an already dead person.
• Absence of Treachery: Appellants insisted that treachery could not be appreciated because the victim was forewarned of impending danger when he saw Armada carrying a firearm, contending that treachery requires the offended party to be completely denied the opportunity to defend himself.

• Presence of Treachery: The Solicitor General countered that there was nothing in Armada's behavior that could have forewarned the victim of impending danger, as both the victim and Armada knew each other and Armada even acknowledged the victim's greeting before suddenly gunning him down.

• Conspiracy: Whether the trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused-appellants.
• Guilt: Whether the accused-appellants were guilty of murder beyond reasonable doubt.
• Impossible Crime: Whether, assuming guilt, the offense committed was only an impossible crime under Article 4, Paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present despite the victim's alleged forewarning.

• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established through the concerted conduct of the accused before, during, and after the killing, without need of direct proof of a prior agreement.
• Guilt: Yes. The positive identification of the appellants by two credible eyewitnesses without motive to testify falsely prevailed over the defense of alibi, which was corroborated mainly by relatives and contradicted by prosecution evidence.
• Impossible Crime: No. The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with the simultaneous defense of alibi, as the former presupposes participation in the act while the latter denies presence at the scene.
• Treachery: Yes. The essence of treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation, and nothing in Armada's behavior forewarned the victim of impending danger despite his having seen the firearm.

• Conspiracy: The Court found no inconsistency between the testimonies of Salamanca and Paterna. Close perusal of the transcript showed that Paterna actually testified that after Armada fired at her husband, the other appellants arrived one after the other ("nag-arabot abot") and continued to fire at the prostrate body — consistent with Salamanca's account. The two testimonies constituted cumulative evidence identifying all five accused as participants in the shooting. Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement; the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or after the commission of the crime suffices. Four circumstances indubitably showed concerted action: (1) after Armada incapacitated the victim, the other accused arrived almost simultaneously and took turns shooting him, with empty cartridges from guns of different calibers and the victim's numerous wounds indicating plurality of assailants; (2) Jose Enoja fired at his brother Antonio's thigh to simulate self-defense; (3) Jose planted a short firearm near the victim's body and placed bullets in his pocket; and (4) Antonio conveniently disappeared after being brought to the hospital. These acts pointed to common purpose, concert of action, and community of interest. Once conspiracy is proved, the act of one becomes the act of all, and all are answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent of their participation.

• Guilt: The appellants' alibi was feeble and unconvincing. Nicasio admitted being within the vicinity of the crime but claimed he was inside Salamanca's ricemill, a claim contradicted by Salamanca's testimony that no milling was ongoing. Ronnie's alibi placed him at home doing chores, but he admitted going to the scene with a hammock. Alibi, especially when corroborated mainly by relatives and friends, is viewed with extreme suspicion as it is easy to fabricate. Both Paterna and Salamanca positively identified Nicasio as one of the shooters, and Paterna categorically pointed to Ronnie as the person who shot her husband in the right eye. The appellants could not attribute any motive to these witnesses to falsely testify against them. In the light of positive identification by witnesses without motive to testify falsely, the defense of alibi cannot prevail. The suggestion that Paterna's crying impaired her credibility was rejected, as witnesses of startling occurrences react differently and there is no standard form of human behavioral response; her powers of observation could even have been heightened by the startling event.

• Impossible Crime: The theory of impossible crime was rejected for two reasons. First, it completely contradicted the appellants' primary defense of alibi and denial — one cannot simultaneously claim to have been elsewhere during the offense and to have participated in shooting an already dead person. The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with alibi. Second, the theory was speculative as to the cause of death, as it assumed that Armada's shots alone had already killed the victim before the others fired, which was not established. For alibi to prosper, the accused must show he was so far away he could not have been physically present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity, and that his presence elsewhere renders it impossible for him to be the guilty party — a standard the appellants failed to meet, as Nicasio admitted being within the vicinity.

• Treachery: Nothing in Armada's behavior forewarned the victim of impending danger. Both knew each other, and Armada acknowledged the victim's greeting. The victim was walking with his wife when he was suddenly gunned down without provocation. The essence of treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. The victim's mere awareness that Armada was carrying a firearm did not constitute forewarning of an impending attack, as the greeting and nodding exchanged between them suggested amity, not hostility. Abuse of superior strength was also present given the number of armed assailants against the lone unarmed victim, but this aggravating circumstance was absorbed by treachery and need not be appreciated separately.

• Conspiracy by Concerted Conduct — Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement among the parties to commit the crime. The conduct of the malefactors before, during, or after the commission of the crime is sufficient to prove conspiracy. Once proved, the act of one becomes the act of all, and all shall be answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their participation. The Court applied this doctrine by identifying four concerted acts — the simultaneous arrival and taking of turns in firing, the simulation of self-defense by shooting a co-conspirator, the planting of a firearm and bullets on the victim, and the disappearance of the wounded brother — as establishing common purpose, concert of action, and community of interest.

• Treachery as Qualifying Circumstance — The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. The victim's mere awareness that the assailant is armed does not negate treachery where nothing in the assailant's behavior forewarns of an impending attack. Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which need not be appreciated separately.

• Impossible Crime vs. Alibi — Irreconcilability — The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with the defense of alibi. Impossible crime presupposes that the accused performed acts for the execution of an offense against persons or property, while alibi denies presence at the scene. An accused cannot simultaneously claim to have been elsewhere during the offense and to have participated in shooting an already dead person. The theory of impossible crime is also speculative when it assumes a particular sequence of causation — that one assailant's shots alone caused death before others fired — without evidentiary support.

• Positive Identification Prevails Over Alibi — In the light of positive identification by witnesses who have no motive to falsely testify, the feeble defense of alibi cannot prevail. Alibi is viewed with extreme suspicion, especially when corroborated mainly by relatives and friends of the accused, as it is easy to fabricate and concoct. For alibi to prosper, the accused must show he was so far away he could not have been physically present at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity, and that his presence elsewhere renders it impossible for him to be the guilty party.

• Extinction of Liability by Death Pending Appeal — Pursuant to People vs. Bayotas, the death of an appellant pending appeal extinguishes both criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. The appeal is dismissed as to the deceased appellant.

• Abandonment of Appeal by Escape or Jumping Bail — An appellant who escapes from prison or jumps bail is deemed to have abandoned his appeal, rendering the judgment against him final and executory.

• "The conduct of the malefactors before, during or after the commission of the crime is sufficient to prove their conspiracy. Once proved, the act of one becomes the act of all. All shall be answerable as co-principals regardless of the extent or degree of their participation." — This passage articulates the controlling doctrine on proving conspiracy through concerted conduct, the ratio decidendi for the Court's finding that all appellants acted in concert.

• "The defense of impossible crime is irreconcilable with alibi." — This succinct statement resolves the appellants' alternative defense, establishing that an accused cannot simultaneously deny presence at the crime scene and claim to have participated in an impossible crime of killing an already dead person.

• "The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked." — This formulation defines the controlling standard for treachery and explains why the victim's awareness of Armada's firearm did not negate the qualifying circumstance.

• "In the light of positive identification by witnesses who have no motive to falsely testify, the feeble defense of alibi cannot prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime." — This passage states the doctrinal hierarchy between positive identification and alibi, a principle frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239 — Controlling precedent applied to extinguish the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of Antonio Galupar, who died pending appeal.
• People vs. Quiritan, 197 SCRA 32 (1991) and People vs. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104 (1993) — Cited for the rule that an appellant who escapes or refuses to surrender is deemed to have abandoned his appeal, rendering the judgment final and executory; applied to dismiss the appeals of Armada and Jose Enoja.
• People vs. Cantere, G.R. No. 127575, March 3, 1999 — Followed for the doctrines that conspiracy is proved by concerted conduct and that alibi corroborated by relatives is viewed with extreme suspicion.
• People vs. Caritativo, 256 SCRA 1 (1996) — Cited for the proposition that empty cartridges from guns of different calibers and numerous wounds indicate plurality of assailants.
• People vs. Matubis, G.R. No. 109774, March 27, 1998 — Followed for the principle that witnesses of startling occurrences react differently and there is no standard form of human behavioral response.
• People vs. Noay, G.R. No. 122102, September 25, 1998 and People vs. Cogonon, 262 SCRA 693 (1996) — Cited for the definition of treachery as a sudden and unexpected attack without provocation.
• People vs. Gutierrez, Jr., G.R. No. 116281, February 8, 1999 — Followed for the rule that treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength.
• People vs. Canete, G.R. No. 120495, March 12, 1998 — Cited for the requisites of alibi: the accused must show he was so far away he could not have been physically present at the crime scene, and that his presence elsewhere renders it impossible for him to be the guilty party.
• People vs. Guillermo, G.R. No. 113787, January 28, 1999 — Followed for the rule that actual damages must be supported by receipts and that testimony alone is insufficient basis for the award.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder. At the time of the commission on July 2, 1987, the penalty was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The trial court imposed the medium period (reclusion perpetua) for Nicasio, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Article 4, Paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Defines impossible crime as criminal liability incurred by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means. The Court rejected the appellants' invocation of this provision as irreconcilable with their defense of alibi.
• Article 59, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for impossible crime (arresto mayor or a fine from 200 to 500 pesos). Referenced by appellants in their alternative defense but rendered inapplicable by the Court's rejection of the impossible crime theory.
• Article 68, Second Paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the offender is a minor under eighteen but over fifteen, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law shall be imposed. Applied to Ronnie Enoja, who was born on February 21, 1970, and was below eighteen at the time of the crime.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Governs the imposition of penalties when neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present, directing that the penalty be imposed in its medium period. Applied to Nicasio Enoja's penalty.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in fixing Ronnie Enoja's indeterminate sentence: the maximum taken from the medium period of the imposable penalty (reclusion temporal minimum) and the minimum taken from the penalty next lower in degree (prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium), resulting in six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Noted as having amended Article 248 to impose reclusion perpetua to death for murder, effective December 31, 1993, but not applicable to this case since the crime was committed on July 2, 1987, before the amendment took effect.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurring.