People vs. Encepido

Oral extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, identical in material respects and confirmatory of each other, are admissible as circumstantial evidence against co-accused to show the probability of their participation, and an accused’s in-court testimony implicating co-accused is admissible against the latter who had the opportunity to cross-examine. A defense of alibi cannot prevail over positive identification where the accused fail to prove physical impossibility of being at the crime scene.

Jose Lacumbes was suspected by members of the community, including one of the original accused Rudy Lumarda, of practicing witchcraft. Lumarda believed Lacumbes caused his illness and sought the help of rebels to kill him. On March 30, 1982, Lacumbes was found dead near his farm hut in Sitio Capacohan, Barangay Mabini, Tubajon, Surigao del Norte. His neck had been incised, his right ear removed, his hands tied behind his back with rattan, and he bore eight stab wounds and contusions. The killing was attributed to a group led by “Commander Tanga,” later identified as appellant Brigido Encipido.

• The Killing: On the afternoon of March 30, 1982, Jose Lacumbes (the DECEASED) was killed near his hut in Sitio Capacohan, Barangay Mabini, Tubajon, Surigao del Norte. Post‑mortem findings revealed an incised wound on the neck, eight stab wounds on the back, removal of the right external ear, contusions on the left lumbar region, and both hands tied at the back with rattan. Cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to incised and stab wounds.

• Eyewitness Felicisimo Alciso: Alciso testified that he went to the DECEASED’s hut to get chickens. Before reaching the hut, he heard a gunshot. He saw three persons mauling the DECEASED while others stayed at a distance. The DECEASED was struck with a gun butt, causing him to fall. His hands were tied behind his back. Alciso identified appellant Encipido (“Commander Tanga”) at the DECEASED’s back, appellant Manatad on one side, and appellant De la Peña on the other. On Encipido’s order, De la Peña hacked the DECEASED’s neck with a bolo, nearly severing the head. Frightened, Alciso fled. He later went to the jail after learning the suspects were detained, recognized the three appellants, and asked De la Peña why he was in jail; De la Peña answered that it was because they had beheaded the DECEASED.

• Hearsay Testimony of Armando Bagacay: Bagacay testified that Rudy Lumarda told him his ailment was caused by the DECEASED’s witchcraft and that he would seek rebel aid to cut the DECEASED’s head. Jesus Rubio also confided to Bagacay that they would cut the DECEASED’s neck. This testimony was acknowledged as hearsay.

• Oral Confessions to Public Officials:

  • INP Station Commander Jorge Ortega testified that on May 1, 1982, he met Encipido, who introduced himself as “Commander Tanga,” at the Loreto wharf. Over drinks, Encipido and De la Peña disclosed that they had beheaded the DECEASED and were responsible for other killings on Dinagat Island.

  • Municipal Mayor Mariano Espina testified that the same evening, Encipido and his group visited his house. Encipido confided that he had killed many people, including the DECEASED, to stop his witchcraft. De la Peña produced a sharp‑pointed knife, admitted cutting the DECEASED’s neck, and showed the dried ear.

  • Judicial Admission of De la Peña: In open court, De la Peña, to the surprise of his own counsel, testified that he was forced to join Encipido’s group, that he was present on March 30, 1982 when Encipido and Manatad killed the DECEASED, but that he merely stood by. He also stated that the victim was beaten, kicked, and shot.

• Defense of Alibi:

  • Encipido claimed he was sawing lumber at Barangay Boa, about 60 kilometers away, from morning until 3:00 P.M. on March 30, 1982, and then rested at Norberto Bukid’s house without leaving.
  • Manatad claimed he was plowing a field at Barangay Malinao, about 12 kilometers away, from early morning until 5:00 P.M., and then stayed home. His testimony was partially corroborated by Barangay Captain Sergio Peniones (who saw him plowing in the morning) and his wife (who said he stayed home after 5:00 P.M.).

• Hearsay Testimonies of Espina and Ortega: Appellants argued that the testimonies of Mayor Espina and Station Commander Ortega regarding oral confessions were hearsay and should not have been given credence.
• Incredible Testimony of Alciso: Appellants contended that eyewitness Alciso’s testimony was incredible and hearsay; that he initially said he could not recognize the assailants, was too far away (80–90 meters) to identify them, and his act of visiting the jail to verify identities was unnatural.
• Improper Use of Co‑Accused’s Judicial Admission: Appellants asserted that De la Peña’s in‑court testimony was a self‑serving exculpatory statement and could not be used against his co‑accused Encipido and Manatad, particularly as they were all represented by the same counsel de oficio and had no genuine opportunity to cross‑examine.
• Insufficient Evidence for Conviction: Encipido and Manatad maintained that the evidence did not prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Denial of Motion for Reconsideration: Appellants claimed the trial court erred in refusing to give due course to their Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that it was filed out of time, thereby rendering the judgment supposedly final.
• Improper Conviction of De la Peña: De la Peña argued that the evidence did not support his conviction.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The People maintained that Alciso’s positive identification was credible and corroborated by autopsy findings; minor inconsistencies in his estimates of distance did not impair his overall credibility.
• Admissibility of Oral Confessions: The People argued that the oral extrajudicial admissions made to Mayor Espina and Station Commander Ortega were admissible under Sections 22 and 29 of the Rules of Court, as they were heard and recounted by competent witnesses.
• Interlocking Confessions: The People contended that the admissions were independently made, identical in material respects, and confirmed each other, rendering them admissible as circumstantial evidence against all accused.
• Admissibility of De la Peña’s Testimony: The People submitted that De la Peña’s in‑court testimony implicating his co‑accused was admissible against them because they had the opportunity to cross‑examine him, distinguishing it from an out‑of‑court confession.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The evidence taken together—eyewitness account, interlocking confessions, and judicial admission—established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the defense of alibi could not prevail