People vs. Elarcosa and Orias

Robbery with homicide requires the robbery itself to be proved as conclusively as any other essential element; absent such proof, the killing is homicide or murder depending on qualifying circumstances, and separate shots causing separate deaths constitute separate counts of murder, not a complex crime of multiple murder.

Mitsuel L. Elarcosa and Jerry B. Orias were Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) members. Elarcosa was an acquaintance of the dela Cruz family of Barangay Amotay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental.

On the evening of September 27, 1992, Jorge, Segundina, Jose, and Rosemarie, all surnamed dela Cruz, were in their house in Barangay Amotay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, when they heard persons outside calling to them. Because the voices were unfamiliar, they did not open the door immediately and waited a few minutes to observe and recognize the callers. Only when one of them identified himself as Mitsuel L. Elarcosa, an acquaintance of the family, did Segundina light the lamps and Jose open the door.

Elarcosa and his companion, Jerry B. Orias, then entered and asked that supper be prepared for them because they were roving; both were CAFGU members. Segundina and Rosemarie went to the kitchen to prepare food while Jose and Jorge stayed in the living room with the two visitors. Since the rice was not yet cooked, Rosemarie served a plate of suman to Elarcosa and Orias, who were conversing with Jorge and Jose. Rosemarie heard Orias ask Jose why he did not attend the dance at Sitio Nalibog; Jose replied that he was tired.

Suddenly, Elarcosa and Orias stood up and fired their guns at Jose and Jorge. Segundina, busy in the kitchen, ran to the living room and embraced Jose, who was already lying on the floor. Elarcosa and Orias then immediately searched the wooden chest containing clothes, money amounting to PhP40,000 intended for Jose’s forthcoming wedding in October, and a registration certificate of large cattle. Rosemarie escaped through the kitchen and hid in shrubs about six extended arms’ length from the house; she heard her mother crying loudly, then a series of gunshots, then silence.

Shortly thereafter, Rosemarie went to the house of her cousin, Gualberto Mechabe, who advised her to stay until morning because it was already dark and he had no other companion who could help them. The following morning, Rosemarie returned to their house and found the dead bodies of her parents and her brother. The PhP40,000 and the certificate of registration of large cattle were gone.

An Information for robbery with multiple homicide was filed against Elarcosa, Orias, and Antonio David, Jr.; Orias pleaded not guilty on January 19, 1993. In his defense, Orias claimed that on the night of the incident he was at a dance hall sponsored by his unit, assigned by his Detachment Commander to entertain visitors, and stayed there from 6:00 p.m. until the wee hours of the morning. The RTC and CA found Rosemarie’s testimony clear, consistent, and convincing; she positively identified Orias and Elarcosa at the police station lineup and in court as the persons who shot her brother and father, and no improper motive was shown. The CA also noted that the dance hall was in Barangay Amotay, the same barangay where the crime was committed.

• Credibility of Rosemarie: Orias argued that Rosemarie’s testimony was incredible because her recollection of the incident was uncertain and insufficient to support a finding of guilt against him.
• Alibi / Physical Impossibility: Orias argued that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the crime scene because he was at the dance hall sponsored by his unit from 6:00 p.m. until the wee hours of the morning.

• Credibility of Rosemarie dela Cruz: Whether Rosemarie’s testimony was credible and sufficient to support Orias’s conviction.
• Alibi: Whether Orias’s alibi and claim of physical impossibility should be credited.
• Robbery with Homicide: Whether the prosecution conclusively proved robbery, such that Orias could be convicted of robbery with homicide.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killings to murder.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established between Orias and Elarcosa.
• Complex Crime / Multiple Murder: Whether Orias committed the complex crime of multiple murder or three separate counts of murder.
• Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalty and damages imposed were proper.

• Credibility of Rosemarie dela Cruz: Yes. The RTC and CA found her testimony clear, consistent, and convincing, and Orias showed no arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error or improper motive to overturn the trial court’s credibility assessment.
• Alibi: No. Alibi is inherently weak and must be supported by proof of physical impossibility; Orias failed to show he could not leave the dance hall in the same barangay, and positive identification defeated his defense.
• Robbery with Homicide: No. Robbery was not conclusively proved; apart from Rosemarie’s testimony that the chest was searched, there was no proof that the P40,000 and certificate were inside it and were actually taken.
• Treachery: Yes. The attack was sudden and unexpected, and the victims had no opportunity to defend themselves; a frontal attack does not negate treachery.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Orias and Elarcosa acted in a coordinated and synchronized manner with a common criminal impulse, making the act of one the act of all.
• Complex Crime / Multiple Murder: No. The three murders resulted from separate shots and distinct acts, not a single act; Orias is guilty of three counts of murder, not complex multiple murder.
• Penalty and Damages: Reclusion perpetua for each count; civil indemnity of P75,000, moral damages of P50,000, and exemplary damages of P30,000 for each count.

• Credibility of Rosemarie dela Cruz: The SC gives deference to the trial court’s assessment of witness credibility because the trial court is in the best position to observe the witness’s demeanor and bodily movements, and this deference becomes more compelling when the CA affirms the trial court’s findings. The SC will not disturb those findings absent a clear showing of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error, and Orias failed to show any such ground. The SC also applied the rule that testimonial evidence must not only come from a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself, tested against common knowledge and the experience of mankind. Rosemarie was in the kitchen only an arm’s length from the living room when she saw Orias and Elarcosa shoot her brother and father; she knew them beforehand, the living room was sufficiently lighted, and she identified them at the police station lineup and in court. No improper motive was shown, so her testimony was worthy of full faith and credit.

• Alibi: The SC held that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. Orias failed to present convincing evidence that he did not leave the dance hall in Barangay Amotay, Binalbagan, Negros Occidental, which was the same barangay where the crime was committed; hence, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis. Alibi is inherently weak, negative, and self-serving, and it crumbles against positive identification by truthful witnesses. The corroboration by Robert Arellano and a vendor did not save the defense because alibi becomes more unworthy of merit when established mainly by the accused himself, his relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms.

• Robbery with Homicide: The SC applied the settled principle that in robbery with homicide, the robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other essential element; if the evidence does not conclusively prove robbery, the killing is either homicide or murder depending on the presence of qualifying circumstances. Here, aside from Rosemarie’s testimony that Orias and Elarcosa searched the wooden chest after shooting the victims, no other evidence was presented to conclusively prove that the PhP40,000 cash and the registration certificate of large cattle were inside the chest and were actually taken. The SC found People vs. Alod Manobo instructive: without adequate independent proof of the robbery, the extrajudicial confessions could not support a conviction for robbery, and the killing had to be classified as murder qualified by treachery. Thus, Orias could not be convicted of robbery with homicide.

• Treachery: The SC held that treachery was unmistakably present, and that qualifying circumstances cannot be presumed but must be established by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. When Orias and Elarcosa went to the victims’ house and demanded supper, the victims had no idea of their intent; while Segundina and Rosemarie prepared supper and Jose and Jorge entertained the visitors, Orias and Elarcosa suddenly stood up and fired their guns. The attack, although frontal, was very sudden and unexpected. Under People vs. Lacaden, treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal, as long as it is sudden and unexpected and gives the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself; what is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from an unarmed victim, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.

• Conspiracy: The SC defined conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. In the absence of direct proof, the agreement may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. The acts of Orias and Elarcosa were coordinated and synchronized in their approach to shoot Jose and Jorge, and they were motivated by a single criminal impulse to kill the victims. Under People vs. Alib, it is not necessary to show that all conspirators actually hit and killed the victim; what matters is that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design. Once conspiracy is established, each conspirator is criminally liable for the crime actually committed by any one of them, because the act of one is the act of all.

• Complex Crime / Multiple Murder: The SC disagreed with the CA that Orias committed the complex crime of multiple murder. Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code defines a complex crime as arising when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other; the two kinds are compound crime and complex crime proper. The case fell under neither instance because the three murders did not result from a single act but from several individual and distinct acts. The SC reiterated the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. The CA’s reliance on People vs. Lawas was misplaced because Lawas involved no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing, making it impossible to ascertain the number of persons killed by each accused; here, conspiracy was established, so the act of one was the act of all. The SC also observed that the single Information charged three separate murders, which was duplicitous and a ground for a motion to quash, but Orias’s failure to object constituted a waiver.

• Penalty and Damages: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. With no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime, the medium penalty is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Although the Information charged three aggravating circumstances, only one was proved, namely treachery, which qualified the killing to murder; no other aggravating circumstance was proved. Because Orias was guilty of three separate counts of murder, the imposable penalty was three sentences of reclusion perpetua. Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In murder and homicide, civil indemnity of PhP75,000 and moral damages of PhP50,000 are awarded automatically and are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim. The SC additionally granted exemplary damages of PhP30,000 in line with current jurisprudence.

• Credibility of Witness — The trial court’s assessment of witness credibility is best left to its sound discretion because it observes the witness’s demeanor and bodily movements; appellate courts generally defer unless the findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness, or palpable error. Testimonial evidence must not only come from a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself, conforming to common knowledge and the experience of mankind. Applied: Rosemarie’s testimony was clear, consistent, and convincing; she knew the malefactors, the living room was sufficiently lighted, she identified them at the police lineup and in court, and no improper motive was shown.
• Alibi — Alibi is inherently weak, negative, and self-serving; for it to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was elsewhere but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. It crumbles against positive identification by truthful witnesses, and it becomes more unworthy of merit when established mainly by the accused himself, his relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms. Applied: the dance hall was in the same barangay as the crime scene, so physical impossibility was not shown.
• Robbery with Homicide — In robbery with homicide, the robbery itself must be proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime. Where the evidence does not conclusively prove the robbery, the killing is classified as simple homicide or murder, depending on the absence or presence of qualifying circumstances, and not as robbery with homicide. Applied: there was no proof that the PhP40,000 and the certificate of registration of large cattle were inside the wooden chest and were actually taken.
• Treachery — Treachery is a qualifying circumstance that cannot be presumed; it must be established by clear and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. A frontal attack can still be treacherous if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself; what is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from an unarmed victim, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. Applied: Orias and Elarcosa suddenly stood up and fired at Jose and Jorge while the victims were conversing and had no idea of the attack.
• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue it. In the absence of direct proof, it may be deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. It is not necessary to show that all conspirators actually hit and killed the victim; the act of one is the act of all. Applied: the coordinated and synchronized acts of Orias and Elarcosa showed a common criminal impulse to kill the victims.
• Complex Crime — A complex crime has two kinds: compound crime, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies; and complex crime proper, when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. When various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes, not a complex crime. Applied: the three murders resulted from several individual and distinct acts, so Orias was guilty of three counts of murder, not multiple murder.
• Duplicity and Waiver — An Information charging multiple offenses in one count is duplicitous and is a ground for a motion to quash; failure of the accused to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes a waiver. Applied: the single Information charged three separate acts of murder, but Orias waived the defect by not objecting.
• Civil Liability and Damages — Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In murder and homicide, civil indemnity and moral damages are awarded automatically and are mandatory without need of allegation and proof other than the death of the victim, owing to the fact of the commission of murder or homicide; exemplary damages may also be awarded in line with current jurisprudence. Applied: the SC awarded P75,000 civil indemnity, P50,000 moral damages, and P30,000 exemplary damages for each count.

• “Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the principle that in order to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be proved as conclusively as any other essential element of the crime.” — The SC uses this as the ratio for rejecting the conviction for robbery with homicide and for classifying the killings as murder instead.
• “The settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal, as long as the attack is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or to defend himself.” — This passage explains why the sudden shooting of Jorge and Jose, despite being frontal, was qualified by treachery.
• “Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.” — The SC relies on this to hold that Orias committed three counts of murder, not the complex crime of multiple murder.
• “In a conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. What is important is that all participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose or design to bring about the death of the victim.” — This defines the conspiracy doctrine applied to Orias and Elarcosa’s coordinated attack.

• People vs. Alod Manobo, No. L-19798, September 20, 1966, 18 SCRA 30 — Relied on for the rule that absent adequate independent proof of robbery, the killing cannot be robbery with homicide; quoted at length.
• People vs. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009 — Relied on for the rule that treachery may exist even in a frontal attack if the attack is sudden and unexpected.
• People vs. Alib, G.R. No. 130944, January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 93 — Relied on for the rule that in conspiracy it is not necessary that all conspirators actually hit and kill the victim.
• People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 (1955) — Distinguished; the CA’s reliance was misplaced because Lawas involved no conspiracy and the impossibility of ascertaining individual deaths.
• People vs. Hon. Pineda, No. L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 748 — Relied on to explain that Lawas does not apply where conspiracy is charged and proved; separate acts produce separate crimes.
• People vs. Cadevida, G.R. No. 94528, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 218 — Cited for the requirement that robbery be proved as conclusively as any other essential element.
• People vs. Ocampo, G.R. No. 177753, September 25, 2009, 601 SCRA 58 — Cited for the automatic award of civil indemnity and moral damages in murder and homicide.
• People vs. Ofemiano, G.R. No. 187155, February 1, 2010 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy; applied to find an implied conspiracy from the coordinated acts of Orias and Elarcosa.
• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Defines complex crimes; quoted and applied to hold that the case was not a complex crime because the three murders resulted from separate acts.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Provides the penalty for murder of reclusion perpetua to death; applied to impose reclusion perpetua for each count absent other aggravating circumstances.
• Article 100, Revised Penal Code — Provides that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable; applied to award civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages.