People vs. Eduarte

The crime of concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior courts, not the Regional Trial Court, because the penalty of destierro imposable on the concubine is lighter than arresto mayor, and the husband's penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods does not exceed the four years and two months jurisdictional threshold of the inferior courts under B.P. Blg. 129.

The case concerns the allocation of criminal jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the inferior courts under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129). The crime of concubinage under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code imposes different penalties on the two offenders: prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods on the husband, and destierro on the concubine. Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code requires that the offended party institute criminal prosecution against both guilty parties together. The dispute centers on which court has original jurisdiction over the offense given the differing penalties.

Upon complaint by Alma T. Aggabao, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cabagan, Isabela filed on July 25, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Cabagan, Isabela, Branch 22, an information against private respondents Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime of concubinage allegedly committed in September 1983. Upon arraignment, private respondents entered a plea of not guilty. The complainant was represented before the trial court by a private prosecutor.

During the trial, private respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that concubinage under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, equivalent to imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two months, well within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and not of the Regional Trial Court. The prosecution opposed the motion, contending that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because destierro, the imposable penalty on the concubine, has a duration of six months and one day to six years. The trial court sustained private respondents' position and granted the motion to dismiss.

The private prosecutor, together with the assistant provincial prosecutor of Ilagan, Isabela, filed the instant petition on June 16, 1989, assailing the order granting the motion to dismiss. The Solicitor General subsequently intervened by filing a motion for reconsideration of the Court's resolution denying the petition, submitting additional arguments in support of the position that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage.

• Estoppel: Petitioner contended that private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had started to present its evidence, noting that it took two years and six months before anyone took notice of the jurisdictional infirmity.
• Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Solicitor General argued that the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage because the duration of destierro, between six months and one day to six years, is beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior courts to impose.
• Split Jurisdiction: The private prosecutor argued that the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts have "split jurisdiction," the latter having jurisdiction over the crime as regards the husband and the former as regards the concubine.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Private respondents argued that concubinage under Art. 334 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable with prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, equivalent to imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and two months, well within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and not of the Regional Trial Court.

• Estoppel: Whether private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had started to present its evidence.
• Jurisdiction over Concubinage: Whether the Regional Trial Court has original jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage.

• Estoppel: No. The general rule that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings applies; the exception in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy requires the presence of laches, which is absent in this case.
• Jurisdiction over Concubinage: No. Concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior courts, not the Regional Trial Court, because destierro is lighter than arresto mayor and the husband's penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods falls within the inferior courts' jurisdictional threshold.

• Estoppel: The Court applied the general rule under Rule 117, Sec. 8 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The exception in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, Vera vs. People, and People vs. Munar requires the presence of laches — defined as "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier." In this case, no judgment had yet been rendered by the trial court, and the accused filed the motion to dismiss as soon as they discovered the jurisdictional defect. The pivotal element of laches being absent, the general rule applied and private respondents were not estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the trial court.

• Jurisdiction over Concubinage: The Court applied the doctrine in Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasan and People vs. Santos that destierro is lighter than arresto mayor because destierro means banishment or only a prohibition from residing within a radius of 25 kilometers from the actual residence of the accused, whereas arresto mayor means imprisonment or complete deprivation of liberty. Severity is judged by the degree of deprivation of liberty involved, not by duration, and in the graduated scale of Art. 71 of the Revised Penal Code, destierro is placed below arresto mayor. Although Sec. 20 of B.P. Blg. 129 ostensibly grants the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes punishable with destierro since destierro is not an offense punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, the Court found no intention to overturn the prior doctrine. The gravity of both the offense and the imposable penalty were the important factors considered in the allocation of jurisdiction, and since destierro is a lighter penalty than imprisonment, jurisdiction over crimes punishable with destierro remains vested in the inferior courts. Moreover, since Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code requires the offended party to institute criminal prosecution against both the husband and the concubine together, it would be an absurd situation to allow the inferior court to have jurisdiction over the crime only as regards the husband while the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the same crime with respect to the concubine. The trial court therefore committed no reversible error in dismissing the criminal information.

• Destierro is lighter than arresto mayor — Destierro means banishment or only a prohibition from residing within a radius of 25 kilometers from the actual residence of the accused for a specified length of time, whereas arresto mayor means imprisonment or complete deprivation of liberty. The respective severities must be judged by the degree of deprivation of liberty involved, not by duration, and in the graduated scale of Art. 71 of the Revised Penal Code, destierro is placed below arresto mayor. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that crimes punishable with destierro, such as concubinage, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior courts even under B.P. Blg. 129.
• Jurisdiction may be raised at any stage; Tijam exception requires laches — The general rule is that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action is a matter of law and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The exception in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy applies only where laches is present — failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption of abandonment. The Court applied the general rule where the accused raised the jurisdictional challenge during trial before any judgment on the merits, and the element of laches was absent.

• "Destierro is not a higher penalty than arresto mayor. Arresto mayor means imprisonment or complete deprivation of liberty, whereas destierro means banishment or only a prohibition from residing within a radius of 25 kilometers from the actual residence of the accused for a specified length of time. The respective severities of arresto mayor and destierro must not be judged by the duration of each of these penalties, but by the degree of deprivation of liberty involved." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine that destierro is lighter than arresto mayor, which controls the jurisdictional allocation over crimes penalized with destierro.
• "A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter of the action is a matter of law and may not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the cited case of Sibonghanoy." — This passage from Calimlim v. Ramirez clarifies that Tijam v. Sibonghanoy is an exception to the general rule, applicable only in the presence of laches.
• "a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction" — This statement from Tijam v. Sibonghanoy states the estoppel principle, which the Court distinguished on the ground that laches was absent in the present case.

• Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasan, 86 Phil. 617 (1950) — Controlling precedent establishing that destierro is lighter than arresto mayor and that crimes penalized with destierro fall within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts; the Court found no intention in B.P. Blg. 129 to overturn this doctrine.
• People vs. Santos, 87 Phil. 687 (1950) — Followed; same doctrine that a crime punishable with destierro is within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts.
• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29 — Distinguished; established the estoppel-by-laches exception to the general rule that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage, but held inapplicable where laches is absent.
• Vera vs. People, G.R. No. L-31218, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 711 — Distinguished; jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal, unlike in the present case where it was raised during trial.
• People vs. Munar, G.R. No. L-37642, October 22, 1973, 53 SCRA 278 — Distinguished; same as Vera vs. People, jurisdiction raised only on appeal.
• Calimlim vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. L-34362, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 399 — Clarified that Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the presence of laches, and warned against applying it as a blanket doctrine.
• City Fiscal of Tacloban vs. Espina, G.R. No. 83996, October 21, 1988, 166 SCRA 614 — Cited for the rule that the Solicitor General must represent the People of the Philippines when criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court.
• People vs. Dacudao, G.R. No. 81389, February 21, 1989 — Cited for the rule that the private prosecutor cannot represent the People even with the conformity of the assistant provincial prosecutor.

• Art. 334, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes concubinage; the husband shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, and the concubine shall suffer the penalty of destierro. The Court applied this provision to determine the jurisdictional allocation.
• Art. 27, Revised Penal Code — Provides the duration of destierro as six months and one day to six years; cited by the prosecution to argue that the penalty exceeds the inferior courts' jurisdiction.
• Art. 71, Revised Penal Code — Provides the graduated scale of penalties, placing destierro below arresto mayor; the Court relied on this scale to conclude that destierro is lighter than arresto mayor.
• Art. 344, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the offended party in the crime of concubinage cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties; the Court cited this to reject the "split jurisdiction" theory as contrary to the orderly administration of justice.
• Art. 90, Revised Penal Code — On prescription of crimes; the Court noted that the crime had not yet prescribed, so the offended wife was not precluded from filing another information before the proper court.
• Sec. 20, B.P. Blg. 129 — Grants Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, or body; the Court interpreted this provision as not vesting jurisdiction over crimes punishable with destierro in the Regional Trial Courts.
• Sec. 32, B.P. Blg. 129 — Grants inferior courts exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months; the Court applied this to hold that concubinage falls within the inferior courts' jurisdiction.
• Rule 117, Sec. 8, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Provides that the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings; the Court applied this general rule to reject the estoppel argument.
• Rule 141, Sec. 16, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that payment of legal fees is not necessary for the People; the Court applied this since the only petitioner was the People as represented by the Solicitor General.

Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and Bidin, JJ., concurred.