People vs. Duranan

Mental retardation in rape may be established by the testimony of an ordinary witness sufficiently acquainted with the victim and by the RTC's own observations, without a psychiatric evaluation; and the absence of injuries does not negate force or intimidation where the victim's mental retardation makes her vulnerable to threats.

Nympha Lozada y de Lara, 25 years old at the time of the alleged incidents, was considered retarded and had finished only sixth grade; she lived with her family in an apartment at K-6 No. 28 Kamuning St., Quezon City, where accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a. "Kalbo," rented a room shared with several other people. The governing provision was Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659, which penalizes rape, including rape of a mental retardate. The case required the SC to resolve how mental retardation and force or intimidation are proved in rape, and whether a mental retardate may testify.

Complainant Nympha Lozada y de Lara was 25 years old at the time of the incidents, was considered retarded, had finished only sixth grade, was unemployed, and did household chores for her family. Accused-appellant Emiliano Duranan, a.k.a. "Kalbo," lived with complainant's family in the same apartment at K-6 No. 28 Kamuning St., Quezon City, where he rented a room shared with several other people. In the afternoon of March 7, 1994, Nympha was standing by the door of her grandfather's house when accused-appellant suddenly placed his arm on her neck and dragged her inside the common bathroom. He kissed her and removed her shorts and underwear while holding her hands with his other hand. She did not cry for help because accused-appellant threatened that he would get angry if she did. She claimed that accused-appellant was able to rape her while standing up despite her resistance. After the incident, complainant was sent out of the bathroom and went directly home.

The second incident occurred in the early morning of March 8, 1994. According to complainant, she was cleaning the premises of her family residence when accused-appellant pulled her from her house and took her to his room. Accused-appellant asked his brother, who was then cooking, to leave the room; as soon as his brother had left, accused-appellant laid her on the floor and raped her. Complainant said she was forced to submit to accused-appellant's lust because of his threats. After the incident, accused-appellant sent her letters professing love and telling her how beautiful she was; complainant said she tore up the letters after reading them.

In another incident on March 12, 1994, accused-appellant asked complainant to let him use their bathroom. After being given permission, he grabbed complainant by the hand, pulled her inside the bathroom, and started kissing her on the lips and neck after closing the door behind them. He only stopped molesting her when he heard somebody coming. Virginia Lozada testified that she saw her daughter leave the bathroom, quickly followed by accused-appellant; Virginia noticed that her daughter's lower lip was bruised. When she confronted her daughter about it, the latter revealed for the first time what had happened to her. Virginia went to Camp Karingal, together with complainant and her other children, Teresa and Fernando, where they filed affidavits and two informations. They then took complainant to Camp Crame for examination.

Dr. Rosalina O. Cosidon examined complainant and submitted a report with the following findings: fairly developed, fairly nourished, and coherent female subject; breasts hemispherical with pale brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out; abdomen flat and soft; injury at the head; contusion, mucosa of the lower lip, measuring 1.2 x 0.3 cm, and 1 cm left of the anterior midline; abundant growth of public hair; labia minora full convex and gaping with pinkish brown and congested labia minor presenting in between; on separating, an abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type hymen with shallow healing laceration at 5 o'clock position; external vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum; vaginal canal narrow with prominent rugosities; cervix normal in size, color, and consistency; findings compatible with recent loss of virginity; the injury estimated to resolve in 7 to 9 days; vaginal and pre-urethral smears negative for gram-negative diplococci and for spermatozoa. Dr. Cosidon explained that "congested" meant some inflammation that could have been caused by friction due to intercourse; taken with the shallow hymenal laceration, this indicated the possibility of intercourse that caused complainant's loss of virginity within the last five days.

Accused-appellant filed a demurrer to the evidence, which the RTC denied in its November 17, 1995 order. The defense then presented accused-appellant, his alleged roommates Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig, and his wife Carlita Duranan. Accused-appellant claimed that the first incident could not have happened because his work schedule had him leave the house at 3 a.m., arrive home at 1 p.m., leave for work again at 3 p.m., and arrive home at 6:30 p.m.; he also said that on March 7, 1994 he left and was with Rico Bariquit throughout the day. As to the second incident, he contended that it was impossible for him to commit rape in his room because at least six other people were there at the time, in the morning of March 8, 1994. He charged that the complaints were filed because complainant's family wanted to evict him and his housemates from their house. Bariquit and Catubig confirmed accused-appellant's schedule; Bariquit claimed that he was always with accused-appellant and knew where he was all the time, and both witnesses said rape could not have been committed in a room where at least five other people were sleeping. Virginia Lozada and complainant denied seeing Rico Bariquit and Carlito Catubig before the two testified in court. In dealing with complainant, the RTC admonished defense counsel not to use inculpatory questions because complainant might give an inculpatory answer, and it reminded counsel: "The witness [complainant] is not very intelligent. I think the witness cannot even distinguish fates." The RTC itself found that complainant was mentally deficient.

• Mental Retardation: Accused-appellant argued that he could not be convicted of rape of a mental retardate because the victim's mental age was not proven; under Article 335(2) of the Revised Penal Code, an essential element is a psychiatric evaluation of the complainant's mental age to determine if it is under twelve, and only where retardation is apparent due to physical deformities symptomatic of mental retardation can the mental evaluation be waived; he also cited the medico-legal report's description of complainant as "coherent."
• Competency of Complainant: Accused-appellant argued that complainant could not be a competent witness if she is a retardate.
• Force and Intimidation: Accused-appellant argued that the absence of injury sustained by complainant negates the presence of any force and intimidation.

• Mental Retardation: Whether the complainant's mental retardation was sufficiently established, despite the absence of a psychiatric evaluation, to support a conviction for rape of a mental retardate.
• Competency of Complainant: Whether a mental retardate who can perceive and make known her perceptions is competent to testify.
• Force and Intimidation: Whether the absence of injuries on the complainant negates the element of force and intimidation in rape.
• Damages: Whether the civil indemnity should be doubled for two counts of rape and moral damages awarded for each count.

• Mental Retardation: Yes. Mental retardation may be shown by the testimony of a witness sufficiently acquainted with the complainant and by the RTC's observations; a psychiatric evaluation is not indispensable.
• Competency of Complainant: Yes. Under Rule 130, Section 20, a person who can perceive and make known her perception is qualified; complainant testified and answered questions, and the objection was raised only on appeal and was waived.
• Force and Intimidation: No. The presence or absence of injuries is not essential; force and intimidation are relative, and complainant's mental retardation made her vulnerable to threats.
• Damages: Yes. The civil indemnity was increased to P100,000.00 for two counts, and moral damages of P100,000.00 were awarded.

• Mental Retardation: Rule 130, Section 50 allows an ordinary witness to give an opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom the witness is sufficiently acquainted, provided the witness details the factors and reasons for the opinion. Complainant's mother, Virginia Lozada, testified on complainant's condition: she said complainant bumped her head as a child, acted like a child thereafter, still thought like a child at 25, but could narrate truthful and believable statements; the mother's statement that complainant was "quite intelligent" had to be read with her statement that complainant thought like a child. The RTC itself observed during trial that complainant was "not very intelligent" and could not even distinguish fates, and found her mentally deficient. The medico-legal report's description of complainant as "coherent" was not a mental evaluation because the report stated that the examination was limited to determining whether she had been sexually abused—i.e., her physical, not mental, state. The SC thus held that a psychiatric evaluation was not indispensable and that the RTC's factual findings, including on complainant's mental deficiency, were entitled to deference under People vs. Atop.
• Competency of Complainant: Rule 130, Section 20 qualifies any person who can perceive and make known his or her perception as a witness. Although complainant was a retardate, she was able to tell the RTC what accused-appellant had done and to answer questions from both the prosecutor and defense counsel, as shown by her testimony describing the bathroom incident and the second incident. Any objection to her competency should have been raised at the outset; it could not be raised for the first time on appeal. The SC therefore held that the objection was waived, citing People vs. Francisco and People vs. Cruz.
• Force and Intimidation: The presence or absence of injuries is not essential in proving rape; what is essential is proof that sexual intercourse was accomplished without the complainant's consent. The degree of force or intimidation is relative and must be viewed in the light of the complainant's perception and judgment at the time of the offense, and need only be sufficient to consummate the accused's purpose. Because complainant was a mental retardate, the force or intimidation required was not very great; she submitted because she was afraid accused-appellant would get angry if she refused. People vs. Rosare held that where the victim is so weak in intellect that she is incapable of rational consent, the force applied may be constructive. The SC also noted the threats accused-appellant made and the physical force he employed in placing his arm on complainant's neck and holding her hands while undressing her.
• Damages: The SC held that the award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity should be doubled because there are two counts of rape, and that complainant should also be awarded P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count, or a total of P100,000.00, in accordance with its rulings.

• Mental retardation in rape — Mental retardation may be established by the testimony of an ordinary witness sufficiently acquainted with the victim, provided the witness details the factors and reasons for the opinion, and by the RTC's own observations; a psychiatric evaluation is not indispensable. The SC applied this because complainant's mother testified on her condition and the RTC observed her during trial.
• Competency of a mental retardate as witness — Under Rule 130, Section 20, any person who can perceive and make known his or her perception is qualified to be a witness; mental retardation does not automatically disqualify. The SC applied this because complainant narrated the incidents and answered questions, and the defense failed to timely object.
• Force and intimidation in rape — The presence or absence of injuries is not essential; force and intimidation are relative and must be viewed in the light of the complainant's perception and judgment, and need only be sufficient to consummate the accused's purpose. Where the victim is so weak in intellect that she is incapable of rational consent, force may be constructive. The SC applied this because complainant's mental retardation made her vulnerable to accused-appellant's threats.
• Civil indemnity and moral damages for each count of rape — Each count of rape warrants civil indemnity and moral damages. The SC applied this by doubling the civil indemnity to P100,000.00 for two counts and awarding P100,000.00 in moral damages.

• "The presence or absence of injuries is not essential in proving rape. What is essential is proof that sexual intercourse with woman was accomplished without her consent." — The SC used this to reject the argument that the absence of injuries negated force and intimidation.
• "In this case, due to the complainant's mental retardation, the force or intimidation required is not very great since it does not take much to force a child into submission." — The SC used this to explain why the force or intimidation needed in this case was not great because of complainant's mental retardation.
• "A party may waive his objections to the competency of witness and permit him to testify…[I]f, after such incompetency appears, there is failure to make timely objection, by a party having knowledge of the incompetency, the objection will be deemed waived, whether it is on the ground of want of mental capacity or for some other reason." — The SC used this to hold that the defense waived any objection to complainant's competency by failing to raise it at the outset.
• "The medico-legal report categorically states that the purpose of the medical examination is limited to determining whether the complainant had been sexually abused. In order words, the purpose of the examination was to determine her physical, not her mental, state." — The SC used this to reject the argument that the medico-legal report's "coherent" description proved complainant's mental state.

• People vs. Atop, 286 SCRA 157 (1998) — Followed; the RTC's factual findings, including on complainant's mental deficiency, are entitled to deference.
• People vs. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694, 709 (1947) — Cited for the rule that objection to a witness's competency is waived if not timely raised.
• People vs. Cruz, 208 SCRA 326 (1992) — Cited for the same waiver rule.
• People vs. Corea, 336 Phil. 72 (1997) — Cited for the relativity of force or intimidation in rape.
• People vs. Edualino, 337 Phil. 639 (1997) — Cited for the same rule on relativity of force or intimidation.
• People vs. Antonio, 233 SCRA 283 (1994) — Cited for the rule that force need only be sufficient to consummate the accused's purpose.
• People vs. Rosare, 332 Phil. 435 (1996) — Followed; constructive force where the victim is so weak in intellect that she is incapable of rational consent.
• People vs. Ramos, G.R. No. 136398, November 23, 2000 — Cited for the award of moral damages.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 — Defines rape and imposes reclusion perpetua; applied to affirm accused-appellant's conviction for two counts of rape.
• Rule 130, Section 50, Revised Rules on Evidence — Allows an ordinary witness to give an opinion on the mental sanity of a person with whom the witness is sufficiently acquainted; applied to complainant's mother's testimony on complainant's mental condition.
• Rule 130, Section 20, Revised Rules on Evidence — Qualifies any person who can perceive and make known his or her perception as a witness; applied to hold complainant competent to testify despite her mental retardation.