People vs. Doriquez

An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable, because it does not terminate the proceedings nor finally dispose of the contentions of the parties, and substantial proceedings remain to be had. The protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offense, and where two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one is no obstacle to prosecution of the other if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

Romeo Doriquez was charged before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo with grave oral defamation and discharge of firearm, both allegedly committed on April 22, 1964, in the Municipality of Batad, Province of Iloilo. The charges arose from an incident involving Attorney Sixto Demaisip, whom Doriquez had allegedly defamed and at whom he had discharged a revolver. The case implicates the jurisdictional boundaries between municipal courts and courts of first instance under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828, and the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

Romeo Doriquez was charged on August 28, 1964, with grave oral defamation before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo. The information alleged that on or about April 22, 1964, in the Municipality of Batad, Province of Iloilo, Doriquez, with deliberate intent to bring Attorney Sixto Demaisip into discredit, disrepute and public contempt, spoke and uttered in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons the following defamatory words: "Tonto ka nga klase sang tao, quin pierde mo ang asunto ko, nagastohan ako sing linibo sang ulihi nag pabakal ikaw kay Purita; pasuguiron ka P30.00 lang ang nabayad ko pero linibo ang gasto ko," which translates to: "You are a foolish class of person, you had to lose my case, I spent thousands of pesos and later you allowed yourself to be sold to Purita; you had been telling people that I paid you only P30.00 when I spent thousand of pesos for my case," and other similar words of import.

Six days later, on September 3, 1964, Doriquez was indicted before the same court for discharge of firearm, allegedly committed on the same date, April 22, 1964, when, armed with a revolver and without intent to kill, he discharged twice said revolver at Attorney Sixto Demaisip. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to both indictments.

On December 3, 1964, Doriquez moved to dismiss both informations. He claimed that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral defamation in virtue of Republic Act 3828, which enlarged the original exclusive jurisdiction of city and municipal courts. He further claimed that the institution of the criminal action for discharge of firearm placed him in double jeopardy, as he had already been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, which dismissed, without his consent, an information charging him with the offense of alarm and scandal, allegedly based on the self-same facts relied upon by the Fiscal in support of the information for discharge of firearm. The complaint for alarm and scandal recited that on or about 12:00 p.m., April 21, 1964, at the gate in front of the Municipal Building, Poblacion, Batad, Iloilo, Doriquez did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to cause alarm in the public, discharge his licensed revolver caliber .22 SN-368383 once on the ground and once into the air within the town limits and without any justifiable purpose, thus causing alarm upon the general public.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on March 8, 1965, and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration on March 20, 1965. From these two orders, Doriquez interposed the present appeal.

• Lack of Jurisdiction: Doriquez maintained that the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, not the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, has original exclusive jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral defamation, which under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, reasoning that the exclusive original jurisdiction of municipal and city courts has been enlarged by Republic Act No. 3828 to include offenses for which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three thousand pesos, or both.

• Double Jeopardy: Doriquez contended that the filing of the information for discharge of firearm placed him in peril of double jeopardy, as he had previously been charged with the offense of alarm and scandal in a complaint filed in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo, upon the same facts which constitute the basis of the indictment for discharge of firearm, and the said complaint was allegedly dismissed without his consent.

• Factual Connection Traversed: The State traversed the contention that the two indictments arose from the same act, although the Court noted this contention was made by the appellant.

• Appealability of Interlocutory Orders: Whether the orders denying the motion to dismiss are appealable, or whether the appeal is premature.
• Jurisdiction over Grave Oral Defamation: Whether the Court of First Instance of Iloilo has jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral defamation, or whether the municipal court of Batad has exclusive original jurisdiction by virtue of Republic Act No. 3828.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the filing of the information for discharge of firearm placed Doriquez in double jeopardy, given the prior dismissal of the alarm and scandal complaint based on the same facts.

• Appealability of Interlocutory Orders: No. The appeal is premature. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, because it does not terminate the proceedings nor finally dispose of the contentions of the parties.

• Jurisdiction over Grave Oral Defamation: No. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction with the municipal court over grave oral defamation. The offense, carrying a maximum penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period (incarceration not exceeding 2 years and 4 months), falls within the zone of concurrent jurisdiction between municipal courts and courts of first instance under sections 87(c) and 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

• Double Jeopardy: No. There is no identity of offenses between discharge of firearm and alarm and scandal. The two offenses are distinct in law, having fundamentally diverse indispensable elements, and the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offense.

• Appealability of Interlocutory Orders: Under Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, only final judgments or orders are subject to appeal. A judgment or order may be appealed only when it is final — in the sense that it completely disposes of the cause and definitively adjudicates the respective rights of the parties, leaving thereafter no substantial proceeding to be had except the proper execution of the judgment or order. An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory because it does not terminate the proceedings, nor finally dispose of the contentions of the parties. After such denial, proceedings of substance are still to be had by the trial court, such as hearing of the case on the merits and rendition of final judgment. The rationale underlying the rule is the avoidance of multiplicity of appeals in a single case, as piecemeal appeals delay the speedy disposition of the case and may be resorted to as a means of draining the resources of the poorer party. The Court cited Ramos vs. Ardant Trading Corporation as the latest unequivocal restatement of the rule. Two alternative remedies were available to Doriquez: (1) proceed to trial on the merits and interpose the grounds stated in his motion to dismiss as part of his defense, then appeal if adverse; or (2) interpose a petition for certiorari on the grounds that the court a quo acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion. Because all the cogent issues were before the Court, it treated the appeal as a petition for certiorari to definitively resolve the contentions.

• Jurisdiction over Grave Oral Defamation: The Court applied the rule established in Esperat vs. Avila, affirmed in Le Hua Sia vs. Reyes and Andico vs. Roan, that in view of the amendment to section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and the unaltered provisions of section 44(f), the zone of concurrent jurisdiction of municipal and city courts and courts of first instance has been considerably widened. This jurisdictional parity embraces all offenses for which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months but not exceeding three years (or six years for city courts and municipal courts in provincial capitals), or a fine of more than two hundred pesos but not exceeding three thousand pesos (or six thousand pesos in proper cases), or both. The exclusive original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and municipal courts is confined only to cases where the prescribed penalty is imprisonment for six months or less, or fine of P200.00 or less, whereas the exclusive original jurisdiction of the court of first instance covers cases where the penalty is incarceration for more than three years (or six years in proper cases), or fine of more than P3,000.00 (or P6,000.00 in proper cases). Between these exclusive jurisdictions lies a zone where the jurisdiction is concurrent. Grave oral defamation, carrying a maximum penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period (incarceration not exceeding 2 years and 4 months), falls within this zone of concurrent jurisdiction. The court a quo therefore did not err in assuming jurisdiction.

• Double Jeopardy: For double jeopardy to attach, the accused must prove, among other things, identity of offenses. Under section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, conviction or acquittal, or dismissal of the case without the accused's express consent, is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal, nor is it an attempt or frustration of the latter. Neither may it be asserted that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and scandal, nor could the reverse be true, for the less grave felony of discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of alarm and scandal, which is a light felony. Although the two indictments are closely related in fact, they are definitely diverse in law: alarm and scandal is an offense against public order while discharge of firearm is a crime against persons; the indispensable element of the former is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to the public, while the gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain person, without intent to kill. A single act may offend against two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. The trial judge therefore did not commit abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the information for discharge of firearm.

• Interlocutory Order Doctrine — An order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and not appealable because it does not terminate the proceedings nor finally dispose of the contentions of the parties. The Court applied this doctrine to dismiss the appeal as premature, while treating it as a petition for certiorari to resolve the substantive issues on the merits.

• Concurrent Jurisdiction Doctrine (Esperat Doctrine) — The amendment of section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 by Republic Act No. 3828, read together with the unaltered section 44(f), created a zone of concurrent jurisdiction between municipal/city courts and courts of first instance for offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six months but not exceeding three years (or six years in proper cases), or fine of more than P200.00 but not exceeding P3,000.00 (or P6,000.00 in proper cases), or both. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the Court of First Instance had concurrent jurisdiction over grave oral defamation.

• Identity of Offenses Doctrine (Double Jeopardy) — For double jeopardy to attach, there must be identity of offenses: the subsequent prosecution must be for the same offense, or for an attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. Where two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one is no obstacle to prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the double jeopardy plea, as discharge of firearm and alarm and scandal are distinct offenses with fundamentally diverse indispensable elements.

• "It is an elementary rule of adjective law that an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory, hence not appealable, because it 'does not terminate the proceedings, nor finally dispose of the contentions of the parties.'" — This passage states the core procedural rule governing the appealability of interlocutory orders and is the basis for dismissing the appeal as premature.

• "The rationale underlying the rule that an interlocutory order is not appealable is, basically, the avoidance of 'multiplicity of appeals in a single case.' If very interlocutory order or judgment may be appealed, and the appeal stays the progress of the action, there could arise countless appeals in a single case, and the magnitude and extent of the delay in the final disposition thereof will be such that, conceivably, in a number of instances, the parties may not survive the case." — This passage articulates the policy rationale for the interlocutory order rule, explaining why piecemeal appeals are disfavored in remedial law.

• "It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offense. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the identity of offenses requirement in double jeopardy jurisprudence and is the controlling principle for rejecting the double jeopardy plea.

• Ramos vs. Ardant Trading Corporation, L-21975, June 13, 1968 — Controlling precedent on the non-appealability of interlocutory orders; the Court cited it as the latest unequivocal restatement of the rule that orders denying motions to dismiss are interlocutory and not appealable.

• Esperat vs. Avila, L-25922, June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 597 — Controlling precedent establishing the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction between municipal/city courts and courts of first instance under sections 87(c) and 44(f) of the Judiciary Act of 1948; the Court applied its delineation of jurisdictional boundaries to hold that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over grave oral defamation.

• Le Hua Sia vs. Reyes, L-21686, April 16, 1968 — Affirmed the rule in Esperat vs. Avila on concurrent jurisdiction; cited as authority for the jurisdictional parity between inferior courts and courts of first instance.

• Andico vs. Roan, L-26563, April 16, 1968 — Affirmed the rule in Esperat vs. Avila on concurrent jurisdiction; cited as authority for the jurisdictional boundaries of trial courts.

• Gavieres vs. U.S., 41 Phil. 961 — Cited for the proposition that where two different laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one is no obstacle to prosecution of the other if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

• People vs. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472 — Cited for the same proposition on identity of offenses in double jeopardy analysis.

• Section 2, Rule 41, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that only final judgments or orders shall be subject to appeal, and that no interlocutory or incidental judgment or order shall stay the progress of an action. The Court applied this provision to dismiss the appeal as premature.

• Section 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Court — Provides that conviction or acquittal, or dismissal of a case without the accused's express consent, is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. The Court applied this provision to determine whether double jeopardy attached.

• Section 87(c), Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Act No. 3828 — Enlarged the original exclusive jurisdiction of city and municipal courts to include offenses for which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three thousand pesos, or both. The Court construed this provision in conjunction with section 44(f) to determine the zone of concurrent jurisdiction.

• Section 44(f), Judiciary Act of 1948 — Retained the original jurisdiction of the court of first instance over cases where the penalty prescribed by law is imprisonment for more than six months or fine of more than P200.00. The Court held that this provision remained unaltered and must be harmonized with section 87(c).

• Article 358, Revised Penal Code — Defines the offense of grave oral defamation, punishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period. The Court applied this provision to determine the penalty and thus the jurisdiction over the offense.

• Article 155(1), Revised Penal Code — Defines the offense of alarm and scandal, a light felony. The Court compared this offense with discharge of firearm to determine whether there was identity of offenses.

• Article 258, Revised Penal Code — Defines the offense of discharge of firearm, a less grave felony. The Court compared this offense with alarm and scandal to determine whether there was identity of offenses.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concurred.