People vs. Domingo

Mere presence at the scene of the crime and flight therefrom, without proof of active participation in the commission of the offense with a view to the furtherance of a common design and purpose, do not establish conspiracy; conspiracy must be proven by positive and conclusive evidence, not by conjecture.

On April 2, 2007, in Ramon, Isabela, spouses AAA and BBB were robbed at gunpoint and knifepoint inside their home, AAA was raped, and BBB was shot and killed. Six individuals—Renato De Guzman, Romeo Cabico, Michael Domingo, Renelito Valdez, Bringle Balacanao, and Boboy Tamonang—were charged under an Amended Information with the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide with the aggravating circumstance of Rape under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Only Domingo, Balacanao, and Valdez were arrested and tried; the rest remained at large. Balacanao knew the victims through their son, and Domingo's sibling was married to a nephew or niece of AAA.

On April 2, 2007, at around 9:00 in the evening, AAA was sewing clothes in their home at Villa Marcos, Ramon, Isabela, while her husband BBB watched television with a four-year-old child named CCC. Renelito Valdez, followed by Romeo Cabico, suddenly entered their house. Valdez pointed a knife at AAA while Cabico pointed a gun at BBB and demanded money. When AAA replied that they had no money, Valdez ransacked their belongings and Cabico struck BBB with his gun. They took ₱2,500.00 from AAA's belt bag and BBB's wristwatch valued at ₱1,000.00. Thereafter, Valdez dragged AAA to a room and raped her several times. After she put back her clothes, Valdez brought AAA out of the room. BBB, aware of what had been done to his wife, shouted "Takbo na!" and they ran outside. Renato De Guzman, who was waiting outside, shot BBB, and all the accused fled. AAA cried for help; BBB's brothers, DDD and EEE, arrived and attempted to bring BBB to the hospital, but the barangay captain informed AAA that her husband was already dead.

Domingo, Valdez, and Balacanao each invoked denial and alibi. Balacanao testified that on the evening of April 2, 2007, he was at home in Raniag, Ramon, Isabela, with his wife, child, and De Guzman, his father-in-law, and that he went to bed at around 9:00 p.m. and woke up at 5:00 a.m. the following day. On cross-examination, however, he recanted, stating that De Guzman was not in their house that night and that only his mother-in-law was with them. Valdez claimed he was at home with his children in Bugallon Proper, Ramon, Isabela, having slept at around 8:00 p.m. Domingo claimed he was at home in Centro Ramon, Isabela, with his son and sister-in-law, watching television, and went to bed at around 8:00 p.m.; the following morning he learned of BBB's death and went to the victims' house.

AAA testified that when she and BBB ran outside, she saw De Guzman, Balacanao, Boboy Tamonang, and Domingo standing in front of their house. After De Guzman shot BBB, all the accused ran away. During a clarificatory hearing, AAA elaborated that the four other accused were standing when she saw them and then ran away, with Balacanao nearest to her, followed by Tamonang, then Domingo, and Cabico farthest. She acknowledged that the only sources of light were a 20-watt bulb inside and a 25-watt bulb outside. She further testified that the four did not harm or hit BBB after he was shot, that she did not know whether they saw De Guzman shoot BBB because she was already hysterical, and that they ran away upon hearing the gunshot because they were very near the place.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Accused-appellants contended that AAA's testimony failed to establish with certainty the overt acts indicating their alleged participation in the robbery and killing, as AAA was uncertain of the names and identities of accused-appellants.
• Implausibility of Identification: Accused-appellants alleged that AAA's testimony was implausible in establishing their identification as perpetrators and unworthy of credence and weight.
• Absence of Conspiracy: Accused-appellants argued that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy, as there was no concrete evidence pointing to their participation in the robbery or killing, or that they held weapons. Their alleged presence at the scene should not be deduced as part of the evil design of Valdez, Cabico, and De Guzman; the only conduct for which they were implicated was running away after De Guzman shot BBB.
• Weakness of Prosecution Evidence: Accused-appellants admitted that denial and alibi are inherently weak but argued that the prosecution's evidence was weaker, and that it was the prosecution's burden to establish guilt beyond moral certainty rather than the accused's burden to build a strong defense.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: The OSG maintained that there was insufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellants were part of the conspiracy to rob AAA and BBB.
• Uncertain Role in Conspiracy: The OSG argued that although AAA's testimony placed accused-appellants at the scene, it did not define with certitude their role in the conspiracy or whether they conspired with the other accused at all, and that what transpired between the accused outside the house before BBB was shot must have a concrete link to the crime.
• Flight as Insufficient Proof: The OSG argued that accused-appellants could not be considered conspirators based on flight alone, as AAA was unsure whether they saw De Guzman shoot BBB, and it may be inferred that they ran away upon hearing the gunshot.
• Recommendation of Acquittal: The OSG recommended that accused-appellants Domingo and Balacanao be acquitted, the prosecution having failed to establish their degree of culpability with moral certainty.

• Credibility of Witness: Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants by giving credence to the doubtful and inconsistent testimony of the private complainant.
• Identity and Participation: Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants despite the prosecution's failure to prove the identity and participation of the alleged perpetrators.
• Conspiracy: Whether the trial court erred in finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime charged.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellants despite the weakness of the prosecution evidence, brushing aside their defenses of denial and alibi.

• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not established, the prosecution having shown only that accused-appellants were present outside the victims' house and fled after the shooting—conduct insufficient to prove active participation in furtherance of a common criminal design. Mere presence, knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate, absent overt acts in furtherance of the common purpose, does not constitute conspiracy.
• Other Issues: Unnecessary to resolve, the acquittal on the ground of absence of conspiracy being dispositive.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Its elements are: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement; (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof of conspiracy need not be direct; it may be inferred from the parties' conduct indicating a common understanding, joint purpose, concert of action, and community of interest. However, conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough absent active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. In this case, AAA's testimony established only that accused-appellants were standing outside the house and ran away after De Guzman shot BBB. There was no evidence of any overt act by accused-appellants in furtherance of the robbery, rape, or killing. Their presence could be attributed to various reasons—they could have served as lookouts, could have been called there without knowledge of the unfolding crime, or could have met the other accused by coincidence. Their flight could have been motivated by fear of implication rather than participation in a preconceived plan, as AAA herself was unsure whether they saw the shooting. Because conspiracy was not established by positive and conclusive evidence, accused-appellants must be acquitted. The defenses of denial and alibi, though inherently weak, became irrelevant in light of the prosecution's failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, not on the weakness of the defense.

• Conspiracy transcends mere companionship — Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is insufficient to constitute one a party to conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must be established not by conjecture but by positive and conclusive evidence. Applied in this case to hold that accused-appellants' presence outside the victims' house and their flight after the shooting, without any overt act furthering the criminal design, did not prove conspiracy.
• Elements of conspiracy — (1) Two or more persons came to an agreement; (2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and (3) the execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof need not be direct but may be inferred from the mode and manner of the crime's commission or from the accused's acts before, during, and after the crime, indicating a joint purpose, concert of action, and community of interest.
• Implied conspiracy — Exists when two or more persons aim by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment. Proved through the mode and manner of the offense or from acts of the accused indubitably pointing to a joint purpose.
• Flight from the crime scene does not per se prove conspiracy — Flight after a shooting does not suffice to prove conspiracy where there is no evidence that the fleeing was interwoven with a preconceived plan or agreement to kill the victim. Fear of implication may be a plausible reason for fleeing.
• Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence — The prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of the accused's defense; it must rely on the strength of its evidence and establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• "Conspiracy transcends mere companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose." — The opening passage of the decision, articulating the controlling doctrine on the insufficiency of mere presence to establish conspiracy.
• "Since the prosecution failed to establish conspiracy with positive and conclusive evidence, necessarily, herein accused-appellants must be acquitted of the crimes charged." — The ratio decidendi connecting the failure of proof of conspiracy to the acquittal.
• "The fact that petitioner fled from the scene after the shooting does not suffice to prove the conspiracy there being no evidence to convince us that his running away from the scene had been interwoven with a pre-conceived plan or agreement to kill the victim. Fear of implication in the crime could have been a plausible reason for the petitioner's act of fleeing." — Quoted from Orodio vs. Court of Appeals, applying the principle that flight alone does not establish conspiracy absent evidence of a preconceived plan.

• People vs. Lago, 411 Phil. 52 (2001) — Followed for the elements of conspiracy and the principle that proof of conspiracy need not be direct but may be inferred from the parties' conduct indicating a common understanding.
• Macapagal-Arroyo vs. People, 790 Phil. 367 (2016) — Followed for the doctrine that conspiracy transcends mere companionship and that mere presence, knowledge, acquiescence, or agreement to cooperate is insufficient without active participation; also for the distinction between express and implied conspiracy.
• Orodio vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-57519, September 13, 1988, 165 SCRA 316 — Followed for the principle that flight from the scene after a shooting does not prove conspiracy absent evidence of a preconceived plan, fear of implication being a plausible alternative explanation.
• People vs. Gonzales, 396 Phil. 11 (2000) — Followed for the principle that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and cannot profit from the weakness of the accused's defense.
• Quidet vs. People, 632 Phil. 1 (2010) — Followed for the exception to the rule of deference to trial court factual findings, where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts of weight and substance affecting the result.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Applied to test whether the prosecution proved the elements of conspiracy among all six accused.
• Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. The Amended Information charged all accused with this crime, alleging that on the occasion of the robbery, BBB was shot and killed and AAA was raped.

Hernando, Inting, and J. Lopez, JJ., concurred. Leonen, J., was on official leave.