People vs. Dolendo

Where the main objective of the offender is to burn an inhabited house or dwelling, and death results by reason or on the occasion of the arson, the crime is simple arson under Presidential Decree No. 1613 and the resulting death is absorbed, punishable by reclusion perpetua if no aggravating circumstance is proved.

Appellant Nestor Dolendo and Leonardo Perocho, Sr. had a prior altercation, after which Leonardo Sr. began avoiding appellant. On the afternoon of September 18, 1996, appellant went to the Perocho family residence in Sitio Kapatagan, Barangay Capsay, Aroroy, Masbate, armed with a gun. He shouted for Leonardo Sr., who was not at home. Deolina Perocho and her children, including six-year-old Leonardo Jr., were inside. Appellant gathered dried coconut leaves, set the porch on fire, and the house burned down. Leonardo Jr., who was asleep and was left behind when Deolina and three other children escaped through a rear window, died from massive burns.

• The Arson: On September 18, 1996, around 4:00 p.m., Deolina Perocho and her children were eating in their house in Sitio Kapatagan, Barangay Capsay, Aroroy, Masbate. She heard appellant shouting, “Leonardo, I am already here!” and saw him holding a gun. Deolina and her children ran upstairs and called for help, but no one came. She saw appellant gather dried coconut leaves and set their porch on fire. Deolina and her three children—Ivy (1), Isalyn (3), and Janice (5)—jumped from a rear window and hid in a grassy area. She realized she had forgotten Leonardo Jr. (6), who was asleep inside. When they emerged, the house had completely burned and Leonardo Jr. was dead.

• Eyewitness Corroboration: Jessie Perocho, Deolina’s 18-year-old son, was working at a nearby farm. He saw appellant light a torch made of bundled coconut leaves and use it to set the house on fire. He was too frightened to intervene.

• Post-Mortem Findings: Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s medical report described the cadaver as reduced in size, both upper and lower extremities missing from burning, skull massively burned exposing brain tissue, face muscles gone, mandible and teeth exposed, and all internal organs exposed and burned. Death was due to massive burns.

• Appellant’s Defense: Appellant invoked denial and alibi, claiming he was in Pulong Buhangin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan at the time of the incident. He admitted a prior misunderstanding with the Perocho family regarding gold panning activities. He contended the witnesses could not have identified him from afar.

• Recantation after Conviction: Following the RTC’s guilty verdict, Deolina executed an affidavit of recantation stating the fire came from a lighted kerosene lamp that fell and hit the wall. Jessie’s affidavit stated he was nowhere near the house at the time. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, noting the recantations were made fifteen years after the incident and did not address all material evidence.

• Inconsistencies in Testimony: Appellant argued that the prosecution witnesses gave conflicting accounts regarding which children were inside the house during the fire and what exactly he had uttered about Leonardo Sr., thereby undermining their credibility.

• Ill-Motive: Appellant maintained that Deolina and Jessie Perocho were impelled by ill-motive because of his prior altercation with Leonardo Sr., making their identification unreliable.

• Recantation as Basis for Acquittal: Appellant contended that the affidavits of recantation executed by Deolina and Jessie Perocho should result in his acquittal, as they retracted their earlier in-court identifications.

• Invalidity of Judgment by a Judge Who Did Not Hear the Case: Appellant argued that the trial court’s verdict was invalid because Judge Arturo Clemente B. Revil, who penned the decision, was not the same judge who presided over the trial, thereby preventing an accurate assessment of the witnesses’ demeanor.

• Trivial Inconsistencies: Respondent countered that the alleged inconsistencies referred to trivial matters that did not impair the credibility of the prosecution witnesses on the essential fact of appellant’s identity as the arsonist.

• Recantation Deserves No Credit: Respondent argued that the recantation should be disregarded because it was executed fifteen years after the incident and failed to address all material evidence adduced during trial.

• Judge’s Competence to Decide: Respondent maintained that a decision penned by a judge who did not personally hear the trial is not per se invalid, as the judge can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate witness credibility according to settled rules and common experience.

• Proper Crime is Simple Arson: Respondent recommended that the conviction be modified from arson with homicide to simple arson because the primary intent was to burn the dwelling and the resulting death was absorbed.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s factual findings on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses despite alleged inconsistencies.

• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution proved appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt in light of his alibi and the witnesses’ subsequent recantation.

• Validity of the Decision Rendered by a Judge Who Did Not Hear the Case: Whether the trial court’s verdict of conviction was rendered invalid because the judge who penned the decision was not the same judge who heard and tried the case.

• Modification to Simple Arson: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in modifying appellant’s conviction from arson with homicide to simple arson.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The appellate court’s affirmance was upheld. Deolina and Jessie Perocho gave categorical, consistent, and firm testimony, positively identifying appellant as the person who set their dwelling on fire. The alleged inconsistencies pertained only to trivial matters and did not erode the core of their identification. The trial court’s assessment of credibility was accorded great respect. Any ill-motive arising from the prior altercation did not detract from the truth of their account; rather, it fortified their natural desire to seek justice against the true culprit rather than to falsely implicate an innocent person.

• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The positive and credible eyewitness testimony established the intentional burning and appellant’s identity, sufficient to constitute the corpus delicti of arson. Appellant’s alibi, which was unsubstantiated and failed to demonstrate physical impossibility of his presence at the scene, could not prevail over the positive identification. The affidavits of recantation were viewed with disfavor; a retraction does not automatically overturn solemn in-court testimony, especially when executed long after conviction and without addressing all material points. The rule in Firaza v. People applies: it is a dangerous rule to set aside testimony solemnly given in open court simply because the witness later changes his mind.

• Validity of the Decision Rendered by a Judge Who Did Not Hear the Case: The conviction was not rendered invalid. A judge who did not preside over the trial may validly decide the case by relying on the transcripts of stenographic notes and evaluating the credibility of witnesses in accordance with common experience, knowledge, and observation, as held in Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. v. PMMA. Such reliance does not violate due process, and the mere fact that another judge heard the trial does not impair the efficacy of the judgment.

• Modification to Simple Arson: The Court of Appeals correctly modified the conviction to simple arson. Pursuant to People v. Malngan, when both burning and death occur, the offense is determined by the main objective of the malefactor: if the primary intent is to burn the building, the resulting death is absorbed and the crime is simply arson under Presidential Decree No. 1613. Here, the evidence showed that appellant’s dominant purpose was to burn the Perocho dwelling; the death of Leonardo Jr. occurred by reason of that arson. Consequently, the homicide was absorbed, and the proper penalty was reclusion perpetua under Section 5, there being no aggravating circumstance.

• Absorption Rule in Arson Resulting in Death (People v. Malngan): Where both burning and death occur, the crime depends on the main objective of the offender: (a) if the main objective is to burn the building, and death results by reason or on the occasion of the arson, the crime is simple arson and the death is absorbed; (b) if the main objective is to kill a particular person, and fire is used as the means, the crime is murder; (c) if the objective is to kill and fire is used to cover up the killing, two distinct crimes of homicide/murder and arson are committed. The Court applied the first scenario, as appellant’s dominant intent was to burn the dwelling.

• Retraction/Recantation of Testimony (Firaza v. People): Recantations are viewed with disfavor because they can be easily obtained through intimidation or monetary consideration. A retraction does not automatically negate an earlier declaration made under oath in open court. It is a dangerous rule to set aside testimony solemnly taken under conditions designed to discourage falsehood merely because the witness later changes his mind. When an affidavit of retraction is executed after conviction, it is considered an afterthought undeserving of probative value.

• Competence of a Judge Who Did Not Hear the Trial (Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. v. PMMA): The fact that the judge who rendered the decision did not personally hear the testimonies does not render the judgment erroneous or invalid. The judge can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes and calibrate witness credibility in conformity with common experience, knowledge, and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate substantive or procedural due process.

• Alibi as the Weakest Defense: Alibi is the weakest defense because it is easily fabricated. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by credible eyewitnesses, especially when unsubstantiated by corroborative evidence and without proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene of the crime.

• Corpus Delicti in Arson: The corpus delicti in arson is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and that it was intentionally caused; the credible testimony of eyewitnesses identifying the accused as the perpetrator suffices to establish both the occurrence of the crime and the identity of the offender.

• “Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated — whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed — homicide/murder and arson.” (People v. Malngan, as applied to distinguish the proper crime)

• “Indeed, it is a dangerous rule to set aside a testimony which has been solemnly taken before a court of justice in an open and free trial and under conditions precisely sought to discourage and forestall falsehood simply because one of the witnesses who had given the testimony later on changed his mind. Such a rule will make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of the truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.” (Firaza v. People, applied to reject the recantation)

• “… we have held in several cases that the fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment ... does not render the judgment erroneous. Even though the judge who penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses, such is not enough reason to overturn the findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. ... He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common experience, knowledge and observation of ordinary men.” (Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. v. PMMA, cited to uphold the judgment)

• People v. Malngan , 534 Phil. 404 (2006) — Controlling precedent that established the tripartite test for determining whether the crime is simple arson, murder, or separate arson and homicide/murder; applied to modify the conviction to simple arson.

• Firaza v. People , 547 Phil. 572 (2007) — Followed for the rule that retractions are disfavored and do not automatically overturn solemn trial testimony.

• Sandoval Shipyards, Inc. v. PMMA , 708 Phil. 535 (2013) — Cited to support the validity of a decision rendered by a judge who did not personally hear the trial.

• People v. Murcia , 628 Phil. 648 (2010) — Cited for the corpus delicti rule in arson: proof of the intentional burning suffices.

• People v. Jugueta , 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Followed for the schedule of monetary awards, increasing exemplary damages and adding temperate damages.

• People v. Amoc , G.R. No. 216937, June 5, 2017 — Cited for the rule that alibi must be supported by proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to be at the locus criminis.

• Section 3, Presidential Decree No. 1613 (New Arson Law) — Defines “Other Cases of Arson,” including the burning of an inhabited house or dwelling, punishable by reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. Applied to classify the burning of the Perocho dwelling as an inhabited house covered by the decree.

• Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 1613 — Provides that “[i]f by reason of or on the occasion of the arson death results, the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to death shall be imposed.” Applied to impose reclusion perpetua, as the death of Leonardo Jr. resulted from the arson and no aggravating circumstance was alleged.

• Repeal of Articles 320 to 326-B of the Revised Penal Code — PD 1613 repealed the old arson provisions; the decree now governs all forms of arson, including those resulting in death.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concurred. Caguioa, J., was on official leave.