People vs. Doca

Treachery cannot be appreciated where the victim was not unsuspecting, having been forewarned by visible signs of danger—such as the assailant being drunk, angry, visibly armed, and waiting for the victim—and where there is no showing the offender consciously and deliberately chose the mode of attack to ensure execution without risk to himself. Absent treachery and evident premeditation, the killing constitutes homicide, not murder.

Appellant Jomar Doca y Villaluna and the victim Roger C. Celestino, a seventeen-year-old minor, were both residents of Barangay Gadu, Municipality of Solana, Province of Cagayan. Appellant was acquainted with Benjamin Cabisora, who was Roger's relative and appellant's friend. The killing occurred in the vicinity of a waiting shed in Villa Salud, Barangay Gadu, along the route Roger and his companions used to walk home from the house of Willie Cabisora. Appellant was charged under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for murder qualified by evident premeditation and treachery.

On July 1, 2007, around four o'clock in the afternoon, Rogelio Castro and Roger C. Celestino, along with two companions, were walking home from the house of Willie Cabisora in Villa Salud, Barangay Gadu, Solana, Cagayan. As they walked, they saw appellant Jomar Doca y Villaluna standing inside a waiting shed, appearing drunk and angry. Appellant was shirtless, revealing a Rambo knife strapped around his waist, and was looking for Roger. Roger was walking approximately fifty meters ahead of the group and reached the waiting shed first.

According to the prosecution's eyewitness Rogelio Castro, as Roger was passing by appellant, the latter suddenly stabbed Roger in the left breast with the Rambo knife. Roger fell to the ground, and appellant immediately fled. Castro and his companions wanted to carry Roger to his house, but he had already died. Benjamin Cabisora, who was seated in the waiting shed in front of the house of Georgie Juan, corroborated portions of this account. He testified that appellant appeared to be waiting for someone, and that when Roger reached the waiting shed, he suddenly fell to the ground. Dr. Rebecca Battung testified that Roger died of shock due to severe hemorrhage from the stab wound in his chest, having lost more than 1.5 liters of blood. Police officers PO3 Roque Binayug and SPO3 Bienimax Constantino recovered a Rambo knife beside Roger's lifeless body at the scene.

Appellant invoked self-defense. He testified that he had gone to the house of his friend Georgie Juan and, finding him absent, decided to wait at the nearby waiting shed where he found Benjamin Cabisora. Roger arrived a few minutes later and, without warning, boxed appellant four times, hitting him in the nose and chest. Appellant initially did not fight back, but when Roger drew a fan knife (balisong), he grappled with Roger for the weapon, managed to take hold of it, and used it to stab Roger. He fled because he feared for his life. The following day, he surrendered to Barangay Captain Edgar Palattao of Barangay Andarayan, who turned him over to the police.

The trial court gave full credence to Rogelio Castro's eyewitness testimony, finding that appellant admitted to the killing by invoking self-defense but failed to prove the elements thereof. The Court of Appeals affirmed this factual assessment, rejecting appellant's self-defense claim as resting solely on his self-serving testimony and crediting the prosecution witnesses' account that Roger did not attack appellant in any way.

• Uncorroborated Eyewitness Testimony: Appellant faulted the trial court for relying on Rogelio Castro's allegedly uncorroborated testimony, pointing out that Benjamin Cabisora merely testified that he saw Roger fall to the ground without mentioning appellant's participation in Roger's death.
• Absence of Treachery: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in ruling that he employed treachery, contending that the witnesses' own allegations that he was drunk, angry, and specifically looking for Roger should have cautioned Roger and his group from approaching him.
• Self-Defense: Appellant maintained that he acted in self-defense, claiming Roger boxed him four times and then drew a fan knife, prompting him to grapple for the weapon and stab Roger.
• Voluntary Surrender: Appellant asserted that his voluntary surrender to Barangay Captain Palattao should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.

• Identification of the Assailant: The OSG countered that the prosecution witnesses were able to identify appellant as the person who killed Roger.
• Presence of Treachery: The OSG argued that treachery attended the killing since Roger was unarmed and had no means to defend himself, and that Roger, being only seventeen years old, was definitely weaker compared to appellant, a mature male.
• Rejection of Self-Defense: The OSG maintained that appellant's claim of self-defense could not prosper in the absence of proof that unlawful aggression emanated from Roger.

• Self-Defense: Whether appellant successfully established self-defense to justify the killing of Roger C. Celestino.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing to qualify it as murder.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in appellant's favor.

• Self-Defense: No. Appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the indispensable element of self-defense, relying solely on his own uncorroborated and self-serving testimony.
• Treachery: No. The victim was not an unsuspecting target, having seen appellant drunk, angry, and visibly armed; and there was no showing appellant consciously and deliberately chose the mode of attack to ensure execution without risk to himself.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The elements of voluntary surrender were satisfied—appellant had not been arrested, he surrendered to a person in authority, and the surrender was voluntary—and with the crime downgraded to homicide, the mitigating circumstance could now benefit appellant in fixing the proper penalty.

• Self-Defense: When an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to the accused to establish the plea through credible, clear, and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction follows from the admission that he killed the victim. The elements of self-defense are: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element—without it, self-defense is unavailing because there is nothing to repel. Appellant relied solely on his self-serving testimony and presented no corroborating evidence. He offered no explanation why Roger would have attacked him. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals gave full credence to eyewitness Rogelio Castro's candid and unwavering account that appellant suddenly stabbed Roger as the latter was simply passing by. The trial court's factual findings on witness credibility are binding and conclusive on the reviewing court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Benjamin Cabisora's testimony that Roger suddenly fell to the ground was consistent with the prosecution's theory that no unlawful aggression emanated from the victim. Absent unlawful aggression attributable to Roger, appellant's claim of self-defense was unavailing.

• Treachery: Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure execution of the crime without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. Here, Rogelio and Roger saw appellant standing inside a waiting shed, drunk, angry, and specifically looking for Roger, shirtless with a Rambo knife visible around his waist. Under these circumstances, Roger could not be characterized as an unsuspecting victim; he and his companions should have been alerted to impending danger. Moreover, the attack, though sudden, was not shown to have been consciously launched by appellant to facilitate the killing without risk to himself. Relying on People vs. Pilpa and People vs. Albino, the Court held that mere suddenness of the attack is insufficient to establish treachery where there is no showing the assailant deliberately chose the mode of attack to ensure accomplishment without risk. In Pilpa, the victim was with companions who could have helped repel the attack; in Albino, the appellant was enraged and had no time to reflect on his actions. Similarly, appellant here was drunk and angry, negating deliberate selection of a risk-free mode of attack. Absent both treachery and evident premeditation, the killing constituted homicide, not murder.

• Voluntary Surrender: Voluntary surrender requires: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. The essence is spontaneity and the intent to give oneself up, either because the accused acknowledges guilt or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture. The facts showed appellant was not arrested, he surrendered to Barangay Captain Palattao who brought him to the police station, and the surrender was voluntary. The Court of Appeals had already appreciated voluntary surrender but held it could not modify the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder. With the crime downgraded to homicide, the penalty became divisible under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, allowing the mitigating circumstance to benefit appellant. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court imposed an indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and six months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• Elements of Self-Defense — Self-defense requires: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element; without it, self-defense is unavailing. When self-defense is invoked, the burden of proof shifts to the accused, who must establish the plea through credible, clear, and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction follows from the admission of the killing.

• Essence of Treachery — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms that tend directly and especially to ensure execution of the crime without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might make. The attack must be deliberate and without warning, swift and unexpected, affording the unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. Mere suddenness of the attack is insufficient where the mode adopted does not positively show the assailant deliberately chose it to ensure accomplishment without risk; the victim must also be unsuspecting, not forewarned by visible signs of danger.

• Elements of Voluntary Surrender — Voluntary surrender requires: (1) the accused has not been actually arrested; (2) the accused surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. The essence is spontaneity and the intent to give oneself up and submit to authorities, either because the accused acknowledges guilt or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture.

• Binding Effect of Trial Court's Credibility Findings — The assessment of witness credibility is best undertaken by the trial court, which has the opportunity to observe the deportment of witnesses while testifying. The trial court's factual findings on credibility are binding and conclusive on the reviewing court, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

• "Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element of self-defense. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing, for there is nothing to repel." — This passage states the controlling rule on the primacy of unlawful aggression as an element of self-defense, explaining why the appellant's claim failed.

• "[M]ere suddenness of the attack is not sufficient to hold that treachery is present, where the mode adopted by the assailants does not positively tend to prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the defense that the victim might offer." — This quotation from People vs. Pilpa, adopted by the Court, articulates the canonical formulation distinguishing a merely sudden attack from a treacherous one, and was the decisive basis for downgrading the conviction from murder to homicide.

• "Given these circumstances, Roger cannot be characterized as an unsuspecting victim. He and his friends should have been alerted of an impending danger against his person coming from appellant." — This passage applies the "unsuspecting victim" requirement of treachery to the facts, demonstrating that visible forewarning of danger negates the element of unsuspectingness.

• People vs. Pilpa, G.R. No. 225336, September 5, 2018 — Followed. The Court relied on Pilpa for the principle that mere suddenness of an attack is insufficient to establish treachery where the assailant did not deliberately choose a mode of attack to ensure execution without risk. The facts in Pilpa—where the victim was with companions who could help repel the attack—were found analogous.
• People vs. Albino, G.R. No. 229928, July 22, 2019 — Followed. The Court cited Albino for the proposition that a sudden attack by an enraged assailant who had no time to reflect on his actions, and where there was no showing of a conscious choice of a risk-free mode of attack, does not qualify the killing as murder. Appellant therein was convicted of homicide.
• People vs. Villanueva, 807 Phil. 245 (2017) — Cited for the elements of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Velasquez vs. People, 807 Phil. 438 (2017) — Cited for the rule that when an accused invokes self-defense, the burden shifts to the accused to prove the plea through credible, clear, and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Fontanilla, 680 Phil. 155 (2012) — Cited for the elements of self-defense and the indispensable nature of unlawful aggression.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited for the rule that exemplary damages in homicide cases are awarded only if an aggravating circumstance was proven during trial, and for the adjustment of civil indemnity and moral damages to P50,000.00 each in homicide cases.
• People vs. Macaspac, 806 Phil. 285 (2017) — Cited for the award of temperate damages of P50,000.00 in homicide cases.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659) — Defines and penalizes murder, listing treachery and evident premeditation among the qualifying circumstances. The trial court and the Court of Appeals applied this provision to convict appellant of murder; the Supreme Court held that neither qualifying circumstance was present, warranting conviction only for homicide.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide with reclusion temporal. The Court applied this provision upon finding that the killing was not attended by any qualifying circumstance, and used it as the basis for imposing the indeterminate penalty.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended by Act No. 4225), Section 1 — Requires courts to impose an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which is that which could properly be imposed under the Revised Penal Code in view of attending circumstances, and the minimum within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed. The Court applied this law, together with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, to fix the indeterminate penalty of eight years of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and six months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Carpio (Chairperson), Caguioa, Reyes, Jr., J., and Zalameda, JJ., concurred.