People vs. Diva

Evident premeditation requires proof, as clear as the proof of the crime itself, of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow reflection. Where the prosecution's own evidence shows no belligerence between the parties after a prior incident, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance does not require surrender to authorities in the municipality where the offense was committed; it only requires that the offender surrender to authorities to save the government the trouble and expense of looking for him.

Maximo Diva and Cesaria Diva were husband and wife charged with murder. The deceased, Ananias Bano, was married to Alejandra Diva Aclon, daughter of Teodora Diva de Aclon, who was a sister of Raymundo Diva, Maximo's father. A boundary dispute arose between the deceased and Maximo Diva, who was caretaker of his father's land, and this dispute was pending in the Court of First Instance of Cebu at the time of the incident. The parties were adjoining landowners in barrios Himinsolan and Santiago, San Francisco, Cebu.

Maximo Diva and Cesaria Diva, husband and wife, were charged with murder of Ananias Bano. The aggression took place at the junction of the provincial road and a trail leading to the house of the accused in barrio Santiago, San Francisco, Cebu, on the afternoon of June 3, 1962. The deceased was a resident of barrio Himinsolan, about four kilometers from the adjoining barrio of Santiago. He married Alejandra Diva Aclon, who died in 1958, and in 1961 took Justa Senor as his common-law wife. A boundary dispute arose between the deceased and appellant Maximo, who was caretaker of his father's land, and this dispute was brought to court and was still pending at the time of the incident.

In September 1961, after the case had been filed, the deceased was ambushed by Maximo Diva and his younger brother while returning from a wedding, but nothing serious happened due to timely intervention. From then until the incident, no other unusual event occurred, and Maximo showed no belligerence toward the deceased. In March 1962, the deceased got ill of "El Tor" and recovered; in April, his wife Justa Senor fell seriously ill during delivery and was confined at the Southern Islands Hospital for sixteen days. To offer thanksgiving, the deceased and his wife made a pilgrimage on June 3, 1962, to the chapel of Santiago, passing by a road some 150 meters from the house of the accused, without untoward incident.

On their return, upon reaching the place of the incident, the deceased was suddenly rushed upon by the accused spouses. Maximo was armed with a bolo while Cesaria carried a bolo and a "sangalab," a sort of scythe. The deceased retreated to avoid Maximo's hacking blows, but while defending himself, Cesaria allegedly sneaked behind him and delivered a bolo-blow on his back. The deceased continued retreating, picked up a piece of wood, and hit the bolo held by Cesaria, causing her to drop it. While picking up the bolo, Maximo delivered another blow on the right face of the deceased, who then stood his ground and exchanged blows with Maximo, who received wounds on the face, hand, and arms. Cesaria ran away. Weak and bleeding, the deceased was left on the roadside when two persons, Rosalio Dagatan and Aproniano Talingting, together with Justa Señor, approached. The deceased turned over the bolo to his wife with instruction to deliver it to the authorities. He expired at the steps of the stairs of the house of Andres Icoy.

The medical certificate issued by Dr. Edilberto Olitres listed eight wounds on the victim, with wounds number 3 and 4 fatal, causing death by hemorrhage and destruction of internal organs. The accused disappeared after the incident. The following day, the chief of police of San Francisco was informed that Maximo Diva had surrendered to the police authorities of the next town of Poro.

Maximo Diva admitted killing the deceased but claimed self-defense, alleging that the deceased attacked him from behind in a coconut plantation. Cesaria claimed she did not participate in the fight. The defense claimed the fight lasted about fifteen minutes and that Maximo received nine wounds, although only six were listed by Dr. Olitres. The defense further claimed the deceased used his own bolo, which was long, sharp pointed, and double bladed, but this bolo was not presented in court. Maximo claimed he left in a baroto with his wife for San Francisco but, because of low tide, changed course to Poro, where he surrendered after his injuries were treated. Cesaria claimed she was shouting for help during the fight but no help came.

• Evident Premeditation: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding that evident premeditation qualified the offense.
• Voluntary Surrender: Appellants argued that Maximo Diva should have been given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Presumption of Guilt from Flight: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding a presumption of guilt from flight.
• Conspiracy: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in holding that conspiracy exists.
• Ambush: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding that the deceased was ambushed.
• Aggressors: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in holding that the accused were the aggressors.
• Self-Defense: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in not holding that the deceased was the aggressor and in rejecting the theory of self-defense.
• Suppression of Evidence: Appellants argued that the prosecution was guilty of willful suppression of evidence, particularly the bolo allegedly used by the deceased and the piece of wood.
• Gross Irregularity in Handling Exhibits: Appellants argued that the prosecution committed gross irregularity in the handling and management of exhibits, especially Exhibit B and the piece of wood.
• Res Gestae: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in giving weight and credit to the alleged res gestae.
• Motive: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in holding that the motive of the killing was a land case.
• Superior Strength: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in not holding that the strength of the deceased was vastly superior to that of Maximo Diva.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in giving weight and credit to the testimony of prosecution witnesses Cristina Dagatan, Rosalio Dagatan, and Justa Señor, citing serious contradictions among them.
• Cesaria's Participation: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in holding that Cesaria Diva took part in the fight.
• Specific Finding on Wound: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in not making a specific finding on the wound in the right part of the chest of Ananias Bano.

N/A — The Solicitor General failed to file the appellee's brief, and the case was submitted for decision without it.

• Participation of Cesaria Diva: Whether Cesaria Diva took part in the commission of the crime.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation qualified the offense of murder.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether Maximo Diva was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed between the accused spouses.
• Self-Defense: Whether Maximo Diva acted in self-defense.
• Suppression of Evidence: Whether the prosecution was guilty of willful suppression of evidence and gross irregularity in handling exhibits.
• Res Gestae: Whether the trial court erred in admitting the deceased's statements as part of the res gestae.
• Motive: Whether the trial court erred in finding that the motive of the killing was a land case.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving weight to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
• Specific Finding on Wound: Whether the trial court's failure to make a specific finding on the chest wound constituted reversible error.

• Participation of Cesaria Diva: No. Cesaria Diva did not take part in the commission of the crime; the prosecution witnesses' testimony on her participation was based on hearsay, and she was acquitted on reasonable doubt.
• Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation was not established because none of its three requisites were present.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. Maximo Diva was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as the law does not require surrender to authorities in the municipality where the offense was committed.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy did not exist because Cesaria Diva did not take part in the commission of the crime.
• Self-Defense: No. Maximo Diva failed to prove unlawful aggression, a primordial requisite for self-defense.
• Suppression of Evidence: No. The prosecution was not guilty of willful suppression of evidence, as there was no proof it had possession of the alleged bolo or piece of wood.
• Res Gestae: No. The deceased's statements were admissible as part of the res gestae, having been made immediately after the incident while under the stress of nervous excitement.
• Motive: No. Motive is unessential to conviction in murder cases when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit or where the offender has admitted the deed.
• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's findings on credibility were entitled to full respect and were not disturbed.
• Specific Finding on Wound: No. There was no need to discuss the chest wound in view of the finding that Cesaria Diva did not take part in the crime.

• Participation of Cesaria Diva: The Court analyzed the testimony of Justa Señor and Rosalio Dagatan, who claimed Cesaria sneaked behind the deceased and hacked him at the back. However, Cristina Dagatan, another prosecution witness who claimed to have witnessed the fight from the beginning, clearly declared that Justa Señor and Rosalio Dagatan arrived at the place of the incident after the struggle. Thus, their statements were not founded on personal observation but on hearsay. The Court also noted that Cesaria was on her six or seven months pregnancy at the time, making it doubtful that she would take such an active part in a struggle between two men who fought for no less than fifteen minutes armed with mortal weapons. The Court found it more reasonable to believe her testimony that she was crying and calling for help during the struggle.

• Evident Premeditation: The Court found that the trial court's own finding that Maximo Diva showed no belligerence toward the deceased after the September 1961 incident clearly showed the lack of evident premeditation. To appreciate evident premeditation, it must be established with proof as clear as the proof of the crime itself that: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect. None of these requisites were present.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Court held that the law does not require that the perpetrator surrender to authorities in the municipality where the offense was committed. All that is required is for the offender to surrender to authorities to save the government the trouble and expense of looking for him. Maximo Diva surrendered to the authorities the day following the incident and did not wait for the authorities to arrest him. The Court cited People vs. Yecla and People vs. Valera, et al. as precedents where surrender to authorities was credited as a mitigating circumstance even when warrants had already been issued.

• Conspiracy: The Court held that since Cesaria Diva did not take part in the commission of the crime, conspiracy did not exist.

• Self-Defense: The Court held that having admitted the killing, it was incumbent upon Maximo Diva to prove by positive evidence or convincing credibility his claim of self-defense. A primordial requisite for self-defense is unlawful aggression, which he failed to prove. The trial court rejected the defense's version and gave more faith and credit to the prosecution witnesses' testimony that the assault on the deceased was unprovoked. The Court noted that the trial court's findings on credibility are within its special competence and should not be reversed absent any reason to doubt them. The trial court observed that Maximo's wounds were not serious and curable within fifteen days, whereas two of the deceased's wounds were fatal, making the defense's claim of a robust attacker implausible.

• Suppression of Evidence: The Court held that the defense failed to prove that the prosecution had possession of the alleged sharp-pointed, double-bladed bolo and the piece of wood but willfully refused to present them. The defense witnesses testified that the deceased used such a bolo before the incident, but none testified that he used it during the fight. The record was silent as to whether the piece of wood was recovered and presented to the authorities. The alleged discrepancy in the surrender of Exhibit B went only to the credibility of witnesses, and whoever surrendered the bolo was of no moment.

• Res Gestae: The Court held that the deceased's statements — "Help me because I am going to die from these wounds I sustained" and "If I will expire before the arrival of the chief of police and the doctor, please notify my mother and brothers and sisters, and tell them that it was the husband and wife who hacked me" — were made immediately after the incident while the deceased was still under the stress of nervous excitement, almost at the point of death, and a few minutes before he expired. These statements were admissible as part of the res gestae.

• Motive: The Court held that motive is unessential to conviction in murder cases when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit or where the offender has admitted the deed. Since Maximo Diva admitted having killed the deceased, his motive became irrelevant, and the trial court's finding on motive was a harmless error.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court held that the trial court's findings on credibility are entitled to full respect and will not be disturbed unless some fact of value had been misconstrued or overlooked. The appellants had not satisfactorily shown that the trial court overlooked facts of substance and value.

• Specific Finding on Wound: The Court held that there was no need to discuss the chest wound in view of the finding that Cesaria Diva did not take part in the commission of the crime.

• Evident Premeditation — To appreciate the circumstance of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish with proof as clear as the proof of the crime itself that: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect. In this case, none of these requisites were present, as the prosecution's own evidence showed no belligerence between the parties after a prior incident.

• Voluntary Surrender — The law does not require that the perpetrator of an offense surrender to authorities in the municipality where the offense was committed. All that is required is for the offender to surrender to the authorities to save the government the trouble and expense of looking for him in order to arrest him. The surrender need not be prior to the order of arrest.

• Self-Defense — A primordial requisite for self-defense is unlawful aggression. Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by positive evidence or convincing credibility his claim of self-defense. Where the accused fails to prove unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot be appreciated.

• Res Gestae — Statements made by a victim immediately after receiving wounds, while still under the stress of nervous excitement and almost at the point of death, naming the accused as the author of the aggression, are admissible as part of the res gestae.

• Motive — Motive is unessential to conviction in murder cases when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit, or where the offender has admitted the deed. Failure of the prosecution to establish motive is completely inconsequential in such cases.

• "To properly appreciate the circumstance of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish with proof, as clear as the proof of the crime itself, that (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect." — This passage states the canonical three-part test for evident premeditation, which the Court applied to find that the circumstance was not present in this case.

• "The law does not require that the perpetrator of an offense to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, must give himself up to the authorities in the municipality where the offense was committed. All that the law requires is for the offender to surrender to the authorities to save the government the trouble and expense of looking for him in order to arrest him." — This passage defines the rule on voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, holding that surrender to authorities in a neighboring town suffices.

• "A primordial requisite for self-defense is unlawful aggression. This appellant Maximo Diva failed to prove." — This passage identifies unlawful aggression as the primordial requisite for self-defense and states the accused's failure to prove it in this case.

• "It is, however, a settled rule that 'motive is unessential to conviction in murder cases when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit, or where the offender has admitted the deed, and failure of the prosecution to established motive is completely inconsequential.'" — This passage states the rule that motive need not be proven in murder cases where the identity of the culprit is not in doubt or where the offender has admitted the deed.

• People vs. Leano, 36 Off. Gaz. No. 53, p. 1120 — Cited as the source of the three-part test for evident premeditation.
• People vs. Yecla, 68 Phil. 740 — Cited for the rule that an accused who presented himself in the municipal building five days after the commission of the crime to post bond was credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Valera, et al., L-15662, Aug. 30, 1962 — Cited for the rule that the fact that a warrant for arrest had already been issued is no bar to the consideration of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Quimson, 62 Phil. 162 — Cited for the rule that a victim's statement immediately after receiving wounds naming the accused as the author of the aggression is legal evidence as part of the res gestae.
• People vs. Figueroa, 82 Phil. 559 — Cited for the rule that the question of what motive is sufficient to impel one to commit a particular crime is always relative.
• People vs. Orzame et al., L-17773, May 19, 1966 — Cited for the rule that the desire of the accused to collect the value of a life insurance policy was held to be sufficient motive for killing.
• People vs. Lao Wan Sing, L-16379, Dec. 17, 1966 — Cited for the rule that the desire of the accused to profit by his insurance policy was considered sufficient motive for arson.
• People vs. Caggauan, 94 Phil. 118; People vs. Ramponit, 62 Phil. 248 — Cited for the rule that motive, as distinguished from criminal intent, is not an essential element of a crime.
• U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731; People vs. Gerale, 4 Phil. 218 — Cited for the rule that malice must be proven in cases of libel or slander.
• U.S. vs. Carlos, 15 Phil. 47 — Cited for the procedural rule that evidence of motive is an important aid in completing proof of the commission of the crime.
• People vs. Villalba, L-17243, Aug. 23, 1966; People vs. Serdenia, L-18032, April 30, 1966 — Cited for the settled rule that motive is unessential to conviction in murder cases when there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprit.

• Article 354, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the discussion of motive, specifically regarding the onus of proving malice in cases of libel or slander.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in the dispositive portion, where Maximo Diva was sentenced to imprisonment of 10 years of prision mayor to 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concurred. Concepcion, C.J., was on leave.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the case text.