People vs. Dijan

Defense of a stranger is unavailable where unlawful aggression has already ceased at the time the accused inflicts the fatal injuries, and treachery cannot be appreciated where the evidence does not establish that the victim was unarmed or that the attack was deliberately and consciously adopted to ensure its commission without risk.

Crispulo Dijan, Romualdo Paglinawan, and Oliver Lizardo were residents of Parang, Marikina City, acquainted with each other as members of the same neighborhood. The victim, Alvaro Hilario, lived in the same house as prosecution witness Roderick Silvestre. The stabbing incident occurred along Paraiso and Sumulong Streets in Parang, Marikina City, on the evening of April 11, 1998, following a chance encounter between the two groups at a neighborhood store.

On the evening of April 11, 1998, at around ten o'clock, Roderick Silvestre and Alvaro Hilario went to a store at the corner of Paraiso and Sumulong Streets in Parang, Marikina City, to buy cigarettes. There they encountered Crispulo Dijan, Romualdo Paglinawan, and Oliver Lizardo passing by. According to the prosecution, Paglinawan suddenly confronted Hilario for purportedly giving him a "bad stare." Silvestre apologized, offered cigarettes, and explained that it was the natural way Hilario gazed at people. The three accused then left, and Silvestre and Hilario proceeded home on foot.

The prosecution's account states that while Silvestre and Hilario were walking, the three accused, who had apparently waited for them, suddenly ganged up on Hilario and took turns stabbing him. Hilario, walking slightly ahead of Silvestre, cried out and told Silvestre to flee. Silvestre ran and clung to a passing passenger jeepney. Responding policemen, informed through radio communication, found Hilario's lifeless body at the scene. The following day, Dr. Ma. Cristina B. Freyra, PNP Medico-Legal Officer, conducted an autopsy and found that Hilario sustained fourteen injuries: nine stab wounds, three punctured wounds, an incised wound, and an abrasion, which caused his death. The medico-legal officer concluded the wounds could have been inflicted by two assailants using two single-bladed weapons and an icepick.

The defense presented a different version. Dijan testified that after the confrontation at the store, Paglinawan apologized and everybody shook hands. As the group walked along Paraiso Street, Dijan looked behind and saw Hilario stabbing Paglinawan with a knife. Paglinawan was wounded on the left arm and grappled with Hilario for possession of the knife. Seeing Silvestre pull out an icepick, Dijan disarmed him. Observing that Paglinawan was no match for the taller Hilario, Dijan stabbed Hilario with the icepick he had wrested from Silvestre, then helped Paglinawan home. Paglinawan and Lizardo gave corroborating testimony, with Lizardo claiming he fled when Silvestre rushed at them with an icepick, and Paglinawan testifying that Hilario had suddenly stabbed him and that the two grappled for about five minutes until Dijan pulled Hilario away and stabbed him. The defense also presented Lani Sarmiento, who testified that she saw a tall man pull out a knife and stab one of three men walking towards Paraiso Street, and Dr. Alfredo Garcia, who testified to treating Paglinawan for a stab wound at the right forearm on the night of the incident.

The trial court credited the prosecution's evidence as against Dijan, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery, while acquitting Paglinawan and Lizardo for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt. Dijan appealed his conviction, challenging both the finding of guilt and the appreciation of treachery.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Assuming arguendo that accused-appellant was guilty, he argued that the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

• Defense of a Stranger: Whether accused-appellant's claim of defense of a stranger validly exculpates him from criminal liability for the killing of Alvaro Hilario.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was sufficiently proven to sustain the conviction for murder.

• Defense of a Stranger: No. The defense of a stranger was not established because unlawful aggression had already ceased when the fatal thrusts were inflicted, as Paglinawan himself admitted that both he and Dijan had already taken possession of the weapons from the victim and Silvestre.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not proven because the evidence did not satisfactorily establish that the victim was unarmed, and the stab wound on Paglinawan indicated the victim might have been armed; neither was it shown that there was no provocation on the part of the victim. The conviction was accordingly reduced to homicide.

• Defense of a Stranger: A party invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence the exculpatory cause. Three elements must concur: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of any inducement by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. Unlawful aggression must be a continuing circumstance existing at the time the defense is made; once it ceases, the justification for killing or wounding the former aggressor likewise ceases. From the defense's own account, Hilario had already been disarmed and the unlawful aggression had abated when Dijan still delivered the fatal thrusts. Paglinawan himself testified that after Dijan took possession of the weapon from Silvestre and Paglinawan took possession of the weapon from Hilario, there was no more danger to either of them. The number of wounds sustained by the victim — fourteen injuries consisting of nine stab wounds, three punctured wounds, an incised wound, and an abrasion — further negated the defense plea, as the nature and number of wounds are significant indicia in determining plausibility.

• Treachery: The essence of treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself and ensuring the commission with no risk to the aggressor. Two conditions must concur: (a) employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) deliberate and conscious adoption of such means. These elements must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself and cannot be deduced from conjecture. The evidence did not satisfactorily establish that the victim was unarmed at the time of the stabbing; the stab wound on Paglinawan indicated the victim might have been armed. Neither was it made clear that there was no provocation on the part of the victim. Absent these showings, treachery could not be appreciated, and the accused could only be convicted of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Defense of a Stranger — A justifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code requiring proof by clear and convincing evidence of three elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) that the accused was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil motive. Unlawful aggression must be a continuing circumstance existing at the time the defense is made; once it ceases, the justification for killing or wounding the former aggressor likewise ceases. In this case, the defense failed because the victim had already been disarmed and the aggression had abated when the fatal thrusts were delivered.

• Treachery as a Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery requires (a) employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (b) deliberate and conscious adoption of such means. These elements must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself and cannot be deduced from conjecture. The circumstance was not appreciated where the evidence did not establish that the victim was unarmed or that there was no provocation on his part.

• Number and Nature of Wounds as Indicia of Culpability — The nature and number of wounds inflicted by an accused on the victim are significant indicia in determining the plausibility of a defense plea. Fourteen wounds sustained by the victim in this case negated the claim of defense of a stranger.

• "The unlawful aggression must be a continuing circumstance or must have been existing at the time the defense is made. Once unlawful aggression is found to have ceased, the one making the defense of a stranger would likewise cease to have any justification for killing, or even just wounding, the former aggressor." — This passage articulates the continuing-character requirement of unlawful aggression in defense of a stranger, the pivotal basis for rejecting Dijan's exculpatory claim.

• "These elements must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself and cannot be deduced from conjecture." — This formulation states the standard of proof required for treachery, explaining why the qualifying circumstance was struck down and the conviction reduced from murder to homicide.

• People vs. Emberga, 319 SCRA 304 — Cited for the three elements required to establish the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger.
• People vs. Bitoon, Sr., 309 SCRA 209 — Cited for the rule that unlawful aggression must be a continuing circumstance and that once it ceases, the justification for killing or wounding the former aggressor likewise ceases; also cited for the proposition that the number and nature of wounds are significant indicia in determining the plausibility of a defense plea.
• People vs. Vermudez, 302 SCRA 276 — Cited for the definition of treachery as a sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim.
• People vs. Academia, Jr., 307 SCRA 229 — Cited for the two conditions that must concur for treachery to be appreciated.
• People vs. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68 — Cited for the rule that the elements of treachery must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself and cannot be deduced from conjecture; also cited for the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law in imposing the penalty for homicide.
• Almeda vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 643 — Cited for the proposition that a party invoking defense of a stranger bears the burden of proving the exculpatory cause by clear and convincing evidence.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of homicide with reclusion temporal. Applied as the proper basis for conviction after treachery was not proven, the penalty being imposed in its medium period absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the indeterminate penalty for homicide: a minimum within the range of prision mayor (six years and one day to twelve years) and a maximum within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period (fourteen years, eight months and one day to seventeen years and four months).

Kapunan, J., and Martinez, J., concurred. Davide, Jr., C.J., and Ynares-Santiago, J., were on official leave.