People vs. Desoy and Cuaton

Conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt by showing unity of purpose and concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim; mere presence, separate chasing, or possession of a weapon without infliction of injury or material aid is insufficient. Applied to eyewitness testimony that Elmer Desoy forcibly took the bolo and hacked the victim alone on sudden impulse, no collective criminal liability for murder attached to the two appellants.

Antonio Desoy, Carlito Cuaton @ Yoyok, and Elmer Desoy were charged with the April 30, 1994 killing in Labason, Zamboanga del Norte of Sagrado Salvador Balucan. According to prosecution eyewitness Hernando Balasabas, a 34-year-old laborer from Gil Sanchez who had known Balucan since childhood, he and Balucan were strolling at about 11 o'clock in the evening and sat on the slide at the well-lighted town plaza when they noticed Carlito Cuaton, Antonio Desoy and Elmer Desoy drinking kulafu and tuba on a nearby swing. The three invited Balasabas and Balucan to drink, but the two refused because they did not drink kulafu and tuba, then started to walk home.

Thereafter, the three men chased them. Balasabas testified that he was chased by Elmer Desoy and Carlito Cuaton, armed respectively with an empty bottle and a piece of wood, while Balucan was chased by Antonio Desoy, armed with a bolo. When the parties converged, Elmer Desoy got the bolo from Antonio Desoy and hacked Balucan once on the head, causing him to fall, after which the three assailants ran away. Balasabas ran to inform the victim's relatives and later learned Balucan had died. Dr. Rosalyn Adan Go confirmed the head wound, inflictable by a bolo or sharp-bladed instrument, as the cause of death.

SPO3 Ferdinand Curambao, on duty at Post No. 4 at the public market that evening, testified that upon ICOM radio report of a stabbing near Labason Central School, he proceeded with PO3 Sergio Villaester to find Balucan's body on the road, ordered Villaester to bring the victim to the hospital, and upon inquiry learned the perpetrators ran toward the municipal building. There he found Elmer, Antonio and Carlito, and both Antonio and Carlito told him Elmer hacked the victim. On cross-examination, Curambao added that the bolo was recovered from a ricefield where Elmer said he had thrown it.

For their part, Antonio Desoy and Carlito Cuaton interposed alibi. Antonio, 18, testified that he had come to Labason in April 1994 to visit his detained elder brother Elmer, that on April 30 at about 8 o'clock in the evening he was with Carlito at the Labason Gymnasium to watch basketball and saw Elmer at the plaza, then went to sleep at the Labason Fire Station until awakened at about 11 o'clock by a policeman as a suspect, denying participation but later stating on cross-examination that Elmer confided he killed Balucan. Carlito, 32, married fisherman and Labason resident, testified that he and Antonio went to the gymnasium at around 11 o'clock in the evening, left at about 1 o'clock in the morning for the police station where he was placed in the detention cell until 6 o'clock the next morning, denied participation, and claimed he learned from police that Elmer was identified by the victim's companion as the killer.

The trial court rejected denial and alibi as against Balasabas's positive identification, noting that alibi requires proof of physical impossibility and that the distance between the killing scene and the alibi location was barely forty fathoms. While ruling out treachery and evident premeditation, it characterized the killing as murder qualified by taking advantage of superior strength, with nighttime and aid of armed men, and found conspiracy from concerted overt acts despite absence of prior agreement.

• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between accused-appellants Antonio Desoy and Carlito Cuaton and Elmer Desoy in the killing of Sagrado Salvador Balucan was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Criminal Liability for Murder: Whether accused-appellants are liable as principals by conspiracy for murder qualified by abuse of superior strength with aggravating nighttime and aid of armed men, warranting the death penalty.

• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the eyewitness testimony showing no unity of purpose or concerted effort to kill but only separate chasing with the fatal hacking done solely by Elmer Desoy.
• Criminal Liability for Murder: No. Absent conspiracy and personal infliction of injury or material aid, liability remains individual, so the murder conviction and death sentences could not stand and acquittal on reasonable doubt was required.

• Conspiracy: The rule applied requires that at the time of commission, the malefactors' actions impliedly show unity of purpose and concerted effort to bring about the victim's death, clearly and convincingly proven. Balasabas testified on direct, clarificatory and cross-examination that Antonio merely chased Balucan with a bolo, Carlito first pursued Balasabas then followed in chasing Balucan unarmed, and Elmer forcibly took the bolo from Antonio's hand — Antonio did not deliver it — and hacked Balucan once on the head while the other two were merely nearby. No injury was inflicted by appellants at any point, nor was material aid given or offered. The killing was even found by the trial court to be probably from sudden impulse over the refused drink invitation rather than conscious design, leaving appellants no anticipation of Elmer's intent. Their acts were thus more consistent with frightening the victims than killing, negating concerted design.
• Criminal Liability for Murder: Guilt as conspirators not having been established beyond peradventure of doubt, collective liability for murder qualified by superior strength could not attach. Mere presence at the scene is insufficient, and without previous conspiracy, unity of criminal purpose immediately before commission, or community of criminal design, responsibility for different acts against the same person is individual only for the act committed by each. Since neither appellant inflicted harm contributing to death, moral certainty of guilt for murder warranting death was lacking, requiring resolution of doubt in their favor and acquittal despite their actions not being beyond reproach.

• Conspiracy as unity of purpose — Conspiracy exists where, at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed unity of purpose among them and concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim. Applied here, separate acts of chasing without joint infliction of the fatal wound or handing of the weapon did not satisfy that standard.
• Proof of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt — Conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and must be clearly and convincingly proven, requiring showing of guilty participation in the criminal design entertained by the slayer presupposing knowledge of such design. Applied here, the prosecution's reliance on concerted chasing failed because Elmer's sudden-impulse hacking was unanticipated and unassisted.
• Mere presence insufficient for conspiracy — Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish conspiracy. Applied here, appellants being nearby when Elmer hacked the victim did not make them conspirators.
• Individual liability absent conspiracy — In the absence of previous conspiracy, unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before commission, or community of criminal design, criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, each participant being liable only for the act committed by him. Applied here, appellants who inflicted no injury bore no liability for Elmer's homicidal act.
• Moral certainty and resolution of doubt — Conviction must rest on nothing less than moral certainty of guilt, especially where death is imposable, and in case of doubt as to guilt the case must be resolved in favor of the accused. Applied here, doubt on conspiracy precluded imposition of the supreme penalty and required acquittal.
• Appellate review of trial court findings — Factual findings of trial courts are entitled to great weight, except where the trial court failed to appreciate facts and circumstances that would have altered its conclusion, which the appellate court must correct. Applied here, the trial court's inference of concerted action was corrected as inaccurate upon perusal of the eyewitness testimony.

• "Conviction, it is said, must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt." — States the threshold for conviction, emphasized as especially demanding where the death penalty is imposable.
• "There is conspiracy where, at the time the malefactors were committing the crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the death of the victim." — Defines the operative test for implied conspiracy used to reject the trial court's finding of concerted action.
• "Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish conspiracy." — States the limitation preventing liability based solely on appellants being nearby during the hacking.
• "In the absence of previous conspiracy, unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime, or community of criminal design, the criminal responsibility arising from different acts directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective, and each of the participants is liable only for the act committed by him." — States the rule of individual liability applied to acquit appellants who personally inflicted no injury.

• People vs. Quindipan, 323 Phil. 497 (1996) — Cited for the principle that conviction must rest on moral certainty of guilt.
• People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 314 (1995) — Cited for the rule giving great weight to trial court factual findings and conclusions.
• Sison vs. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995) — Cited as authority for the definition of conspiracy as unity of purpose and concerted effort at the time of commission.
• People vs. Dulatre, Jr., 248 SCRA 107 (1995) — Cited for the rule that conspiracy, like the crime itself, must be proven beyond reasonable doubt and clearly and convincingly.
• People vs. Taaca, 178 SCRA 56 (1989) — Cited for the rule that mere presence at the scene does not by itself establish conspiracy.
• U.S. vs. Magcomot, 13 Phil. 386 (1909); U.S. vs. Abiog, 37 Phil. 137 (1917) — Cited for the rule that absent conspiracy or community of design, liability for different acts against the same person is individual, not collective.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes Murder, under which appellants were charged and sentenced to death by the trial court upon finding the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength with aggravating nighttime and aid of armed men; acquittal removed liability under this provision for lack of conspiracy.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. No separate concurring reasoning was set forth in the text.