People vs. Delfin

A variance between the date of commission alleged in an information and that established at trial is not fatal to the prosecution where the date is not a material element of the offense, provided the discrepancy is not so substantial as to induce the perception that the information and evidence pertain to different offenses, in which case the erroneous allegation is deemed supplanted by the evidence or may be formally amended.

On the night of September 27, 2000, Emilio Enriquez, a 51-year-old fisherman from Navotas City, was gunned down at a store located across his residence on R. Domingo Street, Tangos, Navotas City. Joan Cruz, the victim's live-in partner, witnessed the shooting from outside the victim's house. The appellant, Rael Delfin, was subsequently charged with murder based on a sworn statement executed by Cruz and a resolution from the Office of the City Prosecutor, both indicating the incident occurred on September 27, 2000. However, the information filed before the Regional Trial Court alleged the offense was committed "on or about the 27th day of November 2000."

• The Shooting: At approximately 10:45 p.m. on September 27, 2000, Joan Cruz was standing outside the house of her live-in partner, Emilio Enriquez, on R. Domingo Street, Tangos, Navotas City. From this vantage point, she observed Enriquez conversing on the telephone at a store directly across the street. The appellant, Rael Delfin, was seated on a bench to the left of Enriquez. Cruz then entered the house, but immediately heard a gunshot and rushed outside. She observed Enriquez sprawled on the ground, shot in the head, while the appellant stood holding a gun and fired a second shot at the victim's chest. Cruz testified that she was unaware of any prior misunderstanding between the appellant and the victim, and had observed no altercation or conversation between them prior to the shooting.

• Medical Evidence: Dr. Jose Arnel Marquez, a Philippine National Police physician, conducted a post-mortem examination and issued Medico-Legal Report No. M-608-00. The report established that Enriquez sustained two fatal gunshot wounds—one penetrating the left side of his head and another penetrating his chest—which caused his immediate death.

• Prosecution's Documentary Evidence: The Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon-Navotas and the Sworn Statement of Joan Cruz, both attached to the information, consistently referred to the date of the incident as September 27, 2000.

• Defense of Alibi: The appellant testified that he was fishing in the seas of Bataan from 3:00 p.m. on September 27, 2000, until 4:00 a.m. the following day, accompanied by three individuals including Rene Villanueva. However, during trial, Villanueva recanted his initial corroboration and admitted that the fishing trip actually commenced at 3:00 p.m. on September 26, 2000, and that they returned to Navotas at 4:00 p.m. on September 27, 2000—placing the appellant in Navotas City at the time of the shooting.

• The Information: The formal charge alleged that the murder was committed "on or about the 27th day of November 2000," notwithstanding that all prosecution attachments indicated September 27, 2000.

• Validity of the Information: Appellant argued that the discrepancy between the date alleged in the information (November 27, 2000) and the date established during trial (September 27, 2000) violated his constitutional right to be properly informed of the charge against him, thereby impairing his ability to prepare an intelligent defense.

• Credibility of Alibi: Appellant maintained that his alibi—that he was fishing in Bataan at the time of the crime—was credible and should prevail over the prosecution's evidence.

• Treachery: Appellant questioned the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, contending that the evidence did not support its presence.

• Variance in Date: Respondent countered that the variance was merely clerical and not fatal, as the date of commission is not a material element of murder. The prosecution argued that the error was limited to the month and was deemed supplanted by the evidence and supporting documents consistently referring to September 27, 2000.

• Alibi and Identification: Respondent argued that the positive and credible identification of the appellant by eyewitness Joan Cruz sufficiently established guilt beyond reasonable doubt, rendering the defense of alibi unavailing where the appellant failed to prove physical impossibility of being at the crime scene.

• Treachery: Respondent maintained that treachery was properly appreciated, as the attack was sudden, unprovoked, and executed while the victim was unarmed and in a defenseless position, affording him no opportunity to evade or retaliate.

• Variance in Information: Whether the variance between the date of commission alleged in the information (November 27, 2000) and that proven at trial (September 27, 2000) invalidates the information and violates the appellant's right to be informed of the charge.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution's evidence, particularly the testimony of a single eyewitness, is sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder notwithstanding the appellant's defense of alibi.

• Qualifying Circumstance: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated to elevate the killing to murder.

• Variance in Information: The variance does not invalidate the information. Because the precise date of commission is not a material element of murder, the Rules of Court require only an approximate date. The discrepancy here—limited to the month while the day and year remained consistent—constituted a mere clerical error deemed supplanted by the prosecution's evidence and supporting documents that consistently identified September 27, 2000. Unlike in People v. Opemia, where a five-year variance suggested a different offense, the two-month discrepancy here did not mislead the appellant or prejudice his defense, as evidenced by his ability to formulate a specific alibi for September 27, 2000.

• Sufficiency of Evidence and Alibi: The conviction was affirmed. The positive, clear, and candid identification of the appellant by eyewitness Joan Cruz, who had no ill motive against him, prevails over the defense of alibi and denial. For alibi to prosper, the accused must demonstrate not merely presence elsewhere, but physical impossibility of being at the locus criminis at the time of the offense. The appellant failed to meet this burden when his own witness, Rene Villanueva, admitted they had returned to Navotas by 4:00 p.m. on September 27, 2000, making it physically possible for the appellant to be at the crime scene at 10:45 p.m.

• Qualifying Circumstance: Treachery was properly appreciated. The attack was sudden, unprovoked, and unexpected, perpetrated while the victim was unarmed and engaged in a telephone conversation, thereby depriving him of any opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.

• Variance in Date of Commission (General Rule and Exception): In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, such as murder, the information need not allege the precise date with absolute specificity; an approximation suffices pursuant to Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. A variance between the date alleged and that proven is generally not fatal and is deemed supplanted by the evidence or may be corrected by formal amendment. However, the variance becomes fatal when the discrepancy is so substantial that it induces the perception that the information and the evidence no longer pertain to the same offense, thereby violating the accused's right to be informed of the specific charge and impairing the preparation of a defense.

• Alibi: The defense of alibi requires proof that the accused was at a different place at the time of the commission of the offense and that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the locus criminis. Alibi is inherently weak and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by a credible witness.

• Treachery: Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by the aggressor without any warning, depriving the victim of the opportunity to defend himself or repel the aggression.

• "In crimes where the date of commission is not a material element, like murder, it is not necessary to allege such date with absolute specificity or certainty in the information. The Rules of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of commission be approximated."

• "Variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces the perception that the information and the evidence are no longer pertaining to one and the same offense."

• "The testimony of a single eye-witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction even in a charge of murder."

• "For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be proven that the accused was at some other place at the time the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time the offense was committed."

• People v. Opemia, 98 Phil. 698 (1956) — Distinguished; held that a variance of nearly five years in the date of theft was fatal because it suggested a different offense and violated the accused's right to be informed of the charge.

• Rocaberte v. People, G.R. No. 72994, 23 January 1991, 193 SCRA 152 — Cited for the general rule that variance in date is not fatal where date is not a material element.

• U.S. v. Cardona, 1 Phil. 381 (1902) — Cited for the principle that an erroneous allegation in the information is deemed supplanted by the evidence presented during trial.

• People v. Quigod, G.R. No. 186419, 23 April 2010, 619 SCRA 407 — Cited regarding the deference accorded to trial court findings on credibility of witnesses.

• People v. Zeta, 573 Phil. 125 (2008) — Cited for the rule that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if positive and credible, suffices for conviction.

• People v. Bucayo, 577 Phil. 355 (2008) — Cited regarding the requisites for the defense of alibi.

• Article 248(1), Revised Penal Code — Defines murder and qualifies it when committed with treachery.

• Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court — States the sufficiency of a complaint or information, requiring the approximate date of commission.

• Section 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Provides that it is not necessary to state the precise date of commission unless it is a material ingredient of the offense.

• Section 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Governs amendment or substitution of an information after plea.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe