People vs. Dela Cruz

A judgment of conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to no other logical conclusion than the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Court further held that conspiracy may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and that the illegal seizure of evidence from one co-accused does not necessarily vitiate the conviction of another where independent circumstantial evidence establishes guilt.

Emma dela Cruz was employed as a housemaid by private complainant Ma. Lourdes Velasco, a single parent who lived with her five-year-old daughter Lorgiza Cristal Velasco and her parents Ruben and Norma Lozano at No. 25-C, 11th Jamboree Street, Quezon City. Dela Cruz was hired in September 1994 upon the recommendation of Velasco's officemate, and her sister Riza was employed a month later. The case arose from the robbery and double homicide committed on December 27, 1994, at the Lozano residence, for which dela Cruz and three others were charged under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. 7659.

Emma dela Cruz was hired as a housemaid by Ma. Lourdes Velasco in September 1994, upon the recommendation of her officemate Rodolfo Guerrero, and lived with Velasco, her five-year-old daughter Lorgiza Cristal, and Velasco's parents Ruben and Norma Lozano at No. 25-C, 11th Jamboree Street, Quezon City. A month later, dela Cruz's sister Riza was also employed. On December 23, 1994, the dela Cruz sisters asked for a Christmas vacation in Cavite and returned on Christmas day. Riza then left for the Visayas with her mother. On the afternoon of December 26, 1994, dela Cruz sought permission from Norma Lozano to visit her mother in Marikina, returning the following morning at around 6:00.

At 9:00 in the morning of December 27, 1994, Velasco, preparing to leave for work at the Bureau of Internal Revenue, took a telephone call for dela Cruz, who was in the comfort room. The man identified himself as Roger and left a message that Riza and their mother were going to the Visayas. Velasco relayed the message to her mother, left ₱13,000.00 for a dining set to be delivered that day, and departed. On her way out, she saw Julio Arguiluz in his car at the driveway; he was employed as project representative/driver of the White Beam Home Corp. At noontime, Velasco tried to call her mother but could not reach her, hearing only a recorded message that the telephone was under repair. Around 2:00, two SM delivery boys came and knocked repeatedly at the door; when no one answered, the apartment owner remarked "wala atang tao diyan," but the delivery boys replied "meron po yata dahil nakabukas ang TV," and left. Thirty minutes later, Arguiluz, still in his car, noticed three men come out of No. 25-C one after another at intervals of about two minutes — the first fixing his clothes, the second carrying a bag, and the third walking casually while glancing around.

When Velasco arrived past 3:00 in the afternoon, she noticed the front wooden door, screen door, and windows closed, with the television playing very loud. She passed through the side door leading to the maid's room, which was open, with dela Cruz's personal belongings gone and the mattress folded. She found the telephone cord cut, slippers of her mother and daughter scattered in front of the comfort room, and the comfort room door obstructed. Upstairs, the rooms were in disarray and cabinets ransacked. She discovered the lifeless and bloodied bodies of her mother and daughter in the comfort room. An on-the-spot investigation was conducted, and the Station Investigation and Intelligence Division (SIID) of Police Station 10 dispatched investigators. Dr. Florante Baltazar conducted the autopsies: Lorgiza Cristal Velasco sustained ten external injuries, eight stab wounds, five fatal, piercing the upper lobe of the left lung; Norma Lozano sustained twenty-six external injuries, twenty-three stab wounds, eighteen fatal, piercing the lungs, heart, and liver. The wounds were caused by an 11-inch icepick recovered on January 6, 1995, behind the washing machine.

Appellant's version differed. She testified that she worked as a housemaid from October 5, 1994, to December 25, 1994, and that on December 24, 1994, her mother arrived to fetch her home to the province. Three days later, she went to a bus terminal at Pasay where her mother was waiting, and she was in Matoguinao, Samar for about one month. A reporter named Boy Lawin visited her, asking if she could be a witness in a murder case involving her employer, promising to take care of her if she pointed to the men who killed the complainant's mother. When they reached the Quezon City Police Headquarters, the police incarcerated her in the presence of her former employer, who asked her to point to the person who killed her daughter and mother. She claimed she was not assisted by counsel, denied knowing co-accused Roger Liad, whom she saw for the first time at the Quezon City Jail, and denied being at the crime scene. She further denied knowing Doroteo Micul, Ronnie Lucuensio, and Odie Guerrer.

The trial court found that the prosecution's circumstantial evidence constituted an unbroken chain pointing to the culpability of Liad and dela Cruz. It found conspiracy established, noting that the culpability of Liad was shown by the recovery of the victims' jewelry in his possession and his presence at the crime scene through the testimony of Samuel dela Cruz, who saw both accused with two other male persons leaving the crime scene together. The court reasoned that dela Cruz knew Liad and conspired with his group because the group did not employ force upon things to effect entrance, the side door leading to dela Cruz's room was open, and dela Cruz fled to Samar. The trial court also noted that dela Cruz, a member of the household, was not harmed by the group, who were all natives of Samar.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not acquitting her on ground of reasonable doubt, citing glaring inconsistencies in the accounts of prosecution witnesses Samuel dela Cruz and Julio Arguiluz.
• Paid Witness: Appellant contended that the court erred in believing the testimony of Samuel dela Cruz, who was allegedly a perjured, paid witness whose testimony was unreliable.
• Supplied Identities: Appellant claimed that the identities of the suspects/accused were supplied to Samuel dela Cruz and that he was coached by the police during the investigation, hence their testimonies should not be accepted as evidence.
• Lack of Conspiracy: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused, asserting there was no independent evidence to support such a finding, and that the stolen items seized from Roger Liad were inadmissible.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Office of the Solicitor General argued that Arguiluz's statements were not dubious simply because he delayed giving his statement, as he explained he learned the responding policemen were not the ones with jurisdiction, and the Court has taken judicial notice of the reticence of some Filipinos to be involved in a case.
• Identities Not Supplied: The Solicitor General explained that the police interviewed several people after the incident, obtained a description of Liad from his cousin Sarah Diaz y Liad, and had already made cartographic sketches before dela Cruz went to the police station on December 29, 1994, so there was no need for him to describe the suspects — only to identify them from the sketches.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Julio Arguilus and Samuel dela Cruz despite alleged inconsistencies, the claim that dela Cruz was a paid witness, and the claim that the identities of the assailants were supplied to him by police.
• Conspiracy: Whether the trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused sufficient to convict Emma dela Cruz of robbery with homicide, given the alleged inadmissibility of the stolen items seized from Roger Liad.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The alleged inconsistencies were minor and did not impinge on the witnesses' credibility; the ₱85.00 given to Samuel dela Cruz could not be interpreted as a witness fee; and the identities of the assailants were not supplied to the witness, as the police had already prepared cartographic sketches from other sources.
• Conspiracy: Yes, conspiracy was proven. Although the warrantless arrest of Roger Liad and the seizure of stolen items from him were illegal, and the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine rendered such evidence inadmissible, sufficient independent circumstantial evidence remained to establish appellant's guilt as a conspirator beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court found the alleged inconsistency between the testimonies of dela Cruz and Arguilus "more imagined than real," noting that dela Cruz was riding on a jeep that passed by the front gate some distance away, while Arguilus was sitting in a car in front of the apartment. Arguilus testified that he saw appellant come out of the house to throw garbage, and the Court noted that after coming out of the apartment, she must have waited at the gate for her three cohorts. The Court also observed the natural hesitancy of witnesses to testify regarding a crime, and found the claim that dela Cruz was paid preposterous, as ₱85.00 "cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be interpreted as 'witness fee.'" The alleged error regarding "Apo Street" was a minor detail, as there was a restaurant near the place called "Apo Duwaling." The Court further found that the police had already obtained descriptions and made cartographic sketches from other sources, so there was no need to ask dela Cruz for physical descriptions.

• Conspiracy: The Court first addressed the arrest of Roger Liad and the seizure of items from him. The arrest, ostensibly referred to as an "invitation," was illegal because Liad was already singled out as a prime suspect and the police failed to obtain a warrant; the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exceptions in the Rules of Court. Consequently, whatever was seized from him could not be used against him or appellant, consonant with the raison d'être of the exclusionary rule. The trial court's use of the "fruit of the poisonous tree" against appellant was thus erroneous. However, the Court held that conspiracy was still proven by other evidence. Citing People vs. Geron, the Court stated that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others. The Court enumerated the following pieces of circumstantial evidence: (a) appellant was employed as a maid by Malou Lozano who left the victims with her on that fateful day; (b) before Malou left, a certain Roger called asking for appellant; (c) Witness Arguilus saw appellant coming out of the apartment, followed a while later by three males, one identified as Roger Liad; (d) Samuel dela Cruz saw appellant leaving with these three males; (e) the apartment's ingress and egress was either by the front door or a path leading to the maid's quarters; (f) the door of the maid's quarters was left open; (g) the maid's quarters was bare, appellant's belongings taken, but her room was not ransacked; (h) the rooms of the victims and Malou were sacked and looted; (i) appellant was the only one of the three left at the apartment who was unharmed; and (g) appellant fled to Samar for no credible reason. From these proven facts, the Court inferred that appellant had conspired with three others in robbing the apartment and killing the two victims. The defenses of denial and alibi were inherently weak and negated by the positive identifications of the prosecution witnesses. The Court also found it highly improbable that Malou Lozano, the mother and daughter of the victims, would falsely accuse an innocent person.

• Circumstantial Evidence — A judgment of conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence if the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rationale except that of guilt. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming appellant's conviction, finding that the enumerated circumstances formed an unbroken chain establishing her guilt.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interests. Direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it is planned in utmost secrecy and can rarely be proved by direct evidence. The degree of actual participation in the commission of the crime is immaterial; once conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that appellant conspired with Liad and two other males in committing the robbery with homicide.

• Fruit of the Poisonous Tree — Evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Court applied this doctrine in ruling that the items seized from Roger Liad pursuant to an illegal warrantless arrest could not be used against him or appellant, but held that this did not vitiate the conviction where independent circumstantial evidence established guilt.

• Denial and Alibi — The defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak and cannot prevail against the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who identified the accused and affirmed their presence at the locus criminis. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting appellant's defenses, which rested solely on her uncorroborated testimony.

• "A judgment of conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that, as in the present case, the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain that leads to no other logical conclusion than the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt." — This opening statement articulates the core ratio decidendi of the case, establishing the standard for when circumstantial evidence suffices for conviction.

• "Doubtless, it is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of the crime for which he is charged. There is in fact consensus that resort to circumstantial evidence is essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases, result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community. However, certain guidelines have been evolved for circumstantial evidence to be acceptable. Like a tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Geron, provides the canonical formulation of the circumstantial evidence doctrine as applied in this case.

• "The arrest of Liad, which the arresting officers ostensibly referred to as an 'invitation,' was illegal; so was the subsequent search and seizure of the stolen items from him. He was already singled out as a prime suspect in the grisly deed, yet the police failed to obtain a warrant for his arrest. His warrantless arrest did not fall under the exceptions provided for in the Rules of Court. Consequently, whatever was seized from him could not be used against him or Appellant Emma dela Cruz." — This passage establishes the Court's ruling on the illegal arrest and the application of the exclusionary rule, while clarifying that this did not defeat the prosecution's case.

• People vs. Geron, 281 SCRA 36, October 17, 1997 — Controlling precedent cited for the doctrine that circumstantial evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding of guilt when the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to no other logical conclusion than the accused's guilt.
• People vs. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689, April 18, 1997 — Cited for the proposition that a judge who did not hear the case may rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial.
• People vs. Andal, 279 SCRA 474, September 25, 1997 — Cited for the observation of the natural hesitancy of witnesses to testify regarding a crime.
• People vs. Banola, 274 SCRA 238, June 19, 1997 — Cited in connection with the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine and the inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence.
• People vs. Salas, G.R. No. 115192, March 17, 2000 — Cited among cases supporting the consideration of flight as evidence of guilt.

• Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. 7659 — The provision defining and penalizing the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, under which appellant was charged and convicted, and which prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision guaranteeing the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which the Court found was violated by the warrantless arrest of Roger Liad and the subsequent seizure of stolen items from him.
• Section 3(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision embodying the exclusionary rule, providing that evidence obtained in violation of the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
• Articles 2217 and 2219(5), Civil Code — The provisions cited by the trial court as the basis for the award of moral damages to the private complainants for the death of their loved ones.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concurred.