People vs. Dela Cruz

Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. The conviction for murder was affirmed where treachery was established by the sudden, unexpected attack on the victim, and where the accused failed to prove any mitigating circumstance.

The accused-appellants were charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code for the death of Felipe Natura. The information alleged that the crime was committed with treachery, evident premeditation, and the aggravating circumstances of superior strength, disregard of age, and nighttime. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 380 in the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cabarroguis, Quirino.

In the evening of July 21, 1982, Antonia Natura and her husband, Felipe Natura, went to the house of Councilman Francisco Ponseja in Barangay Magsaysay, Diffun, Quirino, accompanied by Perla Minia. Councilman Ponseja was not around, so they conversed with his wife. Afterwards, the three left and returned to their house. On their way home, they met the three accused — Jesus dela Cruz, Demerold Ayado, and Abecidueño Ajedo — standing by the road. Antonia recognized them as she was carrying an oil lamp.

Upon meeting them, accused Jesus dela Cruz greeted Felipe Natura, saying "Good evening (Tatang) father," and Felipe answered, "Good evening my son (Barok)." Jesus dela Cruz then said to Felipe, "you, after the election, as if you hate me already," to which Felipe replied, "No my son, you forget that already." At this juncture, accused Demerold Ayado tapped the shoulder of Felipe Natura, while Jesus dela Cruz shouted, "Vulva of your mother," and suddenly boxed Felipe. Demerold Ayado, joined by Abecidueño Ajedo, likewise boxed Felipe. While the three accused were boxing and mauling Felipe, Antonia pleaded for them to stop, but they did not listen. When her pleas remained unheeded, she shouted for help, but nobody came. At that juncture, Demerold Ayado took hold of the front dress of Antonia and shouted at her, saying "Vulva of your mother, we are going to kill you now. You ask help from your sons-in-law." Antonia struggled to free herself and ran back to the house of Ponseja for help. When no one was around, she returned to the place where her husband was being mauled. Demerold Ayado, upon seeing Antonia, ran after her, and she ran away again.

After several minutes, when everything was quiet, Antonia returned to the place where her husband was, but the three accused were no longer there. She embraced her husband and noticed blood on his face and body. She ran to the house of her godson, Elpidio Bañao, who was at home, and informed him that her husband was mauled by the three accused. When they returned to the scene, her husband was no longer there. They found that Felipe had been brought to the house of Councilman Ponseja, where Antonia saw her husband prostrate with blood all over his face and body. Elpidio hired a vehicle and brought Felipe to the Quirino Provincial Hospital. The next morning, Felipe Natura died.

The autopsy report showed that the victim suffered generalized contusion of the head, hematoma around both eyes, conjunctival hemorrhage, lacerated wounds of both lips, missing teeth, stab wounds on the right cheek and left anterior digastric triangle, and a stab wound penetrating the liver and colon. According to Dr. Luis Bergado, the stab wound could have been caused by a knife or sharp-pointed instrument, while the other injuries could have been caused by severe blows from blunt instruments such as a piece of wood, bare fists, or a stone.

Accused-appellants Demerold Ayado and Abecidueño Ajedo, Jr. put up the defense of alibi, claiming they were at Campamento, Diffun, Quirino, about five kilometers away from Magsaysay. They presented Rodolfo Mabanta, who testified that they did not leave the house on the evening of July 21, 1982, because of an existing barangay curfew ordinance, though he admitted this was just his opinion and belief. Abecidueño Ajedo, Sr., father of accused Ajedo, Jr. and incumbent Barangay Captain, testified to the existence of a curfew ordinance and that the accused slept and stayed in his house for three days. The trial court noted that the distance between Campamento and Magsaysay could be negotiated by hiking in just an hour.

Accused-appellant Jesus dela Cruz interposed the justifying circumstance of self-defense. He claimed that on the evening of July 21, 1982, he greeted the victim, who angrily answered, "you are the man whom I have been waiting for a long time." The victim then grabbed his waist, boxed his forehead, and he fell down. He stood up and tried to run away, but the victim, holding a scythe, chased him, hitting him on his left arm. They grappled for the scythe, and in the course of the grappling, the victim was stabbed. He claimed the victim wanted to kill him because he turned down the request to kill his political adversary, Rubenciano Ayado, before the barangay election held on May 17, 1982.

• Denial of New Trial: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion for new trial because they were prejudiced and prevented from fairly presenting their defense due to the serious error of their attorney who failed to exert sufficient efforts to bring the vital witness, Dionisio B. Millo, to testify in court.
• Credibility of Lone Eyewitness: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in convicting them on the strength of the testimony of a lone "woman witness," the wife of the deceased, and that nobody corroborated her testimony or version of the case.
• Lack of Conspiracy: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding that a conspiracy existed among them because the prevailing doctrine requires that conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.
• Insufficiency of Evidence Against Ayado and Ajedo: Accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in including Demerold Ayado and Abecidueño Ajedo in the conviction notwithstanding the insufficiency of evidence adduced against them, as the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The People argued that the testimony of Antonia Natura, the lone eyewitness, was positive, reasonable, and credible, and sufficient to support a conviction, especially since it bore the earmarks of truth and sincerity.
• Establishment of Conspiracy: The People argued that conspiracy was established by the concerted actions of the accused, as summarized in the Appellee's Brief, including the nighttime attack, the friendly ploy by dela Cruz, the simultaneous mauling and stabbing, and the accused leaving together.

• Denial of New Trial: Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial based on the alleged excusable negligence of counsel in failing to present witness Dionisio B. Millo.
• Credibility of Lone Eyewitness: Whether the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellants based on the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Antonia Natura, the wife of the victim.
• Conspiracy: Whether the trial court erred in finding that a conspiracy existed among the accused-appellants in the commission of murder.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Ayado and Ajedo: Whether the trial court erred in convicting Demerold Ayado and Abecidueño Ajedo, Jr. notwithstanding the alleged insufficiency of evidence against them.

• Denial of New Trial: No. The trial court correctly denied the petition for new trial because the requisites for new trial based on newly discovered evidence were not present, and the appeal had already been perfected, depriving the trial court of jurisdiction.
• Credibility of Lone Eyewitness: No. The testimony of a lone eyewitness, if positive, reasonable, and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction, and the relation of the witness to the victim does not disqualify her.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established by the acts of the accused themselves, which pointed to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Ayado and Ajedo: No. The defense of alibi was properly rejected because the accused were positively identified and it was not physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime.

• Denial of New Trial: Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, a new trial may be granted based on errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant, or on newly discovered evidence. The requisites for the second ground are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. None of these requisites was present. The accused-appellants knew all along that Millo had executed a sworn statement attached to the records, and they expressly waived the presentation of Millo and any other witness when they rested their case. Moreover, the accused-appellants themselves admitted that the testimony of Millo would only be corroborative of the testimony of Jesus dela Cruz, which is fatal because it amounts to an admission that the third requisite is absent. Additionally, the appeal was perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal on June 4, 1984, and the trial court lost its power to modify or set aside the decision or order a new trial. The only valid withdrawal of an appeal would be one where an accused decides to serve the sentence.

• Credibility of Lone Eyewitness: Antonia Natura's relation to the victim does not necessarily disqualify her on the grounds of bias and undue interest. There is nothing in the laws to disqualify a person from testifying in a criminal case in which the said person's relative was involved, if the former was really at the scene of the crime and was a witness to the execution of the criminal act. The testimony of a lone eyewitness, if positive, reasonable, and credible, is sufficient to support a conviction, especially if the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously, naturally, and in a straightforward manner. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate. The fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear the case in its entirety is not a compelling reason to jettison his findings, considering that the full record was available to him. The trial court meticulously examined each and every testimony of all the witnesses, as apparent from its sixty-seven page decision.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be inferred and proven from the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. The established facts show that the crime was committed at night, the accused were together when they accosted the victim, dela Cruz pretended to be friendly before attacking, Ayado tapped the victim's shoulder, the three accused acted in concert in mauling and stabbing the victim, Ayado threatened and chased the wife, and the three accused left together. The convergence of wills of the accused-appellants in carrying out a common unlawful purpose amply justified the imputation to all of them of the act of any one of them.

• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Ayado and Ajedo: Alibi is an inherently weak defense, especially when the accused is positively identified. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused-appellants are able to show that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed; they must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime. In this case, Ajedo and Ayado were positively identified by a witness, and the place where they supposedly were is only five kilometers away from the scene of the crime, a distance which they could easily negotiate in one hour by hiking. It was not, therefore, impossible for the two to be at the scene of the crime.

• Self-Defense: The plea of self-defense of accused-appellant Jesus dela Cruz was rejected. Where the accused admits to the killing of the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. The burden of proof is shifted to him, and he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. For the plea of self-defense to prosper, the following circumstances must concur: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. In this case, the unlawful aggression came not from the victim but from the accused-appellants. The version of dela Cruz is incredible because the autopsy report shows that the victim suffered multiple injuries, not just one stab wound. The alleged wound of dela Cruz on his left thumb was insignificant and almost unnoticeable, and there was no medical certificate to prove it.

• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances: The evidence for the prosecution was insufficient to establish the elements of evident premeditation. Treachery, however, was duly established. Treachery is present when a crime against a person is committed employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The two conditions are: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) that said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. The friendly gesture of dela Cruz was a clever ploy to gain the trust of the victim, remove from his mind any suspicion, and place him in utter helplessness. The aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nighttime were deemed absorbed in treachery. The aggravating circumstance of disregard of age was not taken into account because there was no sufficient evidence to prove that the accused deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. No generic aggravating circumstances were appreciated, and no mitigating circumstances were proven. The crime of murder is punished by reclusion temporal maximum to death. Following the doctrine in People vs. Muñoz, the medium of the penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed. The indemnity was increased to ₱50,000.00 per recent rulings.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be inferred and proven from the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. It may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated. In this case, the convergence of wills of the accused-appellants in carrying out a common unlawful purpose amply justified the imputation to all of them of the act of any one of them.

• Treachery — Treachery is present when a crime against a person is committed employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The two conditions are: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) that said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. In this case, the friendly gesture of dela Cruz was a clever ploy to gain the trust of the victim and place him in utter helplessness.

• Alibi — Alibi is an inherently weak defense, especially when the accused is positively identified. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused-appellants are able to show that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed; they must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime. In this case, the distance of five kilometers, negotiable in one hour by hiking, did not make it physically impossible for the accused to be at the scene.

• Self-Defense — Where the accused admits to the killing of the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. The burden of proof is shifted to him, and he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. The requisites are: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

• New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence — The requisites for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are: (a) the evidence was discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and is of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. Evidence that is merely corroborative can be dispensed with.

• Perfection of Appeal — In criminal cases, an appeal is deemed perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court loses its power to modify or set aside the decision, or order a new trial. A notice of appeal, once filed, cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration or a petition for new trial. The only valid withdrawal of an appeal would be one where an accused decides to serve the sentence.

• "Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be inferred and proven from the acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on conspiracy, which the Court applied to the facts of the case to affirm the conviction of all three accused.

• "The friendly gesture was a clever ploy to gain the trust of the victim, remove from his mind any suspicion as to the motive of the accused-appellants or make him feel secure in the thought that nothing untoward would happen to him, and place him in utter helplessness and complete inability to prepare for any defense or offer any resistance, thus insuring themselves against the possible risk of harm arising from any defense which the victim may put up." — This passage explains the Court's reasoning for finding treachery, emphasizing the deliberate and conscious adoption of a means of execution that gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself.

• "It is a well-entrenched doctrine that alibi is an inherently weak defense especially when the accused is positively identified." — This passage articulates the general rule on alibi, which the Court applied to reject the defense of the accused-appellants.

• "For the plea of self-defense to prosper, it is necessary that the following circumstances must concur: (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself." — This passage enumerates the requisites for self-defense, which the Court found were not present in this case.

• People vs. Abaya, 185 SCRA 419 [1990] — Cited for the principle that a judge who did not preside over the trial in its entirety may still render a valid decision if the full record was available to him and he thoroughly examined the evidence.

• People vs. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107 [1989] — Cited as controlling authority for the imposition of the medium penalty of reclusion perpetua when there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

• People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 [1968] — Cited for the principle that the convergence of wills of the accused in carrying out a common unlawful purpose justifies the imputation to all of them of the act of any one of them.

• People vs. Lunar, 45 SCRA 119 [1972] — Cited for the doctrine that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused when said acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.

• People vs. Develos, 16 SCRA 46 [1966] — Cited for the principle that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is deemed absorbed in treachery.

• People vs. Pinca, 4 SCRA 574 [1962] — Cited for the principle that the aggravating circumstance of nighttime is deemed absorbed in treachery.

• People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 [1990] — Cited as authority for increasing the indemnity to ₱50,000.00.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing the crime of murder, which was the charge against the accused-appellants. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — The provision on justifying circumstances, specifically self-defense, which the Court applied in rejecting the plea of self-defense of accused-appellant Jesus dela Cruz.

• Article 14, Section 16, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining treachery, which the Court applied in finding that treachery qualified the killing to murder.

• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — The provision on the application of penalties, which the Court applied in imposing the medium penalty of reclusion perpetua in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

• Section 2, Rule 121, Rules of Court — The provision on the grounds for a new trial, which the Court applied in denying the petition for new trial filed by the accused-appellants.

• Section 7, Rule 120, Rules of Court — Cited in relation to the perfection of appeal and the loss of jurisdiction of the trial court.

• Section 12, Rule 122, Rules of Court — The provision on the withdrawal of appeal, which the Court applied in holding that the only valid withdrawal of an appeal is one where an accused decides to serve the sentence.

• Section 2, Rule 125, in relation to Section 14, Rule 124, Rules of Court — Cited for the proposition that an accused may file a petition for new trial with the appellate court in an appropriate case.

Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, and Romero, JJ., concurred. Feliciano, J., was on leave.