People vs. Del Rosario

The two-month prescriptive period for light offenses under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code is computed as 60 days, with the first day (the day of commission) excluded and the last day included, pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code, which also defines "month" as a 30-day period.

Paz M. del Rosario was charged with slight physical injuries, a light offense under the Revised Penal Code, punishable by arresto menor. The prescriptive period for light offenses is two months under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, while Article 91 provides that the period runs from the day the crime is discovered. The Revised Penal Code itself does not define how the prescriptive period is to be computed nor specify the length of a "month." The Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 386), which took effect before the offense was committed, contains Article 13 governing computation of periods and the definition of a month, creating the legal question of whether those civil provisions supply the deficiency in the penal statute.

On May 28, 1953, Paz M. del Rosario allegedly committed slight physical injuries, a light offense under the Revised Penal Code. Two months later, on July 27, 1953, an information was filed in the Municipal Court of Pasay City charging her with the offense. Upon receiving the information, del Rosario filed a motion to quash on the ground that the offense had already prescribed under Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which provide that light offenses prescribe in two months and that the prescriptive period commences from the day the crime is discovered.

The municipal court sustained the motion and dismissed the case. It applied Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines to determine that a "month" under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code means 30 days, yielding a 60-day prescriptive period. However, the court counted May 28 — the day of commission — as the first day of the period. Under that reckoning, July 27, the date of filing, fell on the 61st day, one day beyond the prescriptive period, and the case was accordingly dismissed. The Solicitor General appealed directly to the Supreme Court, raising only questions of law regarding the proper computation of the prescriptive period.

• Computation of Prescriptive Period: The Solicitor General argued that just as Article 13 of the Civil Code is applied to determine the length of a "month" (30 days), its paragraph 3 — which directs that in computing a period the first day be excluded and the last included — should likewise be applied, so that the information should be considered filed on the 60th day rather than the 61st day.
• Suppletory Application of the Civil Code: The Solicitor General further argued that Article 18 of the Civil Code expressly directs that any deficiency in a special law such as the Revised Penal Code must be supplied by the Civil Code's provisions, warranting resort to Article 13 for the manner of computation.

• Commencement of Prescriptive Period: Whether the prescriptive period for a criminal offense should commence from the very day the crime was committed, or from the day following, in accordance with the rule of excluding the first day and including the last day under Article 13 of the Civil Code.
• Meaning of "Month": Whether the term "month" in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code should be understood as a 30-day month rather than a civil or calendar month.

• Commencement of Prescriptive Period: The prescriptive period commences from the day following the commission of the offense, the first day being excluded and the last day included, pursuant to Article 13 of the Civil Code.
• Meaning of "Month": The term "month" in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code means a 30-day month, as defined in Article 13 of the Civil Code, not the solar or calendar month.

• Commencement of Prescriptive Period: Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run "from the day" on which the offense is discovered, but the Code does not explicitly define how the period is to be computed. This deficiency is supplied by Article 13 of the Civil Code, particularly paragraph 3, which directs that in computing a period the first day be excluded and the last included. This method of computation has long been established in the jurisdiction, appearing in section 1, Rule 28 of the Rules of Court, section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, and Article 7 of the Spanish Civil Code. The Court in Surbano vs. Gloria previously applied this method to prescription of offenses, counting from February 18 to March 15, 1927 as 25 days by excluding the first day and including the last. It is logical to presume that the Legislature intended the same method for Article 91. The trial court therefore erred in not excluding May 28 from the computation. Counted from May 29, July 27 is the 60th day, and the information was timely filed.

• Meaning of "Month: No provision of the Revised Penal Code defines the length of a month. Article 7 of the old Spanish Civil Code provided that a month contains 30 days, but section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code modified this to mean the civil or calendar month (cited in Gutierrez vs. Carpio). With the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 386), the law reverted to the Spanish Civil Code concept under which a month is a regular 30-day month (Article 13). Because the offense occurred on May 28, 1953, after the new Civil Code took effect, Article 13 applies. The Court found persuasive authority in decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, which before the Spanish Civil Code held that "month" meant the natural or solar month, but after the Civil Code's promulgation — with its Article 7 defining a month as 30 days — held that the two-month prescriptive period for a light offense means 60 days. By analogy, Article 13 of the Philippine Civil Code governs, and "month" in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code means 30 days.

• Suppletory Application of the Civil Code to the Revised Penal Code — Article 18 of the Civil Code (formerly Article 16 of the old Civil Code) expressly directs that any deficiency in a special law such as the Revised Penal Code must be supplied by the Civil Code's provisions. Because the Revised Penal Code does not explicitly define how the prescriptive period is to be computed or what a "month" means, resort must be had to Article 13 of the Civil Code, which contains detailed rules on both matters.
• Exclusion of the First Day in Computing Prescriptive Periods — In computing a period of time within which an act is to be done, the first day is excluded and the last day included. This rule, codified in Article 13, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code, has been consistently applied in the jurisdiction since before the American regime and governs the computation of prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code. Applied here, May 28 (the day of commission) was excluded, and the count began on May 29, making July 27 the 60th and last day of the prescriptive period.
• Definition of "Month" as 30 Days — Under Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, a month is understood to contain 30 days. This provision, intended for general application in the interpretation of laws, governs the meaning of "month" in Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code for offenses committed after the Civil Code took effect.

• "As the Revised Penal Code is deficient in that it does not explicitly define how the period is to be computed, resort must be had to its Article 13, which contains in detail the manner of computing a period." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for applying the Civil Code suppletorily to fill the gap in the Revised Penal Code's prescription provisions.
• "We hold, therefore, that the offense charged in the information prescribed in 60 days, said period to be counted by excluding May 28, the commission of the offense, and we find that when the information was filed on July 27, 1953 the offense had not yet prescribed because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29." — This is the Court's dispositive reasoning demonstrating the practical application of the exclusion-of-first-day rule and the 30-day-month definition.
• "In the computation of a period of time within which an act is to be done, the law in this jurisdiction has always directed the first day be excluded and the last included." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the rule on computation of periods as applied to criminal prescription.

• Surbano vs. Gloria, 51 Phil. 415 — Followed. The Court cited this case as authority for the rule that in computing the prescriptive period of an offense, the first day is excluded and the last included, having counted from February 18 to March 15, 1927 as only 25 days.
• Gutierrez vs. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334 — Distinguished. Cited for the proposition that under section 13 of the Revised Administrative Code, "month" meant the civil or calendar month rather than the 30-day month — a rule subsequently superseded by Article 13 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
• Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, S. de 6 de abril de 1895 (3 Viada, p. 45) — Persuasive authority. After the promulgation of the Spanish Civil Code (Article 7), the Spanish Supreme Court held that the two-month prescriptive period for a light offense means 60 days, a month being a 30-day month. The Philippine Supreme Court found this analogous reasoning persuasive in applying Article 13 of the Philippine Civil Code.

• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Provides that light offenses prescribe in two months. The Court interpreted "month" as 30 days per Article 13 of the Civil Code, yielding a 60-day prescriptive period for light offenses.
• Article 91, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the period of prescription commences to run from the day the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. The Court held that the first day (day of commission/discovery) must be excluded in the computation.
• Article 13, Civil Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. 386) — Defines how periods are computed (first day excluded, last day included) and provides that a month is understood to contain 30 days. The Court applied this provision suppletorily to the Revised Penal Code.
• Article 18, Civil Code of the Philippines — Directs that deficiencies in special laws must be supplied by the Civil Code's provisions. Served as the textual basis for resorting to Article 13 to fill the gaps in the Revised Penal Code's prescription rules.
• Section 17, sub-paragraph 6, Judiciary Act of 1948 — Authorized the direct appeal to the Supreme Court from the municipal court's order of dismissal, as only questions of law were involved.

Pablo (Acting C.J.), Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes (A.L.), Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Reyes (J.B.L.) concurred.