People vs. Del Castillo

Constructive possession of regulated drugs requires proof that the accused exercised dominion and control over the place where the drugs were found, or had the right to exercise such control; mere frequenting of the premises or presence during a search is insufficient. Moreover, a search that prevents the lawful occupants from actually witnessing the search—while substituting barangay tanods for the witnesses mandated by Section 8, Rule 126—is invalid. For custodial admissions to be admissible, the accused must be informed not only of the right to counsel but also of the right not to sign a receipt and that the document may be used as evidence; any waiver of the right to counsel must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.

On July 21, 2000, Judge Isaias Dicdican of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 11, issued a search warrant against Eden del Castillo authorizing the seizure of shabu and drug paraphernalia at a house on M. Borgonia Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. The house was owned by appellant’s grandmother, Elena Garcia, who lived there with a grandson, Brent Lepiten. Appellant resided in San Vicente Village, Wireless, Mandaue City, and had come to visit her grandmother on the morning the warrant was enforced. On July 31, 2000, a police team entered the house, served the warrant, and conducted a search that yielded a total of 311.94 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride. Appellant was arrested, an inventory receipt was prepared, and she was subsequently charged with possession of regulated drugs.

• Nature of the Charge: Appellant was charged with possession of 294.86 grams, 12.33 grams, and 4.75 grams of shabu (methylamphetamine hydrochloride) under Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended.

• The Search Warrant: A search warrant was issued on July 21, 2000 by Judge Dicdican of RTC Branch 11, Cebu City, for the house located on M. Borgonia Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, directing the seizure of shabu and related paraphernalia.

• Implementation of the Warrant: On July 31, 2000, around 10:30 a.m., a police team led by P/Chief Insp. Pablo Gacayan Labra II and including PO3 Leopoldo Bauzon, PO3 Alfredo Petallar, PO2 Brazilio Borinaga, PO2 Ricardo Baclayon, Jr., and PO1 Jeric Cuyos Toring entered the house, accompanied by three barangay tanods—Wilfredo Wasawas, Mansueto Toong, and Leonico Sagosa. The warrant was served on appellant, who was in the living room with her grandmother Elena Garcia and her brother Servando del Castillo. The occupants were told not to move and were instructed to remain seated in the sala while the search proceeded.

• The Search: The team split into two groups. The first group, including Bauzon and Toring with one tanod, searched the upper portion and recovered three large heat-sealed plastic packs of white crystalline substance. The second group, composed of Baclayon and Borinaga, searched the ground floor and recovered eight medium heat-sealed plastic packs, fifty-three heat-sealed plastic packets, two disposable lighters, a pair of scissors, a tooter, a puller, and an improvised hacksaw. Servando del Castillo voluntarily surrendered five small plastic packs. No drugs or suspicious items were found on appellant’s person.

• Arrest and Inventory: Appellant was arrested and informed of her constitutional rights, including the right to counsel; she replied that she had a lawyer. Petallar prepared an inventory of the seized articles using a blank form pre-dated July 24, 2000. Appellant was made to sign the inventory receipt. A copy of the receipt was given to a barangay tanod, not to the lawful occupants. The seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination; they were not delivered to the issuing court. The laboratory examination confirmed the substances were positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

• Defense Evidence: Elena Garcia testified that she was the owner of the house, as shown by Tax Declaration No. 01-30651 in the name of her late husband. Appellant resided with her parents and aunt in Mandaue City and was merely visiting. Elena’s son, Jaime Garcia, had slept in the upper portion the night before. During the raid, two men carrying an envelope went upstairs, woke Jaime, and went down without the envelope; they later returned with a tanod, retrieved the envelope, and spread its contents on the table. Appellant was forced to sign the inventory list under threat of being handcuffed and was not allowed to contact her lawyer; the inventory was not read to her, and no copy was left with any occupant. Appellant claimed the warrant was served but was not read to her.

• Prosecution Evidence on Residence: PO3 Petallar testified that their casing operation showed appellant frequented the house to eat meals and that they only believed she had belongings there. PO2 Borinaga asserted it was “public knowledge” that appellant had lived there since childhood. No documentary or direct evidence established appellant’s ownership or exclusive control over the premises.

• Failure to Prove Ownership/Control: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred by not making a clear finding that she did not own the searched house and that there was no competent evidence linking her to dominion or control over the place where the shabu was found.

• Violation of Witness Requirement: She argued that the raiding team prevented the lawful occupants from witnessing the search, substituting barangay tanods in their stead, contrary to the mandatory hierarchy prescribed by Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

• Defective Receipt and Non-Delivery to Court: Appellant contended that the police failed to issue a detailed receipt of the seized articles to the lawful occupant and did not deliver the seized items to the court that issued the warrant, in violation of Sections 11 and 12, Rule 126.

• Custodial Rights Violation: She asserted that being ordered to sign the inventory receipt after arrest without the assistance of counsel, and without being informed that she could refuse to sign and that the document could be used against her, violated her constitutional rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution.

• Privacy Violation of the House Owner: She further claimed that the raid violated the privacy of her grandmother Elena Garcia, the true owner of the house, since the search warrant was directed against appellant alone and the house did not belong to her.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: Appellant ultimately argued that the trial court should have acquitted her because the prosecution’s evidence failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Concession of the Appeal: The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of appellee’s brief, praying that the conviction be reversed and set aside and that appellant be acquitted. The OSG did not defend the trial court’s judgment and instead adopted the position that the prosecution failed to prove guilt and that the search and seizure suffered from fatal irregularities.

• Proof of Possession: Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant had actual or constructive possession of the seized regulated drugs, including whether she exercised dominion and control over the premises where the drugs were found.

• Compliance with Witness Requirement: Whether the search of the house conformed to Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which requires that a search be made in the presence of the lawful occupant or a member of the family, or, in their absence, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

• Defects in Receipt and Delivery to Court: Whether the raiding team’s failure to give the detailed inventory receipt to the lawful occupant (instead giving it to a tanod) and to deliver the seized items to the issuing court rendered the search and seizure procedurally invalid.

• Admissibility of the Inventory Receipt: Whether the inventory receipt signed by appellant was admissible in evidence given that it was pre-dated and obtained while appellant was under custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of her right to remain silent and to counsel.

• Proof of Possession: The prosecution’s evidence was held insufficient to prove that appellant had possession—actual or constructive—of the seized shabu. The house was established by competent defense evidence to be owned by appellant’s grandmother, and appellant only visited there; her residence was in Mandaue City. The prosecution’s claim that appellant frequented the house or was “publicly known” to live there did not constitute proof of dominion and control. None of the drugs were found on appellant’s person, and it was not shown in whose specific room the upstairs drugs were discovered. Multiple individuals had access to the house, and the fact that appellant’s brother voluntarily surrendered drugs from his own possession further undermined any inference of exclusive possession by appellant. In the absence of a showing that appellant had the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where the contraband was located, the element of possession was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

• Compliance with Witness Requirement: The search was held to be in violation of Section 8, Rule 126. Although the lawful occupants—appellant, her grandmother, and her uncle—were physically present, they were expressly prevented from witnessing the search; they were told to remain seated in the sala while the searching parties roamed the premises accompanied only by barangay tanods. The rule establishes a clear hierarchy: only in the absence of the lawful occupant or a family member may two disinterested witnesses be called. The police had no discretion to substitute their preferred witnesses for those mandated by law. This procedure, which mirrored the condemned practice in People v. Go and People v. Del Rosario, undermined the integrity of the search and cast serious doubt on the provenance of the seized evidence.

• Defects in Receipt and Delivery to Court: The inventory receipt was given to a barangay tanod instead of to the lawful occupant, in direct contravention of Section 11, Rule 126. Moreover, the seized items were not delivered to the judge who issued the warrant but were instead sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory without any showing that the issuing court had approved their retention elsewhere. Following People v. Gesmundo, this failure violated Section 12, Rule 126, and created an unacceptable risk of tampering, defeating the very purpose of the mandatory delivery requirement. Additionally, the inventory receipt was not verified under oath as required.

• Admissibility of the Inventory Receipt: The inventory receipt, dated July 24, 2000—seven days before the actual raid—was found to be highly irregular, the explanation that a blank form was pre-prepared being unacceptable given the discrepancy. More critically, the receipt was signed by appellant while she was already under custodial investigation. Although she was generally informed of her constitutional rights, she was not specifically advised that she had the right to refuse to sign the receipt and that it could be used as evidence against her. She expressed a desire to consult a lawyer, but no counsel was present, and she was made to sign under pressure. Under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution, any waiver of the right to counsel during custodial investigation must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel; no such written waiver was executed. The inventory receipt was therefore obtained in violation of appellant’s constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel and, per People v. Go and People v. Policarpio, was inadmissible. The receipt could not serve as proof of possession or of the regularity of the seizure.

• Constructive Possession in Dangerous Drugs Cases — Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused, or when the accused has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession is not required, but the prosecution must prove animus possidendi (intent to possess) and knowledge of the existence and character of the regulated drug. Knowledge may be inferred from the fact that the drug is found in premises over which the accused exercises control, absent a satisfactory explanation. Mere presence, occasional visits, or “public knowledge” of residence, without competent proof of actual dominion and control, is insufficient to establish constructive possession. (People v. Tira, G.R. No. 139615, May 28, 2004)

• Mandatory Hierarchy of Witnesses Under Section 8, Rule 126 — A search of a house, room, or premises must be conducted in the presence of the lawful occupant or any member of the family. Only in the absence of both may two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality be utilized. Preventing a present lawful occupant or family member from observing the search and substituting barangay tanods as witnesses violates the provision and invalidates the search. The raiding team has no discretion to replace the witnesses prescribed by law. (People v. Go, G.R. No. 144639, September 12, 2003)

• Mandatory Delivery of Seized Property to the Issuing Court — Under Section 12, Rule 126, the officer seizing property under a warrant must forthwith deliver it to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory duly verified under oath. Delivery to a different agency, such as a crime laboratory, without the express approval of the issuing court is impermissible and renders the seizure procedurally infirm. (People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993])

• Custodial Admissions and the Right to Counsel — During custodial investigation, the accused must be informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel. An inventory receipt or any document acknowledging possession of contraband, signed under custodial circumstances without the accused being specifically informed of her right not to sign and that the document may be used against her, is inadmissible. A waiver of the right to counsel during custodial investigation is valid only if made in writing and in the presence of counsel. (Section 12(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution; People v. Go, supra; People v. Gesmundo, supra)

• “Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. … The prosecution must prove that the accused had knowledge of the existence of the presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the drug.” (citing People v. Tira)

• “The Rules of Court clearly and explicitly establishes a hierarchy among the witnesses in whose presence the search of the premises must be conducted. … The police officers were without discretion to substitute their choice of witnesses for those prescribed by the law.” (citing People v. Go)

• “The mere tolerance by the trial court of [the practice of forwarding seized specimens to the NBI or crime laboratory instead of to the court] does not make it right. Clearly, such practice violates the mandatory requirements of the law and defeats the very purpose for which they were enacted. Speculations as to the probability of tampering with the evidence cannot then be avoided.” (citing People v. Gesmundo)

• “The government’s drive against illegal drugs deserves everybody’s support. But it cannot be pursued by ignoble means which are violative of constitutional rights. It is precisely when the government’s purposes are beneficent that we should be most on our guard to protect these rights. As Justice Brandeis warned long ago, ‘the greatest dangers to liberty lurk in the insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning without understanding.’” (citing People v. Del Norte and People v. Laxa)

• People v. Go, G.R. No. 144639, September 12, 2003 — Followed. The decision reiterated the mandatory hierarchy of witnesses under Section 8, Rule 126 and held that preventing the lawful occupant from witnessing the search and substituting barangay tanods invalidated the search. It also ruled that an inventory receipt signed by the accused under custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel and without being informed of the right not to sign was inadmissible.

• People v. Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 (1993) — Followed. Applied for the rule that seized property must be delivered to the issuing court, and that the police’s practice of sending seized drugs directly to the crime laboratory without court approval violates Section 12, Rule 126. Also cited for the principle that a custodial admission embodied in a receipt is inadmissible if obtained without informing the accused of her right not to sign and the document’s potential use as evidence.

• People v. Tira, G.R. No. 139615, May 28, 2004 — Followed. Relied upon for the definition of constructive possession in drug cases and the requirement that the prosecution prove dominion and control of the premises where drugs are found, coupled with knowledge of their existence and character.

• People v. Del Rosario — Followed. Cited as an analogous case where the confinement of the accused while police searched the rest of the house cast serious doubt on the legitimacy of the seizure and failed to exclude the hypothesis of innocence.

• People v. Policarpio — Followed. Affirmed the rule that inducing a suspect to sign a receipt for items allegedly confiscated, without proper custodial safeguards, is an unusual practice violative of the constitutional right to remain silent and renders the resulting admission inadmissible.

• Section 16, Article III, R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 — Defines the crime of possession or use of regulated drugs and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine for quantities of 200 grams or more of shabu. Applied to confirm the elements of the offense charged; however, those elements were not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

• Section 20, Article IV, R.A. No. 6425, as amended — Specifies the threshold quantities that trigger the higher penalty range. Referred to by the trial court in imposing reclusion perpetua, but rendered immaterial by the acquittal.

• Section 8 (formerly Section 7), Rule 126, Rules of Court — Mandates that no search of a house, room, or premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant or any member of the family, or, in their absence, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality. The raiding team’s conduct was found to have violated this provision, contributing to the invalidation of the search.

• Section 11, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Requires the seizing officer to give a detailed receipt for the property seized to the lawful occupant, or, in the occupant’s absence, to leave a receipt in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion. Violated because the receipt was given to a barangay tanod instead of to the lawful occupants who were present.

• Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Requires forthwith delivery of the seized property to the judge who issued the warrant, together with a true inventory duly verified under oath. Violated when the police delivered the shabu directly to the PNP Crime Laboratory without securing the issuing court’s approval.

• Section 12(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the rights of persons under custodial investigation to remain silent, to be informed of this right, to have competent and independent counsel, and provides that any waiver of the right to counsel must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel. The signing of the inventory receipt without counsel and without a valid written waiver was held to contravene this provision, rendering the receipt inadmissible.

• Article 130, Revised Penal Code — Punishes public officers who search domicile without witnesses in violation of law. Mentioned in People v. Go as underscoring the mandatory character of the witness requirement, though not directly applied in this case.

Justices Puno, Callejo, Sr., Tinga, and Chico-Nazario (on leave) concurred.