People vs. Degamo
The conviction for qualified rape and the imposition of the death penalty were affirmed. Appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping the victim with a deadly weapon in her dwelling. The victim's subsequent psychosis, diagnosed after the filing of the original information, was accepted as a qualifying circumstance justifying the death penalty, it having been ruled that "has become insane" includes temporary insanity and that the amendment of the information to allege this supervening event was merely formal. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime was struck down for lack of allegation and proof of deliberate intent, but dwelling was upheld, warranting the maximum penalty along with the qualifying circumstance of insanity. Damages were modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Primary Holding
The qualifying circumstance of insanity by reason or on the occasion of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code encompasses temporary insanity and does not require that the victim's mental condition be permanent. The circumstance attaches once the insanity manifests, even if the victim subsequently recovers through treatment.
Background
Ellen Vertudazo and her family moved to a rented apartment in Barangay Punta, Ormoc City in July 1994. On October 1, 1994, at around 1:00 AM, Roneto Degamo, a neighbor, forced his way into her house after she opened the door thinking it was her brother-in-law. Armed with a knife, Degamo threatened to kill her, ordered her to undress and turn off the lights, and then had carnal knowledge of her against her will. Following the assault, Vertudazo reported the incident to authorities and sought medical and psychiatric help. A psychiatrist diagnosed her with acute and chronic psychosis induced by the trauma of the rape, for which she was undergoing continuous treatment.
History
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Complaint for rape with use of a deadly weapon filed before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 12.
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Accused arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the original complaint.
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Complaint amended before trial to allege that the victim became insane by reason of the rape.
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Accused re-arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the amended information.
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RTC rendered decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape, imposing the death penalty.
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Case elevated to the Supreme Court via automatic review due to the imposition of the death penalty.
Facts
- The Incident: On October 1, 1994, at 1:00 AM, Ellen Vertudazo heard someone calling her name. Believing it was her brother-in-law Venancio, who had left earlier with the appellant, she opened the door. Roneto Degamo forced his way inside, poked a knife at her neck, and threatened to kill her if she did not accede. He ordered her to turn off the light, undress, and remain silent. Overwhelmed by fear, Vertudazo complied. Degamo kissed her, laid her on the floor, and had carnal knowledge of her while holding the knife. He left after warning her not to tell anyone.
- Post-Incident Actions: The next morning, Vertudazo reported the incident to the Barangay Captain and the police. She submitted to a medical examination on October 3, 1994. The medical certificate noted no signs of traumatic injury on the vulva and vestibule and a negative finding for sperm cells, which the examining physician explained was due to the 48-to-72-hour survival limit of human spermatozoa and the victim's lack of physical resistance due to fear. Her husband returned from Saudi Arabia upon learning of the assault.
- Psychiatric Condition: Vertudazo sought psychiatric treatment from Dr. Gemelina Cerro-Go starting November 8, 1994. Dr. Go diagnosed her with acute and chronic psychosis induced by overwhelming trauma secondary to rape. Vertudazo exhibited delusions, hallucinations, and destructive inclinations, and stated her mind was "padlocked." After weeks of medication, she showed improvement but had not fully recovered and could not function normally as a wife and mother. Dr. Go testified that without continuous treatment, Vertudazo would regress and completely lose all aspects of functioning.
- Defense Version: Degamo claimed he and Vertudazo were lovers. He alleged they met in late August 1994, and she consented to his advances. He testified that on the night of October 1, she willingly let him in, undressed upon his request, and suggested they move to the floor to avoid noise. He denied using force or a knife, asserting they had consensual sex on five different occasions.
Arguments of the Petitioners
- Credibility of the Victim: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, pointing out alleged contradictions in the complainant's testimony regarding whether she opened the door for him.
- Insanity as a Qualifying Circumstance: Appellant contended that the complainant had not become insane by reason of the rape because she gave intelligent answers on the witness stand, implying the insanity must be permanent to qualify.
- Use of a Deadly Weapon: Appellant asserted that the qualifying circumstance of using a deadly weapon should not be appreciated since the weapon was never presented as evidence in court.
Arguments of the Respondents
- Credibility of the Victim: The prosecution maintained that the victim's testimony was credible, straightforward, and corroborated by her prompt reporting and psychiatric treatment, which a married woman would not undergo if the act were consensual.
- Insanity as a Qualifying Circumstance: The prosecution argued that the victim's diagnosed psychosis, induced by the rape, falls under the legal definition of insanity, regardless of its temporary nature or subsequent improvement.
- Use of a Deadly Weapon: The prosecution asserted that the non-presentation of the weapon is not essential for conviction; the victim's positive testimony that a knife was used suffices.
Issues
- Amendment of Information: Whether the amendment of the information after arraignment to allege the victim's insanity by reason of the rape is a permissible formal amendment or a prohibited substantial amendment.
- Credibility and Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite alleged contradictions in the victim's testimony, the non-presentation of the weapon, and the medical findings of no physical trauma or sperm.
- Interpretation of Insanity: Whether the qualifying circumstance "has become insane" under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code requires the victim's insanity to be permanent, or whether temporary insanity suffices.
- Aggravating Circumstances and Damages: Whether the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime were properly appreciated, and whether the damages awarded were correct.
Ruling
- Amendment of Information: The amendment was correctly allowed as a formal, not substantial, amendment. The insertion merely raised the penalty that may be imposed, did not charge a different offense, and did not alter the prosecution's theory or prejudice the accused. Furthermore, the victim's insanity was a supervening event that could not have been alleged in the original information, and the accused's failure to object at the time of amendment constituted a waiver.
- Credibility and Evidence: Guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The alleged contradiction regarding the opening of the door was non-existent; the victim opened the door thinking it was her brother-in-law, not the appellant. The non-presentation of the weapon is not essential, as the victim's credible testimony suffices. The absence of physical trauma and sperm was adequately explained by the victim's fear-induced submission and the lapse of time before the medical examination.
- Interpretation of Insanity: The phrase "has become insane" includes temporary insanity. Legislative history reveals that lawmakers deliberately omitted the word "perpetual" from the original proposal. Courts may not interject a condition or impose a limitation that the legislature did not provide. The qualifying circumstance attaches once the insanity manifests, and subsequent recovery does not exculpate the accused.
- Aggravating Circumstances and Damages: Nighttime was improperly appreciated because it was not alleged in the information and there was no proof the accused deliberately sought the cover of darkness. Dwelling was properly appreciated as it was alleged and proven. The death penalty was correctly imposed. However, the damages were modified: civil indemnity increased to P75,000.00; moral damages of P50,000.00 awarded without need of proof; exemplary damages of P25,000.00 awarded due to the aggravating circumstance of dwelling; and temperate damages of P25,000.00 awarded in lieu of unproven actual damages for psychiatric treatment.
Doctrines
- Formal vs. Substantial Amendment of Information — An amendment after plea is permitted only as to matters of form if leave of court is obtained and the amendment is not prejudicial to the accused. A formal amendment relates only to the range of penalty, does not charge a different offense, does not alter the prosecution's theory causing surprise, and does not adversely affect a substantial right. The test is whether a defense under the original information would be equally available after the amendment. Amendment to charge a more serious offense based on a supervening event is permissible even after arraignment.
- Qualifying Circumstance of Insanity in Rape — The qualifying circumstance of insanity by reason or on the occasion of rape does not require that the victim's insanity be permanent. Temporary insanity suffices. The resultant insanity must be manifest at the time of filing the complaint or information or at any time before judgment, allowing for the corresponding amendment. Subsequent recovery does not negate the attaching of the qualifying circumstance.
- Non-presentation of Weapon in Rape — The non-presentation of the weapon used in the commission of rape is not essential to the conviction of the accused. The credible testimony of the victim that the accused was armed with a deadly weapon suffices to establish the qualifying circumstance.
Key Excerpts
- "The test as to whether an amendment is only of form and an accused is not prejudiced by such amendment is whether or not a defense under the information as it originally stood would be equally available after the amendment is made, and whether or not any evidence which the accused might have would be equally applicable to the information in one form as in the other; if the answer is in the affirmative, the amendment is one of form and not of substance."
- "Applied inversely, the courts should not interject a condition, make a distinction, or impose any limitation where the legislators did not opt to do so. Thus, it is without any doubt that when the legislators included the victim's resultant insanity as a qualifying circumstance in rape cases, it did not intend or impose as a condition that the insanity must be of permanent nature..."
- "The absence of traumatic injury on her vulva and vestibule is not a strong proof that appellant did not use force on the victim who submitted to the dastardly act of appellant because of the knife wielded by him."
Precedents Cited
- Teehankee, Jr. vs. Madayag, 207 SCRA 135 (1992) — Followed. Established the guidelines for determining whether an amendment to an information is formal or substantial.
- Melo vs. People, 85 Phil. 766 (1950) — Followed. Held that amendment of an information to charge a more serious offense is permissible where the basis of the more serious charge comes as a subsequent or supervening event.
Provisions
- Article 335, Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 7659) — Defines rape and prescribes the penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane. Applied to impose the death penalty based on the victim's psychosis.
- Section 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Governs amendments of complaints or informations after plea. Applied to validate the trial court's allowance of the amendment to include the victim's insanity.
- Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides rules for the application of indivisible penalties. Applied to impose the greater penalty of death due to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
Notable Concurring Opinions
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ. Three members maintained their position that R.A. No. 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional, but submitted to the ruling of the Court by majority vote that the law is constitutional.