People vs. Declaro

A dismissal made with the express consent of the accused bars a second prosecution for the same offense only when predicated on insufficiency of the evidence or denial of the right to a speedy trial; a dismissal for the prosecution's single failure to appear at the first hearing is not an acquittal.

At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 7, 1980, a traffic accident occurred at Barangay Laguinbanua West, Numancia, Aklan. The incident gave rise to two criminal charges against Edgar Ibabao. On September 5, 1980, a complaint for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed in the Municipal Circuit Court of Malinao, Aklan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1028-N, with Crispin Conanan as offended party. On October 1, 1980, an information for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1421, with Eduardo Salido as offended party.

Upon arraignment in Criminal Case No. 1028-N on October 7, 1981, Ibabao pleaded not guilty. The case was first set for hearing on January 19, 1983. On that date, both the offended party and the prosecuting fiscal failed to appear despite due notice. Counsel for the accused verbally moved for dismissal for lack of interest on the part of the prosecution, and the motion was granted.

Thereafter, the fiscal filed a motion for reconsideration on January 27, 1983, which was granted in an order dated May 27, 1983 resetting the case for trial. Upon motion for reconsideration by the accused, however, the inferior court issued another order dated August 30, 1983 dismissing the case anew. In the meanwhile, invoking the January 19, 1983 dismissal, counsel for the accused moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 1421 on the ground that the prior dismissal barred the latter prosecution.

• Consent to Dismissal: Petitioner argued that double jeopardy had not set in because the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1028-N was at the instance and with the express consent of the accused and his counsel, constituting a waiver of the constitutional right against double jeopardy.
• Different Offenses: Petitioner argued that the second offense charged is not the same as the first, nor an attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, nor an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first.
• Lack of Termination: Petitioner argued that Criminal Case No. 1028-N is not yet terminated.

• Dismissal as Acquittal: Private respondent maintained that although the dismissal was at the instance and with the consent of the accused, it was in reality an acquittal by reason of the prosecution's failure to prove guilt, thus barring another prosecution for the same offense.
• Speedy Trial — Lagunilla Doctrine: Respondent Judge relied on Lagunilla vs. Reyes, where dismissal for apparent lack of interest of the complainant to prosecute, predicated on the accused's right to speedy trial, was held equivalent to an acquittal that became final immediately and could no longer be recalled.

• Bar by Prior Dismissal With Consent: Whether an order of dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused after arraignment for failure of the prosecution to appear on the first day of hearing bars another prosecution for the same offense.
• Speedy Trial Violation: Whether the prosecution's single failure to appear at the first hearing violates the accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial so as to render the dismissal equivalent to an acquittal.

• Bar by Prior Dismissal With Consent: No. The dismissal, made with the express consent of the accused and not predicated on insufficiency of evidence or denial of speedy trial, does not bar another prosecution for the same offense.
• Speedy Trial Violation: No. A single failure to appear at the first hearing, remediable by postponement, does not constitute unjustified delay or a long unexplained lapse violative of speedy trial.

• Bar by Prior Dismissal With Consent: Legal jeopardy attaches only upon valid indictment before a competent court, after arraignment and valid plea, when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case dismissed without express consent. To invoke double jeopardy, first jeopardy must have attached, been validly terminated, and the second jeopardy must be for the same offense. While dismissals at the accused's instance for repeated prosecution unpreparedness were treated as acquittals predicated on speedy trial, the present dismissal followed only one non-appearance. Since the dismissal was expressly consented to and fell under neither recognized exception, it was not a bar.
• Speedy Trial Violation: The more prudent course was postponement to give the prosecution another day in court, not dismissal, there being no denial of speedy trial from a mere first-setting non-appearance. The right to speedy trial is violated only when unjustified postponements are secured or, without good cause, a long period elapses without trial. The trial court's duty as guardian of both the accused's and the public's rights, including offended parties who actively participate, required balancing speedy trial against prosecutorial due process rather than jeopardizing the public interest for light cause.

• Double jeopardy — requisites — Three requisites must concur: (a) first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (b) first jeopardy was validly terminated; and (c) second jeopardy is for the same offense as the first. Applied to test whether dismissal of Criminal Case No. 1028-N barred Criminal Case No. 1421, with termination-without-consent found lacking.
• Attachment of legal jeopardy — Jeopardy attaches only upon (a) valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) valid plea entered, and (e) acquittal, conviction, or dismissal or other termination without express consent of the accused. Applied to frame why express consent generally prevents jeopardy from terminating in the accused's favor.
• Dismissal with consent as acquittal — two exceptions — Dismissal with the express consent of the accused or on his motion bars reprosecution only if predicated on either insufficiency of the evidence or denial of the right to a speedy trial, in which cases the dismissal has the effect of an acquittal. Applied to hold the January 19, 1983 dismissal, based on a single non-appearance, outside both exceptions and therefore no bar.
• Right to speedy trial — violation standard — Violation occurs when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured, or when without good cause or justifiable motive a long period elapses without trial. Applied to find no violation where the fiscal and witness missed only the first hearing and postponement would have sufficed.
• Trial court as guardian of accused and public rights — The court must not unduly force trial nor for light cause jeopardize public rights, with offended parties equally entitled to protection. Applied to fault the inferior court for dismissing rather than resetting the hearing.

• "Can an order of dismissal of a criminal case upon motion of the accused after arraignment for the failure of the prosecution to appear on the first day of hearing be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense?" — Frames the sole controlling question of whether the first dismissal triggers double jeopardy.
• "The right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without his case being tried." — States the canonical test used to find no speedy-trial violation on a single first-hearing absence.
• "Double jeopardy will apply even if the dismissal is made with the express consent of the accused, or upon his own motion, only if it is predicated on either of two grounds, i.e., insufficiency of the evidence or denial of the right to a speedy trial." — Articulates the narrow exceptions under which a consented dismissal operates as an acquittal.
• "The court a quo should not have dismissed the case and should have instead reset the case to another date to give the prosecution another day in court." — Expresses the required balancing of speedy trial against prosecutorial due process.

• People vs. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166 (1985) — Cited as authority for the three requisites of double jeopardy and the elements for attachment of legal jeopardy.
• Lagunilla vs. Reyes, 1 SCRA 1364 (1961) — Invoked by respondent Judge for the proposition that dismissal for lack of interest to prosecute, predicated on speedy trial, is equivalent to acquittal; distinguished on its facts from a single first-hearing absence.
• Esmena vs. Pogoy, 102 SCRA 861 (1981); Salcedo vs. Mendoza, 88 SCRA 811 (1979); People vs. Cloribel, 11 SCRA 805 (1964); People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714 (1954); People vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 722 (1949) — Cited as the line holding certain dismissals on accused's motion equivalent to acquittal; distinguished because those cases involved two or more prosecution postponements and genuine speedy-trial predicates.
• People vs. Pablo, 98 SCRA 289 (1980) — Followed for the principle that the court is guardian of both accused's and people's rights and should not for light cause jeopardize the public interest.
• People vs. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 (1968) — Cited to support that a dismissal with express consent not based on insufficiency or speedy-trial denial does not bar another prosecution.
• Flores vs. People, 61 SCRA 331 (1974); Kalaw vs. Apostol and Alcazar, 64 Phil. 852 (1937) — Cited for the standard on when the right to speedy trial is deemed violated.

• Section 9, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without express consent of defendant by a competent court upon valid charge after plea bars another prosecution for the same offense, attempt or frustration, or included offenses; applied as the textual basis for requiring termination without express consent.
• Section 22, Article IV, 1973 Constitution (now Section 21, Article III, 1987 Constitution) — Guarantees against double jeopardy; invoked by petitioner as waived by express consent to dismissal and construed to permit reprosecution except for insufficiency or speedy-trial-based dismissals.

Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.