People vs. De la Torre

A woman may be held liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape when a man is charged together with her, provided her participation is sufficiently proven; and each separate charge of rape must be independently proven beyond reasonable doubt, such that a complainant's generalized assertion that subsequent rapes occurred "in the same manner" as the first is inadequate to sustain conviction for those subsequent charges.

Appellant Fe de la Torre employed Baby Jane Dagot, then sixteen years old and barely finished with the second grade of elementary schooling, as a housemaid in July 1992 in Langogan, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a week, Fe brought Baby Jane to New Buncag, Puerto Princesa City, and in September 1992 they transferred to Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan, where Baby Jane first met Fe's husband, appellant Butchoy de la Torre. Baby Jane's father, Rafael Dagot, was employed by Fe as a capataz in her rattan business. The appellants claimed Rafael owed them ₱11,500 and suggested the rape charges were fabricated to evade repayment.

Appellant Fe de la Torre employed Baby Jane Dagot as a housemaid in July 1992 in Langogan, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Baby Jane was then only sixteen years old and had barely finished the second grade of elementary schooling. After a week's stay in Langogan, Fe brought Baby Jane to New Buncag, Puerto Princesa City. In September 1992, they transferred to Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan, where Baby Jane first met Fe's husband, appellant Butchoy de la Torre.

As recounted by Baby Jane, the initial rape occurred in the first week of September 1992. She could not remember the exact date, but on that night, as on previous nights, Baby Jane and the appellant-spouses were asleep on the floor of the same bedroom. At around midnight, Fe woke Baby Jane and Butchoy, holding a lighted kerosene lamp and a scythe. Fe ordered Butchoy to transfer and lie beside Baby Jane. When Butchoy did not comply, Fe herself transferred so that Baby Jane was between her and Butchoy. Fe put down the scythe and the lamp, removed Butchoy's clothes, and then Baby Jane's. Baby Jane objected and cried but could not resist, as she was afraid of Fe and the scythe. Fe then ordered Butchoy to have sex with Baby Jane. Butchoy placed himself on top of Baby Jane, inserted his penis into her vagina, and performed a push-and-pull motion. Baby Jane felt pain. All the while, Fe stood beside them holding the lamp and the scythe. After the intercourse, Butchoy kissed Baby Jane on the neck and fondled her breasts. When Butchoy finished, he threw her clothes to her and got dressed. Baby Jane immediately put on her clothes and wanted to leave the room, but Fe prevented her. The following morning, Baby Jane saw blood on her panty.

The rape was repeated once a week from the second week of September 1992 through the fourth week of October 1992. Baby Jane had her menarche in November 1992 and was spared from the appellants' abuse that month. However, she was again raped in the second week of December 1992, which was the last incident. Baby Jane testified that the subsequent rapes were carried out in the same manner as the first. She felt pain during the first and second rapes but did not feel pain in the succeeding incidents. In December 1992, Fe brought Baby Jane with her to Langogan. When Fe went out to check on her rattan business, Baby Jane was left alone and took the opportunity to slip out and go to her godmother Lucita Talamisan, the barangay captain of Langogan, to whom she narrated her ordeal. While Baby Jane was at the barangay captain's home, Fe arrived and told Baby Jane not to report the matter, threatening to twist the facts and claim she caught Baby Jane and her husband in the act. Baby Jane thereafter proceeded to her parents' home and related the abuse. Her father brought her to the police station in San Rafael, Puerto Princesa, and she underwent a medical examination in February 1993 at the Provincial Health Office of Palawan, conducted by Dr. Joselito Vicente. The Medico-Legal Certificate revealed healed hymenal lacerations at the 2:00, 4:00, and 10:00 o'clock positions and a vaginal vault admitting one finger with ease. Dr. Marideth de Leon, Assistant Provincial Health Officer, testified that the healed lacerations indicated sexual intercourse possibly two or three weeks before the examination, though she could not determine when the first intercourse occurred.

The appellant-spouses denied the allegations. They claimed that from September to October 1992, neither they nor Baby Jane were in Tumarbong but in Puerto Princesa, and that they stayed in Tumarbong for less than a month. Fe explained they had to leave for Puerto Princesa because her daughter-in-law gave birth in October 1992. In Tumarbong, they claimed Baby Jane and the appellants slept in separate rooms divided by a sawali wall. The appellants professed no quarrel with Baby Jane but suggested the charges were instigated by Baby Jane's father, Rafael Dagot, who was employed by Fe as a capataz in her rattan business. Fe alleged she caught Rafael stealing rattan and selling it without her consent, and that Rafael also owed them ₱11,500 borrowed in May 1991. The appellants implied Rafael filed the rape complaints to escape payment of his debt. They also insisted Baby Jane was already married to one Eddie Tabi, explaining why she was no longer a virgin, but their witness, Gloria Mijares, testified only that Eddie Tabi had proposed marriage to Baby Jane, which she refused—a statement that was also hearsay.

• Credibility of Complainant's Testimony: Whether the complainant's testimony regarding the rape incidents, given the unusual manner of commission involving the participation of the wife, is credible and sufficient to sustain conviction.
• Liability of a Woman for Rape: Whether a woman may be held liable as a principal in the crime of rape committed together with a man.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt for Each Charge: Whether each separate charge of rape must be independently proven beyond reasonable doubt, and whether the complainant's generalized testimony that subsequent rapes occurred "in the same manner" as the first is sufficient to sustain conviction for all nine charges.

• Credibility of Complainant's Testimony: Yes. The complainant's testimony was straightforward, consistent, and credible, and the trial court's assessment of witness credibility was accorded the greatest weight absent any overlooked fact or circumstance of substance.
• Liability of a Woman for Rape: Yes. A woman may be held liable as a principal by indispensable cooperation in rape when a man is charged together with her, pursuant to Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt for Each Charge: No, not for all nine charges. Only the first rape charge was proven beyond reasonable doubt; the complainant's generalized assertion that subsequent rapes occurred "in the same manner" was insufficient to establish guilt to a moral certainty for the remaining eight charges.

• Credibility of Complainant's Testimony: The test for determining the value of a witness's testimony is whether it conforms with knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind. The appellants pointed to the unusual manner of commission—a wife directing her husband to rape their maid—to discredit the complainant, but failed to identify any specific inconsistency or contradiction in her testimony. Baby Jane's testimony was straightforward and simple, positively identifying the appellants and clearly narrating the circumstances of her defloration. She never wavered even under intense cross-examination. The trial court noted that Baby Jane was young, unlettered, and unsophisticated, making her incapable of fabricating such a shocking tale of sexual perversity. No ill motive was imputed to her; the appellants themselves admitted they had no quarrel with her. The claim that her father instigated the charges to evade a debt was rejected as unnatural—a father would not subject his daughter to the indignities of a rape trial merely to escape payment. The Court accorded the greatest weight to the trial court's findings on witness credibility, as the trial court is in the unique position to observe the witnesses testify, and no overlooked fact or circumstance of substance was shown to warrant disturbance of those findings.

• Liability of a Woman for Rape: Under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be held liable as a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. This applies in a charge of rape against a woman, provided a man is charged together with her. The Court cited People vs. Villamala, where a wife was convicted as a principal by direct participation for pinning the victim to the floor while her husband raped her, and People vs. Saba, where a wife who was a reputed healer ordered a fourteen-year-old epileptic victim to lie down, pinned the victim's hands, and covered her mouth while her husband raped her. These cases demonstrate not only the possibility but the reality of rape committed by a woman together with a man. A common thread in these cases is the close relationship between the parties and the attendant conducive environment—the victim and the felons were familiar with each other, with a bond of trust between them. The same kindred relationship and suitable setting were present in this case, as Baby Jane was the appellants' housemaid living under their roof. The appellants' argument that the prosecution failed to present evidence of aberrant sexual behavior on their part was rejected, as the sexual habits of the appellant-spouses do not constitute an essential element of rape; the prosecution need only prove carnal knowledge of the complainant and that it was done against her will.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt for Each Charge: Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime, and each must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is required to establish the elements of rape for each charge by the necessary quantum of proof. Baby Jane's testimony on the first rape charge was explicit, detailing the participation of each appellant and clearly illustrating all the elements of rape. However, her simple assertion that the subsequent rapes occurred in exactly the same manner as the first was grossly insufficient to establish the appellants' guilt to a degree of moral certainty for the eight other charges. Her testimony was too general and failed to focus on material details as to how each subsequent act was committed. Her cross-examination did not add anything to support the accusations of subsequent rape. Accordingly, only the rape alleged to have been committed in the first week of September 1992 was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The use of a bladed weapon, alleged in the Amended Complaint and sufficiently proven, qualified the rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Principal by Indispensable Cooperation in Rape — Under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, a person may be held liable as a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. In a charge of rape against a woman, a woman may be convicted as a principal provided a man is charged together with her. The Court applied this doctrine to hold Fe de la Torre liable as a principal for her active role in orchestrating the rape—holding a scythe and lamp, removing the clothes of both Baby Jane and Butchoy, and ordering Butchoy to have sexual intercourse with the victim.

• Each Rape Charge Must Be Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt — Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime requiring independent proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution must establish the elements of rape for each charge by the necessary quantum of proof. A complainant's generalized assertion that subsequent rapes occurred "in the same manner" as the first, without detailing material circumstances of each subsequent act, is insufficient to sustain conviction for those subsequent charges. The Court applied this doctrine to acquit the appellants of eight of the nine rape charges, sustaining conviction only for the first.

• Trial Court's Assessment of Witness Credibility — The greatest weight is accorded to the findings and conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses and their testimony, owing to the court's unique position to see, hear, and observe the witnesses testify. Unless it is shown that the court overlooked or misunderstood facts or circumstances of weight and substance affecting the outcome, or that its findings are unsupported by the evidence on record, its determination is left undisturbed. The Court found no reason to overturn this principle, as the appellants failed to point to any inconsistency in the complainant's testimony.

• Damages in Rape Cases — Civil indemnity of ₱50,000.00 and moral damages of ₱50,000.00 are automatically granted once the fact of rape has been established. Exemplary damages are awarded under Article 2230 of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. Since the rape was qualified by the use of a deadly weapon, exemplary damages of ₱25,000.00 were awarded.

• "Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime; hence, each of the eight other rape charges should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is required to establish, by the necessary quantum of proof, the elements of rape for each charge." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for the acquittal on eight of the nine charges, articulating the principle that each rape charge requires independent proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• "Her simple assertion that the subsequent rapes occurred in exactly the same manner as in previous incidents is clearly inadequate and grossly insufficient to establish to a degree of moral certainty the guilt of the appellants insofar as the eight rape charges are concerned." — This passage defines the insufficiency standard for generalized testimony in multiple-charge rape cases, explaining why the complainant's testimony failed to meet the burden for the subsequent charges.

• "Under the Revised Penal Code, however, an accused may be considered a principal by direct participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. This is true in a charge of rape against a woman, provided of course a man is charged together with her." — This passage articulates the doctrinal basis for holding a woman liable as a principal in rape, grounding the ruling in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Villamala, 78 SCRA 145 (1977) — Controlling precedent followed. The Court found a husband and wife guilty of rape where the wife pinned the victim to the floor while the husband consummated the offense. Used to demonstrate the possibility and reality of rape committed by a woman together with a man, and to identify the common thread of close relationship and conducive environment.
• People vs. Saba, 319 SCRA 36 (1999) — Controlling precedent followed. A married couple victimized a fourteen-year-old epileptic; the wife pinned the victim's hands and covered her mouth while the husband raped her. Cited alongside Villamala to establish that a woman can be a principal by direct participation in rape.
• People vs. Gazmen, 247 SCRA 414 (1995) — Cited for the test of determining the value of a witness's testimony: whether it is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind.
• People vs. Supnad, 362 SCRA 346 (2001) — Cited for the doctrine that each charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Escober, 281 SCRA 498 (1997) — Cited for the principle that it is unnatural for a parent to use offspring as an engine of malice, particularly in subjecting a daughter to the embarrassment and stigma of a rape charge.

• Article 17, Revised Penal Code — Defines principals by direct participation, by inducement, and by indispensable cooperation. Applied to hold Fe de la Torre liable as a principal for her indispensable cooperation in the rape, as she held a scythe and lamp, removed the clothes of both the victim and her husband, and ordered the sexual intercourse.
• Article 335, Revised Penal Code — Provides that whenever rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Applied to qualify the rape given the use of a scythe, a bladed weapon alleged in the Amended Complaint and sufficiently proven.
• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — Provides that in cases where the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Applied to impose reclusion perpetua in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Authorizes the award of exemplary damages when an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, attends the commission of a crime. Applied to award ₱25,000.00 in exemplary damages due to the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon.

Puno (Chairman), Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concurred.