People vs. De la Cruz

A plea of guilty does not qualify as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code unless it is spontaneous and made prior to the presentation of prosecution evidence; a plea entered after the prosecution has begun presenting evidence is not entitled to mitigating weight. Additionally, allegations of prior convictions that are insufficient to establish habitual delinquency may nevertheless constitute the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.

The appellant, Francisco de la Cruz, together with Fernando Legaspi and three unidentified persons, was charged with robbery under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code for assaulting one Yu Wan and taking P26 in cash. The information also alleged that de la Cruz was a habitual delinquent, having been previously convicted once of theft and twice of estafa, with the last conviction rendered on July 24, 1933. The case was prosecuted in the City of Manila.

On or about May 30, 1936, in the City of Manila, Francisco de la Cruz, Fernando Legaspi, and three other unidentified persons confederated together and, with intent to gain, attacked and assaulted one Yu Wan by striking him with fists on the face and other parts of the body. The blows inflicted physical injuries requiring medical attendance for more than one but less than nine days and prevented Yu Wan from engaging in his customary labor for the same period. After the assault, the group took and carried away P26 in cash belonging to Yu Wan without his consent.

The information further alleged that de la Cruz was a habitual delinquent under the Revised Penal Code, he having been previously convicted once of theft and twice of estafa by final judgments of competent courts, with the last conviction rendered on July 24, 1933. Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. During trial, however, after two prosecution witnesses had already testified, the accused withdrew their pleas of not guilty and substituted them with pleas of guilty.

The trial court sentenced de la Cruz to six months and one day of prision correccional and, considering him a habitual delinquent, imposed an additional penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor. Legaspi was sentenced to ten months of prision correccional. De la Cruz alone appealed from the sentence.

• Habitual Delinquency: Whether the allegations in the information are sufficient to consider the appellant a habitual delinquent under the Revised Penal Code.
• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance: Whether the appellant's plea of guilty, entered after two prosecution witnesses had testified, constitutes a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Habitual Delinquency: No. The allegations were insufficient to sustain habitual delinquency, but the facts alleged constituted the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance: No. The plea was not spontaneous and was not made prior to the presentation of prosecution evidence, failing the requisites of Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Habitual Delinquency: The Court found that the allegations in the information regarding the appellant's prior convictions—one for theft and two for estafa—were not sufficient to consider him a habitual delinquent, citing People vs. Venus. However, the same allegations sufficed to establish the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, as they showed prior final convictions for crimes embraced in the Revised Penal Code. The distinction mattered because habitual delinquency carries an additional penalty, while recidivism operates as an aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the principal penalty.

• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance: Article 13, subsection 7, of the Revised Penal Code requires that a plea of guilty be spontaneous and made prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to qualify as a mitigating circumstance. The Court explained that a confession of guilt mitigates the penalty because, as an act of repentance and respect for the law, it indicates a moral disposition in the accused favorable to his reform. These benefits, however, are not deserved by an accused who submits to the law only after the prosecution has presented some evidence, believing that conviction will ultimately result from that evidence. Because the appellant changed his plea only after two prosecution witnesses had testified, the plea lacked the spontaneity and timing required by the Code and could not be credited as mitigating.

• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance — Under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code, a plea of guilty is mitigating only if it is spontaneous and made prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution. The rationale is that a confession of guilt, though subsequent to the crime and alien to its commission, indicates repentance and respect for law—a moral disposition favorable to reform. An accused who pleads guilty only after the prosecution has begun presenting evidence, anticipating conviction on the strength of that evidence, does not deserve the mitigating benefit.

• Habitual Delinquency vs. Recidivism — Allegations of prior convictions that are insufficient to establish habitual delinquency may nevertheless constitute the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. Habitual delinquency triggers an additional penalty, whereas recidivism operates as an aggravating circumstance in fixing the principal penalty.

• "It is clear that these benefits are not deserved by the accused who submits to the law only after the presentation of some evidence for the prosecution, believing that in the end the trial will result in his conviction by virtue thereof." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for denying the mitigating effect of a plea of guilty entered after the prosecution has presented evidence, defining the spontaneity and timing requirements of Article 13(7).

• "The allegations of the information with respect to the appellant Francisco de la Cruz are not sufficient to consider him a habitual delinquent. However, the facts alleged in this respect constitute the aggravating circumstance of recidivism." — This establishes the distinction between habitual delinquency and recidivism as applied to the same set of prior-conviction allegations.

• People vs. Venus — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that the allegations in the information were insufficient to consider the appellant a habitual delinquent under the Revised Penal Code.

• Article 294, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, punishable by prision correccional to prision mayor in its medium period. Applied to classify the facts charged as robbery.
• Article 13(7), Revised Penal Code — Provides that a plea of guilty is a mitigating circumstance when spontaneous and made prior to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution. Applied to deny mitigation where the plea was entered after two prosecution witnesses had testified.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to impose an indeterminate penalty, with the minimum set at six months of arresto mayor and the maximum at six years, ten months, and one day of prision mayor, given one aggravating circumstance (recidivism) and no mitigating circumstance.

Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Concepcion, JJ., concurred.