People vs. De Jesus

The testimony of a co-conspirator may be given full probative weight when it is candid, straightforward, replete with details that by their nature could not have been contrived, and corroborated by independent evidence — and such testimony, together with corroborating proof, is sufficient to establish conspiracy and guilt beyond reasonable doubt, even over a later recantation by the same witness.

SPO3 Eugenio Ybasco was a Makati policeman who, after his tour of duty, worked on the sly for a money changer in the Ayala Center vicinity, delivering money by bicycle in a plastic bag every afternoon. He was a familiar figure among cigarette vendors in the area, including Yolanda dela Rapa. Eduardo de Jesus, a native of Apalit, Pampanga, was the brother-in-law of Crispin Del Rosario, a native of Los Baños, Laguna. Dante Manansala was a native of Calamba, Laguna. The three men agreed to stage a robbery targeting Ybasco, whom they believed was carrying US$250,000 for deposit. The planned heist was financed by Christopher Nash, a British national residing in the Philippines, who provided the getaway vehicle.

Sometime in February 1994, Dante Manansala, Eduardo de Jesus, and Crispin Del Rosario agreed to stage a robbery on the afternoon of March 7, 1994. On February 15, 1994, the appellant told Del Rosario of the planned robbery, informing him that the financier was Christopher Nash, a British national. The group knew that SPO3 Eugenio Ybasco, a Makati policeman who worked part-time as a money courier, was to deposit US$250,000 every afternoon for his employer, and they decided to waylay him on his way to the bank.

At 8:00 a.m. on March 7, 1994, upon Nash's instructions, Del Rosario and the appellant took a Toyota Corolla with Plate No. TAX 732 from Rolando Fajardo in Tanauan, Batangas. The car was owned by Nash. The appellant was armed with a caliber .45 handgun. Manansala, the appellant, and Del Rosario arrived at the Ayala Center parking lot near Rustan's Supermarket and Kimpura Restaurant. Manansala instructed Del Rosario to position himself as a lookout at the corner of the supermarket, and the appellant within the vicinity. Manansala waited for Ybasco near the money changer's office. Yolanda dela Rapa, a cigarette vendor, was about five arm's length away from the car.

At around 6:30 p.m., Ybasco emerged from his employer's office holding a plastic bag. Manansala contacted Del Rosario and told him that Ybasco was on his way out, reminding Del Rosario to be on the lookout for anyone who might come to Ybasco's aid while the appellant would take care of Ybasco. Manansala and the appellant confronted Ybasco, told him he had a warrant of arrest, handcuffed him, and dragged him to the car. During the scuffle, Roberto Acosta, a roving security guard, sped toward the scene on his motorbike and drew his .38 caliber revolver. Del Rosario grappled with Acosta, wrested the gun from him, and on Manansala's orders, shot Acosta in the mouth. The group boarded the car and sped toward EDSA. Acosta was brought to the Makati Medical Center and expired at about 10:10 p.m.

En route to Cabuyao, Laguna, Manansala discovered that Ybasco's bag contained only ₱5,000 instead of the expected US$250,000. Enraged, Manansala hit Ybasco on the nape and took the ₱5,000. At a sugar farm in Barangay Pulo, Cabuyao, the appellant and Manansala brought Ybasco out of the car. The appellant warned Ybasco not to follow them, claiming to be a member of the New People's Army. Del Rosario took ₱80 from Ybasco's wallet but returned ₱50 for fare. The appellant then suddenly shot Ybasco on the head. Ybasco fell to the ground with his hands still handcuffed. The group proceeded to Calamba, where Del Rosario alighted after receiving ₱100 from the appellant for his fare.

Police operatives from the Makati Police Station arrived at the Ayala Center to investigate. Dela Rapa gave a sworn statement identifying Del Rosario as Acosta's assailant. Juanito Mendoza, who had just stepped out of Rustan's, also gave a sworn statement describing the shooting and the getaway car's plate number. At 6:20 a.m. on March 8, 1994, a farmer found Ybasco's handcuffed cadaver in a sugar field in Cabuyao. The police traced the Toyota Corolla to Nash, who had instructed Fajardo to turn it over to Del Rosario and the appellant. Del Rosario was arrested on March 9, 1994 at his residence and tried to shoot it out with police using Acosta's service pistol, which was recovered from him. Manansala was arrested the same day. On March 12, 1994, Manansala executed an extrajudicial confession narrating the planning and execution of the crime. The appellant remained at large until his arrest on November 20, 1995 in Cabuyao, Laguna.

The appellant denied any involvement. He testified that on March 7, 1994, he was plying his tricycle route in Apalit, Pampanga, and that at around 5:00 p.m. he transported a passenger, Silvina Lumba, to and from the market, arriving at her house at about 6:30 p.m. Lumba corroborated this testimony. The appellant claimed that Del Rosario falsely implicated him out of a grudge stemming from a personal altercation and the appellant's separation from Del Rosario's sister, Cecille. He presented letters from Del Rosario dated October 8 and December 4, 1997, in which Del Rosario stated that the appellant was not involved and apologized for implicating him. The trial court, however, relied principally on the testimony of Del Rosario given on April 21, 1994 — which it treated as a judicial confession — corroborated by the testimony of Dela Rapa and other evidence on record, in convicting the appellant.

• Insufficiency of Evidence: The appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, asserting that while the killings of Acosta and Ybasco were established, the prosecution failed to prove that he divested Ybasco of ₱5,000 or that he was one of the malefactors.
• Inadmissibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony: The appellant argued that absent proof of conspiracy, Del Rosario's judicial confession was admissible only against the confessant and not against him. He further asserted that Del Rosario was a "polluted source" as a co-conspirator, that Del Rosario's testimony was inconsistent (Del Rosario himself stated that Manansala was Ybasco's assailant and later claimed no robbery took place), and that Manansala's extrajudicial confession was hearsay because Manansala died before he could be cross-examined.
• Motive to Falsely Implicate: The appellant maintained that Del Rosario implicated him out of a personal grudge arising from their quarrels and the appellant's separation from Cecille, Del Rosario's sister. He pointed to Del Rosario's letters as proof of false implication and argued those letters were not hearsay.
• Credible Alibi and Denial: The appellant argued that his alibi — that he was driving his tricycle in Pampanga at the time of the crime — was credible and corroborated by Silvina Lumba, and that the trial court erred in outrightly disregarding it.
• Treachery Not Proven: The appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove that he shot the victim, and that even if he did, it failed to prove that he adopted a particular means or method to ensure the killing without risk to himself.
• No Robbery Committed: The appellant argued that no robbery actually took place, relying on Del Rosario's later testimony that no money was found in Ybasco's possession.
• Presumption of Innocence: The appellant asserted that the prosecution's evidence failed to overcome the constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence.

• Treachery Attendant: The Office of the Solicitor General contended that treachery was attendant because when Ybasco was shot, he was handcuffed and unable to defend himself.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony: Whether Del Rosario's judicial confession was admissible against the appellant and sufficient to establish conspiracy.
• Credibility of Alibi and Denial: Whether the appellant's defense of alibi and denial should prevail over the prosecution's evidence.
• Commission of Robbery: Whether the crime of robbery with homicide was committed despite the appellant's claim that no robbery took place.
• Treachery as Aggravating Circumstance: Whether treachery was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant conspired with Del Rosario and Manansala to rob Ybasco and that he was a principal by direct participation.
• Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony: Yes. Del Rosario's April 21, 1994 testimony was admissible and given full probative weight because it was candid, replete with details that could not have been contrived, and corroborated by independent evidence.
• Credibility of Alibi and Denial: No. The defenses of alibi and denial were intrinsically weak, easy to concoct, and belied by the appellant's flight from justice.
• Commission of Robbery: Yes. The asportation of ₱5,030 from Ybasco was established through Del Rosario's April 21, 1994 testimony, which the trial court and the Supreme Court found to represent the truth over his later recantation.
• Treachery as Aggravating Circumstance: Yes. Treachery was attendant because Ybasco was shot while handcuffed and unable to defend himself.
• Imposition of Death Penalty: Yes. With the aggravating circumstance of treachery and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty of death was properly imposed under Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The prosecution established all elements of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code: (1) taking of personal property with violence against persons; (2) the property belonged to another; (3) the taking was animo lucrandi; and (4) homicide was committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery. The intent to rob preceded the taking of life, as the group planned the robbery in February 1994 and executed it on March 7, 1994. The homicide of both Acosta and Ybasco was committed on the occasion of the robbery, integrating all felonies into the single and indivisible crime of robbery with homicide. The prosecution was not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen; the fact of asportation established beyond reasonable doubt sufficed for conviction even if the property was not presented in court.

• Admissibility of Co-Conspirator Testimony: The Court applied the exception to the general rule that a co-conspirator's testimony must be viewed with caution. Under People vs. Sia, the testimony of a co-conspirator may be given full probative weight when it is sincere, given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. Del Rosario's April 21, 1994 testimony met this standard: it was detailed, logical, positive, and consistent even under clarificatory questions from the trial court. It was given with the assistance of counsel. When asked on May 20, 1997 to affirm and confirm the truth of his earlier answers, Del Rosario unequivocally did so and denied being coerced. His later recantation — claiming his mind was confused and that no robbery took place — was rejected as a volte face, inconsistent with his earlier detailed testimony and incredible given that he had pleaded guilty to robbery with homicide and accepted reclusion perpetua. Under People vs. Ubiña, it would be a dangerous rule to reject testimonies taken before courts simply because witnesses later change their minds. Del Rosario's letters to the appellant did not weaken his testimony; rather, the October 8, 1997 letter showed Del Rosario expecting financial help from the appellant, and the December 4, 1997 letter's claim of false implication was an afterthought to inveigle money. The appellant failed to prove any animosity between them, and Del Rosario categorically denied harboring a grudge on cross-examination.

• Credibility of Alibi and Denial: Denial and alibi are intrinsically weak defenses that cannot prevail over positive and straightforward identification. Alibi is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The appellant's defenses were further debilitated by his flight after learning he was wanted by police, his evasion of authorities from March 1994 until his arrest in November 1995, and his hiding in Cabuyao and Binangonan while his family remained in Pampanga. Flight is an indication of guilt.

• Commission of Robbery: The Court rejected the appellant's contention that no robbery took place. Del Rosario's April 21, 1994 testimony clearly established that Manansala took ₱5,000 from Ybasco's bag and that Del Rosario himself took ₱80 from Ybasco's wallet, returning ₱50 — totaling ₱5,030 taken from the victim. The trial court's preference for the April 21, 1994 testimony over the May 20, 1997 recantation was sustained, the earlier testimony being more detailed, logical, and consistent, and given with counsel's assistance.

• Treachery as Aggravating Circumstance: The evidence showed that the appellant and Manansala handcuffed Ybasco, transported him to a sugar field in Cabuyao, and the appellant shot him on the right cheek while he was still handcuffed and unable to defend himself. The identity of which conspirator actually shot Ybasco was immaterial, as conspiracy was established. The aggravating circumstance of the use of a vehicle was also attendant but could not be appreciated because the Information did not allege it as required by Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was applied retroactively as favorable to the appellant. The additional killing of Acosta was not an aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide, pursuant to People vs. Regala.

• Imposition of Death Penalty: The imposable penalty for robbery with homicide as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 is reclusion perpetua to death. With the aggravating circumstance of treachery and no mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed the death penalty under Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Robbery with Homicide as a Single and Indivisible Felony — All felonies committed by reason or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense, encompassing murder, parricide, and infanticide. It is immaterial that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, that two or more persons are killed, or that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers. Once homicide is committed by or on occasion of the robbery, the felony is robbery with homicide. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during, or after the robbery.

• Liability of Conspirators in Robbery with Homicide — All those who took part as principals in the robbery are liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the killing. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized. To exempt himself, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate himself from the conspiracy and prevent the commission of the felony.

• Exception to the Rule on Co-Conspirator Testimony — The testimony of a co-conspirator may be given full probative weight, even if uncorroborated, when it is shown to be sincere in itself, given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought. Corroboration by independent evidence further strengthens its probative value.

• Rejection of Recantations — It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies taken before courts of justice simply because witnesses later change their minds. Such a rule would make trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. Courts must utilize all expedients to determine which of contradictory testimonies represents the truth.

• Treachery in Robbery with Homicide — Treachery is appreciated as an aggravating circumstance when the victim is shot while handcuffed and unable to defend himself. The additional killing of a person other than the robbery victim is not a separate aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide.

• Alibi and Denial as Weak Defenses — Denial and alibi are intrinsically weak defenses, easy to concoct and difficult to disprove, and cannot prevail over positive and straightforward identification. Flight from justice is an indication of guilt and further debilitates these defenses.

• "All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word 'homicide' is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide." — This passage articulates the integrated nature of robbery with homicide as a single felony and the generic sense in which "homicide" is understood under Article 294.

• "By way of exception, the testimony of a co-conspirator may, even if uncorroborated, be sufficient as when it is shown to be sincere in itself, because given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner, and is full of details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought." — This is the canonical formulation of the exception allowing co-conspirator testimony to suffice for conviction, as quoted from People vs. Sia, and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on conspiracy and witness credibility.

• "It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solely taken before the courts of justice simply because witnesses who had given them later on change their minds for one reason or another. Such a rule would make some trials a mockery and place the investigation of truths at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for rejecting recantations and upholding the trial court's preference for the earlier, more detailed testimony over a later volte face.

• People vs. Sia, 370 SCRA 123 (2001) — Followed. Established the exception allowing co-conspirator testimony to be given full probative weight when sincere, straightforward, and replete with details that could not have been contrived. The Court quoted this case directly in applying the doctrine to Del Rosario's testimony.

• People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515 (1955) — Followed. Established the principle that courts should not reject testimonies taken before them simply because witnesses later change their minds, as this would make trials a mockery. Applied to reject Del Rosario's recantation of his April 21, 1994 testimony.

• People vs. Regala, 329 SCRA 707 (2000) — Followed as prevailing doctrine. Held that the additional killing is not an aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide. Applied to reject the aggravating circumstance of additional killing for the death of Acosta.

• People vs. Escote, Jr., 400 SCRA 603 (2003) — Followed. Held that treachery is aggravating in robbery with homicide. Applied to appreciate treachery as an aggravating circumstance.

• People vs. Delim, 396 SCRA 386 (2003) — Followed. Applied Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure retroactively, as favorable to the accused, to preclude appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of a vehicle because it was not alleged in the Information.

• People vs. Catubig, 363 SCRA 621 (2001) — Followed. Basis for awarding civil indemnity to the heirs of Acosta despite the killing being integrated into the single felony of robbery with homicide.

• Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659) — Defines and penalizes robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, imposing reclusion perpetua to death when homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery. The Court applied this provision to convict the appellant and impose the death penalty, treachery being present as an aggravating circumstance with no mitigating circumstance.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a felony and decide to commit it. The Court applied this provision to find that the appellant, Del Rosario, and Manansala conspired to rob Ybasco, each performing specific assigned tasks in furtherance of their common criminal objective.

• Article 63, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and an aggravating circumstance is present without any mitigating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. The Court applied this provision to impose the death penalty, the aggravating circumstance of treachery being present without any mitigating circumstance.

• Section 8, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires that aggravating circumstances be alleged in the Information. The Court applied this provision retroactively, as favorable to the appellant, to preclude appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of a vehicle because it was not alleged in the Information.

Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concurred. Davide, Jr. and Puno were on official leave.