People vs. De Jesus

Where the prosecution's sole eyewitness is discredited by material contradictions and impartial testimony placing him elsewhere, and the defense version is corroborated by a disinterested witness, conspiracy cannot be established and an accused who fired no shot must be acquitted on reasonable doubt; where the deceased was the unlawful aggressor but the means employed to repel the aggression were not reasonably necessary, only incomplete self-defense may be appreciated, reducing the penalty by one degree pursuant to Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.

Nilo de Jesus and Wilfredo Yalong were residents of Tatalon Estate, Quezon City, living in the same vicinity. The deceased, Feliciano de los Santos, was a neighbor whose son, Pat. Narciso de los Santos, was a member of the Quezon City police force. Hours before the shooting, de Jesus and Feliciano had an altercation during a drinking session, during which Feliciano punched de Jesus and de Jesus struck Feliciano with a bottle on the head. The case was tried before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, with the trial heard wholly by Judge Sergio Apostol (later appointed City Fiscal) and the decision rendered by Judge Jaime Lantin.

On the afternoon of May 21, 1978, Nilo de Jesus went to the house of Feliciano de los Santos in Tatalon Estate, Quezon City, looking for one Joe (Pitong) Napucao, who had invited him to join in work. Not finding Napucao, de Jesus was invited by Feliciano to join others having drinks. After Feliciano fell asleep drunk on a table, de Jesus tried to leave but was asked by one Lito to stay until Feliciano woke up. When de Jesus insisted on leaving, Lito got mad and tried to box him. Feliciano woke up and punched de Jesus, but the blow was evaded. They were pacified, and de Jesus went home.

After lunch, de Jesus went to a nearby store to buy cigarettes. Napucao arrived and asked what had happened between him and Feliciano. Wilfredo Yalong, who had come from a baptismal party and dropped by the store of Remy to buy cigarettes and pop-cola, also arrived. Minutes later, Feliciano, still drunk, arrived holding a bayonet, shouting at de Jesus. Napucao tried to pacify Feliciano, saying "pare that is enough. Nilo has done nothing wrong to you." Feliciano extricated himself from Napucao and lunged at de Jesus with the bayonet, but since de Jesus was protected by a piece of palo china wood, Feliciano instead turned and attacked Yalong. Yalong drew a gun from his waist and fired two shots at Feliciano, who ran and fell to the ground. De Jesus stayed behind, intending to help the fallen man whom he called "Tiyo Siano," but bystanders advised him to leave as he might be suspected. Yalong and Napucao had already left.

The prosecution's version, based on the testimony of lone eyewitness Fernando de los Santos, son of the deceased, differed materially. Fernando claimed he was awakened by a boy's shout that his father was quarreling with someone, proceeded to the scene, and saw Yalong aiming a gun at his father. He shouted for his father to run, but Yalong fired first, hitting the deceased on the right hand. Then, according to Fernando, de Jesus grabbed the gun from Yalong and fired the fatal shot into the victim's chest, causing him to fall. Fernando went home to look for his brother, Pat. Narciso de los Santos, and upon their return, his father had no pulse. A cousin, Baltazar de los Santos, brought the victim to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Dr. Nieto Salvador of the NBI conducted the autopsy and found two bullet wounds: one on the left side of the chest perforating the atrium of the heart, which was fatal, and the other on the right hand.

Both appellants went into hiding after the incident. De Jesus stayed with a friend in Tatalon for a week, then went to Isabela for four months, and was arrested by Philippine Constabulary soldiers in Pangasinan on October 14, 1978. Yalong hid at his uncle's house in Sampaloc, Manila for three weeks, then traveled to Quezon Province, Iloilo, and Zamboanga before returning to Manila, where he was arrested on February 22, 1979. After arrest, Yalong gave an extrajudicial statement implicating de Jesus, which he later retracted, claiming he impleaded de Jesus out of spite because the latter was pinning him down. The trial court credited Fernando's testimony, found conspiracy, and convicted both appellants of murder. However, Anita Bernales, an unbiased witness, corroborated the defense version and categorically declared that Fernando was not at the scene of the shooting.

• Denial of Participation (de Jesus): De Jesus denied any participation in the shooting, testifying that only Yalong fired the two shots and that Fernando de los Santos was not present at the scene when the shooting occurred.
• Self-Defense (Yalong): Yalong admitted shooting the deceased but claimed self-defense, alleging that the deceased, in a state of drunkenness, attacked him with a bayonet and he drew his gun and fired twice to defend himself.
• Recantation of Extra-Judicial Statement (Yalong): Yalong maintained that his extrajudicial statement implicating de Jesus was false, made only out of spite because de Jesus was pinning him down.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Through counsel, Yalong argued that the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Fernando de los Santos was "riddled with inherent incredibilities and unexplainable contradictions," citing nine specific inconsistencies including the delay of five months in giving a written statement, contradictions in distance from the scene, contradictions regarding whether he approached his father, and the absence of any police blotter entry.
• Justification for Flight: Both appellants explained their flight as motivated by fear of the deceased's son, Pat. Narciso de los Santos, a Quezon City policeman who had threatened to shoot them on sight.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Whether the testimony of the lone prosecution eyewitness, Fernando de los Santos, is credible and sufficient to sustain a conviction.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed between de Jesus and Yalong such that de Jesus may be held liable for the shooting.
• Self-Defense: Whether Yalong's claim of self-defense is valid, and whether complete or incomplete self-defense may be appreciated in his favor.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing, thereby qualifying the crime as murder.
• Liability of de Jesus: Whether de Jesus's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: No. The testimony of Fernando de los Santos was discredited by numerous material contradictions and the contrary testimony of an impartial witness, Anita Bernales, who placed him elsewhere at the time of the shooting.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not established, the participation of de Jesus in the shooting being unsupported by credible evidence, their presence at the store being purely coincidental, and only Yalong having been armed.
• Self-Defense: Incomplete self-defense only. Unlawful aggression was present on the part of the deceased, but the means employed by Yalong were not reasonably necessary, the deceased being drunk and his aim faulty.
• Treachery: No. The shooting was sudden and on the spur of the moment, without deliberate selection of means to insure execution without risk to the offender.
• Liability of de Jesus: No. De Jesus was acquitted on reasonable doubt, no credible evidence linking him to the shooting having been presented.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: The lone prosecution eyewitness, Fernando de los Santos, testified that de Jesus grabbed the gun from Yalong and fired the fatal shot. This testimony was found fabricated. Both appellants were one in stating that only Yalong fired the two shots, and Yalong's admission against interest was deemed highly reliable. The motive for the falsehood was manifest: de Jesus had quarreled with the deceased and struck him with a bottle earlier, making him the natural target for blame. The witness's credibility was further undermined by nine specific contradictions catalogued by the defense, including a five-month delay in giving a written statement despite his brother being a policeman, false claims that he gave a statement on the day of the incident, contradictions in his distance from the scene (fifteen meters in his written statement versus ten meters in court), contradictions regarding whether he approached his father before going home, and his claim that it took fifteen minutes for his father to slump after being shot in the chest without any effort to rush him to a hospital. Most decisively, Anita Bernales, an unbiased witness, corroborated the defense version and categorically declared that Fernando was not at the scene. The absence of a police blotter entry corroborating his claim that he identified the culprits immediately further discredited him.

• Conspiracy: With the discrediting of the lone eyewitness, the trial court's finding of conspiracy lost its main basis — the alleged participation of de Jesus in the shooting. The presence of both appellants at the store was undisputedly coincidental, not pre-arranged. There was no evidence that they knew the deceased would go to the store. Had there been a prior agreement to kill, they would not have chosen a public place where people come and go. The fact that both left together did not prove conspiracy since they lived in the same vicinity. Only Yalong was armed; had de Jesus been a co-conspirator, he would have armed himself as well. Yalong had no motive to join de Jesus in harming the deceased, having never seen the deceased that day except at the moment of the shooting. Their flight was satisfactorily explained by the threat of the deceased's son, a policeman, to shoot them on sight, and thus could not be taken as indicative of conspiracy or guilt.

• Self-Defense: The deceased was shown to be the unlawful aggressor, having attacked Yalong with a bayonet without provocation from Yalong. However, the reasonableness of the means employed could not be assessed in Yalong's favor. The deceased was drunk and therefore not as dangerous as if sober; his aim proved faulty and was easily evaded, as Yalong was not hit. At best, incomplete self-defense was granted, the necessity of the means used not appearing clearly reasonable. Under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty was reduced by one degree.

• Treachery: Treachery requires that the method, form, or means adopted in killing the victim be consciously and deliberately chosen to insure execution without risk to the offender from the defense the victim might make. Nothing in the records indicated that Yalong reflected on the means to insure the killing or diminish risk to himself. His decision to shoot was sudden, provoked by the deceased's unlawful aggression with a dagger. The killing was on the spur of the moment, with no time for deliberation. Had Yalong intended a treacherous attack, he could have shot from a farther and safer distance rather than at close range — at least five inches from muzzle to skin, as testified by Dr. Salvador. In the absence of treachery, the crime was homicide, not murder.

• Liability of de Jesus: De Jesus fired no shot at the deceased. His co-accused owned sole authorship of the shooting. His liability could only rest on conspiracy, which was not established beyond reasonable doubt. His uncontradicted testimony that he stayed after the shooting to help the fallen man, and left only upon advice of bystanders, further supported his innocence. On ground of reasonable doubt, his guilt was not duly established.

• Credibility of Lone Eyewitness — A conviction may rest on the testimony of a single eyewitness, but where that witness is motivated by bias (here, being the son of the deceased with a manifest motive to implicate the person who had quarreled with his father) and where the testimony is riddled with material contradictions on critical details, the testimony must be rejected. Corroboration by a disinterested, impartial witness of the defense version is decisive against a biased and contradicted lone eyewitness.

• Conspiracy Must Be Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt — Conspiracy must be established as clearly as the commission of the crime itself. Coincidental presence at the scene, leaving together by persons living in the same vicinity, and flight motivated by fear of retaliation from a relative of the victim in the police force do not establish conspiracy. The absence of a prior agreement, the lack of a common motive, and only one conspirator being armed all negate conspiracy.

• Incomplete Self-Defense (Article 69, Revised Penal Code) — Where unlawful aggression exists without provocation from the defender, but the means employed to repel the aggression are not reasonably necessary, only incomplete self-defense may be appreciated. The penalty shall be lowered by one degree. The reasonableness of the means is assessed in light of the circumstances: a drunk aggressor with faulty aim is less dangerous, making the use of a firearm against a bayonet attack not clearly reasonable.

• Treachery Requires Conscious and Deliberate Choice of Means — Treachery cannot be appreciated where the killing is sudden and on the spur of the moment, provoked by the victim's own unlawful aggression, with no time for the accused to deliberate on the mode of attack. The close range of the shooting (five inches) further negates treachery, as a treacherous attacker would have chosen a safer distance.

• "The fabricated nature of the testimony of state witness de los Santos becomes more evident in the light of the testimony of Dr. Salvador, that the muzzle of the gun could have been only five inches to the body of the deceased." — This passage links the physical evidence of close-range shooting to the discrediting of the prosecution witness, undermining the trial court's speculation that de Jesus was a better marksman who fired the fatal shot.

• "To constitute treachery, the method, form or means adopted in killing of the victim must be consciously and deliberately chosen to insure its execution without any risk to the offender arising from the defense which the victim might make." — This is the canonical formulation of treachery applied in the case, distinguishing a deliberate, premeditated killing from one provoked by sudden unlawful aggression.

• "At best, We can grant incomplete self-defense in his favor, the necessity of the means he used to repel the aggression not appearing to Us clearly reasonable." — This articulates the standard for incomplete self-defense: where unlawful aggression is present but the reasonableness of the means is not clearly established, the benefit of incomplete self-defense is granted, reducing the penalty by one degree under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Dealon, 99 SCRA 422 — Cited for the proposition that coincidental presence at the scene of the crime, not pre-arranged, does not establish conspiracy.
• People vs. Trinidad, 20 SCRA 549 — Cited for the proposition that the fact that accused left the scene together does not necessarily prove conspiracy where they live in the same vicinity.
• People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738 — Cited as authority for the definition of treachery: the method, form, or means adopted must be consciously and deliberately chosen to insure execution without risk to the offender from the victim's defense.
• People vs. Sotelo, 55 Phil. 396 — Cited among cases supporting the application of incomplete self-defense and the penalty reduction under Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Article 69, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when only one or some of the conditions of a justifying circumstance are present, the penalty shall be lowered by one or two degrees. Applied to Yalong, who established unlawful aggression by the deceased but failed to prove the reasonable necessity of the means employed, resulting in a penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for homicide.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery as a qualifying circumstance. The Court found its elements absent because the shooting was sudden and provoked by the deceased's aggression, with no conscious and deliberate choice of means.
• Article 29, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 6127 — Governs the credit for preventive imprisonment. Applied to Yalong, who was to be credited with the full time of preventive imprisonment upon showing compliance with disciplinary rules, otherwise four-fifths thereof.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, and Escolin, JJ., concurred.