People vs. De Guzman

When rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon and no aggravating or mitigating circumstance is proved, the lesser of two indivisible penalties — reclusion perpetua — is imposed; and the victim is entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00 without need of additional proof, in addition to civil indemnity.

Corazon Deliso y Reyes was the wife of Roberto Deliso, a lumberman who worked in Macad, Pasacao, Camarines Sur, and who returned home only after several days. Joel De Guzman y San Juan was the husband's cousin. At the time of the incident, the accused and the private complainant resided in Sitio San Vicente, Barangay Caranan, Pasacao, Camarines Sur. The charge was brought under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which then defined and penalized rape.

On August 2, 1995, at around eleven o'clock in the evening, Corazon Deliso y Reyes was sleeping beside her three-year-old son in her house in San Vicente, Caranan, Pasacao, Camarines Sur. Her husband, Roberto Deliso, was away working as a lumberman in Macad, Pasacao, and would return home only after several days. She was awakened when she felt someone on her left side. As she sat up in bed, the person covered her mouth. Turning to her right, she recognized him to be Joel De Guzman, her husband's cousin. She removed his hand from her mouth and attempted to shout, but he warned her, "Do not shout, Manay Cora," and poked a knife on her neck. She pleaded for mercy, telling him, "It's wrong. I respect you so you respect me too as I respect your mother." Appellant nonetheless told her to accede, saying he had long been looking for an outlet for his sexual urge. She noticed he was drunk and naked from the waist down.

Appellant pushed her down on the bed, laid on top of her, and removed her pajama pants and panty. He then inserted his organ into her vagina and made push and pull movements. Afterward, he stood up and warned her not to report the matter to anyone. She promised not to, and appellant left. Private complainant wrapped her son in a blanket and ran to the house of Herminia Pellejera, her husband's grandmother. Herminia testified that the complainant was crying when she arrived and told her what happened. Herminia initially grew angry that the complainant had not shouted, but the complainant explained she could not because appellant had a knife poked on her neck and had threatened to kill her and her child. Herminia went to the house of appellant's mother to look for him; he was not there, and she told his mother, "Do not bear any grudge against me for whatever may happen to Joel because he raped Corazon."

The following morning, the complainant, accompanied by her mother-in-law, reported the incident to the barangay tanod and then to the local police. Appellant was apprehended by the barangay tanod at Macad, Pasacao, and brought to the police station, then transferred to the custody of the Provincial Warden at Tinangis Penal Farm, Pili, Camarines Sur. The complainant submitted herself for physical and internal examination; Dr. Melchor Baesa, Municipal Health Officer of Pasacao, attested to the presence of spermatozoa in the victim's vaginal canal. She thereafter filed a complaint for rape against appellant.

For his defense, appellant admitted being at the complainant's residence on the date and time in question, arriving at around 10:30 P.M. and staying for about an hour. He claimed, however, that he and the complainant were lovers and had engaged in sexual intercourse many times during a six-month affair, known only to a certain Pancho Latuza. According to appellant, on the night in question the complainant told him she was ready to leave her husband to go with him, but he rebuffed her, informing her of his plan to go to Manila. The complainant allegedly threatened that if he left, she would charge him with rape. Appellant then left and went home. To corroborate his account, appellant presented Bong Barro, a fellow detainee at Tinangis Penal Farm, who testified that he knew of the illicit relationship and had witnessed the two holding hands at a corner of appellant's store a year earlier. Barro also stated that on August 2, 1995, at about 8:00 P.M., while watching television at appellant's place, appellant told him he was going to the complainant's house. The trial court found the prosecution's evidence strong and convincing and convicted appellant as charged.

• Consensual Sex: Appellant contended that his carnal knowledge of the complainant was with her consent, claiming they were lovers engaged in a six-month illicit affair.
• Lack of Resistance: Appellant argued that the complainant did not resist the alleged sexual assault, made no outcry, sustained no injuries, and had no part of her apparel torn.
• Contradictions in Testimony: Appellant pointed to alleged irreconcilable and unexplained contradictions in the complainant's testimony to cast doubt on her credibility.
• Fabrication: Appellant maintained that the rape charge was fabricated because he had refused to accede to the complainant's desire to leave her husband and go with him.

• Credibility of Victim: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the victim and in finding the accused guilty of rape beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Victim: No. The trial court did not err in crediting the victim's testimony; the accused's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, the defense of consensual sex being a fabrication unsupported by corroborating evidence, while the victim's testimony was clear, consistent, and credible despite minor inconsistencies.

• Credibility of Victim: The defense of consensual sex was rejected as a concoction born of desperation. While the Court has sustained such a defense in other cases, those cases involved corroborating evidence such as love notes, mementos, and witnesses attesting to a consensual relationship. Here, appellant's only corroboration was a fellow detainee, Bong Barro, who contradicted him on major details: appellant claimed the affair lasted six months, while Barro said he learned of it a year before the incident; appellant said he went to the complainant's house at 10:30 P.M., while Barro testified appellant left at 8:00 P.M. The witness Pancho Latuza, whom appellant claimed knew of the affair, did not testify. The complainant's immediate reporting to Herminia, the barangay tanod, and the police, and her submission to a physical and medical examination, all bolstered her credibility. Her crying during direct examination was taken as reinforcing the truthfulness of the charge. Minor inconsistencies in her testimony were treated as indicia of truth rather than badges of falsehood, erasing any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. No ill motive was shown to implicate the accused. The law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance when intimidation is employed; the complainant was cowed into silence by the knife poked on her neck and the threat to kill her and her child. The absence of external physical injuries does not negate rape, as such injuries are not an essential element; what is imperative is proof that force or intimidation was actually employed. Because the crime was committed with a deadly weapon, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death applied; with no aggravating or mitigating circumstance proved, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed. Moral damages of P50,000.00 were additionally awarded without need of further proof, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.

• Credibility of Rape Victim's Testimony — The testimony of a rape victim is given full faith and credit when she is clear and consistent in asserting that the accused threatened and raped her, and when no ill motive is shown to have actuated her to fabricate the charge. Minor inconsistencies do not affect credibility; on the contrary, they serve as indicia of truth, erasing any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. The Court applied this doctrine by sustaining the trial court's crediting of the complainant's account despite appellant's challenges to her credibility.

• No Requirement of Resistance Under Intimidation — The law does not impose a burden on a rape victim to prove resistance when the culprit employed intimidation. The victim's lack of stiff resistance cannot be taken against her when she was terrified by a weapon poked on her neck and threats to kill her and her child. Silence in the face of a shocking incident is not unnatural, as there is no standard form of behavior when confronted by an assailant.

• Absence of Physical Injuries Does Not Negate Rape — The absence of external signs of physical injuries does not prove that rape was not committed, for proof thereof is not an essential element of the crime. What is imperative is for the prosecution to prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by the accused upon his victim.

• Imposition of Indivisible Penalties — When the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances are proved, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. The Court applied this rule to impose reclusion perpetua, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death) prescribed for rape committed with a deadly weapon.

• Moral Damages in Rape Cases — A rape victim is entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00 without need of additional proof, in addition to civil indemnity, in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

• "The law does not impose a burden on the rape victim to prove resistance when the culprit employed intimidation, as in this case. Accordingly, private complainant's lack of stiff resistance cannot be taken against her." — This passage articulates the rule that resistance is not required where intimidation is employed, a principle frequently invoked in rape jurisprudence.

• "On the contrary, they should be taken as indicia of truth rather than badges of falsehood for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony." — This defines the doctrine that minor inconsistencies in a victim's testimony enhance rather than diminish credibility, a canonical formulation in Philippine rape jurisprudence.

• "The absence of external signs of physical injuries does not prove that rape was not committed, for proof thereof is not an essential element of the crime of rape." — This states the rule that physical injuries are not an element of rape, rebutting a common defense argument.

• People vs. Bayron, 313 SCRA 727 (1999) — Cited for the proposition that the defense of consensual sex has been sustained in rape cases where corroborating evidence such as love notes, mementos, and witnesses was presented; distinguished from the present case where no such corroboration existed.
• People vs. Joya, 227 SCRA 9 (1993) — Cited for the principle that the cry of a victim during testimony bolsters the credibility of the rape charge.
• People vs. Rabosa, 339 Phil. 339 (1997) — Cited for the doctrine that minor inconsistencies in a victim's testimony are indicia of truth rather than badges of falsehood.
• People vs. Gecomo, 254 SCRA 82 (1996) — Cited for the definition of rape as carnal knowledge of a woman using force or intimidation, such as threatening her with a knife.
• People vs. Silvano, 309 SCRA 362 (1999) — Cited for the principle that there is no standard form of behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident, and silence is not unnatural.
• People vs. Patriarca, G.R. No. 132748, November 24, 1999 — Cited for the rule that the absence of physical injuries does not negate rape.
• People vs. Alquizalas, 305 SCRA 367 (1999) — Cited to support the characterization of the knife used by appellant as a deadly weapon.
• People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998) — Cited for the award of moral damages of P50,000.00 without need of additional proof.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Defines and penalizes the crime of rape. Applied to convict the accused of rape committed by means of force and intimidation with the use of a deadly weapon, prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Amended the penalty for rape committed with a deadly weapon, prescribing reclusion perpetua to death. Applied to determine the proper penalty; with no aggravating or mitigating circumstance proved, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.